What this covers

This is a May 2020 conversation in which Ali Hamed answers the host's questions about how private credit has behaved in the first weeks of the pandemic. It starts with mechanics. Defaults take 60 to 90 days to show up, because covenants test on cohorts or quarters and borrowing bases can be cured with cash. Short-duration assets like 60-day receivables had to be worked out first, since their maturities arrived before anyone could see how the pandemic would unfold. Hamed also explains why a senior lender holds control, and why junior lenders inherit the senior's problems under the Senior-Junior Control Asymmetry. He contrasts private credit with venture capital, where startups are always short on runway and valuations reset within months. Founders who reopened a round to dodge a down round ended up signaling weakness, an example of the Signaling Cost of Down Rounds.

The rest ranges across sectors, with some contested calls. In digital advertising, revenue is views times CPM, so a surge in views can mask collapsing prices, and fill rate is the real test. Programmatic exchanges serve as a real-time sentiment gauge, and Hamed says CPMs bottomed in late April. He argues gig workers who can switch platforms are better credit risks than stable employees, and that online buying habits formed during the shutdown will stick. He puts Amazon's third-party marketplace at roughly $150 billion a year. On consumer credit, he says duration of unemployment matters more than its peak. He cites used car prices falling about 11.8 percent, roughly twice the worst drop of the last financial crisis. He expects losses in hospitality and real estate but not a systemic event, and he predicts a bubble in assets that merely look safe.

Sharpest takeaway

Hamed argues that COVID produced uncertainty-driven freezing rather than distress, so private credit lenders should defend by raising quality and cutting advance rates rather than chasing yield, while digitally native, variable-cost businesses are now less risky than physical-economy borrowers.

  • Buyers are selling uncertainty at discounts, not distressed assets with a fixable problem, so the right response is to wait and de-risk rather than buy cheap
  • Lenders are solving uncertainty by lowering advance rates instead of raising yields, which limits losses even if forecasts are wrong
  • E-commerce, streaming, and creator ecosystems with variable costs and resilient demand are reclassified as lower risk than physical retail

The argument · threads11 threads · 68 claims
0.85

Lenders should tighten standards, reprice, and lend to higher-quality borrowers after the shock.

11 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Lenders should call every borrower who previously declined their loan because of price and ask whether they want financing now, provided they still view them as high-quality credit.

    “you should call every borrower that you've ever talked to who said no to your loan because of price”

  • Lenders who previously underwrote to a 2x loss coverage ratio, meaning losses must be twice the base case before income is lost, should now underwrite to around 10x coverage, and borrowers who do not need capital will not accept terms set at that conservatism.

    “you might genuinely have to underwrite this to a 10 times loss coverage”

  • Stem finances streaming revenues for musicians, and with canceled tours it is now working with artists it had not previously financed, reducing its risk by working with higher-quality counterparties.

    “Stem finances streaming revenues for musicians.”

  • Before the shock the firm tolerated concentration breaches when a portfolio company was financing higher-quality credit, because it did not want beta exposure to overvalued credit; now the firm wants stricter diversification and will not accept the same concentration risk.

    “Now, you aren't willing to take that same concentration risk”

  • Lenders who had been losing deals to JV investors paying 300 basis points too tight should now reprice and reacquire assets from partners whose capital is unstable, picking up coupons they always wanted.

    “at 300 basis points before where they ever should've”

  • When demand doubles, originators should not double loan volume; instead they should keep volume flat, raise pricing so fees absorb some losses, and lend to higher-quality borrowers that are now accessible.

    “If you have twice the level of demand, maybe don't make twice the amount of loans. Instead keep making the same amount of loans but just increase your pricing”

  • Assets that look safe because defaults did not rise during the pandemic will be overbought, creating a bubble in perceived quality while assets that were hit and may recover later are ignored for a time.

    “I bet you that's the first thing that all private credit investors are going to be chasing”

  • Early in the crisis venture capitalists publicly declared they were open for business and focused on long-term value, but the real constraint was that many startups had only months of runway and had to raise regardless of market conditions.

    “initially, all these venture capitalists went on Twitter and told everyone, 'Oh, we're open for business.'”

  • The firm used to be known for creative investing, but the market has come to it, so it is leaning away from creativity for at least the next few years and simply executing on existing opportunities.

    “we're leaning away from creativity for at least the next few years”

  • Before COVID, the firm's underwritten deals were being taken at prices about 300 basis points too tight by JV investors who did not normally do private credit, so the firm now plans to return to those borrowers and offer higher pricing.

    “some JV investor, who doesn't do a lot of private credit, would come in and just take the deal from us at 300 basis points before where they ever should've”

  • Operators who said they did not know the market and let bids set the price did best, while those who posted a price or posed as unaffected were damaged.

    “The operators who actually had the best time were the ones who said, 'We're not going to put a price on it.”

0.69

Digital and online borrowers and businesses are more resilient and less risky than conventional assumptions.

10 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Advertising is shifting from TV to platforms like Google, YouTube, and Instagram because they are cheaper, easier to measure, and offer higher ROI, so digital ad revenue holds up even as traditional media loses audiences.

    “ads are being pulled from TV and instead are going onto Google, for example, because Google's a cheaper way to do it, easier to measure, and has higher ROI.”

  • Gig workers who can shift between platforms such as Uber and Instacart when work dries up are less likely to become unemployed, so occupational fluidity makes them better credit risks than stable employees who cannot switch.

    “that fluidity of what your occupation can be might actually make you a better credit risk, not a worse credit risk”

  • Tech-enabled e-commerce businesses have more variable costs than physical retail and can adjust quickly, so they are now more resilient and less risky than physical retail, reversing the old view that new tech-enabled assets required a higher cost of capital.

    “these tech-enabled assets have more variable costs, so they're more dynamic in changing market environments, they're actually less risky than physical retail”

  • When an ad plays on a YouTube video, the creator receives about 55 percent of the revenue and YouTube keeps the rest, so creator-owned libraries generate cash flow that can be priced and financed.

    “It's 55% to the person who made it.”

  • Shopify merchants can now buy advertising at higher return on investment than before, because competitors have pulled back from ad spending, allowing them to take share from physical retail brands.

    “since advertising dollars have pulled back, it's actually a higher ROI for them than it's ever been”

  • Luxury brands will struggle even online because cutting prices would damage brand value, while perishable food categories will do sustainably well because consumers cannot hoard them the way they can hoard staples like corn.

    “you can't horde grapes, but you can horde corn”

  • Before the crisis a company growing 100 percent year over year could raise a round from any firm, one growing 80 to 100 percent could raise with effort, and anything below 80 percent was hard to finance.

    “If you were growing 100% year-over-year, you could do any size round from any firm.”

  • The YouTube creator economy has become a durable part of the American workforce, offering flexible income that can make creators less risky borrowers than conventional employees.

    “The YouTube economy was already quite large. It vows to become a permanent part of the American workforce.”

  • Ally's website makes it easy for borrowers to request deferment, which is part of why deferment rates are high but do not indicate defaults, since borrowers face little friction in asking for relief.

    “They're not making it hard, but it's definitely a black box.”

  • The online small business lending market roughly doubled after the shift, and because the firm had been one of few lenders there with several years of proprietary data, it now has a data advantage and found that the segment was less risky than others assumed.

    “the market just grew by like 100%, and we were almost one of the only lenders in that space to begin with”

0.52

The March dislocation favored skilled lenders, and the stress remains idiosyncratic rather than systemic.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Many funds were not structured to execute trades as quickly as opportunities appeared in March, so only those with particular fund structures or discretionary authority could act on the dislocation.

    “you really had to have a certain fund structure or a certain level of discretion to go make certain trades”

  • Lenders financing perishable produce benefited partly from skill, since they underwrote that people would keep eating produce and that ProducePay could redirect farmers' output from hospitality to retail and grocery, and partly from luck in the nature of the asset class.

    “ProducePay is really good at helping farmers redirect their produce to non-hospitality type buyers”

  • Capital flows that moved to safe assets in public markets will also move to perceived-safe private credit assets first, and because private transactions are illiquid the adjustment unfolds in slow motion rather than all at once.

    “everything that happens in private credit happens in slow motion because they're private transactions.”

  • Hospitality and real estate lenders are seeing revenue drops of around 90 percent that no model anticipated, so surprising firms will be blown up, but the event is idiosyncratic rather than systemic because lenders have capital and many market participants are ready to deploy it.

    “I certainly didn't have sales and revenues of hospitality going down 90% in any model I ever built.”

0.47

Pandemic-accelerated digital shifts have become permanent norms across commerce and advertising.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Programmatic ad exchanges function like a stock market for advertising, so CPM movements on them give real-time sentiment on advertiser spending, and CPMs bottomed in late April before recovering.

    “they're somewhat of a the stock market. You actually get real-time sentiment”

  • Small businesses selling through Amazon's third-party marketplace account for about two-thirds of e-commerce revenue on the platform, roughly 150 billion dollars a year, an economy that is widely underappreciated.

    “two-thirds of e-commerce revenue on Amazon is done by small businesses that sell through Amazon”

  • With sports broadcasts gone, advertisers such as Nike that need to reach sports fans are moving budget to Instagram, Snapchat, and creator accounts, and this shift is likely permanent because those channels are cheaper and higher ROI.

    “no one's watching ESPN or CBS or FOX Sports right now. So how do you go reach those sports audiences?”

  • Ideas that were once novel, such as YouTube taking share from cable, Instagram accounts being commercial, and Shopify building an economy, have become the norm, showing how quickly digital structural changes move from fringe to consensus.

    “I think that became less and less controversial, and now it's just the norm.”

  • Luxury brands cannot lower prices to compete online without devaluing the brand, which keeps them from adapting to e-commerce the way mass-market retail does.

    “they can't lower their prices even if they wanted to because it would devalue the brand quality”

  • The Shopify App Store and the services built around online merchants, such as staffing and warehouse management, are likely to be interesting investment areas, though the firm is not yet pursuing them because its existing pipeline is sufficient.

    “The Shopify App Store, I've always thought, would continue to be an interesting place to look for investment opportunities.”

  • Shifts such as e-commerce taking share from physical retail and Instagram accounts becoming commercial are not new, but the pandemic accelerated them, and they are now the norm and likely permanent.

    “It used to be a novel idea that YouTube was going to continue to take market share from traditional cable.”

0.41

Pandemic uncertainty was too wide to underwrite, so losses stayed hidden behind deferments.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • A fund making small business loans is a large bag of uncertainty because it is unclear whether PPP will help businesses, whether restaurants can survive, and whether default rates will be 10%, 30%, or 100%, leaving even senior tranches at under 50% advance trading at discounts.

    “Is it going to be 10%? Is it going to be 30%? Is it going to be 100%?”

  • Lenders froze for at least the first 30 days of COVID because no one had underwritten to a pandemic and no existing model remained useful, leaving variance in outcomes so wide that people no longer knew what safety meant.

    “everyone sort of froze for at least the first 30 days. The problem is, no one underwrote to a pandemic and no model matters anymore.”

  • In March 2020 sellers were not offloading troubled assets that could be bought cheaply and fixed for high yield; they were giving away bags of assets whose contents nobody understood, so the sale reflected uncertainty rather than distress.

    “people selling uncertainty. But it wasn't really distress.”

  • Deep subprime consumer books had not yet shown a meaningful increase in defaults because borrowers were laid off but not yet missing payments, staying home and spending less, or prioritizing other loans over rent after hearing about rent relief, so the lagged effect was still ahead.

    “the sub-prime consumer really hasn't seen a huge tick-up in defaults yet”

  • Ally Financial had about 75 percent of floorplan financings and about a quarter of consumer loans in deferment, but deferment does not mean default; it means the lender cannot see what is happening inside the book.

    “It doesn't mean that 25% of people have defaulted on Ally loans. It just means that you have no idea what's going on.”

0.41

The new small business is online, and its digital valuations and ad revenue are being repriced sharply.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The new definition of a small business is an online business such as an Amazon third-party seller, a YouTube channel, or a Spotify-linked creator, rather than a dry cleaner or drug store, and this shift will occupy investors for years.

    “A small business is not a dry-cleaner or a drug store.”

  • Traditional media companies needing cash can sell media assets at better prices to specialized financers, because banks do not credit the value of YouTube or Snapchat accounts on the balance sheet, creating a valuation mismatch that favors specialized lenders.

    “For a media company, its bankers aren't going to give it any credit for a Snapchat account or for a YouTube account”

  • Digital ad revenue equals views times CPM, so views up 20 to 100 percent with CPMs down 50 percent can leave advertising revenue flat, and the true test is fill rate, meaning how much inventory actually sells.

    “views across most of them are up as low as 20%, as high as 100% up... CPMs... might be down 50%, but that means advertising is flat”

  • Series A SaaS companies growing 100 percent year over year traded at 20 to 30 times revenue in December, but the crisis has reduced that to around 2 to 3 times revenue for fast-growing SaaS deals, an unprecedented compression.

    “20 times revenue was not crazy, 30 times even”

  • Hulu commercial breaks went unfilled during the shutdown, a sign of advertiser pullback that can be checked by any viewer and a useful indicator of digital ad demand.

    “They weren't able to fill those ad spots.”

0.38

Lenders prioritize originator solvency and repayment sources, since specialty loans depend on originator skill.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • In specialty lending each asset is serviced or originated by a firm with unique domain expertise, so if an originator fails the lender cannot simply swap in a backup servicer the way mainstream residential mortgage investors can, making originator health the first thing lenders watch.

    “In specialty lending, there's a lot more domain expertise in each of the lenders.”

  • Lenders to tech-enabled originators that rely on venture capital are first working to keep those originators solvent, by waiving prepayment penalties, lowering advance rates, and helping them raise equity even at cheap prices.

    “I'll lower my advance rate in exchange for a lower rate of return.”

  • Lenders prefer assets with automatic repayment that comes from a source other than the borrower, because lending through an originator whose core skill is collecting repayments amounts to implied corporate credit exposure to that originator.

    “all of a sudden, you've actually taken implied corporate credit.”

  • As traditional lenders pull back, demand for specialty financing from newcomers rises sharply, and originators face a decision between pulling back entirely and capturing market share, which depends on comparing expected losses with forgone fee revenue.

    “origination demand has gone up because banks are going to be lending less”

0.27

Venture valuations have reset sharply, pushing fundraising toward profitability over growth.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Venture capital reacted faster than private credit because startups are structurally always running out of money, so they must raise even in bad markets, which forces valuation resets within months.

    “venture capital companies - by default - are always running out of money”

  • The fundraising question has shifted from growth to whether a company can reach profitability with the current round or with one more round.

    “Can you get to profitability with this round if you need to, and if not, can you get to profitability with one more round?”

  • Venture funds are reserving much more capital to lead insider rounds in existing portfolio companies, which leaves less dry powder for new deals, reducing the number of new companies funded.

    “funds were looking at themselves realizing that they were going to have to allocate much more of their fund”

  • Founders who reopened their last round to avoid a down round ended up signaling weakness, and then had to announce a down round anyway, so humility about valuation worked better than posturing.

    “the whole reopening the round or posturing or acting like, 'Hey, this isn't going to affect me,' I think that really damaged people.”

  • Companies that raised capital in the last one to two months did so at valuations roughly 50 to 70 percent below prior levels, and valuations are expected to recover only partially in the next 60 days.

    “the valuations we're seeing right now are probably about 50% to 70% down”

0.25

Private credit stress shows up in slow defaults, falling collateral values, and cutting advance rates.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Private credit defaults take 60 to 90 days because covenants trigger on multiple cohorts or quarterly tests rather than a single missed month, borrowing bases can be cured with cash injections, and disputes add further delay.

    “a lot of the things that require default just take 60 to 90 days”

  • An advance rate is the share of a loan portfolio's value that a lender finances; an 80 percent advance against 100 dollars of loans means the borrower bears the first 20 percent of losses, so lowering the advance rate is a direct measure of reduced leverage.

    “If I give you $80 against $100 of loans, it's an $80 advance rate, which means you're fronting the first 20% of losses.”

  • The Manheim Auction Index showed used car prices down about 11.8 percent, roughly twice the peak decline of about 5.5 percent during the last financial crisis, even though sellers were not trying to sell used cars.

    “car prices were down at auction by about 5.5 percent, at most. This is, quote-unquote, twice as bad.”

  • Investors have not yet priced in expected government support by lowering required yields, because no one will underwrite to a backstop until its results are visible; instead they are cutting advance rates.

    “the way they're solving uncertainty is not by pricing their loans at higher yields. Instead... adjusting their advance rates.”

0.22

Loss exposure depends on borrower occupation, loan maturity, and how long unemployment persists.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Lenders are examining loan tapes to see the occupational makeup of borrowers, especially the share working in hospitality, because occupational concentration determines which loans are exposed to the shutdown.

    “Super important to know what percent of your borrowers work in hospitality right now.”

  • Short-duration assets such as 60-day receivables or merchant cash advances had to be worked out first because their maturities arrived before anyone could see how the pandemic would evolve, whereas a five-year loan can absorb a few months of deferred payments and remain sound over its life.

    “if you have an asset that's due in 60 days, you're dealing with it now because maturity is coming up”

  • With roughly 26 million Americans unemployed, the key question for consumer credit is not how high unemployment peaks but how long it stays elevated, since that determines borrower stress.

    “The question is not really how high do they get but more, how long do they stay that high?”

0.11

Senior-debt holders gain control and advantage in distressed junior credit positions.

4 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Junior lenders are exposed to senior lenders' other problems, because a stressed senior lender may demand repayment or block workouts for reasons unrelated to the junior borrower's performance.

    “you have a senior who's really your boss, and they may make decisions because of other things happening in their portfolio”

  • Some lenders trying to exit junior positions are selling at discounts of roughly 10 to 20 percent, but the discount is modest because buyers must also price the senior lender's behavioral uncertainty.

    “we're starting to see those at 10%, 20% discounts”

  • Holding senior debt gives a lender control because it is not a forced seller as long as its fund has liquidity, so it can react to portfolio data rather than to others' distress, and workouts take 60 to 90 days.

    “Senior debt is a good position to be in because you're in control and you're not really a forced seller”

  • Workouts with originators or asset books take 60 to 90 days, and lenders must avoid knee-jerk moves like transferring servicing too fast, which can trip further problems.

    “you're now going to spend the next 60 to 90 days trying to figure out a workout plan”