What this covers
This conversation brings Jim Higgins, Tom Digan, and Rick of Sorin Capital through the mechanics of commercial real estate credit and the firm's own history. They explain how CMBS pools are cut into tranches for investors with different duration and yield needs, and what a fulcrum security is: the bond at the line in the waterfall where losses begin. They also describe a two-phase CMBS life cycle, in which a ten-year loan pool trades on macro factors for about seven years and on credit for the last three.
The retail material is the most data-heavy stretch. E-commerce share has climbed to about 20% in apparel, electronics, and books and music, but has barely moved in grocery and autos, and was 8.3% of total sales at the end of 2016. Foot-traffic figures diverge by format. The speakers also cover retail's weight in CMBS vintages, which ran as high as 40% of some 2012 deals and is now close to nothing. Simon's tenant turnover and the Amazon–Whole Foods deal also come up. Rick's claim that the US is overmalled is flagged as contested, as are the foot-traffic and grocery arguments. On the equity side, they argue REITs should be valued on granular NAV, and that passive flows can push some REITs to nearly double their real estate value.
The last stretch turns to running the business. Higgins recounts a commingled fund with about 100 LPs that failed because investors wanted different things, which led to customized portfolios. He also describes a crisis-era loss from taking illiquidity on the hedge side of a trade, and a 2010 pension mandate structured as a fund of one. Post-crisis bank capital rules, he says, opened room for private firms to provide liquidity that dealers no longer can.
Sorin Capital argues that the market's 'retail is dying' sell-off lumps together very different retail real estate formats, so bottom-up specialists can profit by owning discounted grocery-anchored shopping centers and shorting mall exposure, and that beta-dominated CMBS and REIT investor bases let such mispricings persist.
- Retail weakness is concentrated in apparel-heavy malls, while grocery-anchored shopping centers have held foot traffic and were sold down by the same amount as malls
- Passive and index flows dominate liquid commercial real estate, so mispricing persists until specialists or fundamentals correct it
- Specialists earn alpha by underwriting individual properties, since CMBS and REIT values depend on asset-level recovery value and NAV
CMBS is far less structurally complex than residential securities, despite bearish retail-driven short talk.
- CMBS has far less structural complexity than residential mortgage securities, and the esoteric high-risk structures associated with the 2008 crisis were mostly a residential phenomenon.
“CMBS is pretty basic, pretty vanilla. There's not a lot of structural complexity in it.”
- One market participant has labeled CMBS the next big short, based largely on the negative retail thesis, and institutional investors keep asking about malls and CMBX.
“One market participant has gone so far as to label CMBS the next big short, based largely on the negative retail industry thesis.”
- Virtually every major institution has a commercial real estate allocation, but the allocation falls away sharply once you move to the liquid end of CMBS and REITs.
“most every institutional investor is exposed to commercial real estate... When you start getting into the liquid end of commercial real estate, CMBS and REITs, that drops off a lot.”
Managers should run customized portfolios and fee structures for investor profiles, since timing and flows matter.
- Rather than one fund with 100 LPs, a firm should run a few dozen LPs across customized portfolios grouped by similar profiles and tolerances, with different fee structures and risk parameters.
“This really goes to the one size does not fit all, and I think it really lends itself well, particularly to a niche sector like ours”
- Being early is often indistinguishable from being wrong, so managers must factor in flows and timing, since a correct thesis can fail to pay if investors do not stay the course.
“being early sometimes is indistinguishable from being wrong, but you've got to factor these things in”
- Sorin builds different products for clients with distinct tolerance and goal profiles, such as 10 to 12 percent uncorrelated returns with 15 percent drawdown tolerance, or 6 to 8 percent carry-driven returns with low volatility, and fees vary accordingly, rather than selling one product to all.
“they can withstand 15% drawdowns... We have another client, a very large Asian bank that is looking for six to 8% returns with very low price volatility”
A construction-lending career and a hiring anecdote show valuing hustle and trend over pedigree.
- Jim's career began in the late 1980s as a construction lender at a Chicago commercial bank, right after the S&L crisis, when commercial real estate was among the worst-performing markets.
“I started my career at a commercial bank in Chicago as a construction lender right out of the credit analyst training program.”
- A Notre Dame classmate who had poor grades but a strong upward trend in his academic record was hired after Jim's junior team member argued for him, illustrating that Sorin values hustle and trend over pedigree.
“I saw the upward trend, and... so I said all right, he looks like he hustles, let's give him a shot.”