What this covers
Gregory, founder of Gregorys Coffee, talks with Matt about building the company from one New York shop into a large chain. He begins with arithmetic. Drinks average about $5, and roughly 60% of revenue goes to labor, cost of goods, insurance, and card fees, leaving about $2 a cup toward rent. That is Unit Economics Break-Even in concrete terms: a $15,000 monthly rent needs 250 to 275 cups a day, and paying back a roughly $300,000 build-out in about a year and a half needs 500 to 600. He also explains why New York's short breakfast and lunch windows forced a Quality-Speed Balance, and why quality-focused shops ended up on cheap, off-peak blocks at the city's edges.
The middle of the conversation covers product and menu. Gregory describes converting milk-and-sugar drinkers by having them taste specialty coffee black first, like wine, and he argues that coffee earns the trust that lets customers try scones or a vegan breakfast sandwich, a Trust Transfer Menu Strategy. New items must pass the Sell-to-Myself Test. On innovation, he says first-mover credit fades because rivals copy quickly, so he looks for new formats such as a finished premixed drink, plus order-ahead and loyalty. He also covers the third place expectation that coffee carries.
The last stretch concerns running the company. Staff remake any drink prepared wrongly, which he ties to a Slippery Slope Standard. He says going from one store to three required trusting others, and that founders should give up control earlier than feels comfortable. His account of leaning on family is marked contested. He also explains the bootstrapped path, with no Series A until 2019.
Gregory argues Gregorys Coffee won by combining mass-chain speed with specialty-level quality, then scaled through team culture, systems, and trust-building rather than outside capital.
- Early New York coffee was split between high-volume chains that lacked quality and quality shops that could not move a line fast enough
- Menu expansion works by building trust in the coffee anchor first, then extending into complementary products
- Scaling depends on hiring strong people and installing culture and systems that carry the standard to every store
Scaling consistent quality requires trusting strong leaders, delegating control, and founders giving up control to team members
- Relying on family members in early days was valuable because they could be called at any time and would drop what they were doing, a level of trust Gregory found hard to replace even with strong non-family team members, despite costs like saying things to relatives one would never say to others.
“relying on family was something that I knew I could call at any time, and they would drop whatever they were doing.”
- Expansion from one to two to three stores was harder than opening the first because the founder had been present 60 to 80 hours a week ensuring nothing went wrong, and the critical step was trusting a few people to execute his vision the way he would have.
“the minute you need to trust others to sort of execute on a vision the way I would have done it myself was sort of the first step”
- Menu decisions should pass the test of whether the founder would buy the product himself; if he cannot sell it to himself, he cannot sell it to anyone, and staff bringing outside products signals a gap to fix.
“At the end of the day, I have to sell to myself... if I can't sell to myself, then who am I selling to?”
- Introducing new menu items is far riskier across many locations than in one shop, because consistent execution by hundreds of staff is hard to guarantee, so the company designs menus as if it still operated one or two stores.
“100% riskier. I still operate and think as if we have one or two shops, and that's how I approach menu building.”
- Staff are expected to pour out and remake any drink, even a milk-and-chocolate mocha, that is not prepared properly, because tolerating small deviations creates a slippery slope where a double espresso served wrongly becomes a real cultural problem.
“if you're willing to serve that one the wrong way, then all of a sudden, then we have a real problem”
- Gregory can trust remote stores such as a Florida location because he has spent time with its manager and because unsolicited customer feedback that the experience matches New York builds confidence in replicating quality without being physically present.
“I was shocked at how close the experience was to what I used to get in New York.”
- Overemphasizing every dollar early can cause a founder to miss decisions that matter, because launch assumptions will change once real customers react, so resilience and pivoting matter more than the original plan.
“whatever you thought on day one, I guarantee you, is going to change.”
- A common founder mistake is controlling every purse string and function, and the company only unlocked once strong people could execute at a high level, so founders should give up control earlier than feels comfortable.
“Earlier, I was late to that, where I was controlling all the purse strings and all the different areas for so long.”
- For a founder, the sharper worry is not what is going wrong but what is being missed, because tunnel vision on one product or store creates blind spots, and strong team members are what fill them.
“it's not what's wrong or what could go wrong but what am I missing? Because it's very easy to have blind spots.”
- Greg applied his father's food-business standards to coffee: a clean store, great service, and speed, with the owner personally present on the floor to maximize the guest experience.
“How can we maximize the guest experience? How can I make a great product without sacrificing time? That was something that I just wasn't seeing in the coffee space.”
- Greg left his law track after deciding to test a food and beverage career by working in his father's sandwich shop across from law school during his second year, and he fell out of the top 10 percent academically while discovering he was good at the work.
“So fell out of the top 10%, unfortunately, in my second year. But I definitely realized I was good at that job.”
- A remote store in a mall about 40 minutes from Minneapolis performing well gives Greg confidence to expand into downtown Minneapolis and other markets with drive-thrus and strip-center sites, because the core operating model transfers when strong local leaders run it.
“if we can successfully run a store in an indoor mall 40 minutes outside Minneapolis, I know we can go to downtown Minneapolis”
- Quality culture in a coffee business cannot be imposed by a message alone and must be built through trust in store leaders, with latte art and visual pride helping staff buy into the craft, which is more achievable in coffee than in food because baristas are front-of-house artisans.
“It has to be cultural. It has to be trusted with the leaders in the store.”
- Moving from a few locations to hundreds of people across many stores makes it hard to guarantee the same drink quality, so the solution is systems plus a cultural trust that lets team members make the right quality choices without supervision.
“the confidence from one to eight hundred that they're all going to do the same program the same way time and time again, it's challenging.”
- Some of the company's best product and operational ideas now come from team members, and this is what has been most rewarding as the company scaled, because people with varied expertise can see things the founder would have missed.
“some of the best stuff does come from the team, and they pivot.”
- Founders should have a point of view and passion, ask what their differentiator is, and be willing to give up control to strong people, since early micromanagement of costs can cause them to miss larger opportunities.
“Earlier, I was late to that, where I was controlling all the purse strings and all the different areas for so long.”
- Gregory's father's loyal long-tenured team, some with him 20 to 40 years, demonstrated that treating people with respect in the trenches builds long-term loyalty, a lesson Gregory applies to his own team.
“He has people that, even today in a number of his businesses still in operation, have been with him for 20, 30, 40 years.”
Customer wants, not founder taste or preference, should drive store design, offerings, and product decisions
- Gregorys became early in plant-based menu items partly because Greg has been vegan since 2017, and customers can tell when a menu is built by someone who genuinely practices the diet versus one that is ticking a box.
“I know as somebody that practices that diet, you can tell when a menu is built by somebody that actually thinks about this versus somebody that's just ticking the box, and you can't fake that stuff.”
- Gregory uses a 'sell to myself' test: a new product must be something he would buy and consume himself, and the team is asked what they eat and drink, because if the leader does not want a product, the company is drifting from its identity.
“At the end of the day, I have to sell to myself. And I think that's where it comes back to, is I want to be able to have as many of my meals or beverages at Gregorys as possible.”
- Gregorys first refresher line, called The Crush, including a mango jalapeño version, did not sell even though Gregory personally enjoyed it daily, showing that founder taste is not a reliable predictor of customer demand.
“We had this jalapeño—mango jalapeño one—I was drinking it every day.”
- Gregory drinks multiple double espressos daily because he enjoys the espresso and uses his personal consumption as a quality barometer, which he hangs his personal pride on.
“I'm just drinking double espressos all day long.”
- When introducing a new product category such as a hot-pressed grilled sandwich, the family business had to aggressively sample to customers to explain what it was, because customers knew grilled cheese but not grilled chicken and cheese or ham and cheese.
“people knew what a grilled cheese was, but people weren't familiar with a grilled chicken and cheese sandwich... we had to go out aggressively sampling to people to explain what this was”
- Gregorys replaced the clicking manual espresso dosing with an automatic grinder that pre-weighs each dose, which improved quality and consistency even though it removed a familiar sound associated with the coffee shop experience.
“we need to move to an automatic grinder because it's pre-weighing every dose, so we're going to be better quality, more consistent.”
- During COVID, Greg could not find a local coffee shop with Wi-Fi, plugs, or laptop tolerance, so he opened a Greenwich-area location designed with many plugs and unlimited table time, because a shop that welcomes long stays earns loyalty.
“There's no time limits on the tables... If you want to choose to spend your day with us, that's an honor”
- Customers weigh coffee factors differently, some prioritizing specific coffee, others convenience, seating, or price, so a shop cannot please everyone and should aim to create the best experience for the largest number of people.
“Everybody has different things they over-index on.”
- Customers now expect order-ahead and loyalty options, so a coffee business must offer pre-order and efficient pickup without sacrificing the in-store experience for customers who want to sit and linger.
“It's like, now it's like, you don't have order ahead, you're shot, right?”
- Mall foot traffic suits coffee because it is an easy walk-and-carry purchase, and people across demographics stop for coffee in malls.
“the strong malls have only gotten better... It's like the perfect walk-and-carry.”
Quality paired with speed and convenience in a middle position is what wins New York customers
- In New York, high quality is necessary but insufficient; because businesses depend on short breakfast and lunch windows, a coffee shop must also be fast to turn customers, since customers expect to move.
“in New York, you had to be fast to be able to turn the customers and get your throughput where it needs to be. People just have that expectation; they want to move.”
- Around 2006 and 2007, novel specialty elements such as latte art and pour-overs astonished New York customers because no one had seen them, which differentiated the shop from the mass players before those elements became ubiquitous.
“if you were doing latte art on somebody's drink, they were, like, mind-blown because they just had never seen anything like that.”
- Mass coffee players were good at volume but weak on quality, while quality operators made great coffee but could not move a line; quality shops therefore sat on off-peak blocks at the city's edges because lower rents did not require high turnover to justify them.
“the mass players were good at volume, but I thought there was definitely an opportunity from a quality perspective... they couldn't move a line.”
- Gregorys deliberately sits in the middle between boutique specialty shops and mass chains, offering mass-player conveniences like apps, order-ahead, and speed while keeping specialty-level quality, a combination he says is very hard to execute at volume.
“We sit in the middle, where we can deliver a lot of the value and the convenience... and giving you the quality element that you're getting at the other types of locations.”
- Customers will walk past other shops to reach a coffee shop when the product, the environment, the welcoming team, and practical amenities like seating and Wi-Fi are in balance; coffee shops carry a third-place expectation that salads or bowls lack.
“The whole idea of the third place... created this special environment, an expectation in a coffee shop, that is what people will go out of their way for.”
- A coffee shop's seriousness about quality can be judged by its plain black espresso because it is hard to execute well and cannot be masked by milk and additives, and Gregorys' black espresso is markedly better than mass chains' versions.
“you can usually tell how serious a place is about their coffee program by just trying a black espresso, because it's hard to get it right.”
Continuous innovation anchored in coffee is necessary because competitors quickly copy successful products
- Gregorys did not launch a hot food program until 2019, and before that the business centered on pastries and grab-and-go items.
“we didn't have a hot food program until 2019.”
- Being first to launch a product earns limited credit because competitors copy successful menu items quickly, so innovation must be continuous rather than resting on past launches.
“maybe we get credit for being a first mover, but I don't know how long that lasts... I'll see the exact same version or very similar version elsewhere.”
- Food operations moved from buying finished pastries from a third party, to converting the first store's basement into a commissary that supplied the second location, to a scratch bakery after the father completed a year-long bread and pastry course at the French Culinary Institute.
“He did an intense year-long course on bread making and pastry making at the French Culinary Institute, and that's when we started launching our own scratch bakery program.”
- After his father demanded a new cappuccino-style signature item, Gregory developed premixed, ready-to-drink cold brew concoctions around 2017 or 2018 such as the Honey Badger, and cold beverages now occupy about a third of menu boards.
“a third of our menu boards are occupied by our cold brew bar.”
- A large graveyard of failed products is a sign of healthy experimentation, and failed products are inevitable when a company keeps innovating.
“the graveyard of our products is deep. I've tried plenty of things.”
- Product expansion should be anchored in coffee: once customers trust the coffee program, they will try complementary products such as a vegan breakfast sandwich or a scone because they trust the brand's execution.
“Everything starts and stops with our coffee and building the trust that we do an amazing job with our coffee program.”
- Menus that reflect genuine belief, such as plant-based offerings built by a vegan founder, are distinguishable to customers from menus that merely tick a box, and cannot be faked.
“you can tell when a menu is built by somebody that actually thinks about this versus somebody that's just ticking the box, and you can't fake that stuff.”
- A room-temperature egg item in the pastry case flopped, prompting Gregory to buy a George Foreman grill and test hot sandwiches the next day, which redirected the company toward hot food; an earlier jalapeño-mango refresher called The Crush also failed commercially.
“literally went out and bought a George Foreman grill and just started testing hot sandwiches like the next day”
Expansion follows visible demand and is limited only by the supply of strong people
- Despite the decline of many malls, strong Class A malls maintain high traffic, and coffee works as an easy walk-and-carry purchase within them, with the weak malls being those that had been struggling for a long time.
“the strong malls have only gotten better... It's like the perfect walk-and-carry.”
- Gregorys still roasts coffee in Long Island City and now ships product to California and Washington State, and it shifted from baking everything in a commissary to baking fresh in stores because the commissary model could not support the expansion.
“there was no way we could have continued on that commissary model from a food perspective and grow the way we did.”
- The first customer at a new suburban Summit, New Jersey store paid through the app and was already a loyalty member, which Gregory took as validation that brand loyalty can transfer to a new market outside the core.
“the first customer paid with our app... New market out of our core, and we already have people locked and loaded on our app.”
- Gregory sees no ceiling on store count, projecting that the company could grow from 50 to several hundred stores, with 10 to 20 stores possible in a single market, and says the only real constraint is the number of strong people available.
“My only restriction is by how many great people I have around me.”
- A deal with Simon Property Group, one of the largest U.S. property owners, to open stores in its malls and other properties drove this year's growth, and mall stores require afternoon-focused menus because malls open around 10 a.m., after the breakfast rush.
“The malls don't open till 10 in the morning, so the breakfast rush is already over.”
- Greg saw that the best specialty coffee in New York sat on the outskirts and edges of the city because rents were lower there, while the Financial District and Midtown daytime office core, where his father's businesses had operated, had almost no great coffee options.
“I realized there were a few folks doing great things with coffee, but mainly on the outskirts of town, on the edges of the city. And where my father's businesses historically were were Financial District, Midtown... And in those areas, there was nowhere to get a great cup of coffee.”
- Greg started looking for a second location in year two once customers were traveling to Gregorys because nothing comparable existed nearby, using visible demand to justify expansion to another part of the city.
“people are appreciating these things and then going out of their way to come to us in the area, because there wasn't anything else like that.”
A distinct experience and tight execution, not fear, keep competitors from eroding customers
- Starbucks reorganized stores around throughput and order-ahead, shrinking in-store elements such as seating, and in doing so removed experiences customers want, while Gregorys tries to keep order-ahead efficient without sacrificing the in-store experience.
“by doing that, you've taken other elements of what people are looking for out”
- Midtown went from one Gregorys and one Starbucks a couple of blocks away, with daytime office crowds, to four to six coffee shops within a block or two, showing saturation that resulted from earlier first-mover success.
“Now it's that same location—might have four or five or six coffee shops within a block or two. The saturation has definitely happened.”
- Specialty coffee's community rhythm of competitions, festivals, and meetups stopped during COVID and has not fully returned, leaving businesses more siloed, though Gregory believes the industry's collaborative spirit will eventually return.
“COVID sort of definitely screwed up a lot of community-building stuff.”
- A coffee shop should be a welcoming place without table time limits, where a customer who buys one cup and reads the paper for hours is choosing the shop over competitors, which means something and does not happen by accident.
“There's no time limits on the tables... If you want to choose to spend your day with us, that's an honor”
- Stores lose customers to competitors when operations become complacent, because a slightly fresher competitor can cause customers to drift when a team is not on its A-game, so execution must stay tight.
“all it takes is one person to come by doing something a little bit different, the store feels a little bit fresher, and then people start to drift”
- Would-be founders should first articulate what makes their business special and differentiated, because a competitor may appear at any time, and the founder must be willing to take risks rather than optimizing every penny from day one.
“What is your differentiating factor? ... There has to be something that you think is sort of special”
- When a competitor opened a block away from a downtown Brooklyn store run by a strong team, the store's business held steady and even rose, which Gregory attributes to a strong value proposition and consistent execution rather than to fear-based reaction.
“our business not only stayed the same, but actually... did go up.”
Bootstrapped growth, funded by family help and store profits, carried the company from one shop to dozens
- The business idea emerged while Gregory was a law student working at his father's sandwich shop: near Brooklyn Heights the only options were Starbucks or Dunkin', and in Financial District and Midtown, where his father's businesses were, there was nowhere to get a great cup of coffee.
“I pulled up a map. I'm like, where do you get good coffee in the city? ... in those areas, there was nowhere to get a great cup of coffee.”
- Gregory's food-business expertise came from working in his father's fast-casual New York business from age three or four, progressing from shaving carrots to delivering food to working the line, which he frames as a lifelong apprenticeship akin to the 10,000-hour idea.
“I sort of go back to that Malcolm Gladwell's 10,000 Hours idea where I was born into this almost. I've been doing this my whole life.”
- The first Gregorys location was built bootstrapped by Gregory, his father, and two handymen, and its first door opened around Christmas 2006.
“it was my father, myself, and like, basically two handymen that built that store. So we definitely bootstrapped it together.”
- The second Gregorys location opened in 2009, about two and a half years after founding, and the third opened in summer 2010.
“So the second location came 2009... And then the third came summer of 2010.”
- Gregorys grew by bootstrapping, funding each new store from prior store profits, and did not raise a Series A until 2019, about 13 years into the company, a path Gregory says he would not necessarily repeat but would not change.
“The next store was sort of fueled by previous store's profits... We didn't do a Series A until 2019. It was like 13 years into our existence.”
- Gregorys added eleven stores in the current year to reach 47 locations, with a 48th opening within a week, and the company expects to exceed 50 stores by year-end with more planned for the following year.
“We've added eleven stores so far this year, so our store count is up to 47.”
Store viability depends on enough daily cup volume to recoup build-out costs and cover rent
- To pay back a roughly $300,000 build-out in about a year and a half, a New York shop needs about 500 to 600 cups a day, every day, which raises stakes once a competitor enters.
“If you're $300,000 to pay yourself back in a year and a half, you're talking about five or 600 cups a day”
- A Times Square location of roughly 750 to 800 square feet served about 330 customers an hour at its peak, and a busy store at its peak handled around 1,000 customers a day.
“We used to do, like, 330 customers in an hour out of that store.”
- A scrappy coffee shop can be opened for about $150,000 with new equipment, while a more polished space might cost $500,000 to $600,000, and Gregory suggests about $300,000 as a practical midpoint for a decent shop.
“scrappy startup, 150, maybe up to 500,000—let's call it $300,000”
- With average drinks around $5 and roughly 60% of revenue consumed by labor, cost of goods, insurance, and card fees, a shop keeps about $2 per cup toward rent, so a $15,000 monthly rent requires about 250 to 275 cups a day just to break even.
“So for every $5, $3 out the window, you've got $2, and you apply that towards your rent... you're probably, like, 250 to 275 cups of coffee a day just to break even.”
Businesses must keep pivoting operations and product formats as needs change
- When the second store opened, Gregorys converted the first store's basement into a mini commissary to prepare food in-house and deliver it daily, after initially buying fully finished pastries from a third party, which Gregory found frustrating for a food-heritage company.
“He did an intense year-long course on bread making and pastry making at the French Culinary Institute, and that's when we started launching our own scratch bakery program.”
- Gregory's food program over-invested in refrigeration by the third store and then adjusted as operators changed, illustrating a general lesson that businesses should continuously pivot and adjust based on what the operation actually needs.
“I had three reach-in refrigerators with tons of food, and then all of a sudden, you know, different operators start showing up and like, wow, I don't think I need three refrigerators anymore.”
- Innovation in a mature beverage category means finding a new way to approach it, such as a finished premixed format, rather than a single new drink, because once a novelty is widely copied its first-mover advantage erodes.
“I didn't find the new cappuccino, but I found a new category, a new way to approach things.”
- Gregory did not offer a single target for the food-versus-coffee split or for balancing speed and quality, and his answer implies that the right mix is a moving target rather than a fixed ratio.
“But I mean, the economics of the business continue to change.”
Product and technology choices succeed when they stay clear and remove customer friction
- Alternative creative names for the non-coffee fruit drinks failed because customers could not understand what they were, so the company simply called them refreshers, illustrating that differentiation through naming should not sacrifice clarity.
“At the end of the day, I couldn't get people to understand what it was... And now we just called it refreshers, right?”
- Gregorys launched its mobile payment and loyalty app in 2014, which was ahead of specialty peers and behind Starbucks, illustrating its willingness to adopt technology early.
“I think we launched our mobile payment and loyalty app in 2014.”
- Customers were reluctant to load credit cards onto a mobile app about ten years earlier, and Gregory's counter-argument was that they already had the App Store and used apps for other purposes, so the friction was in habit rather than technology.
“People didn't feel comfortable loading a credit card onto a mobile app.”
- Gregorys was among the first specialty coffee concepts to launch a drive-thru, which tests whether a quality-focused operation can combine speed with unhurried preparation, a tension the company frames as how to elevate quality without sacrificing speed.
“I think we were one of the first specialty coffee concepts to launch a drive-thru.”
- Gregorys refreshers are caffeine-free by default, unlike mass-player refreshers, which lets parents order them for children and opens a family segment.
“our refreshers are caffeine-free... the mass players, all their refreshers are caffeinated.”
- Cash was about 80% of Gregorys' business when it started and is now about 10%, and the first cash payment at a new opening is a signal Gregory still personally collects.
“it used to be 80% cash when we started. Now it's like 10% cash.”
Competition and rent economics determine where coffee opportunity exists and how the market develops
- Greg believes that competitors raising the quality bar grows the overall pie for specialty coffee, because more consumers who know what good coffee can taste like make the category more appealing to all operators, even though he would not want a competitor across the street.
“building that awareness and having more people care about quality coffee... it just continued to raise the bar”
- Greg believes a competitive, beast-mode mindset inherited from his father helps him avoid letting rivals derail the company's confidence, and he tells store leaders that focusing on their own execution is the best defense.
“I can't let what other folks are doing derail me or, like, take away our confidence.”
- Despite being early in many areas, New York specialty coffee lagged because the high rent of the city center made every operator late to the specialty concept, so the market behind-the-curve reflects rent economics.
“for specialty coffee, we're definitely behind.”
- Before Gregorys, the Brooklyn Heights neighborhood offered only Starbucks or Dunkin' Donuts, and high-quality coffee existed only at city edges, signaling that competitive scarcity drove the opportunity.
“at the time I was in Brooklyn Heights, it was really just Starbucks or Dunkin' Donuts.”
- Early on, landlords doubted a coffee business could cover rent because its cups sold for about two dollars, so Gregory had to explain volume and throughput economics to win space.
“he couldn't get over the fact that we were selling, like, two-dollar cups of coffee, and how was I going to pay all this rent?”
Coffee quality converts milk-drink customers and elevates baristas into respected craft professionals
- Converting milk-and-sugar drinkers worked by having them taste a single-origin coffee black before adding milk or sugar, comparing it to wine; a natural Ethiopian Harar that tasted like blueberries produced visible surprise and word of mouth.
“making sure they try it before they add the milk and sugar so they could experience it, likening it to wine or all these other flavor notes.”
- Revenue originally split roughly 75-25 or 80-20 in favor of drinks over food, and this mix has been shifting as food and new categories grow.
“that was maybe like a, I don't know, 75-25 split, 80-20 split, indexing towards the drinks.”
- Baristas can gain the same regard as mixologists and craft beverage experts because they create customized, artisanal drinks, and the value placed on quality beverages has been shaped by wine and craft beer's premium pricing.
“Bartenders are held in super high regard because they can create something super special for you”
- Latte art is the easiest entry point that draws baristas into caring about the details of drinks, because visually impressive results create pride, and Instagram and TikTok have made aesthetics as important as taste.
“the easiest way for people to sort of slip into that rabbit hole is latte art.”
Grit and self-driven learning mattered more than financial modeling in early growth
- Greg identifies his core inherited traits as a cross-section of passion and grit, illustrated by his father introducing panini sandwiches to America after importing machines from Europe, which taught Greg to stay ahead of the curve through innovation.
“it seems like it's this cross-section of passion and grit... he had to import the machines from Europe because you couldn't buy them here.”
- Gregory accelerated quality improvement by visiting other shops, attending coffee festivals and shows, and learning from the specialty community, which allowed him to put a new idea on the menu the next day.
“So I could see something on a Monday, and it would be on the menu by Tuesday.”
- Gregory did not analyze break-even economics when he started the company because passion and hunger to make it work outweighed financial modeling, which is a reflection he now shares as a lesson.
“that was honestly something I didn't even think about. I didn't even want to, like, think about it in that term when we got started”
- Gregory learned latte art through trial and error and burned through about 20 gallons of milk, illustrating that self-taught skill acquisition in the pre-social-media era required heavy material investment.
“I must have burned through, like, 20 gallons of milk to try and figure out the motion”