What this covers

Patrick talks with Rishi Ganti about how Orthogon invests, and the conversation starts with why so little capital goes this way. Ganti describes allocators who are not paid to try new strategies, so choosing something like Blackstone is rational for their careers whatever the expected return. He also argues that fees mean managers bid at a premium, so the industry loses money on a risk-adjusted basis, a claim that is contested. He ranks assets on an Asset Liquidity Mountain, from currencies and stocks at the efficient base up to esoteric assets at the peak, where no one else is bidding.

The middle of the episode is concrete. Ganti walks through charter school receivables, backed by a California payment waterfall that pays schools ahead of bondholders. He says ERAN notes still priced in basis points during 2008, and that the business grew from about $100,000 in receivables in its first year to a market of hundreds of millions that it created. He also covers buying Italian hospital receivables at a discount and enforcing them in court, and bank-held assets that regulators force out in confidential one-buyer sales. He describes Orthogon's returns as showing little equity, rate, or credit exposure, but says they carry change-of-law risk, the risk that secrecy fails, and the risk that competitors arrive once the opportunity is discovered.

Two claims stand out as contentious. One is that the usual rule that smaller managers outperform does not apply when a firm builds its own platform rather than competing for shared opportunities. The other is that the only real barrier to entry is human capital. The talk then moves to the value of abstraction, citing Renaissance Technologies. It closes on education, where Ganti forecasts that credentialism will fade, and on introspection coming before planning.

Sharpest takeaway

Ganti argues that alpha exists only where no price mechanism operates, so investors should build operating platforms that create and mine esoteric, non-market assets rather than compete for traded ones.

  • Multiple bidders in a market compete away alpha, so returns come from assets with few or no bidders
  • Non-traded assets vastly outnumber traded ones, but attention and capital concentrate on traded markets
  • Esoteric assets are unlocked by building operational platforms that originate, refine, and own them, as with charter school receivables and Italian state payments

The argument · threads11 threads · 77 claims
0.68

Alpha exists only where no competing bidder exists, making esoteric assets the sole source.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Esoteric assets are non-bid, non-flow, non-market, non-auctioned, non-brokered, one-of-a-kind, orphaned or ignored assets, which are the category where competition is absent.

    “Those are non-bid, non-flow, non-market, non-auctioned, non-bid. They are typically one-of-a-kind, orphaned, or ignored.”

  • Assets can be ranked on a mountain by how easily cheap pattern-seeking agents can enter them: the most liquid assets like currencies, stocks, and mortgages are the most efficient, then off-the-run bonds, then niche assets, then high-touch M&A and buyouts, and esoterics at the top are the only ones without a competing bidder.

    “Clearly, the assets that are the most susceptible are the most liquid. Those will be currencies or stocks or mortgages”

  • If there are even two bidders in a market, they squeeze out all the alpha that exists, because alpha is the gap between price and fair value and competition closes that gap.

    “If you even have two bidders in a market, you're squeezing out all the alpha that exists.”

  • To earn real alpha one must avoid the price mechanism, and to avoid the price mechanism one must avoid markets altogether.

    “In order to get real alpha, in my opinion... you have to avoid a price mechanism. To avoid a price mechanism, you have to avoid a market.”

  • Buying refined assets is like buying fish at Whole Foods, where convenience means paying above fair value, whereas a fisherman who harvests raw assets has value unrelated to costs, so alpha is only possible with raw assets.

    “you know you got it above fair value because Whole Foods needs to make a profit margin.”

  • Orthogon knows of no other manager doing strictly non-competed esoteric assets, because building the required machinery took dozens of years of accumulated human capital.

    “In the sense of being pretty strict on looking at non-competed assets, esoterics, one-off, non-bid, non-flow, non-market, non-auctioned, we're alone.”

0.63

Institutions and allocators resist or neglect esoteric strategies for structural reasons, not performance.

10 pointscentrality 4/5
  • A general partner of a large private equity fund invested within about two minutes once Ganti explained that private equity, venture, and real estate are highly competed spaces with little alpha, showing that heavily trained investors respond to the logic.

    “one gentleman that we spoke with decided to invest within about two minutes of the phone call.”

  • Endowments with fixed policy portfolio buckets may refuse an unconventional manager simply because there is no bucket for it, a constraint that is institutional rather than about performance.

    “We have our policy portfolio in certain buckets, and you're not in one.”

  • Non-traded opportunity sets are roughly ten times the size of traditional markets, and by building a machine for each niche the firm treats the niche as the dimension of analysis, so it argues it has solved the scale problem at a first order of magnitude.

    “Multiply by 10. ... We believe we have solved the scale problem at a first order of magnitude.”

  • The world of non-traded assets has to dwarf the world of traded assets, because an asset must be highly refined to be traded, yet investor attention is almost entirely on traded assets, the reverse of their real proportions.

    “we know that the world of non-traded assets simply has to dwarf the world of traded assets. Our attention is exactly the reverse.”

  • Institutional allocators often refuse to invest in first-time funds, managers below 100 million dollars, or managers with track records under three years, which screens out novel strategies like Orthogon's.

    “Well, we don't invest in a first-time fund. We won't invest in a manager that's below $100 million... We won't invest in someone with under a three-year track record.”

  • Many allocators are not paid to take a chance on a new strategy, so their upside is limited and their downside is career risk, which makes safe-seeming choices like Blackstone rational for them regardless of expected return.

    “You don't get fired for putting money with Blackstone. You could with us.”

  • The strongest response to Orthogon has come from people who run their own money, such as private equity general partners, who grasp the unconventional source of returns quickly and invest after a single call.

    “The biggest response has come from investment managers, from people who run their own money”

  • Some investors refuse to invest outside the United States, which Ganti treats as home bias, and others demand a chase manager as a number two, reflecting institutional heuristics he finds hard to justify.

    “We've heard people say, 'We don't like to invest outside the United States.' I actually referred that group to a Wikipedia page on home bias.”

  • Investors who are GPs or run their own money, and who understand the quantitative logic, respond most positively to Orthogon's pitch, while institutional allocators constrained by policy portfolios are the most reluctant.

    “the biggest response has come from investment managers, from people who run their own money, from people who are GPs in private equity funds or hedge funds.”

  • Allocators and endowments often reject uncorrelated strategies because of rigid policy buckets, first-time-fund rules, or demands for a chase manager, even though investing only with competed number-ones guarantees investment in heavily competed assets.

    “We have our policy portfolio in certain buckets, and you're not in one.”

0.61

Orthogon's self-originating alpha-factory platforms seek alpha relentlessly and solve scale.

9 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Orthogon is not a fund-of-funds that invests in managers; its platform teams are operational businesses carrying Orthogon genetics that Orthogon runs in part, so the firm is a system of sister companies managed by industrialists.

    “We are definitely not a fund-to-fund that invests in managers. They are we, and we are they.”

  • Once created, platforms learn, grow, react to threats, and expand into product and geographic adjacencies, so the strategy is biological and the platforms seek alpha relentlessly from wherever they start.

    “Even more than that opportunity, remember platforms can learn. They're really alive. Our investment strategy is biological.”

  • Ganti believes there are no real barriers to entry in esoteric assets aside from the human capital required to operate in them.

    “I don't really think that there are real barriers to entry, aside from the human capital required.”

  • Orthogon does not simply buy assets like a comparison shopper; it builds operating platforms, or alpha factories, that find, refine, and mine esoteric opportunities across a region, like buying the mineral rights and putting an expert mining operation on the land.

    “At Orthogon, we're not actually making investments in the sense directly into assets. ... We are actually building machines. We're building alpha factories”

  • Investors who insist on a strong number two manager to replace a faltering manager are guaranteeing they only invest in heavily competed assets, which is the opposite of the competition-avoidance that generates alpha.

    “If you only invest with number ones that have number twos, you're guaranteeing that you're only investing in assets that are heavily competed.”

  • The rule that smaller managers outperform applies to competed anomalies where the alpha is squeezed out by growth, but it does not apply to non-market scenarios where the firm is not competing for the same opportunities.

    “This kind of rule of thumb, this kind of intuition does not apply to non-market scenarios.”

  • Orthogon has raised more than $100 million and could deploy roughly twice that amount immediately into self-originating platforms, having deployed about a billion dollars over more than a decade.

    “We've raised somewhat more than $100 million. We could deploy at this moment twice that amount”

  • The conventional rule that smaller managers outperform because larger ones get competed out does not apply to non-market esoteric opportunities, where scale is solved by building a platform that defines the analysis dimension.

    “This kind of rule of thumb, this kind of intuition does not apply to non-market scenarios.”

  • Once an operating platform understands a novel asset class, it develops adjacencies, product or geographic, and self-originates new deals relentlessly, so the platform itself becomes the source of deal flow and a built-in safety mechanism.

    “Once these machines are created, they can take on a life of their own.”

0.57

Charter school receivables are safe, high-return assets that factoring can profitably fund.

14 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Individual hospitals lack the legal and accounting expertise to fight the state over one-off payment claims, so it is more cost-effective to outsource enforcement to a platform that aggregates many such claims.

    “Collecting all of these one-offs together and mechanizing them can be a source of value. That's what our platforms do.”

  • The largest charter management organizations, often run by former investment bankers, are the biggest users of factoring, using it as acquisition finance rather than the unsophisticated schools the speaker expected.

    “They are the schools that are run by former investment bankers at Goldman embarking on their second careers as tycoons.”

  • California's constitution includes a payment waterfall that pays schools before bondholders, which makes charter school receivables effectively quadruple-A assets, safer than the bonds of the state itself.

    “California has a waterfall in its constitution... It pays the schools first, and then it pays the bonds.”

  • State rules requiring charter schools to prove six to nine months of teaching before receiving any payment for a student taken off a public school waitlist create a large working-capital barrier that slows the shift of students from public to charter schools, which factoring can pre-fund.

    “the school must prove that it has been teaching the student for six to nine months before they even get one payment”

  • Charter School Capital buys future state payments at a small discount, such as paying 99 dollars for a 100 dollar receivable, which solves the schools' liquidity crisis with very favorable effective rates and brief duration.

    “Charter School Capital came in and said... We'll pay you $99 for it today. Boom.”

  • When states delay payments to charter schools, the schools cannot borrow from banks because they lack assets, credit history, and traditional underwriting criteria, so a lumpy payment delay can force bankruptcy.

    “You don't even own the building that you teach in... You don't have any credit history.”

  • A municipal-bond-like risk of about 10 basis points combined with a roughly 10 percent return on the school receivable implies that the other 9.9 percentage points are an abnormal return not explained by any systematic factor, which Ganti posits as alpha for surfacing the asset into a market.

    “if we make on an IOR basis something like 10% off a school, the actual risk of the payment... is something like 10 basis points.”

  • Because financiers provide 100 percent financing against these quadruple-A receivables, and Charter School Capital has done more than 1.5 billion dollars of such assets with essentially zero loss, the return on equity capital is almost arbitrarily high.

    “financiers typically provide us 100% financing... Charter School Capital has done more than $1.5 billion dollars of these assets with essentially zero loss.”

  • Charter schools are public schools paid by municipalities, so their payments are essentially municipal obligations, and the rules differ by state.

    “What's interesting about charter schools that most people don't realize is that they're not private schools. They are public schools.”

  • Charter school payment receivables are effectively quadruple-A credits, and even during the 2008 crisis, when California delayed payments to state workers and charter schools, ERANs were still issued at yields in basis points, even as Lehman was failing.

    “ERANs are issued at yields in the basis points. This was true even as Lehman was failing.”

  • Charter School Capital has deployed more than $1.5 billion in charter school receivables with essentially zero loss to investors, and banks such as East West Bank, Bank of America and BlackRock have funded the market.

    “Charter School Capital has done more than $1.5 billion dollars of these assets with essentially zero loss.”

  • Traditional public schools benefit when charter schools are delayed in growth, so the waitlist and payment-timing rules function as a check on charter expansion.

    “probably traditional public schools sort of like that. It's a check on charter school growth.”

  • Charter School Capital has done more for charter school growth than any education secretary could, by financing schools so they avoid bankruptcy and can pre-fund waitlisted students.

    “has done more for charter schools than any Betsy DeVos, or any education secretary ever could.”

  • The charter school receivable is safe because school payments are prioritized, meaning default risk is minimal even when the state delays payments to other parties.

    “The banks are not worried. There's been no loss to any investor.”

0.52

Esoteric assets are created, unpriced, and uncompeted, holding large hidden value traditional markets miss.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Esoteric assets are not found lying around but are created: a submerged asset is pulled out, refined, and manufactured through a process, and the firm then owns it, which is why no other investors bid for it.

    “Really we're in an asset creation business. The asset was submerged. We pull it out, we refine it, we create it in a manufacturing process, and then we proceed to own it.”

  • When an asset is not priced at all, bringing it into a market where traditional capital can see it creates social value far beyond what the investor captures.

    “When an asset is not priced at all, the social value pickup by introducing it into a market where at least it can be seen by more traditional sources of capital is immense.”

  • Financial news and tools like Bloomberg cover only a vanishing fraction of available assets, with the newspaper's subjects (Yellen, Draghi, student loans, Apple, Uber) being just the tip of the iceberg.

    “The assets that we read about in the newspaper, what do we read about?”

  • Just as physicists estimate about ten times more dark matter than visible matter, the investable world contains roughly ten times more non-traded assets than the visible traded assets investors can see.

    “we calculate that there are 10 times as much dark matters in the universe, stuff we can't see, than the stuff we can see.”

  • Non-traded assets persist for years without being found, much like a wallet buried under a tree in a forest, so an investor who searches for them faces little competition and the opportunity remains intact.

    “You bury your wallet underneath a tree. You could come back four or five years later... Nobody will have found it.”

0.52

Competition closes price gaps, so sophisticated investors in competed markets lose money.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • In 1990s economics PhD programs, students wrote dissertations trying to show markets were inefficient by finding small anomalies, and they then traded on those anomalies while presenting them in seminars.

    “you would find the smallest of tremors in the market, the smallest perturbations. We called these anomalies.”

  • Market mechanisms produce accurate prices that let ordinary savers buy stocks at reasonable prices, which is socially valuable even though it makes beating the market hard for investors.

    “It's a great thing socially. It's a tough thing for an investor, and that's a good thing overall.”

  • Niche assets such as aircraft leases, music royalties, tax liens, and litigation finance sound attractive but are still competed, so any superior returns they show are probably more apparent than real and carry legitimate risk.

    “In the end, those are also competed assets. ... If you're seeing superior returns there, those returns are probably more apparent than real.”

  • Investment managers who are paid two and 20 generally bid between $1.02 and $1.12 for assets, so on a risk-adjusted basis the asset management industry loses money even when headline returns of around 20 percent look good.

    “generally bid $1.02 to a $1.12 for these assets. In other words, on a risk-adjusted basis, the asset management industry is a money-losing industry.”

  • When asset values are uncertain rather than known, the winner's curse causes bidders to overpay, which is why real-world bidding diverges from the simple textbook auction.

    “In the real world, assets have uncertain values. Phenomena like the winner's curse enter.”

0.34

Orthogon's uncorrelated, low-risk returns are rare and diversify portfolios better than more stocks.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • According to modern portfolio theory, an investor targeting a given return should spread risk across as many distinct dimensions as possible, so an uncorrelated strategy like Orthogon's should be attractive even compared with adding more stocks.

    “an investor should flatten his or her risk surface. That is, spread the risk quanta among as many different dimensions of risk as possible.”

  • Orthogon's returns show little exposure to equity, market, rate, or credit risk factors, but it carries exotic risks such as change in law, secrecy that can expose the platform, and competition that arrives once discovered.

    “We are, however, exposed to rather exotic risks. Risks like change in law. What happens if California changes its state constitution?”

  • Orthogon has delivered consistent double-digit returns, no principal losses, and very low correlation to markets, and most investors can only obtain one of these three characteristics, so the trifecta is rare.

    “We've had consistent double-digit returns. That's number one. Number two is we've had no principal losses, ever. Number three is we've had orthogonality to the markets”

0.32

Non-traded assets are everywhere, and forced sellers without competition can dictate low prices.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Banks like J.P. Morgan hold assets such as tax technology or intellectual property that regulators force them to dispose of, and these can only be sold to one buyer in a confidential transaction at prices unrelated to market activity or intrinsic value, revealing a large world of non-traded assets.

    “They can only sell it to one buyer in a confidential transaction.”

  • Almost everything in a conference room, including microphones, monitors, books, and phones, is a non-traded asset, and a forced seller in such a setting could dictate terms and pay very low prices because there is no competition.

    “everything here is a non-traded asset. The microphones that we're speaking into, these monitors, the books”

0.22

Italian government receivables are a search problem rather than a market, yielding discounted enforceable claims.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The Italian government is far behind on payments to hospitals and other providers, so a team can buy hospital receivables at a discount and then enforce them in court to make the state pay more than the hospital would otherwise recover.

    “We'll secure that payment against the state of Italy, win in court. It's got to work in court to do this.”

  • Charter School Capital started with about $100,000 of receivables in its first year and now does a couple of $100,000 receivables every business day in a market of hundreds of millions of dollars that it created.

    “Today, it does a couple of $100,000 receivables every business day in what is now a market that we created of hundreds of millions of dollars.”

  • The real constraint on this business is finding the fragmented state agencies and counterparties that have these stranded payment problems, since they do not know each other or the firm exists, so it is a search problem rather than a market.

    “we can't find all of the state agencies that are in this kind of predicament. It's really a discovery or a search problem”

  • Italy's pervasive tax avoidance and non-transparent black transactions make its public finances opaque, so bankers must find ways to monetize receivables against a government that routinely delays and claws back payments.

    “That country is crippled by a pervasive culture of tax avoidance and what I'll call black transactions that are never seen.”

0.21

Credentials are overrated, and ideas, curiosity, and economic reasoning matter more.

10 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Ganti regrets having over-planned his life through many credentials and competitive sports rather than stepping back earlier, and he says he became a father only at age 45, which he considers too late.

    “I didn't become a father until I was 45. That is too late in this world.”

  • The credentialization of education is harmful, colleges may become ghost towns as information is democratized, and distance learning works for most learning except in-person disciplines such as particle accelerator work or opera training.

    “I think that colleges could easily become ghost towns. Information is being liberated. It's being democratized.”

  • The value of his many credentials is not career advancement but living a life animated by ideas, and he argues credentials are overrated, since a wide education mainly fosters abstraction.

    “The value from it is that I enjoy a life that's animated by ideas.”

  • Highly talented graduates tend to enter well-paved paths such as banking, stocks, bonds, and private equity because the social and career pull is strong, leaving unstructured asset opportunities underexploited.

    “There are these well-trodden, well-paved highways, whether they're stocks, bonds, derivatives, venture capital, private equity, real estate.”

  • A former employer ran a lending operation in Poland that hired older women to visit troubled borrowers at home and help them return to work and clean living, creating social value beyond the loan return.

    “The bank's way of creating value was to hire old ladies, little old ladies, who would then drive around in their cars to the borrowers”

  • Students bidding on a dollar bill in a classroom show how quickly competition drives the price toward fair value, illustrating why price mechanisms are efficient.

    “Pretty soon, that dollar bill is going for 99 cents.”

  • Academic credentials are not necessary; what matters is living a life animated by ideas, and an open mind combined with curiosity produced more value than the degrees did.

    “Take it from a guy who's very well pedigreed, you just don't need that.”

  • Markets are among the greatest human institutions, prices are generally accurate, and for most investors trying to beat the market is an act of hubris because competition quickly eliminates mispricing.

    “I think markets are one of the greatest human institutions ever invented.”

  • Ganti argues that a life needs both serendipity and planning, that over-planning is as harmful as under-planning, and that goals chasing money or fortune are often misplaced.

    “I think that there is under-planning, and I think there is over-planning. I think that there is room in a life for serendipity.”

  • The Marshallian marginal cost and marginal revenue framework that Ganti learned in an economics class applies to everyday choices such as how much to eat, sleep, study, or whom to ask out.

    “Then I just woke up and realized, wait, wait, that works for everything.”

0.09

Markets and abstraction deserve respect, and introspection should precede planning and kindness matters.

4 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Abstraction is greatly underappreciated in financial disciplines, and algorithmic shops like Renaissance and Two Sigma succeed partly because they incorporate abstraction rather than only practical market microstructure.

    “I think abstraction is greatly underappreciated, especially in the financial disciplines.”

  • The kindest thing anyone did for Ganti was a woman who drove him to school after he, as a child, was left to fend for himself in a new suburb, which taught him what kindness is.

    “I asked the lady who appeared, 'Will you please drive me to school?' She said, 'Sure,' and she did.”

  • Markets are one of the greatest human institutions ever invented.

    “I think markets are one of the greatest human institutions ever invented.”

  • Planning is a useful tool only after achieving a truce with oneself through introspection about deep needs and attachments, since planning built on unexamined wants leads people astray, and introspection must come first.

    “I think planning is a tool that is best used when you've achieved some kind of truce with yourself.”