What this covers

Patrick, host of Invest Like the Best, talks with Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal about what they have learned from early-stage investing and from studying large acquisitions. The first half is a toolkit. They propose asking first whether a company is in an emerging market or transforming a legacy one, since each triggers different questions. They build a Tree of Contributing Factors to test whether a $5 billion TAM is plausible, using SaaS gross margin and pricing by customer size. And they treat venture pricing as a clearing price set by supply and demand, not by comps or DCF. Helmer's Seven Powers comes with a caveat: knowing the powers does not give you them.

The middle covers deal mechanics and market behavior. Two or three co-leads, David says, usually means five to eight term sheets came in. Ben argues founders should prefer fewer engaged investors to a party round. In uncertain times, money herds into the top tenth of companies still growing month over month. Airlines make a contrast: a fixed pie, closer to real estate than venture.

The second half turns to acquisitions such as Instagram, YouTube and DoubleClick. Ben notes that Instagram was negotiated over a weekend at Mark Zuckerberg's house, and that price and diligence run inversely. Acquirers also had an information edge from their own data. The recurring explanation is zero marginal cost economics, and Android is read as a hedge against paying Apple for default search. Two contested forecasts stand out: that such acquisitions won't recur, and that GPT-3 could be a next platform. They also admit they wrongly expected streaming to produce esports league value.

Sharpest takeaway

Gilbert and Rosenthal argue that early-stage investing turns on founder insight rather than polish, that TAM is unmodelable and expands wherever founders care, and that the most valuable acquisitions were media and software deals whose value came from zero-marginal-cost economics and the acquirer's information edge.

  • In emerging markets the scarce trait is understanding a new need, not organizational polish
  • Huge TAM expansions came from founders who cared about the product, which no analyst could have modeled
  • Top acquisitions were mostly tech and media deals whose value came from zero marginal cost and acquirer data advantages

The argument · threads6 threads · 59 claims
0.85

Early-stage investors should classify the market as emerging or legacy and stress-test large numbers qualitatively.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The first question an early-stage investor should ask is whether a business is in an emerging market or is trying to transform a legacy market, because each triggers a different set of evaluation questions.

    “I often ask myself the first question in the flowchart which is, "Is this business in an emerging market or trying to transform a legacy market?"”

  • After decomposing a seemingly implausible number, the investor should move from quantitative modeling to qualitative work, talking to people to find the circumstances under which that number could actually happen.

    “you move from the quantitative to the qualitative”

  • A useful way to judge whether a market can become big is to build a tree of contributing factors that multiply to a large target number, such as a $5 billion TAM, using unit economics like SaaS gross margin and pricing by customer size, then branch down until assumptions are granular enough to reveal core beliefs without false precision.

    “My favorite way to do this is to basically make a tree of contributing factors that ultimately add up to a large number.”

  • In an emerging market, investors should not weight whether the founder is an experienced manager or polished, because the scarce commodity is a founder who understands the needs of a newly developing thing and can build a product that galvanizes a movement.

    “if it's an emerging market, you really don't need to pay attention to is this founder and experienced manager? ... that's not the scarce commodity in the business.”

  • In a pitch deck, once TAM is calculated as under one billion dollars, the business had better be in an emerging market, otherwise it is not an investable opportunity.

    “as soon as I get to TAM, if it's less than a billion, then it sure as heck better be an emerging market otherwise, it's just not an investible one.”

  • An emerging market is one that only a few people are obsessed with now, where few can mean hundreds of thousands or millions, and it is not yet a universally accepted view of how the world will be.

    “can I see this thing that only a few people are obsessed with now becoming huge? And I use few there. It could be in the hundreds of thousands or millions”

0.66

Top acquisitions created value through net new revenue upside and network effects, not cost synergies.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The kind of transformative acquisition seen with Instagram, DoubleClick, and YouTube is unlikely to happen again, due to regulatory reasons and because private capital markets now have late-stage funding that prices fast-growing companies far above a billion dollars.

    “I don't think we'll ever see that again for regulatory reasons, if none other.”

  • Most of the top ten acquisitions created value through net new revenue upside rather than cost savings or synergies, and revenue upside has an asymmetric payoff that synergy-seeking deals do not.

    “most of these top 10 were revenue upside, not cost savings.”

  • The Acquired top 10 acquisitions list ranked deals by absolute dollar return to the acquirer, requiring wholesale purchases rather than partial stakes, and the list is dominated by tech and media businesses.

    “our yardstick for ultimately ranking these acquisitions was in the absolute dollar value return to the acquirer.”

  • The driving force of value creation in the top acquisitions was network effects on the internet and businesses with zero marginal costs and zero distribution costs, which makes tech businesses media businesses with an added software layer that delivers ongoing value without creating new content.

    “the driving force of the massive amount of value creation on basically every single one was network effects on the internet, the fact that these companies in large part had zero marginal costs and also in large part had zero distribution costs.”

  • Measured by absolute dollar return, Instagram generated over $150 billion, DoubleClick over $120 billion, and YouTube $85 billion for their acquirers, and these acquirers' market caps grew meaningfully, sometimes 50 percent, in the six months since the episode.

    “Instagram, the absolute dollar return was over $150 billion, DoubleClick was over $120 billion, YouTube was $85 billion.”

0.57

Value and power concentrate in platforms, incumbents, and consolidated commodity industries, leaving few startup opportunities.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Analysts including Ben and David mistakenly projected that the rise of streaming would accrue to organized competitive esports leagues in the manner of traditional sports, but so far the value has gone to publishers and broadcasters, leaving no new startup ecosystem.

    “there was a mistake made by all of us who were analyzing the industry and looking at the rise of streaming and projecting that that would accrue to competitive, organized eSports”

  • Airline economics resemble real estate because the number of gates is fixed and rarely expanded, so prices are high for constrained assets, and airline businesses compete over a fixed pie based on balance sheet management rather than the venture-style expansion where the future is assumed to be 1000x larger.

    “There are a very fixed number of gates and no one's build new airports and rarely are they building new terminals.”

  • Amazon is growing around 40 percent, which is faster than any of the other big tech companies, so one could ask why anyone invests in startups rather than a trillion-and-a-half-dollar public company growing that fast.

    “Why not just invest in a trillion-and-a-half-dollar public company that's growing faster than any of them?”

  • The airline industry has consolidated into a pure commodity where differentiated airlines have failed, so Virgin America had few potential acquirers, and Alaska was the de facto winner because it was the only buyer with a strong enough financial profile.

    “it's effectively a pure commodity at this point. ... Alaska was almost the de-facto winner, because they were the only one who could kind of get it done”

  • Instagram's media model benefits from other people making content for free, whereas YouTube pays creators about half its revenue, which means Instagram pays nothing to creators.

    “In YouTube's case, they pay out half of their revenue to those creators and in Instagram's case, they don't need to pay anything to their creators.”

  • Google built Android to create a credible competitor to Apple's iOS and reduce traffic acquisition costs, since without Android the iPhone's monopoly would force Google to pay Apple dozens of billions of dollars a year to remain the default search engine.

    “if Android did not exist and the iPhone had a monopoly, Google would have to pay dozens, literally dozens of billions of dollars to Apple every single year.”

0.47

Identifying the next platform wave is hard, since powers come from invention rather than analysis.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Hamilton Helmer's Seven Powers warns that understanding powers is not the ticket to having them, because creativity and invention are the necessary precondition, and founders who start by asking which power they can build will not get there.

    “Hamilton Helmer basically has caution tape all over his book that says that understanding the powers are not the ticket that you need in order to have them.”

  • GPT-3 may be a potential next platform because it is so powerful and amorphous, a generative model trained on a large chunk of the internet, including public GitHub, that can take text, code, or image inputs and may be capable of things no prior model could do.

    “GPT-3 is a potential one. It's so hard to know how that will evolve. But it's so powerful and so amorphous that it's got a shot.”

  • Ben is trying to identify the next wave comparable to the App Store launch in 2008, which created a free-for-all of creativity before moats formed, and he lacks conviction in crypto, DeFi, and other frontier tech as that wave.

    “I am desperately trying to get better at figuring out what the next App Store is.”

  • In times of uncertainty, herd mentality increases so that investor dollars flood into the top roughly 10 percent of companies still hitting milestones and growing month over month, pushing prices up for a smaller set of assets while the middle of the curve struggles to raise.

    “in times of uncertainty, herd mentality increases and therefore prices go up among a smaller set of assets.”

0.29

Founders should admit only investors who add specific, engaged value, avoiding party rounds.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Beyond the lead investor, founders should ask what specific value each additional investor will uniquely bring, and if that value cannot be quantified it should at least be specifically articulated.

    “what is the specific value to this company that this investor will uniquely bring and can you, if not quantify it, then at least specifically articulate it?”

  • Between a term sheet and signed definitive docs, adding one more investor always feels compelling, but the incentives of follow-on investors to participate in a round can make it worse for the founder, who should prefer fewer engaged investors over a party round.

    “the worst thing you can do is get yourself into a position where the founders are the only people who have real career risk on the line with the company”

  • Ben named Benchmark partnership as the firm whose investment judgment he would most want to see from 15 years ago, because they did not miss.

    “Mine is the Benchmark partnership 15 years ago. ... But they just didn't miss.”

0.29

Acquirers with data advantages and hot deals move fast and skip formal diligence.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • A Disney employee who bent rules to get Ben and his girlfriend onto Rise of the Resistance before their flight was the kindest act Ben has experienced because he gained nothing from it.

    “He truly had no personal gain in doing that, and many kind things that people do. There's some amount of personal gain, this one had actually none.”

  • Acquirers such as Facebook and Google had a competitive advantage because they knew the future from their own data, like Zuckerberg seeing Instagram's impact on Facebook, so Ben revised the view to say they had little process rather than little diligence because the data enabled faster conviction.

    “So maybe I should revise and say it's not as much that they did little diligence, it's that they did little process because they had the data to enable them to get to that sort of conviction faster.”

  • There is an inverse relationship between purchase price and the amount of diligence done, driven by deal heat, as with Instagram, which was negotiated over a weekend in Mark Zuckerberg's backyard and bypassed corporate development and the board until notified.

    “I think there is an inverse relationship between the purchase price and the amount of diligence that is done. ... The Instagram deal went entirely around anybody in Corp Dev”