What this covers
This installment pulls together several conversations hosted by Patrick, with Naval, Olaf Carlson-Wee, Peter, Juan, Fred, Muneeb and Nick. It starts from the mechanics of how blockchains change, with forking described as a kind of genetic mutation tested in the real world. It then moves through how projects are funded, how regulators respond, and how holdings are protected. The ICO is framed as Kickstarter meets venture capital meets speculation, either a new way to fund innovation or an excellent way to defraud investors.
The range is wide. Olaf explains the Decentralized Autonomous Organization, argues that crowdsales coordinate capital better than Silicon Valley's who-you-know fundraising, and places crypto on a long Decentralization Pendulum swing. He also floats richer voting schemes written in software. Fred argues that a short window at the start of a paradigm shift fixes base protocols, as the early web's missing incentives produced spam. Peter covers the legal side: FinCEN's 2013 guidance, the patchwork of state money-transmission regulators, and why many token sales fit the Investment Contract Test while Bitcoin probably does not. He also calls compulsory KYC for peer-to-peer transactions Orwellian. Juan questions valuations that drift from underlying utility, and cites an estimate that 40 to 60 percent of storage capacity sits idle.
The security discussion is concrete. Nick applies Attacker Cost-Benefit Analysis: an attacker will spend about $1 million to intercept $100 million, so custody escalates to air-gapped machines, Faraday-caged rooms and multi-signature approval. Naval adds a personal turn, arguing that specific knowledge, leverage and accountability drive wealth. Patrick closes on James Carse's finite and infinite games.
Hash Power Part 3 argues that blockchain innovation moves unusually fast because of forking and global crowdfunding, that this creates both real opportunity and serious fraud and regulatory risk, and that durable value must be grounded in actual use cases, careful security practice, and the individual's own specific knowledge.
- Forking lets sub-communities alter protocols and test variants in the real world, so blockchains evolve at the speed of software rather than biological evolution
- Token-based crowdfunding (ICOs) can accelerate development but, with little regulation, invites scams, and the industry will need a few years of losses before it matures
- Token valuations should be decomposed into underlying utility, new value layers, store-of-value, and speculation, because many tokens trade far from their underlying value
Pseudonymous token-holder DAOs, not controlling individuals, will decentralize funding and governance over time.
- A decentralized autonomous organization pools crowdfunded cryptocurrency in a smart contract, issues tokens, and has no individual with access; token holders vote to allocate funds, making them shareholders in a protocol rather than a company, with no legal entity behind it.
“no one, no individual person has access to that cryptocurrency that was raised. It's actually controlled by the token holders in a voting mechanism.”
- A DAO has no controlling individual and its tens or hundreds of thousands of globally scattered, pseudonymous token holders make violence or physical targeting by a government hard, because there are no identifiable people to target.
“It's basically who do you target.”
- Because DAOs cannot sign traditional ink-and-paper legal contracts but can enter software-based smart contracts, a regular person five to ten years out may be employed by a DAO and paid by a global group of token holders.
“you may be employed by a Dao. You may actually get paid for the services you render to a global group of token holders”
- Over the next couple of years, the $20 to $100 million-plus currently sitting in non-profit foundations from crowdfunds will move into smart contracts and be allocated by the votes of the token holders who bought in.
“over the course of the next couple of years, we'll see that money leave in smart contracts and be allocated via the votes and will of the token holders”
- Power has swung slowly toward centralization since the first agricultural civilizations over millennia; crypto protocols, after the Internet itself, are the most important technology pushing the pendulum back toward decentralization, though that shift will still take a long time.
“I do think though that cryptocurrency protocols are actually, after the Internet itself, the most important technology as part of that pendulum swinging towards decentralization.”
- Software allows voting systems that are far richer than the US one-candidate, no-weights system, such as weighted confidence votes and negative votes, so the era of codified governance can let experiments with governance improve on traditional democratic designs.
“you can now use software to code voting systems. Voting systems, historically, have been relatively simple”
Online reputation increasingly outweighs social position, so anonymous networks can select leaders institutions would reject.
- Crypto crowdsales coordinate capital far more efficiently than the old-boys-club of Silicon Valley venture fundraising, where most of the battle is who you know; teams can launch a spec and have millions within two weeks.
“They can launch a protocol specification and two weeks later, they can have millions of dollars.”
- Individual reputation in online communities is becoming more important than economic position or standing in one's local community, so age, race, gender, and geography matter less than positioning and reputation within online networks.
“I think that we are moving to a world where those kind of ideas about local geography, around racial identity, gender identity, age matter less”
- In the online game EVE Online, a 16-year-old who skipped school commanded a battle that reportedly cost about 700,000 real dollars in losses, illustrating that anonymous reputation-based systems can select leaders who would be rejected in person.
“Yeah, it turns out that the commander was 16, and had to skip school to do the battle.”
Stablecoins and cashing out to stable assets will reduce volatility exposure for crypto projects.
- To run token crowdfunds, teams create non-profit foundations or holding companies, often in Switzerland, Singapore, or Hong Kong, in jurisdictions different from where the team sits, for legal compliance and tax purposes; the entity lets the team open a bank account and cash out crypto.
“what people are doing is creating non-profit foundations or holding companies like LLCs or C corps.”
- As advanced financial products are built natively on blockchains, stablecoins pegged or tracking stable assets like the US dollar or gold, along with better governance and smart contracts, will develop and reduce volatility exposure for crypto projects.
“as we get financial products, more advanced financial products built in a native blockchain environment, so this is stable coins”
- Teams that raise money in cryptocurrency often fail to hedge its volatility and so either get lucky or suffer outcomes unrelated to their execution, which is why foundations cash out to stable assets.
“we've seen many times teams or companies raise money in cryptocurrency not properly hedge the financial risk and get either really lucky or have really unfortunate things happen”