What this covers

This Business Breakdowns episode has Erin Broderick walking through the FTX restructuring as it stood in March 2024. She starts with why the case belongs in Chapter 11 rather than in the hands of a Chapter 7 trustee, who would lack the expertise to realize the value in FTX's assets, and why broad U.S. venue rules let affiliates be filed together. From there she turns to the central dispute: whether customers are owners who rank above creditors, or unsecured creditors sharing a pool. The Ad Hoc Committee avoids proving ownership through tracing and identification, which she says would take months or years. A government exhibit attributing 469 million dollars of customer funds to the Anthropic investment shows how hard attribution is.

The range is wide. She compares FTX with bank failures and with pooled-investment collapses like MF Global, and explains why commingling breaks those analogies. She covers Alameda's purported secured lenders, whose collateral was often FTT or other tokens and sometimes included customer funds. She also covers the IRS claims, which sit at Alameda and the U.S. holding company and are therefore structurally junior. The most contested ground is whether government claims should face subordination to customers, citing IRS Tax Directive 137, and whether post-petition interest in a global settlement could lift recoveries above dollarized par value.

Practical details round this out: FTX scheduled liabilities in tokens and relied on an estimation motion to set prices, and claims have traded in the high-70s to low-80s percent of par. The exchange stayed shut, and no bidder valued its technology. She also gives a timeline, with exit expected before fall if the plan is filed in March.

Sharpest takeaway

Erin Broderick argues that FTX's bankruptcy is unusual because customer funds were commingled across silos, so the case turns on ownership-versus-creditor arguments and the fixed-date dollarization rule rather than on a conventional lender-group negotiation, and that the best realistic outcome is a global settlement that routes upside to customers.

  • Commingled customer funds across FTX.com, the U.S. exchange, Alameda, and Ventures made tracing impractical, pushing parties toward substantive consolidation and a pro rata pool.
  • The Bankruptcy Code requires claims to be valued in U.S. dollars as of the petition date, so appreciation can only reach customers through negotiated settlement such as post-petition interest or creative structures.
  • Customers were unified as one class with no distinct contractual arrangements by asset type, so the crypto-versus-fiat distinction seen in other cases is less relevant here.

The argument · threads12 threads · 54 claims
0.80

Customers' ownership claims are sidestepped by maximizing pro rata value for one customer class

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Banks generally do not go bankrupt in the same way because regulatory regimes allow liquidation and protect deposits, and a depository relationship gives the depositor a claim on bank assets, whereas FTX customers argue they never loaned their assets to the exchange and retained ownership with the right to withdraw at a 1:1 ratio.

    “I wasn't putting my assets on loan to the exchange. I own the assets.”

  • A full pro rata tracing and identification exercise to attribute each asset's appreciation to specific customer funds would take months if not years, with uncertain outcomes, so the Ad Hoc position was to maximize pro rata value to all customers instead.

    “It would take months, if not years. We don't exactly know how it would end up.”

  • Formal creditor groups did not form in FTX because all customers shared a common terms-of-service experience in which they owned assets and could withdraw them, so they formed one customer class that everyone wanted to see recover the highest value.

    “that speaks to the nature of the common customer experience that they had terms of service”

  • Many FTX customers believe they own the assets they deposited and should therefore be superior to all others as owners rather than unsecured creditors, which raises the question of whether ownership must be proven through tracing and identification or whether customers can simply be paid their maximum value.

    “many of the customers believe that they have ownership of these assets, that they should be superior to everyone as owners instead of mere creditors”

  • Customers argue they own the assets and should rank above creditors, but the Ad Hoc Committee avoids proving ownership through tracing by aiming to maximize pro rata estate value for all customers, which is faster and more certain.

    “It would take months, if not years. We don't exactly know how it would end up.”

0.71

Commingled customer and noncustomer funds prevent clean tracing and complicate attribution of recoveries

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Purported secured lenders at the Alameda silo had loans often secured by FTT or other tokens, and some of that posted collateral was actually customer funds, which complicated the capital structure.

    “their loan arrangements were often secured by FTT or other tokens”

  • A government exhibit attributes 469 million dollars of customer funds to the Anthropic investment, and there were over 100 million of other funds plus funds that went through intermediate steps, illustrating the difficulty of attributing funds to specific investments.

    “they're relying on this government exhibit while it was 469 million of customer funds and there was over 100 million of other funds”

  • In pooled investment failures such as MF Global, similarly situated investors are allowed to receive pro rata distributions of pooled assets according to the debtor's books and records, but FTX lacks a clean pot of customer funds because customer and noncustomer funds are mixed together.

    “they have allowed to have a distribution of the pooled assets pro rata to everyone according to the debtors' books and records”

  • Unlike other crypto cases with separate contractual arrangements by asset type, FTX customers all held one account and could trade freely, so the distinction between crypto and fiat claims asserted elsewhere is not as relevant here.

    “the distinction between the crypto and fiat claims that's been asserted in other cases is really not as relevant here”

  • Debtors and insiders misappropriated billions of dollars in customer funds, probably north of 10 billion dollars, which the DOJ and debtors have partially traced into commingled accounts and investments including a boat in the Bahamas.

    “misappropriated billions, probably north of 10 billion in customer funds”

  • In other crypto cases, property-based estate arguments produced clear rulings when assets were properly held in segregated custody; FTX is different because customer assets were commingled with noncustomer funds.

    “In cases where it was a clear-cut ruling one way or the other, you actually had assets that were properly held in custody, that were segregated.”

0.71

Government claims should be subordinated so customers recover ahead of general unsecured creditors

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Under the current plan construct, assets traceable to the dot-com or U.S. exchange go only to those respective customers, while remaining assets go into a general pool where customers receive a priority payment of 66 percent of their claim amount before general unsecured creditors, functioning almost like a lien.

    “they get a 66% priority payment from that general pool before it goes next to general unsecured creditors”

  • Conflict between customers and general unsecured creditors is overstated in the news; general unsecured claims are around 2 billion dollars excluding subordinated government claims, and the real issue is ensuring government agencies recognize their claims benefit customers.

    “it's really not customers against general unsecured creditors as much as I think that's in the news”

  • The CFTC has already agreed to subordinate at least the par amount for creditors, and the IRS and other government agencies are expected to follow, though this is required only if government claims would otherwise be subordinated without consent.

    “the CFTC has already agreed to subordination of at least the par amount for creditors”

  • Government agencies' claims are asserted on behalf of victimized customers, so subordinating them to customers is equitable, supported by IRS Tax Directive 137, which directs the IRS to divert recoveries to victims in Ponzi, embezzlement, or misappropriation cases that may give rise to constructive trust arguments.

    “It's Tax Directive #137, and it asserts that in cases where there's a Ponzi scheme or embezzlement or misappropriation of funds”

  • The debtors' plan, expected in March after a missed end-of-February target, would pay customers and general unsecured creditors in full at par value of their dollarized petition-date claims, contingent on subordinating government claims exceeding 20 billion dollars.

    “it will be filed in March that will pay not only customers, but general unsecured creditors in full”

  • IRS tax liabilities sit mainly with Alameda and the U.S. holding company level rather than the foreign dot-com debtors, making them structurally subordinate to operating-level claims, so the IRS has real claims but complex nuances.

    “it's not with the foreign dot-com debtors. It's really with Alameda and the U.S. side and at the holding company level”

0.71

Post-petition interest and creative structures could channel appreciation to customers beyond dollarized par

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Customers who had liquidated tokens to fiat just before the petition date may argue they should receive the time value of money and cost of capital, because the money would have earned the same returns as a crypto-denominated claim.

    “Should I not get the value of the cost of capital, time value of money”

  • The live question is who should capture the appreciation of the debtors' assets since petition date: customers receiving only their petition-date dollarized claim, or customers receiving the appreciation they would have had absent the bankruptcy, given the ownership arguments.

    “Should it be that customers just get 100% of their petition date dollarized claim pay? Or should they have the benefit of appreciation”

  • Post-petition interest is an equitable grant available to unsecured creditors where there is a contractual rate and a solvent debtor, and as part of a 9019 global settlement it could give customers returns above dollarized par, provided government agencies accept being subordinated.

    “There's post-petition interest, which is an equitable grant to unsecured creditors”

  • Beyond post-petition interest, the parties are exploring creative structures such as gifting and redistribution through government agencies, plus a trust or plan administrator monetizing the Ventures portfolio and unsold tokens, to channel upside to customers without giving them direct equity.

    “We're also looking at creative structures with gifting and redistribution maybe through some of the government agencies”

  • FTX claims are not separate tradable instruments under the current plan, so their value follows disclosures about upside; as of the prior week they traded in the high-70s to low-80s percent of par, much higher than at the outset.

    “as of last week, I believe it was high-70s, low-80s depending on the claim amount”

  • Receiving par on petition-date claims does not feel like a win to most customers because their capital was held up for about a year and a half while market appreciation went to others, and customers broadly want any value to go to customers rather than equity holders.

    “getting their petition date claim paid in full does not feel like a win to them”

0.53

The exchange has limited standalone value, and monetization of tokens and Grayscale is court-guarded

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The exchange was not valueless because some trading products had value, but those products face heightened regulatory scrutiny, so the exchange's standalone value is limited.

    “there was value in some of the trading products for sure. There is also heightened scrutiny from a regulatory standpoint”

  • The debtors have not held crypto passively; an independent manager, Galaxy, has been monetizing the token portfolio and the Grayscale interest under volume and pricing guardrails approved by the court over some objections, raising nearly a billion dollars last month.

    “There's been a monetization of those assets done through an independent manager, Galaxy”

  • The FTX exchange was shut down throughout the bankruptcy, and in the marketing process no bidder ascribed material value to the underlying IP or infrastructure, so a restarted exchange on existing technology was not feasible, although the customer list still has value to a separate exchange.

    “no bidder in the marketing process ascribed material value to IP or infrastructure underlying technology”

  • In-kind distributions of crypto would require equitable grounds and the estate buying tokens at current prices, but FTX faced a shortfall in its token portfolio, making in-kind return extremely costly, unlike Genesis which chose to hold its crypto assets.

    “there was such a shortfall in the token portfolio at the exchange that I think it was decided that's not going to be the best route”

  • The bankruptcy court makes the final decision on monetization guardrails after the debtors propose a motion, consult the official and Ad Hoc committees, and receive objections, with the motion approved in October over some objections.

    “Ultimately, the court. So the debtors proposed a motion with consultation parties”

0.43

Exhaustive forensic tracing would delay the cases and erode value, so a quick exit is preferable

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Requiring a source-of-funds analysis for every asset sale or a full forensic accounting before selling would delay the cases and erode value, so the practical path is to exit bankruptcy quickly, maximize customer recoveries, and confirm a plan under the Code.

    “should we really require a source of funds for every sale?”

  • Investments of customer funds, such as roughly 469 million dollars into Anthropic, have been traced through bank records, Slack messages, and emails, and the dispute over source-of-funds shows why exhaustive forensic accounting would halt the cases and is not worth the delay.

    “they're relying on this government exhibit while it was 469 million of customer funds”

  • The public record on where customer funds went is limited to the government's criminal exhibits and a few large investments, and the debtors' fuller tracing work has not been placed on the bankruptcy docket.

    “not all of the debtor's efforts have been put on the bankruptcy docket”

0.39

Secondary claim buyers are treated identically to original holders, and distribution logistics create friction

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Early in the cases secondary buyers could diligence possible preference exposure, creating a distinction, but with announced recoveries it is likely preferences will not be pursued, erasing the distinction between original and secondary claims.

    “it's likely that preferences will not be pursued”

  • Large FTX claims trade through brokers to distressed funds with minimums, and online exchanges now connect buyers and sellers, with the unique customer code and dollarized schedule amounts making pricing and diligence easier, though smaller claims remain largely shut out by diligence and cost.

    “there's been a number of exchanges set up so that parties can connect to buyers very quickly”

  • Distributions require a KYC process designed for original holders through the portal, which creates logistical complications for secondary buyers of claims.

    “There's a KYC process that original holders have to undertake in order to receive distributions in the case”

  • Secondary hedge fund participation in claims is not unusual because such funds buy claims when they can drive returns, although FTX's unique feature was scheduling liabilities in tokens and deferring dollarization until a late January estimation motion.

    “I don't think that the participation of the secondary hedge funds is unique in this case where they think that they can drive returns”

  • Original customers unfamiliar with Chapter 11 often mistakenly believe that buying claims from original holders is nefarious, but in practice the original and secondary claims are treated identically under the plan because preference actions are unlikely to be pursued.

    “there's something nefarious about secondary buying claims from original holders”

0.38

Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession with experienced professionals preserves asset value better than a Chapter 7 trustee

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • In Chapter 11, the debtor-in-possession process lets a company's management and board stay in control, whereas in Chapter 7 control passes to a court-appointed trustee; in FTX, insiders could not be trusted, so John Ray was installed as CEO and new directors were appointed, yet the case remains a debtor-in-possession proceeding.

    “the key distinction is that in the Chapter 11, you have a debtor-in-possession process, which means the company's management and board can stay in power and in control”

  • A Chapter 7 court-appointed trustee would lack the expertise and resources needed to realize the substantial value in FTX's assets, so experienced professionals operating under Chapter 11 were necessary to avoid squandering recoveries for creditors.

    “there is a practical expectation of the limitations of a Chapter 7 trustee, both in terms of expertise and of resources”

0.29

Ad Hoc Committee formed to represent customers the official committee did not adequately represent

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Customer identities were kept confidential for two reasons: revealing identities could expose wealthy individuals in certain jurisdictions to harm, and the customer list itself is an estate asset whose value would be lost if identities were disclosed in a reboot or sale.

    “the customer list is an asset of the estates or a reboot of the exchange”

  • The Ad Hoc Committee officially formed December 5 with three members in the first week, growing through grassroots contacts because customer lists were confidential and customers felt the official committee with fiduciary duties to all unsecured creditors did not represent them on ownership arguments.

    “Ad Hoc officially formed on December 5, and we had three members in the first week”

  • The Ad Hoc Committee is now about 80 percent original holders by count but its claim amount is dominated by secondary hedge funds, mirroring a customer class that has shifted toward secondary buyers.

    “In number, it's about 80% original holders, but in claim amount, it's more the secondary hedge funds at this point”

0.29

Chapter 11 venue flexibility and substantive consolidation keep dispersed FTX value allocated to customers

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • U.S. Chapter 11 has very broad venue and jurisdiction rules, so if one debtor qualifies, affiliates can be filed together, which streamlines administration and prevents dissipation of assets across the world, especially where corporate distinctions were not respected.

    “if one debtor can satisfy the jurisdictional and venue requirements, you can bring in any other affiliate”

  • Because FTX.com's foreign customer silo acted as the enterprise's piggy bank and value was scattered across the dot-com exchange, U.S. exchange, Alameda, and Ventures silos, there was early recognition that the estates would need substantive consolidation so customer-derived value could be allocated fairly and maximally to customers.

    “there was going to need to be a substantive consolidation of the estates to make sure that the value elsewhere that came from customer funds was allocated in a fair and really maximum amount”

  • Chapter 11 venue flexibility in the United States is unusual relative to other jurisdictions and is a key reason global corporate groups are filed together.

    “It's something that's unique about insolvency proceedings in the United States versus other jurisdictions”

0.24

Petition-date claims must be dollarized in U.S. dollars under the Bankruptcy Code's equality rule

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires claims to be valued in U.S. dollars as of the petition date to ensure equality among creditors, so claims cannot be denominated in volatile crypto and the dollarization rule cannot be avoided.

    “502(b) Bankruptcy Code, it requires that claims be valued as of petition date in U.S. dollars. That's done purposely for equality of creditors”

  • FTX did not dollarize claims at the outset, instead scheduling liabilities in tokens and relying on an estimation motion, not heard until late January, to set token values, which made pricing unique and created the market's pricing assumptions.

    “not dollarizing claims at the outset, but scheduling all the liabilities in terms of the token and then having the estimation motion”

0.15

Plan timing will slip, so shortening solicitation lets the case exit before fall

3 pointscentrality 1/5
  • The plan that was expected by the end of February is likely to slip, so the realistic goal is to shorten the solicitation period so the plan can still be filed in March and the case exits before fall.

    “that's likely to be pushed back. But if we can shorten the solicitation period and get the plan still filed in March”

  • After the plan and disclosure statement are filed, a disclosure statement hearing about 30 days later, a solicitation period of 30 to 60 days, a confirmation hearing after voting, and then the effective date would take the case out of bankruptcy, with exit expected before fall if the plan is filed in March.

    “that's likely to be pushed back. But if we can shorten the solicitation period and get the plan still filed in March”

  • Closing thanks and remarks about the conversation being enjoyable.

    “Yes. Thank you for having me.”