What this covers
This is a conversation with Arcadea's founders, chiefly Paul Y, Daniel and Rick, about how they buy and hold vertical market software businesses and why they structure the firm as they do. Much of it is autobiographical. Paul Y says reading frameworks and Berkshire letters gave him theory without substance, and that running a turnaround and laying off employees taught him how businesses make money. Rick makes a parallel case that early operating roles are an underappreciated route into investing. Mark Leonard and Constellation serve as the reference point, including how Leonard spotted small, persistent software businesses that venture investors ignored.
The range then widens. On structure, the speakers argue that finite-life funds and agent-run pension or endowment money push toward sales, and that a two-to-five-year hold period rules out initiatives that take about five years to pay off. They want to be owners rather than renters. On markets, they say vertical niches often have a TAM near $100 million, too small for venture capital, and that industry insight remains the moat even if AI can generate code, using an aviation MRO system as the example. They also describe a founder domain insight test and a Cleveland Orchestra test for taking outside money.
Operating topics include benchmarking on Rule of 50, low CAC in businesses with no formal sales function, and incentives over consultants for scaling decentralized firms. The more contested turns are Paul Y's study favoring two-person founding teams and his claim that groups beyond about 150 people need systems to function.
Arcadea's founders argue that vertical market software, owned through permanent capital with owner-style incentives, compounds better than fund-based or flip-oriented ownership, and that operating experience and aligned principal shareholders are the real edge.
- Finite-life funds force liquidation decisions that conflict with long-term operating value creation
- Vertical software niches are small TAMs that venture capital and outsiders misprice, while industry insight is hard to replicate
- Operating experience and principal-only shareholders give better decisions than consultants and agent-driven capital
Permanent capital avoids forced asset sales and carry-driven exits, enabling long-term compounding for investors and employees.
- A fund has a finite life, so it eventually forces decisions about selling assets to serve investors rather than the business, whereas a holding company with indefinite capital can make long-term operating decisions.
“the fund is just fundamentally not long term”
- Permanent capital forgoes carried-interest exit payouts that fund personal goals, so people must accept short-term pain in exchange for exponential long-term compounding for investors and employees.
“there's no exit event that's going to lead to a carried interest check in five years”
- Neither founder seriously considered founding a firm alone, because both had expected to remain at Constellation, and they valued the long-term platform for operating businesses more than investing or vertical software specifically.
“wanting to operate businesses and put it aside the investing piece”
- Without a carried interest exit event every five years, a holding company keeps all capital compounding, but this comes with short-term pain and a deliberate price that the founders accept, unlike fund managers chasing carry.
“there's no exit event that's going to lead to a carried interest check in five years that you can go and pay off for mortgage”
- Daniel joined Constellation because it offered a long-term platform for operating businesses without investor liquidity pressure, and software was secondary to that platform.
“it came there because it was a place that businesses could thrive over the long term without the pressures of investors looking for liquidity”
Principal individual shareholders keep Arcadea aligned to long-term growth rather than near-term liquidity or EBIT.
- Arcadea is a Delaware LLC with transfer restrictions that make trading shares difficult, not to block liquidity permanently but as a signal that shareholders are meant to be long-term.
“mechanisms in the LLC docs that not only had folks hiding the shareholders, but made the ability to trade shares really difficult”
- Pensions and endowments that invest through agents have liquidity needs that conflict with a long-term holding company, so Arcadea chose principal investors whose own families' capital is at stake.
“the folks who are managing that capital are agents, and they have their own needs when it comes to the liquidity”
- Arcadea was assembled in about three months in late 2020 with 11 investors, mostly individuals and small family office groups, all investing their own capital.
“ended up with a group of 11 investors, the mix of individuals and small groups”
- A long-term investor's orientation is tested in difficult moments, and Arcadea shows it by having all partners at the table as equals who can be consulted directly, while declining some early investors whose capital structure would have caused cracks under pressure.
“if you get your partners wrong and by extension of capital structure, the whole thing is on a stable basis. It's probably going to crumble at some point”
- Arcadea's shareholder base of 11 investors, mostly individuals and small family offices investing their own capital, aligns partners to operate and invest for long-term growth without pressure for near-term EBIT or liquidity.
“we've got, what we think of as the absolute best shareholder base for the strategy that we're pursuing, one because it's all principles”
- If the partners and shareholders are wrong, the whole permanent capital structure will eventually crumble, so Arcadea turned away some early investors whose stance on liquidity signaled misalignment.
“if you get your partners wrong and by extension of capital structure, the whole thing is on a stable basis. It's probably going to crumble at some point”
- Arcadea's shareholders are close partners who are accessible for advice on operating decisions, so the firm has no investor relations function and draws on partners' perspective through texts and calls.
“There's no IR function to Arcadea. It's a bunch of partners”
Overlooked niche vertical software, judged by strict growth and profitability benchmarks, is the chosen investment focus.
- Arcadea targets growth of roughly 20 percent or higher, maybe high teens for a world-class business, and avoids businesses growing only 3 to 4 percent.
“Slower for us is in that 20% range, maybe high teens if it's a world-class business”
- Vertical software serves niche mission-critical workflows with TAMs often around 100 million dollars rather than multibillion dollar markets, which makes them unattractive to venture capital.
“they don't serve multibillion dollar TAMs. These are often $100 million, sometimes some $100 million TAMs”
- Arcadea benchmarks businesses on Rule of 50, which means a vertical software company growing 50 percent can burn cash on organic growth, while a business growing 10 to 20 percent should be profitable.
“So we benchmark our businesses at Rule of 50”
- About two and a half years in, Arcadea owns 11 businesses across four industry verticals, with two verticals at scale, and its best business nearly doubled ARR last year.
“The portfolio today, about two and half years into building the company, 11 businesses across four industry verticals”
- Mark Leonard discovered the vertical software opportunity only because his venture capital experience exposed the flaws of that model, and without that background he likely would not have found vertical software.
“it only came from the fact he was a venture capitalist and saw the challenges with that model”
Partners' combined modeling, founder-reading, and operating skills are hard to outsource and valuable to CEOs.
- Arcadea requires professionals who can model and also read founders and markets, because banking plus outsourced consultants and due diligence firms cannot tie together the full package needed to support CEOs.
“you can't get that just doing banking and then outsourcing your market work to McKinsey”
- Arcadea's first year was far more stressful than expected, since the founding investor group was assembled in three months from September to December 2020 and the team then had to build a platform, brand, and hire.
“it was basically three months from September to December of 2020 when this all came together”
- Daniel and Paul Y both independently rejected a lucrative public-company CEO and COO role for the same reasons, and that shared decision signaled they would be good partners.
“we both decided independently for what turned out to be the same reasons that it was not the right thing for us”
- Investing in and operating vertical software businesses requires a combination of finance skills, market insight, emotional reading of founders, and handling senior people, which is hard to outsource to consultants and banks, and is extremely valuable to CEOs once the investor has lived through the operating challenges.
“This is the whole package. And you can't get that just doing banking and then outsourcing your market work to McKinsey”
Constellation sustained excellence by revisiting past decisions and developing its own talent pool.
- Constellation's stock traded privately around 2 dollars per share among employees, so roughly 10x of appreciation occurred before the public market listing, adding to the public-market returns.
“there's probably a 10x before they even got to the public market”
- Scaling a business depends on keeping capable people who want to be there and giving them room; the company also must push out people who will undermine the culture even if they help in the short term.
“having folks leave the business that, well, they may have been capable, didn't fit the culture they were building”
- Mark Leonard's organization repeatedly questioned past practices and decisions 5 to 10 years after they were made, which Daniel considers a rare trade worth bringing to Arcadea.
“the willingness to question past beliefs”
- Constellation's leadership sustained excellence by revisiting past decisions and practices, even 5 to 10 years after they were made, and challenging its own assumptions despite its success, which Daniel considers a rare trait.
“The trade that I noticed that served Constellation well is a willingness to question past beliefs”
- Constellation's early success relied partly on luck: its second acquisition already had leaders, Mark Miller and Dexter Salna, who later became two of six operating group leaders, and Mark Leonard recognized and developed that talent pool.
“the luck aspect of ending up with a business already with people who are capable of that is a huge part of the story”
A formative rejection and peer comparison fueled a deliberate, continuous-improvement learning mindset.
- Working in a corporate treasury department, managing cash flow and working capital, gave Daniel a broader world view than a traditional banking path and became a differentiator for recruiting at Constellation.
“sitting in the treasury department of a big corporation and thinking about cash flow needs”
- Daniel's rejection from investment banking and hedge fund co-op jobs became a formative failure that fueled a chip on his shoulder, and seeing peers who got those jobs made the gaps feel achievable.
“It was a concept of benchmarking, I guess, when I look back and that's probably the relevant dynamic”
- Staying in the steep part of the learning curve, where you keep getting better and feel uncomfortable, is a deliberate life strategy, and both founders treat being put into unfamiliar positions as a source of growth rather than failure.
“feel uncomfortable living in the steep part of the learning curve and not seeing that as a negative, but as a way to make my life better”
- Observing peers who had reached the same goals made the remaining gaps seem achievable, which Daniel describes as the origin of his continuous improvement mindset.
“I think that was probably early part of this concept of continuous improvement and feel uncomfortable living in the steep part of the learning curve”