What this covers

This is a conversation between Patrick and Bill Gurley, a venture investor, about how companies go public and why he thinks the conventional route is broken. Gurley's case is built on numbers and incentives. He cites Jay Ritter's calculation that venture-backed IPOs over four decades have produced about $171 billion of underpricing. He then works through specific deals. In Elastic, the hand-picked price was 28, the first trade was 70, and about $338 million moved off the company's balance sheet. In Zoom, he splits the giveaway among investors, founders, and employees, with employees bearing about $175 million. He also puts a figure on the total cost: roughly 33 percent underpricing plus a 7 percent fee yields an effective cost of capital near 40 percent.

The middle of the discussion is about why this persists. Gurley points to a frequency mismatch: founders do one IPO, while banks and buy-side accounts do 20 to 40 a year. He adds a multiple agency problem in which the buy side is effectively the bank's customer. He also argues that the banks with the strongest reputations deliver the worst pricing. His data on Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Credit Suisse is contested, as are his claims that underwriters no longer carry real risk and that the greenshoe cannot meaningfully stabilize a stock.

The alternative is the direct listing, which uses price-time priority, the same matching that opens stocks each morning. Gurley discusses Spotify's choice, driven by fairness and access, and why a primary raise is a regulatory limit rather than a technical one. He closes on psychology: why founders fall back on anxiety-driven tradition, and whether boards' fiduciary duty should rule out giving away hundreds of millions of dollars.

Sharpest takeaway

Gurley argues the traditional IPO's hand-allocated, underpriced process transfers value from companies (especially Silicon Valley founders and employees) to favored buy-side accounts, and that a direct listing using an open price-time auction would eliminate that transfer.

  • Banks allocate IPO shares by hand to a handful of favored accounts, which systematically underprices offerings and creates a multi-billion-dollar wealth transfer on day one.
  • The incentive gap arises because banks and buy-side accounts run 20 to 40 IPOs a year while founders do one in a lifetime, and banks serve multiple constituents.
  • A direct listing uses the same price-time matching used to open stocks daily, so it allocates shares fairly and captures the demand that IPOs deliberately ignore.

The argument · threads4 threads · 75 claims
0.85

Direct listings offer fairer access and a sensible matching design than traditional IPOs.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Banks' narratives that direct listings suit only big-brand companies are unconvincing, and Gurley argues an unknown company's exposure can be generated through public commentary on platforms like Twitter.

    “several banks said, "Yeah, you can do them if you have a big brand like Spotify but if it's a more esoteric company we have to get out there and meet with the accounts”

  • Bonds have long been priced through algorithmic matching that allocates to whoever bids most, which Gurley argues is the sensible design that IPOs should adopt.

    “I already say all bonds priced through algorithmic matching, that's been happening for years.”

  • Direct listings provide fairness and equal access to information and allocation, because no one gets an advantage from reputation or bank relationships, which Gurley argues is hard to defend against the traditional IPO's unfair access.

    “I can't imagine how you could defend the traditional IPO process versus this direct listing process from a fairness in access standpoint.”

  • Spotify and Slack opened their direct listings with initial blocks of roughly 5% and 9% of shares outstanding respectively.

    “I think they opened with 5% shares outstanding in a block and one with 9.”

  • Direct listings require giving indications of price ranges to investors so they can reiterate demand, which brings more participants together before the opening match.

    “they'll give indications of ranges to people so that they can reiterate on what they're willing to do so that you bring more people together.”

0.71

Banker incentives and buy-side allocations sustain IPO underpricing and resist change.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Used-car and real-estate agency problems are a known economic analysis, and the Multiple Agency Problem is a variant in which one agent serves several principals with different frequencies of interaction.

    “There's a variant of that called the Multiple Agency Problem. And in this case you have an agent who has multiple constituents.”

  • Select buy-side firms that get large IPO allocations benefit from the wealth transfer and would resist change, while long-term buy-and-hold investors would benefit from direct listings.

    “for those few select firms who are able to take advantage of this wealth transfer, I think they probably wouldn't like a change”

  • The greenshoe, stabilization, and secondary fees give bankers financial incentives that conflict with issuer interests, and the bankers' profit motive is more important than defending the stock.

    “They're more focused on profit maximization.”

  • Over four decades, the handpicked IPO price and the next-day close were the only values that mattered for transfer, and banks create the gap by pricing below expected demand.

    “the price that the hand allocated, handpicked by the banker and that closed the very next day. I view this as true wealth transfer”

  • Attempts to replace the 180-day lockup with price-based or staggered lockups have had some success but face pushback from banks.

    “We've tried to suggest price based lockups, staggered lockups. We've had some success, but there's quite a bit of pushback from the banks”

0.52

Press framing and historical legacy keep the IPO pop celebrated as good news.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Underpricing has accelerated recently, with roughly $12 billion of wealth transfer in the last 18 months, as many recent tech IPOs have popped sharply on day one.

    “In the last 18 months that's 12 billion. It's been accelerating lately”

  • The press reinforces the IPO pop as good news and a trading-down stock as bad news, which sustains the status quo even though journalists criticize Wall Street for short-termism.

    “The press thinks a pop is good and a stock that trades down is bad.”

  • Many silly IPO details persist because they happened once and were reinforced, so the process is a legacy of history rather than a rational design.

    “A lot of the silly things or a lot of the silly details just evolved because they happened once and then got reinforced.”

  • Daryl Morey's analogy compares celebrating an IPO pop to a sports team owner celebrating when tickets sold cheaply rise in the aftermarket.

    “it'd be like a sports team owner or someone that owned an arena selling their tickets and then seeing them pop in the aftermarket”

0.32

Change will come from courageous reputable founders and firms moving first.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Change will come through reputable firms and founders who show courage, since the main barrier is anxiety about going first, and the 40% cost of capital is the easy default for most companies.

    “I do think it's reps. I really do think it's reps”

  • Highly intelligent, courageous, high-profile founders are already interested in direct listings, and they will move the market the way early adopters cross the chasm.

    “I'm already aware of very high profile, highly intelligent, highly courageous founders who are excited about going this direction.”

  • The phrase about 'Fractional' is not a substantive claim.