GE Aerospace: Full Throttle
What this covers
The episode is a Business Breakdowns conversation in which Matt Reustle talks with Ramesh about how a commercial jet engine business actually works. It begins with the engineering: hot-section temperatures that exceed alloy melting points, a difficulty compared to chip fabrication and reusable rockets. It then moves to the commercial structure, in which the airframer buys the engine and the airline lives with it. Airlines choose on time on wing. The discussion covers CFM International, the 50/50 GE–Safran venture, the LEAP's roughly 70% share of narrow-bodies, and the choice between sole-source and shared platforms.
The range is wider than the economics of service. Ramesh recounts Rolls-Royce's 1970s collapse over the RB211, and Pratt & Whitney's slide from about 60% of the fleet in 1995 to under 20%, as evidence that dominance can erode over decades. He covers the Welch and Immelt era of acquisitions and GE Capital leverage, then argues that much of the margin gain under Larry Culp came from shedding Vernova rather than from operations.
Several positions are contested. Ramesh says engine programs should be judged on cash IRR over program life, models air travel at roughly 1.5x GDP growth, and values the installed base like an inflation-protected bond. He also calls GE's open-rotor design, a decade or more away, a potential game changer with about 20% better fuel burn. Latent demand gets a concrete number: about 40% of CFM56 engines have yet to see a first shop visit.
Ramesh argues GE Aerospace is a durable, scarce aftermarket annuity: engine makers sell engines at or near breakeven to lock in decades of regulation-mandated, high-margin service revenue, so value rests on the installed base rather than on new-aircraft sales.
- OE engines are sold at deep discounts while spare parts and services are sold to fragmented airlines at roughly 60% gross margins
- Sole-source positions on Boeing 737 MAX, 787, 777 and COMAC platforms create a near-monopoly installed base
- High barriers to entry, mandated maintenance, and PMA resistance keep the aftermarket protected through cycles
GE's engine losses are temporary, and lifetime cash returns will turn favorable.
- GE has passed the hardest part of the LEAP ramp, and OE losses should narrow to breakeven over the next five years, while slower CFM56 retirements provide a cash cushion that makes the next 5-10 years of cash flow favorable.
“you could make a good case that the losses from the OE side for LEAP should reduce quite substantially over the next five years to make it breakeven.”
- Capital intensity of engine programs should be judged by cash IRR over the life of the program, since engines are costly and loss-making early and then throw off cash in the mature aftermarket phase.
“The correct framing is from a cash IRR perspective, because engines cost a lot to develop and they suffer a lot of losses in the early phases.”
Welch and Immelt's growth, EPS focus, and GE Capital leverage lacked business rationale.
- Under Jack Welch and Jeff Immelt, GE pursued growth, acquisitions, and earnings-per-share management, and GE Capital exposed a lot of leverage while the businesses competed for capital without a true business rationale for holding them together.
“A big part was played by GE Capital, which exposed a lot of leverage in the system, and the various businesses housed under GE were competing for capital”
Making jet engines at scale is among humanity's toughest technical challenges.
- Making a jet engine at scale is among humanity's toughest technical challenges, comparable to semiconductor fabrication, biologics manufacturing, or reusable rockets, because hot-section temperatures exceed alloy melting points and engines must survive extreme conditions.
“within the hot section of the engine, inside the high-pressure turbine, the temperatures can exceed the melting point of alloys”