What this covers
Mike works through Arthur J. Gallagher from the mechanics up. Broker revenue follows the premium pool, which he splits into exposure and rate through Exposure and Rate Decomposition, with rate moving on its own Soft-Hard Market Cycle. He explains why clients rarely leave: insurance is bought every year, brokers learn a client's operations, and Status Quo Bias holds until service or trust breaks. Organic growth has run about 4% to 6% in soft markets and around 10% now, and fell only about 2% in the financial crisis. Total revenue has risen every year since 1963 except 2020.
The middle of the episode covers market structure and acquisitions. The top end of brokerage consolidated decades ago, but the mid-market where Gallagher and Brown & Brown compete is still fragmented, with about 19,000 independents left. Gallagher does 30 to 50 tuck-ins a year, plus occasional larger deals like Willis Re. Mike notes that Private Equity buyers bid down returns on acquisition capital, and that clean-energy tax credits effectively lower the multiple Gallagher pays.
Mike also looks at margins and risks. EBITDAC margin is about 30%, up from about 25%, helped by offshoring to India and pandemic-era cost cuts. He distinguishes personal auto, where GEICO and Progressive pulled business away from brokers, from commercial lines, which stay intermediated. The more contested arguments are that no evidence of commercial disintermediation exists, that the Lindy Effect favors betting against it, and that EBITDAC is a fair profit measure. He also argues that Gallagher looked cheaper than peers only because of GAAP versus cash EPS screening.
Gallagher compounds because insurance brokerage is a capital-light, high-retention toll booth whose cash flow funds a repeatable tuck-in acquisition engine, and the market underprices that durability.
- Brokers earn fee and commission income without underwriting risk, and retention runs about 95%, so revenue is sticky and economically defensive
- A fragmented mid-market with roughly 19,000 independent brokers and agents supplies 30 to 50 tuck-in deals a year that integrate smoothly
- A culture rooted in producer rewards and customer service, plus long-run family stewardship, sustains the model across cycles
Brokers earn sticky fees as intermediaries that never bear underwriting risk.
- Gallagher is an insurance broker that intermediates between clients needing coverage and carriers like AIG or Chubb that take the risk onto their balance sheets, earning fee and commission income (about 10% of premium on average) without taking underwriting risk themselves.
“Gallagher is an insurance broker. That means that they act as an intermediary between somebody or a business that needs insurance and somebody who writes it”
- Broking companies have retention rates of about 95%, making the business very sticky and its revenue highly predictable.
“all of these companies have incredibly high retention rates. Retention rates are about 95%.”
- Personal auto insurance has seen substantial disintermediation toward direct carriers such as GEICO and Progressive, whereas commercial insurance has remained intermediated because its risks are complex, heterogeneous, and involve multiple carriers.
“in personal lines, you've seen substantial disintermediation and direct channels have gained share to the benefit of the likes of GEICO, Progressive”
- Because insurance must be bought at least annually and coverage must be maintained constantly, brokers build an ongoing relationship with deep knowledge of operations and trust, which makes status quo bias strong and clients switch only after a breach of trust or poor service.
“The client needs an active reason to change broker, like a breach of trust or poor client service”
- Client stickiness arises because brokerage is a relationship business where switching is unnecessary absent a negative event, and scale helps through commission-based economics, analytics investment, and the bargaining leverage of aggregating a very large premium pool with carriers.
“There really isn't a need for the customer to switch providers unless they do something that's actively negative.”
- For mid-market clients, brokers function like tax advisers because they must understand the client's risk profile, match coverage forms, know carriers and policy wording, and source the best rates across non-standardized policies, leaving clients unable to judge their own coverage gaps or rates.
“perhaps a tax adviser or CPA is a better analogy here to use at least for a mid-market broker.”
Tuck-in acquisitions at reasonable multiples create long-run value, beating buybacks even amid competition.
- Gallagher has done about 30 to 50 tuck-in acquisitions a year for a very long period, a consistent feature enabled by market structure, plus sporadic larger opportunistic deals such as Willis Re.
“they do about 30 to 50 a year. That number has grown a little bit over time, but has been a very, very consistent feature of the company”
- Integration of small tuck-in acquisitions seems fairly seamless in brokerage, which is why the strategy works, while larger opportunistic deals carry real integration risk, as seen when Marsh bought JLT.
“integration seems to be fairly seamless in this industry, especially when we're talking about these smaller tuck-in acquisitions.”
- Gallagher paid about 7x EBITDA for tuck-in deals five years ago, multiples have risen to about 10 to 11x amid competition from PE and other acquirers, but at a starting yield of about 7% to 8% with stable organic growth the deals still create value versus buying back stock.
“If we look just five years ago, Gallagher specifically was paying about 7x EBITDA for their tuck-in acquisitions. Those multiples have expanded to about the 10 or 11x level in recent times”
- Producers in these businesses earn roughly 20% to 30% of commissions, so a seller can rationally sell to Gallagher at a modest multiple and keep growing the business, since the producers' economics remain tied to commission income.
“producers or the client-facing people in these businesses are commissioned. So while Gallagher earns commissions, the producers tend to earn about 25% of those commissions”
- Despite many deals by Gallagher and peers, there are still about 19,000 independent brokers and agents left to acquire, so the M&A runway will take a very long time to exhaust.
“they're probably still about 19,000 of these independent brokers and agents left. So it will take a very, very long time for Gallagher to reach the end of their M&A runway.”
- Gallagher's historical clean energy and clean coal investments generated large tax credits that will last for many years and produce excess cash flow that effectively lowers the net multiple it pays on acquisitions.
“these kind of generate a bit of excess cash flow to help them effectively buy down the multiples on their acquisition targets.”
- Sellers who take an earnout to exit to PE are different from long-term owners who see the need for data and analytics investment; Gallagher prefers the latter, and producers keeping about 75% of commissions lets a seller sell to Gallagher and still grow the business after the sale.
“Gallagher tends to prefer sellers that are kind of in it for the long haul and essentially see the writing on the wall”
- Although incremental returns on organic growth are close to infinite, deploying capital into tuck-in acquisitions with a 7% to 8% starting yield and stable organic growth is a better use of capital than buying back stock, which some consolidated brokers do.
“if you compare the opportunity cost of either buying back stock, which is what some of the larger consolidated brokers do and doing these deals, I think that the starting yield of about 7% or 8%”
- The high retention, economic stability, and predictability of broker revenue make a roll-up strategy work, since acquired earnings are reliable, but returns on acquisition capital get bid down as more buyers and PE compete.
“I think the fact that retention rates are high, that it's very economically stable and predictable really help this sort of a strategy.”
- Competition for tuck-in deals is real, but only a limited number of players find this model economically sensible, which partly protects Gallagher's acquisition returns.
“while there is competition for these deals, there's a limited number of players in the market for whom this makes sense”
Broker revenue grows with a premium pool driven by exposure and rate cycles.
- The total global insurance industry writes about $7 trillion of premiums, split roughly half life insurance and half property and casualty, with about half of P&C being commercial insurance, the pool relevant to commercial brokers.
“The total insurance industry right now is probably about $7 trillion of premiums globally. About half of that is life insurance and half of that is P&C.”
- The high end of brokerage consolidated in the late 1990s and mid-2000s, while the mid-market where Gallagher and Brown and Brown compete remains dramatically fragmented, served by PE-backed roll-ups, private firms, and a long tail of independent agencies.
“The higher end of the market is more consolidated and went through its consolidation period really in the late '90s and a little bit in the mid-2000s, whereas the mid-market is dramatically more fragmented.”
- Marsh is the largest insurance broker at about $22 billion of group revenue (some unrelated consulting included), Aon is about $13 billion, and Gallagher is now third with about $8.5 billion of 2022 revenue, projected near $10 billion for 2023.
“Marsh is the biggest insurance broker in the world at the moment with a group revenue of about $22 billion”
- Within broking, Gallagher's revenue is about 45% retail, under 10% wholesale, slightly over 10% reinsurance, and about 20% employee benefits, with the broking business split roughly 65-35 between the U.S. and international operations, mostly U.K. and Australia and New Zealand.
“underneath broking, you have what's called retail that's about 45% broking, wholesale that's slightly less than 10% of broking, reinsurance is slightly more than 10%, and employee benefits is about 20%.”
- Broker revenue follows the premium pool, which equals exposure (the insured value of property and liabilities, loosely tethered to nominal GDP) times rate (the price carriers charge), and rate moves on its own cycle independent of exposure growth.
“you can think of that in terms of what's called exposure and rate. Exposure is essentially the value of the property and liabilities being insured”
- Gallagher's organic growth has been about 4% to 6% in flat to soft markets and significantly higher in hard markets, around 10% currently, and organic revenue fell only about 2% during the global financial crisis.
“In flat to soft markets, it's generally been about 4% to 6%. In hard markets, it's been significantly higher than that, so it's about 10% at the moment. And even during the GFC, it only declined about 2%.”
- Gallagher's total revenue, including acquisitions, has been positive every year since 1963 except for 2020 during the COVID period, and it has been a growth company across the 1970s through the 2010s.
“Their total revenue, so including M&A, has been positive every single year since 1963, except for 2020 during the COVID period.”
Brokers deserve a valuation premium over capital-intensive carriers, judged from first principles.
- Listed broking peers have outperformed the S&P and other broad indices over almost every time period, including 30, 20, and 10 years, with even stronger outperformance recently.
“they've outperformed the S&P and other broad indices over almost every time period, 30 years, 20 years, 10 years”
- EBITDAC, which adjusts EBITDA for changes in the valuation of acquisition earnouts, is a fair profit measure for capital-light brokers because amortization can be excluded unless the business is expected to decline, and the earnout adjustment nets to roughly zero over time.
“I think x'ing out the amortization is a fair way of doing things. Unless you think the business is going to flee”
- Brokers earned high-margin contingent commissions in the early-to-mid 2000s, which Spitzer's investigation of Marsh ended for a period, collapsing margins, and the lingering effect may have weighed on broker stocks.
“the industry did go through one challenging period from the early to mid-2000s when these brokers were earning contingent commissions”
- Insurance is seen as a technical topic covered mainly by specialist analysts, and brokers, being capital-light toll booths, deserve a large premium to capital-intensive carriers that trade at price-to-book and single-digit earnings multiples, a premium that is hard to judge at any point in time.
“Insurance is seen as a somewhat technical topic for a lot of generalists, even though these brokers are fairly simple businesses at a high level.”
- Stepping back to reason from first principles, rather than valuing companies on mechanical screens, revealed Gallagher's underappreciated value, and this approach is worth applying to investing and company analysis.
“just thinking from first principles and noticing some of these things, I think, was valuable.”
Brokerage has survived past technology shifts and resists new entrants, so disintermediation risk is low.
- The Lindy effect suggests that a business surviving about a century, as brokers have done, is likely to keep surviving, so the odds favor investors betting against future disintermediation.
“going back and looking at just how resilient this industry has been for a century means that the odds are perhaps on your side when betting against future disintermediation.”
- There is no evidence that commercial insurance is disintermediating, since wholesale brokers and the E&S market, which grew substantially over the past five to ten years partly due to new risks such as cyber, add intermediation layers rather than removing them.
“if anything, in the commercial space, the industry has only become more intermediated over time”
- Although the internet disintermediated many industries over the past 20 to 30 years, it has not meaningfully affected broking, which suggests the business has already been tested against major technology change and may be a reasonable bet against future disintermediation, though AI's effect is uncertain.
“It has disintermediated other businesses, but it really hasn't had an impact on the broking business.”
- In personal lines, direct channels have gained share from brokers and benefited players like GEICO and Progressive, while the U.S. personal market remains more intermediated than the U.K. market because of structural reasons that limited aggregators.
“in personal lines, you've seen substantial disintermediation and direct channels have gained share to the benefit of the likes of GEICO, Progressive”
- Commercial brokers should be compared to professional advisers such as a CPA, because they provide ongoing specialist advice on risk profile, coverage forms, carrier relationships, and policy wording, and clients need annual renewal and constant coverage, which builds trust and an ongoing relationship.
“perhaps a tax adviser or CPA is a better analogy here to use at least for a mid-market broker.”
- Gallagher has been an excellent business for nearly all of its history, surviving the Great Depression and growing through the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and recent decades, though detailed financials before its 1984 IPO appear only in the book The Gallagher Way.
“you can go back and look at some of the high-level numbers in a book that was written about the company called The Gallagher Way”
- A new entrant could not simply put up a shingle and replicate a broker, because relationships, carrier access, policy-wording expertise, and scale in premium aggregation and analytics take years to build.
“They need to understand the carriers, have relationships with carriers, have knowledge about things like policy wording”
Offshoring, cost declines, and organic growth are driving Gallagher's margin expansion.
- Gallagher earns interest on client funds held before premiums are paid out, with a lag relative to fed funds rate increases, and this income is now a small share of revenue but carries 100% incremental margin.
“Gallagher does earn interest income on funds which they hold for clients before they pay out premiums. And there's a little bit of a lag between when the fed funds rate goes up and when they experience that”
- Gallagher's EBITDAC margin is about 30%, up from about 25% five years ago, driven by offshoring back-office work to centers of excellence in India, temporary COVID-period cuts in travel and entertainment, and organic growth averaging around 10% in some periods versus about 5% the prior decade.
“That all translates to what they call an EBITDAC margin of about 30% currently, and that was sitting at about 25% five years ago.”
- Gallagher says it needs at least about 4% organic growth to achieve margin expansion, and it expects 50 to 75 basis points of margin expansion going forward, with recent expansion well above that due to offshoring, COVID-era cost declines, and roughly 10% organic growth.
“Gallagher talks about needing at least 4% organic growth in order to see some level of margin expansion, and they would expect about 50 to 75 basis points of margin expansion going forward.”
- Insurance pricing alternates between soft markets where rates decline, flat markets, and hard markets where rates rise, and this rate cycle operates independently of exposure growth.
“soft market referencing periods where rates are declining, a shallow or flat market and then a hard market where rate is rising”
- About 60% of Gallagher's revenue goes to staff compensation, with producers receiving roughly 20-30% of commission, making the largest cost line variable and tied to revenue.
“About 60% of the revenue that Gallagher generates is paid out as compensation to staff”
- Broker revenue comes from insurance premiums that are economically defensive and have grown over time despite insurance cycle undulations, so Gallagher's organic growth is tied to the cycle yet remains stable.
“the revenue of these companies is driven by insurance premiums, which tend to be very economically defensive and despite undulations in the insurance cycle, have grown over time”
Gallagher's family-led, sales-oriented culture has persisted and supports its competitive edge.
- Gallagher's edge rests on three things: durable favorable industry dynamics, the ability to deploy excess free cash flow into M&A that adds value over time, and a company culture that aligns closely with how it operates.
“I'd pin the secret sauce of Gallagher really down to three main things”
- Arthur Gallagher founded the firm in 1927 after becoming disillusioned as a top-performing salesman who was paid less than peers from higher social backgrounds, which led him to believe that sales and customer service drive the brokerage business.
“he was working at another broker and essentially became disillusioned when he was a top-performing salesman in that office, but somehow was getting paid less”
- Gallagher is organized into 27 niche practice groups, such as K-12 education and real estate and hospitality, which shows that specialized risk advice is required and that specialization is optimal for client service.
“Gallagher themselves set itself up into 27 niche practice groups, for example, one that serves K through 12 education”
- The Gallagher Way, written by Bob Gallagher in 1984 before the IPO, is poorly written and internally contradictory, but it captures a culture that is sales-oriented, customer-focused, outwardly competitive, and inwardly collaborative, and this has persisted for decades.
“they are pretty cumbersome, poorly written, kind of contradict each other at times. But I think what it really captures is the essence and spirit of this company”
- The Gallagher family has controlled the business for almost its entire history, with only three CEOs in nearly 100 years, and Pat Gallagher, a grandson of the founder, has served as CEO since 1996.
“It's pretty remarkable that they've only had three CEOs during that coming on 100 years of business history.”
Investors underappreciate brokers because of mechanical EPS screens and generalist analyst coverage.
- A business or industry can be structurally underappreciated for very long periods even when its large market capitalization means its key facts are widely known to market participants.
“It is possible for a business or even an industry to be structurally underappreciated for very, very long periods of time.”
- The current market is the hardest insurance market in about 20 years, and Gallagher has seen margins, organic growth, and valuation all expand, so earnings may be above trend with historically high valuation, a combination that preceded underperformance in the early 2000s, though Mike does not see it as a structural risk.
“right now, we're in the hardest insurance market for about 20 years. The last time things looked like this was in the early 2000s.”
- Gallagher looked cheaper than some peers early in the analysis because its valuation was screened on GAAP EPS while peers switched to cash EPS, which is economically meaningless and ignored Gallagher's superior organic growth, so investors valued the companies on mechanical rather than economic bases.
“they hadn't switched their accounting from GAAP EPS to what some of the brokers call a cash EPS. It's really meaningless in terms of the economic earnings of these companies”
- Sell-side coverage by generalist insurance analysts and the fact that carriers trade near book value with single-digit earnings multiples has led investors to underappreciate the premium a capital-light broker deserves relative to carriers.
“broking businesses would always trade at a significant premium to them even if they're undervalued”
- Even with large market caps, brokers can be structurally underappreciated for very long periods, and Gallagher looked cheaper than peers because of GAAP EPS while ignoring its superior organic growth.
“It is possible for a business or even an industry to be structurally underappreciated for very, very long periods of time.”
Regulatory scrutiny and conflict concerns look limited for Gallagher's fragmented mid-market business.
- Gallagher runs its wholesale broker RPS alongside its retail broker and has kept RPS a separate brand, disclosing that about 15% of RPS revenue comes from the retail parent, which Mike views as not disproportionate and evidence of independence.
“always disclose the portion of RPS' revenue that's coming from their retail broker, which is, I think, about 15%, so not disproportionate”
- Anti-competitive action is more likely to target large corporate brokers like Aon and Marsh, whose reinsurance broking is the most consolidated part of the market, while Gallagher's fragmented mid-market makes it an unlikely antitrust target, though Gallagher may hold around 85% share in some K-12 niches.
“anti-competitive action taken against these companies is probably more likely to affect the brokers that operate in large corporate broking”
- Insurance is a very slow-moving industry, so the main risks to these businesses are fairly obvious, and investors would probably see early trends or signs before any of them materialized in a surprising way.
“Insurance is a very, very slow-moving industry in terms of how it evolves and so I wouldn't expect one of these risks to be particularly surprising”
- The conversation mentions that the broker industry has been studied by the FCA and that fines for bribery have been small.
“There have been some fines for bribery in various instances, but these have tended to be small.”
- After Spitzer's investigation, contingent commissions were curtailed for a period and then returned with more disclosure, and the conflicts they create are no longer a major topic of debate.
“culminated in contingent commissions for the large brokers going away for a period of time, but making a return with some changes to disclosure”
Scale and internal collaboration let large brokers outcompete small broker-owners.
- Gallagher employees across offices collaborate on commission splits without head office involvement, as when a California real estate and hospitality leader helps a Minneapolis colleague close a deal, and scaling this to about 50,000 people requires that collaboration be part of core company DNA.
“Now if you think about how to scale something like that to 50,000 people, I think it really has to be something that's part of the core DNA of the company”
- Investment in data, analytics, and technology benefits larger brokers because small local broker-owners lack the capacity or will to fund these tools, which gives them a reason to sell to scaled platforms like Gallagher.
“technology is something that really benefits the larger brokers simply because these local broker/owners don't have the capacity or the will to invest”
- Companies may dismiss strong cultural DNA aligned with core competency as a cop-out answer, but over a very long period it adds substantial value, as Gallagher illustrates.
“having an incredibly strong cultural DNA that aligns with your core competency is really something that could be dismissed by some companies, but over a very long period of time is something that adds a lot of value”