What this covers

This is a conversation between Patrick and Jeff Gramm that walks through activist investing era by era. It begins with Ben Graham reading ICC-filed reports on Northern Pipeline and finding liquidation value far above the share price. It then moves to the 1950s, when proxy fights like Robert Young's against New York Central were front-page populist campaigns aimed at newly dispersed individual holders. Gramm disputes the idea that activism began in the 1980s. That decade's defining feature, he says, was Michael Milken's junk bonds, which let outsiders such as Carl Icahn challenge Phillips. Boone Pickens's greenmail challenge there ended in a recapitalization the market valued below the cash he received. Today, he argues, the work is persuading concentrated institutions, including Vanguard's governance teams.

The second half widens into several debates. Patrick presents buyback research that sorts programs by conviction. High-conviction programs outperformed the market by about 4 percent a year since 1982, against about 1 percent for low-conviction ones. Gramm adds that a buyback must be large and made at a real discount to matter. They also argue over shareholder primacy. Gramm says the law does not require it but that boards and capital-raising bias companies toward shareholders anyway. Patrick raises Rappaport's claim that managers really manage to quarterly earnings, and Gramm replies that he has seen no compelling evidence public shareholders are uniquely myopic. He also finds share-price-based CEO pay distorted, because markets are not efficient in the short term.

Case studies include Star Gas and Tandy, and they discuss why microcap investing still has room for active managers. Gramm's practical conclusion is that bad governance is always present, so deep undervaluation is what justifies the lost liquidity and risk of going active.

Sharpest takeaway

Gramm argues shareholder activism has moved from information arbitrage and hostile raids toward institutional persuasion, and that good investing and governance depend on undervaluation and capital allocation skill rather than on governance rhetoric or shareholder-value dogma.

  • Early activism exploited information that was hard to obtain, such as Graham's ICC pipeline reports, which the public record did not yet make easy to read
  • The 1980s raiders were funded by Milken's junk bonds, and the wave ended when that financing ended
  • Today's activism is a game of persuading concentrated institutional holders, including passive giants like Vanguard

The argument · threads3 threads · 88 claims
0.85

Shareholder value is a contestable, measurable belief that drives managerial short-termism and harms stakeholders.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Icahn argued that corporate management was dominated by institutional politicians who rose the ladder without being good at managing or allocating capital, and this Peter Principle-like dynamic gave activists the chance to fix companies.

    “Icahn had this idea, this, I think you call it, anti-Darwinian idea of kind of corporate management”

  • The shareholder-value principle is a fairly recent idea and potentially a fictional one, and it is taken for granted by most people despite its history being contestable.

    “you realize that is kind of a not only a fairly recent concept, but also potentially a fictional one.”

  • Alfred Rappaport argues managers talk about shareholder value but actually manage to quarterly earnings, and for every Bezos there may be 50 to 100 more myopic managers, given the Fortune 500 CEO tenure of about six years.

    “Alfred Rappaport who's written a number of books on this topic says that managers talk shareholder value, but then walk quarterly earnings.”

  • Lynn Stout argues that shareholder-value thinking is a belief system rarely questioned, leads managers to myopically chase short-term earnings, discourages innovation and harms employees, customers and communities.

    “Shareholder value thinking causes corporate managers to focus myopicly on short-term earnings reports at the expense of long-term performance”

  • Shareholder value has become popular partly because it is measurable: share price and earnings can be tracked, whereas stakeholder outcomes are softer and fuzzier, in an age obsessed with statistics and measurables.

    “I wonder coming back to the idea of stakeholder versus shareholder value, if the idea of shareholder value has become so popular and so commonly accepted because it's very measurable.”

0.65

High-conviction buybacks have added value, despite negative coverage framing buybacks as manipulative.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Patrick's research separated buybacks into low conviction at 5 percent or less of shares in a year and high conviction at 5 to 10 percent or more, finding that higher-conviction programs were associated with cheaper relative valuations.

    “higher conviction on average the share prices are trading at cheaper or bigger discounts.”

  • High-buyback firms lagged considerably in 2015 and early 2016, even though buybacks have been an effective longer-term factor.

    “Now, we're in a period now of certainly 2015 and thus far in 2016 when these high buyback firms have lagged pretty considerably”

  • High-conviction buyback groups outperformed the market by about 4 percent per year in forward returns since 1982, while low-conviction groups outperformed by only about 1 percent per year.

    “The low conviction group outperforms by, say, 1% a year a little bit, but not hugely significant. Then, that high conviction group outperforms by about 4% a year.”

  • Most coverage of buybacks is negative, framing them as manipulative, self-serving EPS boosts that should be replaced by growth investment, even though empirical evidence shows that well-timed, high-conviction buybacks can add value.

    “most coverage of buybacks is pejorative or negative. There seems to be this kind of narrative that it's manipulative, it's self-serving.”

0.46

Active investing now means passive selection with active ownership, under pressure toward closet indexing.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Active investors now face the problem of separating signal from noise in alternative data, since most of the information from research boutiques is likely useless.

    “the problem we face now as active investors is how in the world to separate signal from the noise because, surely, most of that information is completely useless.”

  • The traditional active-passive distinction has inverted: active management historically meant stock picking to beat the market, while passive ownership now involves active governance involvement, so the new active is passive selection with active ownership.

    “It's active selection passive ownership, I'll call it. Now, it's the opposite. It's passive selection.”

  • Institutional asset management pressures portfolios to look like the market because managers who underperform even briefly, against low-cost passive alternatives, face a shortening leash, which pushes them toward closet indexing even without any change in strategy.

    “the fastest way to get fired and I can attest to this, running portfolios that look a bit different from the market is to underperform”