What this covers
This is a memorial conversation in which Rick talks with David, who became Managing Partner of Glynn Capital seven or eight years before the interview, about his father, John Glynn. It mixes biography with method. Glynn left a law practice after about five years, having realized he was doing paperwork for companies being built in Silicon Valley. He started his firm in 1974 with public companies and began private investing in 1978 with a first venture fund. He saw no line between public and private, asking only what a company could become in five to ten years. His friendships with Gordon Moore and Bob Noyce led to an Intel investment at a $26 million valuation that people thought was crazy.
The middle of the conversation covers specific bets. Facebook was backed in August 2008 on test revenue and a team of A players. Palantir was backed in fall 2009 after rising AWS spending across portfolio companies pointed the firm toward cloud data analytics, and it was held for nearly 13 years. ServiceNow's revenue ran at twice analyst projections five years after its IPO. Several of David's claims run against convention: financial models are always wrong, the best businesses always feel expensive, and an analyst who presents a model without meeting management has a serious problem. Glynn also advised his son against business classes in favor of reading, writing and analytical thinking, and taught with a case method built on recent, still-operating companies.
The conversation also covers how Glynn ran meetings, what he asked CEOs, and why the firm sees itself as a co-owner. It ends on how the firm outlasted a gradual succession, and on Glynn measuring his life by relationships.
John Glynn's investing success came from treating people, judgment about intangibles, and wave-of-change analysis as the core edge, with financial modeling as a humbling secondary step, and this approach carried over into how his firm operates.
- The common thread across Glynn's portfolio was the quality of entrepreneurs and their teams, not market timing alone
- Forecasts are routinely wrong, so the edge lies in judging people and secular shifts rather than precise models
- Glynn's firm treats co-ownership, integrity, and writing-based analysis as durable institutional habits that survived succession
Founder quality, team culture, and people judgment matter more than market size or financial models.
- The common thread across John Glynn's investments was people: he looked for entrepreneurs who really wanted to build something and a culture that attracts and retains other great people, because being an entrepreneur is hard and cannot be pursued to get rich quick.
“It is people. It is trying to identify entrepreneurs that really want to build something and want to build a culture that attracts and retains other great people and are committed to that.”
- After the opening question, Glynn probed how the CEO or team was spending their time and what keeps them up at night, asking in a soft way how they prioritize, what matters now, and what will matter in the next couple of years.
“Generally speaking, it would be about priorities and what keeps you up at night. He wanted to understand how the CEO or team was spending their time”
- John Glynn's first-meeting question was 'what are you trying to build here?', asked in a disarming way, and then he let the CEO talk, because the two or three open-ended questions that get the CEO discussing who they are, where they came from, and how they will get there matter most.
“he was like, what are you trying to build here? And let the CEO talk. That's the most important thing is figuring out the two or three open-ended questions.”
- A key test of a CEO is whether they are an A player willing to hire other A players and delegate, and young CEOs struggle most with delegation, often believing they can do it themselves and hiring people who may not be able to do the job.
“was the CEO an A player willing to hire other A players and delegate? And I think that's one of the things that young CEOs struggle the most with is delegating.”
- When an analyst presents a financial model without having spent time with the management team, John Glynn considered that the biggest problem, since understanding people, personalities, and motivations is central to investing.
“And he's like, well, that's problem number one. That's the biggest piece of it, is really getting younger people and analysts to understand how critical people, personalities, motivations are to what we do.”
- Glynn's firm invested in Palantir in fall 2009, held it for nearly 13 years, and Palantir was roughly a $40 billion market cap company at the time of the interview, with founders saying they had no interest in going public, which the investors found attractive.
“And it was a long journey with the company for nearly 13 years of ownership, but worked out really well for us. Today, Palantir is roughly a $40 billion market cap company.”
- The edge in investing is not necessarily a unique insight but the emphasis placed on people and the art of judgment, rather than treating management meetings as a checkbox in diligence.
“I think the edge isn't necessarily the insight. It's the emphasis, placing value and importance on that piece rather than having it be one check box on the list of diligence stuff”
- Acquiring Zappos, which Amazon bought, was less valuable for its success than for the new view it gave into Amazon and its cloud business, because portfolio companies' usage of AWS provided signals about industry shifts.
“the real benefit for us was really a new lens into what was going on within Amazon.”
- At the first meeting with Facebook, the presence of several highly capable early team members, not just Mark Zuckerberg, convinced Glynn's team the company had depth beyond a single founder.
“this isn't just one person, Mark, this is some incredibly talented people on the table.”
- Glynn's investing process deliberately set market size aside as the primary question, treating it as a baseline requirement while focusing on people and the underlying change driving opportunity.
“Market, hugely important. So just sort of take that off the table for a second.”
- Being mission-driven about defending democracy and allies is meaningfully different from claiming mission-driven status for ordinary software, and Glynn saw Palantir's mission as genuinely present across its offices.
“being mission-driven about some mundane software versus being mission-driven about helping to defend and protect democracy”
- Private company financial models are almost always wrong, with analysts either overestimating or underestimating outcomes, and the investing business is built on acknowledging being wrong rather than predicting precisely.
“We're in the business of being wrong from a financial modeling perspective.”
- Glynn did not distinguish between public and private companies, asking only what a company could become five or ten years out and how he could get involved, a view that anticipated a later convergence in investing.
“He invested in public companies first and then invested in private companies in 1978. That was our first venture fund. But what he did was he never saw the line between public and private companies. He just saw company.”
- Advent Software is so deeply embedded in financial services firms that they would not want to rip it out, and even Glynn's own firm has tried unsuccessfully to disrupt its use internally.
“if you ever go into a financial services firm and tell them you're going to rip out Advent Software, they don't want to do that.”
Glynn Capital prioritizes substance over size, judging success by investing outcomes rather than AUM.
- David views Glynn Capital as a 50-year-old startup that has invested across six major economic cycles, building institutional knowledge and a reputation for going the distance, while growing roughly 10x over 15 years with growth not being the goal in assets under management.
“I actually view us as a 50-year-old start-up in some respects... we've grown roughly 10x over the last 15 years and I feel like we're just getting started.”
- Glynn Capital treats itself as a big family in which every person matters, interviews candidates with the whole firm, and avoids transactional relationships by helping employees with life events in meaningful ways.
“We operate the firm as though we are a big family. ... we do our best to not be transactional in anything that we do.”
- Glynn Capital has no dollar or size target; the firm's growth should be the output of investing success and partnership, not an assets-under-management goal.
“And so there's no dollar number that we're trying to get to or size that we're trying to get to from a people perspective.”
- Glynn Capital has grown roughly tenfold over 15 years, but growth is not measured by assets under management; success is judged by investing outcomes, and the firm wants substance over size.
“And so there's no dollar number that we're trying to get to or size that we're trying to get to from a people perspective.”
Teaching, learning, and analytical writing were central to Glynn's network and practice.
- John Glynn's teaching began at the University of Virginia's Darden School when he walked into the business school and pitched a venture capital and entrepreneurship course to the dean, which Darden did not previously offer, and he later taught at Stanford GSB where demand required a second teacher.
“my dad went in to the business school, was able to sit down with the Dean, he just happened to be there, and talk to him about this idea he had for teaching this course on venture capital and entrepreneurship.”
- Glynn's case method used recent, still-operating companies with open-ended questions rather than historical cases with known outcomes, which produced spirited classroom discussion with no single right answer.
“where the questions were open ended, right? ... when the company is still sort of mid-stage and still operating and going, you don't know. And it inspired this really interesting conversation in the class”
- Guests in John Glynn's class included Peter Thiel and Mike Maples, and teaching gave him a way to learn from accomplished practitioners while passing knowledge to students.
“whether it was Peter Thiel or Mike Maples or whoever... These people that are just really good at what they do.”
- John Glynn advised his son not to take business classes in college because business skills can be learned later, and instead to learn to read, write, and think analytically, which he believed came from legal training and the ability to synthesize and communicate.
“He's like, I don't want you taking on business classes... Go learn to read, to write, to think analytically.”
- Glynn Capital writes memos and sentences rather than using slides or bullet points, because writing forces the analytical thinking that the firm values.
“We don't do slides, we write. We write memos, we write actual sentences. There's not a lot of bullet points.”
- Over about 30 years of teaching, John Glynn's thousands of students founding companies gave his firm access, because when founders learned he was John Glynn's son they recognized the name from class, which shifted the conversation and created opportunities; David acknowledged the teaching also had a selfish professional element.
“over the course of 30 years, he's got thousands of students that are out there founding companies. ... the tone of the conversation immediately shifts.”
- Glynn treated every interaction as an opportunity to learn, listening closely and reflecting afterward; David argued this habit, rooted in natural curiosity and empathy, became an incredible habit that persisted until Glynn's death.
“he viewed every interaction with people as an opportunity to learn.”
- Glynn's legal training gave him the ability to read, synthesize, and communicate through writing or speaking, which David says was critical to how Glynn taught and later how the firm operates.
“I think that comes from his education as a lawyer.”
- Glynn's cases were built around entrepreneurs he worked with, and David says his father's case-writing passion was immersing students in what is happening today, with help from Stanford staff.
“He was a prolific case writer. He had a lot of help doing this at Stanford”
Best companies outrun forecasts, so pattern recognition matters and they rarely look cheap.
- Five years after its IPO, ServiceNow's revenues were twice what analysts had projected at the time of the IPO, illustrating how growth and compounding routinely exceed forecasts for companies that are getting it right.
“When ServiceNow went public five years after its IPO, the revenues were 2x what analysts were projecting at the time of the IPO.”
- Glynn's firm invested in Facebook in August 2008 when revenue was only test revenue, betting on a team of A players and on the wave of how people communicate, with expectations far below Facebook's eventual size, and John Glynn was almost 70 at the time.
“We invested in Facebook in August of 2008. The business was super early. The revenue that the company had at that point was not what it was going to be years going forward.”
- John Glynn befriended Intel founders Gordon Moore and Bob Noyce and was able to invest in Intel at a $26 million valuation, which people thought was crazy at the time but worked out.
“He had befriended the founders of Intel, Gordon Moore and Bob Noyce, credible people and was able to invest in Intel at a $26 million valuation.”
- Investors are always wrong in their financial models, either overestimating or underestimating, and the companies that work out best outperform forecasts by so much in revenue growth and durability that they cannot be forecast in advance, so pattern recognition is what matters.
“And the reality is, you're always wrong. We're in the business of being wrong from a financial modeling perspective.”
- John Glynn's rule was that you never pay too much for your best businesses, because the best companies almost always feel expensive at the time of investment, as with Intel at a $26 million valuation that seemed crazy then.
“I'll just quote my dad, you never paid too much for your best businesses, full stop.”
Major opportunities emerge from tectonic shifts observed through networks, not market-size reports.
- Silicon Valley's talent density and productivity over several decades is arguably the country's most valuable resource, even though it is not a traditional natural resource.
“Silicon Valley is arguably our most valuable resource. It's not a traditional natural resource, but the talent density and productivity that Silicon Valley has produced over the last several decades is incredible.”
- Identifying a wave of change requires observing, listening, reading, and talking to a network to form independent conclusions about market size, rather than relying on a report like one from McKinsey.
“It wasn't just looking at a McKinsey report or some report about how big a market was. It was, we're going to roll up our sleeves and we're going to get our hands dirty”
- A big market opportunity is necessary, but the firm's real focus is on what is shifting underneath, a tectonic change over the next 10 to 15 years, such as semiconductors, mainframe to client-server, the Internet, or social media, rather than just a large total addressable market.
“What's really going on here? What's shifting in the ground that's causing a tectonic change in sort of what's to come over the next 10 or 15 years?”
- Palantir initially sold to large government agencies with no traditional sales team and commercial customers like banks came to it on their own, showing that government agencies were shifting from tough, lumpy, long-cycle customers to attractive ones.
“The salespeople were called forward-deployed engineers... The company was focused on selling to large government agencies, but banks and other companies heard about the product and came knocking on Palantir's door.”
- Portfolio companies increasing AWS spending from x to 2x to 5x a month revealed that falling compute and storage costs had let companies store and analyze larger data sets, which prompted Glynn's firm to invest in cloud-based data analytics and led it to Palantir in 2009.
“our companies were increasing their spend monthly from x a month to 2x a month to 5x a month, and so on. It's the kind of growth that you only really see when something really different is going on.”
The firm wins meetings through integrity and co-ownership rather than by being loudest.
- Most investment firms do not survive the founding group or any sort of succession, and succession at Glynn Capital happened gradually over roughly a decade, with David taking on more responsibility before becoming Managing Partner seven or eight years before the interview.
“Most investment firms don't make it for a variety of different reasons. They don't make it from the first group that started it. Most firms don't make it through any sort of succession.”
- Glynn Capital gets meetings with companies it might not otherwise access because it is not the biggest or loudest firm, but has a reputation for doing what it says, acting with integrity, treating people well, and asking good questions.
“We're able to meet with companies maybe we wouldn't get a meeting with otherwise because we're not the biggest firm. We're not the loudest firm”
- Glynn's firm does not think of itself as owning stock but as co-owning a business with the founder and management team, so it has a responsibility to arrive at every meeting fully prepared to listen and help, not to poke holes or extract information.
“We don't own stock. We are co-owners of a business with the person sitting across the table from us as CEO, the founder, management team.”
- Palantir's stated disinterest in going public and its genuine mission orientation, unlike the vague mission claims of other companies, made the investors believe the company wanted to build something big without focusing on short-term outcomes.
“For us, we thought maybe we had found a company that really wanted to build something big without being focused on any short-term outcome.”
John Glynn measured life by relationships and family, pairing drive with humility and presence at home.
- John Glynn was driven by success in all aspects of life but balanced it with presence at home, such as being home for dinner, so he did not miss family life while building his career.
“He wasn't the kind of person or kind of father that was working all the time and gone and missed everything. He was very present and home for dinner”
- John Glynn had a tough exterior, his wife described him as a bear with a heart, and he rarely let people fully into his thinking, though David believed he would open up if asked directly about how he felt about his life.
“My mom always called him kind of bear with a heart. ... He had this sort of tough exterior that was up in conversations.”
- John Glynn would measure his life by relationships, such as his marriage, his children, and the entrepreneurs he worked with, rather than by company successes or multiples on investments, reflecting a humble, soft-spoken approach.
“He wouldn't talk about the success of a company or the multiple that he got on it or whatever. It would be about the experiences that he was able to have with these incredible entrepreneurs”
- John Glynn carried a soft-spoken humility, almost feeling he should not be in the room, which made him likable in interactions with people.
“he always walked in the room... with this very soft-spoken humbleness.”
Growing up with a driven father shaped David's work ethic, risk-taking, and balanced temperament.
- Growing up in Palo Alto with a father in technology investing, David was exposed early to entrepreneurs and technology, such as testing games at Electronic Arts as a child, which seeped in and led him to eventually do something entrepreneurial or tangentially related.
“It was almost impossible for me, and it was cool... But it was impossible not to have that just seep in. And so I realized pretty quickly that at some point, I would do something entrepreneurial”
- John Glynn cultivated work ethic in his children by giving David a daily list of tasks even on Saturday mornings, instilling a sense of day-to-day responsibility tied to longer-term commitments such as work, family, or chores.
“It didn't matter Saturday, seven in the morning, he would literally knock on the door and he's like, David, here's what you got to do today.”
- David sees himself as a balance of his parents: driven by success and risk-taking like his father, with a softer, more balanced side from his mother, and his parents' marriage worked because their values overlapped even though their methods differed.
“Their values overlapped completely, but their way of doing things was very different.”
- John Glynn drove with his left foot on the brake and right on the accelerator, which David links to his father's refusal to see investing one-dimensionally across public and private companies.
“He used his left for the break and his right for the accelerator.”
Glynn's firm has treated public and private investing as one continuum since 1974.
- Glynn founded his firm in fall 1974, a terrible economic time, so raising capital for a young investor for a ten-year fund was tough and he had to cobble together early investors, including two Intel-linked semiconductor figures.
“in the fall of 1974, and I wish he were here to describe it, it was a terrible time in the economy. So for a young kid to go out there and try to raise a bunch of capital for a 10-year lack of fund was tough.”
- John Glynn started his firm in 1974 during a terrible economy by investing in public companies first, then began private investing in 1978 with the first venture fund, because he never saw a line between public and private companies and only asked what a company could become over five to ten years.
“He invested in public companies first and then invested in private companies in 1978. That was our first venture fund. But what he did was he never saw the line between public and private companies. He just saw company.”
- John Glynn left a law practice after about five years once he realized he was doing legal paperwork for companies being built in Silicon Valley and was on the wrong side of the fence, recognizing that the technology innovation around him was an opportunity to get involved in.
“he kind of popped his head up when he was like, something's going on here. Like I'm doing all this paperwork, legal paperwork for these companies that are getting built... I'm on the wrong side of the fence here.”
Glynn modeled his firm on early venture partnerships and first-generation pioneers' long-term commitment.
- Early venture capital was built on ecosystems of small firms rather than large funds, and Glynn modeled his firm on partnership both internally and externally, following the first-generation venture pioneers he admired.
“Because nobody had gigantic funds. It was an ecosystem of people.”
- Early entrepreneurs like Gordon Moore and Bob Noyce, who sat in open offices rather than private ones, were laser-focused on their technology and company, illustrating that being an entrepreneur requires long-term commitment rather than quick riches.
“Gordon Moore and Bob Noyce had center offices in the middle of a floor, never an outside office.”
- Venture capital as an industry started around 1958 when the government allowed banks to invest in private companies, and Glynn belonged to the second generation of venture capitalists, admiring the first generation.
“So venture started, think about it in 1958. The government basically allows banks to invest in private companies essentially.”