What this covers

This Business Breakdowns conversation features Ali Hamed explaining how the market for buying third-party Amazon sellers works. He starts with why it was not investable until Thrasio and similar firms appeared around 2018-2019: Amazon did not allow seller accounts to be transferred. He then covers the economics of owning a storefront. FBA charges for storage, shipping, and payments typically take about 40% of revenue, and product weight and volume drive the variance more than category does. He argues the core asset is a listing's position, meaning its reviews, comment count, and rank, which is the Reviews as Ranking Moat idea, and that aggregators succeed by operating skill rather than by product.

The middle of the discussion is about finance and how investors misread the sector. Ali contends lenders underwrite on loan-to-value when debt-to-income is the better lens, and he calls aggregators capital-hungry but equity-light. He argues variable costs make them resilient, so a 10% revenue loss cuts EBITDA by only about 12%. He also notes that returns look venture-like even though venture investors avoid roll-ups. Unlike classic roll-ups, he says, value comes from the revenue side, through supply chain redundancy, international expansion, and better paid advertising, not from cost savings.

The contentious stretch concerns Amazon itself. Ali names fee increases and sponsored ads crowding organic slots as the real threats, yet he describes Amazon as a facilitator of small business rather than a monopoly. He also covers diligence, where revenue is easy to verify, expenses are hard, and terms-of-service violations are the worst finding. He closes on velocity over perfection for builders.

Sharpest takeaway

Ali Hamed argues Amazon aggregators are a mispriced, capital-starved asset class because their value lies in Amazon-specific operating skill and listing reviews rather than products, so conventional venture, private equity, and direct-lending frameworks misjudge them.

  • Aggregators' moats come from Amazon ranking mechanics (reviews, stock availability, price) and operating know-how, not from proprietary products or brands
  • Debt markets underwrite these businesses on the wrong metric, LTV rather than debt-to-income, which keeps financing expensive and multiples low
  • Variable-cost P&Ls and diversified cash flows make these businesses resilient, so the low multiples are not justified by the fundamentals

The argument · threads6 threads · 93 claims
0.81

Aggregator advantage comes from many small operating skills, not one big secret

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • A common mistake is buying too many businesses at once, which leaves an aggregator understaffed, forces rushed hiring, and produces weak hires who churn, breaking the acquisition-and-onboarding cycle.

    “One of the things that we see a mistake is when people buy too many businesses at the same time, they're not staffed appropriately and they have to rush to hire people.”

  • Investors who accept that franchisees look alike still profit by identifying operators with the 'thousand small secrets', so the investing skill is distinguishing among operators through lengthy diligence calls rather than classifying businesses by product category.

    “You have to know the space well enough, where you can go do those six, ten, twelve-hour phone calls with all the different operators”

  • Durable aggregator advantage comes from a thousand small secrets, doing many small things right, rather than one big secret, and the firm's heuristic is that it takes 50 B's to recognize one A.

    “There's other businesses with 1,000 small secrets that are impossible to beat, because they do a thousand small things right. We absolutely think these are businesses of 1,000 small secrets.”

  • Amazon aggregators raise debt and equity, then buy FBA seller accounts including ASINs, SKUs, inventory, reviews and other assets, betting that they can operate those accounts at scale and improve them more than the original sellers can.

    “you get the ASIN, you get the SKUs, you get the inventory, you get the reviews, the comments, all the assets... an Amazon aggregator finds these seller accounts more valuable than the seller themselves does”

  • Typical Amazon seller businesses are built around a hero SKU that sells best, plus a handful of related variants, usually within one category like home goods, electronics, sleep or kitchenware.

    “An Amazon seller account or one of these businesses that you might buy, often sells a hero SKU”

  • The lesson for builders is velocity: spending six months searching for the perfect business or haggling over a few tenths of a turn of EBITDA costs far more than moving quickly, and grit and blocking-and-tackling matter as much as genius ideas.

    “if you spend six months trying to find the perfect business, or haggling over three and a quarter versus three and a half times EBITDA, you went from being a really wealthy individual to somebody who's now starting your second business.”

0.58

Investors struggle to differentiate aggregators, so capital stays cautious and the space looks crowded

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Investors looking at aggregators must unlearn frameworks like 'it's a roll-up, I don't do roll-ups' or 'only software or winner-take-all markets,' because the labels obscure a levered, equity-light business with venture-like returns.

    “It's okay to undo a lot of the frameworks that you are used to thinking about.”

  • Growth and PE investors struggle to differentiate aggregators because most are bottoms-up buyers of any asset, so many investors wait until one breaks out before backing it, essentially picking a jockey after the race is underway.

    “We just want to pick a jockey. We don't know who we're going to pick so we want to wait until someone starts to break out before backing them.”

  • Investors find aggregators hard to tell apart because most are bottoms-up buyers of any asset rather than category specialists, so the market lacks obvious exits, IPO paths, and clear winners, which keeps capital cautious.

    “There's not those obvious fall on rounds. There's not those obvious exits. There's not a lot of people who have IPO.”

  • The reported $500 million Apollo gave to Victory Park for aggregator lending is only one or two loans' worth of capital, so the headline makes the space look crowded when it is actually underfinanced.

    “It's reported that five to $10 billion of capital's gone in the space. That's basically nothing.”

0.57

Amazon's restraint on self-preferencing and promoted results protects sellers and marketplace health

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Amazon Basics does not always get top placement, which Ali cites as evidence that Amazon is restrained in self-preferencing, an approach he thinks is important for the marketplace.

    “If you actually see Amazon Basics, it's not always the top listed asset. They actually do a pretty good job of being honest with themselves.”

  • Ali hopes Amazon will follow Google's precedent of limiting promoted results relative to organic results, because promoted slots at the top would move sellers down the page and advantage the highest spenders.

    “luckily there's general precedent sent with the Google pages and how much of the Google pages promoted versus their organic”

  • On Amazon, the factors that get a product ranked highly are having the most reviews and comments, not running out of stock, and pricing competitively, which together make ranking more predictable than on other platforms.

    “if you have the most comments, you have the most reviews, you're ranked highly, you don't run out of stock often and you price competitively, you're going to be ranked highly”

  • The false narrative that Amazon wants to sell everything itself misreads its strategy; Amazon Basics fills market gaps so that some reasonable option always exists for any product, rather than displacing sellers.

    “there's this false narrative that Amazon still wants to sell everything in their store. In fact, Amazon basics generally tries to pursue being the everything store”

  • The most damaging thing a seller can have in diligence is a demonstrated violation of Amazon's terms of service, such as driving traffic off Amazon or writing fake reviews, which Ali ranks above even the US Constitution in importance to sellers.

    “the number one thing you could do to bust yourself during diligence is to have demonstrated that you break Amazon terms of services”

  • Amazon is unlikely to dramatically over-promote ads because Google has already set precedent for keeping a mostly organic results page, and the firm hopes Amazon follows that precedent.

    “luckily there's general precedent sent with the Google pages and how much of the Google pages promoted versus their organic”

  • Amazon is unlikely to disrupt small categories, because any category large enough for Amazon to care about is already well-served by other companies, and a $50 million category would not be worth Amazon's risk to its approach.

    “anything that's a big enough category for Amazon to care about, other people cared first... it's probably not going to move the needle for Andy Jassy”

0.45

Scarce financing and earn-out structures keep deal multiples low and leave valuation risk unresolved

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Most aggregator acquisitions are priced around three to five times EBITDA, and the original seller typically leaves within a few months, which is very different from conventional M&A.

    “So, it's a case that most of these are three to five times EBITDA, and ultimately the seller is gone after a few months.”

  • Because cheap-debt providers avoid aggregators, financing has come from hedge funds, credit funds, and specialty lenders in limited amounts, pushing interest rates above what a normal market would charge and forcing buyers to pay lower multiples.

    “So, instead what you have is hedge funds or credit funds or specialty lenders or esoteric credit funds, financing the ecosystem with very limited amounts of capital, which has caused interest to be higher”

  • Sellers and buyers avoid debating whether COVID created a demand bump for certain products by structuring deals with earn-outs, which shifts the valuation risk to the future rather than resolving it.

    “I think a lot of people don't want to get into a debate about whether or not COVID created a bump in demand for certain products, so they solve that debate by just earn outs”

  • If capital markets adjust and debt costs fall, the sector could deliver a double multiple arbitrage, as conglomerate-like cash flows and scale-driven stability attract syndicated loan and institutional capital.

    “All the things that people used to love about conglomerates are actually here in these types of businesses”

0.35

Rushed entrants and seller flight into aggregation add crowding and competitive pressure to the market

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Many sub-scale sellers want to sell because operating alone is grueling, with seasonal peaks like the holidays and manufacturing timing that keep owners from family and overwhelm them.

    “It is just a very hard business to run by yourself. So, people want to sell.”

  • A major risk is that the seller market grows through a flood of new sellers rather than through stronger existing sellers, competing categories into lower margins even as total revenue rises.

    “what happens if the Amazon third party seller space gets really big, but it gets really big not because the existing seller accounts are doing well, but because there's just so much supply”

  • Thrasio's announcement that aggregation was a real ecosystem, backed by its financing, triggered a rush of new entrants, though Ali's firm is not an investor in Thrasio.

    “It was largely driven by the Thrasio Financing announcements. And by the way, we're not investing in Thrasio.”

  • Elite business-school search-fund entrants who saw aggregation as an easier path were among the groups that rushed into the space, though Ali's firm was more interested in existing Amazon operators.

    “Category one was Harvard, Stanford, and Wharton kids who were going to do search fund, who thought, oh my gosh. This seems so much easier.”

  • India is an attractive aggregator market because Chinese sellers find it hard to ship small parcels directly into India, which removes much of the competition, and India has more third-party marketplaces that may reduce Amazon dependency.

    “it's much harder for Chinese sellers to compete in India, because you can't sell small little boxes from China into India and sell directly”

0.31

Small sellers lack the supply chain and finance capabilities that aggregators must provide

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Helium 10 is the most popular software tool in the Amazon seller space, giving analytics on SKUs, competitors, and categories, and Ali says a real aggregator must use Helium 10 and Jungle Scout.

    “Basically, if you're an Amazon aggregator and you're not using Helium 10 and Jungle Scout, you're not a real aggregator.”

  • The two most distinctive functions in an aggregator are supply chain, which requires supply planning and manufacturer relationships often run through brokers, and finance, which must manage M&A, capital markets, controller work, and a wide range of inventory and term financing.

    “So, I'd say the two most unique functions in these businesses are the finance function and the supply chain function.”

  • Small sellers who try to bypass brokers and go straight to Chinese manufacturers usually fail, because brokers know the factories better and have more pull across many clients.

    “your broker knows your manufacturer way better than you do, and likely have more pull and power than you have”

  • Many small Amazon sellers have flimsy supply chains because they lack backup 3PLs, backup freight brokers, warehouse options, quality assurance in China, and a plan for when to switch between water and air freight.

    “a lot of these people have somewhat flimsy supply chains... you might not have a backup 3PL, you might not have a backup truck broker in Long Beach”