What this covers

This Business Breakdowns episode has Compound248 walking Zack through Twitter's history and its position in early 2022, with the stock around $34 against a $45 first trade in November 2013. The account starts with the IPO Valuation Expectation Trap: revenue grew about 7.5 times in eight years, yet shareholders were left unhappy. It then follows Dorsey's 2015 return, the cleanup of abuse and employee turnover, and the rebuild of a tech stack that began as one giant code base. It continues through the arrival of Elliott and Silver Lake, and ends with Dorsey's abrupt exit and the appointment of Parag Agrawal as CEO and Bret Taylor as chairman.

The middle of the conversation covers the product and the ad business. Compound248 describes Twitter as an Interest Network rather than a friends-and-family graph, contrasts its high-friction onboarding with TikTok's, and argues its defensibility rests on a creator-user network effect. On advertising, he places it at the top of the Advertising Funnel Model and says it has almost no self-serve performance product for SMB advertisers. Some positions are flagged as contested: that Dorsey's four years repaired the business, that maximizing IPO valuation can hurt a company, and that the global ad market keeps growing at GDP plus. He also argues that stock-based compensation should be counted as a real cash cost.

The closing stretch is about the clock. Management's 2023 targets are over 315 million mDAUs and roughly $7.5 billion of revenue, against under 200 million and about $4 billion in 2020. Compound248 says the owners would replace the operator or catalyze a sale if the targets are missed, and that Twitter has roughly two years.

Sharpest takeaway

Compound248 argues Twitter is a mid-turnaround business whose user base and ad monetization lag peers mainly because of product friction and weak performance advertising, and that its rebuilt tech stack and subscription products can unlock compounding growth if the company keeps the trust of its owners and users.

  • Twitter's US revenue per daily user is about one-fourth of Meta's, driven by the lack of performance and SMB advertising rather than by weak audience quality
  • The 2013 IPO valuation set expectations the company could not meet, and the resulting shareholder frustration shortened management's time horizon
  • A modularized tech stack and new products since 2019 have restored growth, but the 2023 user and revenue targets require a record pace of user growth

The argument · threads9 threads · 57 claims
0.85

Missing SMB performance advertising explains Twitter's revenue gap with Meta, and that gap can be closed.

15 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Twitter's business is roughly 90 percent advertising, sold mainly to large corporate brands, plus about 10 percent high-margin revenue from reselling aggregated user data as an API-based SaaS product.

    “Twitter monetizes them through advertising, which is about 90% of revenue, and it's primarily to large corporates”

  • Super Follows, where followers pay creators for private access, mostly serve to drive engagement and keep users on the platform because most of the revenue goes to creators, so they are not a meaningful profit source.

    “That to me is really more about driving engagement and keeping it on platform.”

  • Twitter is a top-of-funnel brand advertising business, similar to TV, which limits its ability to win bottom-of-funnel performance spending because it cannot attribute purchases to ads as precisely as digital peers do.

    “twitter is a very top-of-funnel-skewed company. Their opportunity... they have to get to the bottom of the funnel.”

  • Twitter's US users are on average more affluent and more highly educated than Meta's, so the monetization gap reflects under-monetization of the average Twitter user rather than a weaker audience.

    “Twitter has, actually, a more affluent, higher income, higher educated customer base on average than Meta.”

  • The largest reason for Twitter's low revenue per user is that it has essentially no performance advertising product for SMBs, which need self-serve, targeted, bottom-of-funnel ads with measurable returns, and past promoted tweets had very poor measurement.

    “Twitter is effectively null on performance advertising, and performance advertising is what SMBs require.”

  • In the last 18 months Twitter launched more new products than in its entire prior history, including tipping, communities, Super Follows, live shopping, subscriptions, professional profiles, and NFT profile pictures, with most being non-ad products.

    “in last 18 months, we've seen more new products I would argue, than in Twitter's entire history combined.”

  • Twitter holds about 5 percent of large digital advertising but less than 0.5 percent of SMB advertising, and unlocking self-serve, performance-oriented SMB ads is a major blue ocean opportunity.

    “Twitter has 5% market share in large, digital advertisements, large brands, but has less than 0.5% market share in SMB”

  • Using daily active users, Meta's US revenue per user was about 70 dollars in Q3 while Twitter's was about 17.50 dollars, so Meta generated about four times Twitter's revenue per US user despite Twitter's more affluent audience.

    “In Q3, Meta's was about $70 per US user. Whereas, Twitter is about $17.50.”

  • Meta's Facebook app alone has close to 2 billion daily active users, and including WhatsApp and Instagram the total is higher, while Twitter has about 211 million users, so Twitter's cultural prominence far exceeds its actual usage.

    “Meta has, and this is actually just on the Facebook blue platform, but close to two billion DAUs”

  • Twitter's cultural relevance stayed high, as seen in Trump's use of the platform and Twitter's role as a news center, even as its product looked stagnant and its revenue lagged Facebook's scale, creating a gap between social impact and economic value.

    “the product looked like it was doing nothing and yet its cultural relevance seemed as high as ever”

  • Twitter's roughly five-times-smaller revenue versus Meta is explained by having about one-fifth as many US users combined with about one-quarter the revenue per user, and the gap can plausibly be closed.

    “In Q3, Meta's was about $70 per US user. Whereas, Twitter is about $17.50.”

  • Twitter's Topics feature lets users follow a subject, like the New York Giants, without manually finding accounts, which both deepens engagement and improves ad targeting.

    “Twitter automatically begins feeding you content around the New York Giants.”

  • Twitter's only performance-oriented ad product is app-download advertising, so it cannot yet support direct purchases such as buying a t-shirt, which limits the ad revenue it can capture.

    “The only product they have today that is really a performance oriented product is for app downloads.”

  • For Twitter to win SMB advertisers, it must make its ad platform easy to self-serve, customizable, and targeted, with more transactional down-funnel products such as e-commerce, because SMBs buy performance rather than brand advertising.

    “SMBs are much less about brand advertising and more transactional. It needs to get to e-commerce.”

  • Increasing revenue per engagement requires better targeting using machine learning, better ad quality that moves beyond brand display to down-funnel ads reaching purchase, and better measurement so transactions on the platform can be tracked.

    “so using machine learning to better understand you and capture relevant signal, that's timely, better targeting, better ads. So not just brand ads that look like display, but more down-the-funnel ads that ultimately get to purchase.”

0.59

Dorsey's removal of friction and tech stack rebuild restored Twitter's usage and platform health.

9 pointscentrality 4/5
  • When Dorsey returned in 2015, Twitter had high employee turnover, abuse and harassment, a tangled tech stack, lost users, and negative revenue growth in 2017; his four years focused on employee morale, team focus, abuse cleanup, and a full tech stack rebuild, and business health recovered with top-line growth returning in 2018 and user growth accelerating in 2019.

    “his last four years were unquestionably an organizational turnaround, with four key focus areas”

  • Twitter was founded out of Odeo, a podcasting company started by Evan Williams and Noah Glass, after Apple launched its own podcasting service and made Odeo's business obsolete; a junior employee, Jack Dorsey, pitched a group messaging idea that became Twitter.

    “shortly after their founding Apple launched its podcasting service, which really obviated the need for Odeo”

  • From Compound248's 2012 to 2020 absence, Twitter's look and feel barely changed except for doubling the character limit from 140 to 280 and switching to an algorithmic timeline, which together left the company better positioned for the 2020 COVID user surge.

    “other than two primary enhancements, one, they doubled the number of characters you could use from 140 to 280”

  • Twitter posted negative revenue growth in 2017 while the broader social and advertising market was rising sharply, so the company was clearly going backwards before its rebuild restored growth.

    “And in 2017, it posted negative revenue. In the context of a market where big tech and social and advertising are skyrocketing, Twitter's going backwards.”

  • Amazon's principle that faster page loads drive proportionally more sales implies that reducing friction increases usage, and Twitter's failure to remove friction from its service, including harassment and politicization, held back usage for years.

    “for every 10% faster we can get pages to load, we're able to drive sales 10%”

  • Twitter's legacy tech stack was a single giant code base, so any change to a feature like the timeline risked breaking the entire service, which slowed innovation and produced outages like the fail whale.

    “When Jack got there, Twitter had a single giant tech stack.”

  • When a platform does not have a healthy relationship with its users, it risks entering a negative cycle, which Twitter stemmed in 2017 but which could recur if user health deteriorates again.

    “When you don't have healthy relationship with your users, you obviously risk entering a negative cycle”

  • When COVID-era users arrived in 2020, Twitter was better positioned to engage and retain them because of the doubled 280-character limit, the algorithmic timeline, and the tech stack rebuild Jack Dorsey's team had carried out.

    “those two big external changes that when you combine with what Jack had done on the tech stack and the team had done, really set it up as much more prepared when the 2020 COVID bump arrived”

  • Twitter's harassment, abuse, and politicization created negative user experiences that acted as friction, and removing that friction in the last three years helped improve the health and safety of the environment and lift usage.

    “their users put a lot of friction into the system, through what I'll call negative experiences of harassment and politicization of everything.”

0.55

The public narrative and market valuation trail Twitter's operating reality and misread the business.

7 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Twitter's 2023 targets of 315 million mDAUs and 7.5 billion dollars of revenue would roughly double revenue from under 4 billion in 2020 and require a record user growth pace every quarter for eight quarters, which the market appears skeptical can be achieved.

    “they set out a KPI of ending 2023 with over 300 million mDAUs, 315 to be precise.”

  • Even as Twitter's stock declined to its lows, the operating health of the business had reached an all-time high in platform health and innovation pace, so the negative narrative is out of step with the business's operating performance.

    “Platform health is at an all-time high. And so now today, even as the stock plumbs its depths”

  • Twitter's enterprise value of about 26 billion dollars against roughly 5 billion dollars of expected 2021 revenue implies a valuation near 5 times revenue, down from 40 to 60 times at its IPO, which Compound248 reads as a major derating.

    “this year Twitter is likely to make five billion of revenue, and it has maybe a $26 billion enterprise value.”

  • Public narrative about a company trails actual business reality and tends to follow the stock price, so it is backward-looking, which makes the company's history relevant to understanding its present.

    “narrative trails reality, and narrative follows stock price, and so in that sense, narrative is backwards-looking”

  • When Elliott arrived in 2019 with the stock in its twenties, it framed Twitter as a clown car in a gold mine that professional oversight could turn into a smaller Facebook, and the activist's involvement led to aggressive operating KPIs.

    “we think with professional oversight, we can turn this into something that looks more like a small Facebook”

  • Elliott's 2019 arrival and Silver Lake's investment pushed management in 2021 to set 2023 targets of over 315 million mDAUs and about $7.5 billion of revenue, compared with fewer than 200 million mDAUs and roughly $4 billion of 2020 revenue, along with development efficiency goals.

    “they set out a KPI of ending 2023 with over 300 million mDAUs, 315 to be precise. And they said the year 2023, we'll generate seven and a half billion of revenue.”

  • Although management does not seem to fully understand share issuance costs, the analyst treats the dilution from share leakage as a real cash cost in the ROI analysis.

    “It's not clear that the management team really understands exactly what share issuance costs, but we do. So I'm just going to assume that that's really a cash cost.”

0.53

Reinvesting in users, engagement, and monetization can justify today's valuation.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Twitter must grow net new logged-in users, increase engagement per user, and raise revenue per unit of engagement, and these three levers reinforce each other in a virtuous circle.

    “it really needs to drive three KPIs around revenue”

  • Twitter's roughly 2.5 billion dollars of 2021 OpEx, about 50 percent of revenue, can be split into about 30 points of maintenance and 20 points of growth, since Meta-like margins of 35 percent would be possible with no growth spending.

    “So 30 points of OpEx is maintenance, and 20 points is growth.”

  • Twitter's past growth-category spending was largely used to restore platform health and rebuild the tech stack, not to fund growth, so the investment thesis now is that the business no longer merely treads water.

    “that excess spend therefore was not for growth, but really to rebuild the existing business”

  • The roughly 600 billion dollar global ad market is still growing at GDP plus because digital advertising, with its better attribution and measurement, keeps expanding the potential addressable spend, especially for down-funnel ads whose contribution to sales is measurable.

    “That overall market is still growing at GDP plus. The reason is that digital is doing such a better job of attribution”

  • Using 60 to 65 percent gross margin, 10 percent user growth, 5 percent engagement growth, and 5 percent revenue per engagement growth, Twitter's roughly 1.1 billion dollars of revenue growth yields about 400 million dollars of incremental EBIT, worth 6 to 7.5 billion dollars at 15 to 20 times EBIT, against a 1 billion dollar growth spend, implying about 25 percent annual value accretion from today's enterprise value.

    “it's spending a billion dollars to create six to seven and a half billion of value per year. And today, Twitter has $26, $27 billion enterprise value.”

  • After the rebuild, Twitter's growth turned positive again by the second half of 2019, and even after the COVID one-time surge, user growth remained in the double digits, so revenue per user and usage growth together suggested a path to a 20-plus percent secular top-line growth rate.

    “even today after that surge, Twitter is still growing users back in the double digit rate”

0.40

Owner pressure and leadership churn shorten Twitter's time horizon to execute its plan.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Twitter's leadership history was a turbulent power struggle: Dorsey was fired in 2008, Evan Williams was replaced by Dick Costolo in October 2010 after VCs removed him, Costolo led for five years, and Dorsey returned as CEO in 2015 while also running Square.

    “the leadership history is a completely sordid Games-of-Throne-style war of egos and usurpation”

  • Elliott and Silver Lake's presence implies that if Twitter's new leadership fails to hit its targets, the owners will find a new operator or catalyze a sale, and the market assumes this threat is real.

    “that seems to me to be the latent threat of Elliot and Silver Lake in the background is, all right, if you guys can't do this, we suspect there are owners who can do it”

  • When a company has an unhealthy relationship with its owners, time horizons shorten, which shrinks the ability to make long-term value-creating decisions; Twitter has roughly two years to execute its plan before this becomes dangerous.

    “when you don't have a healthy relationship with your owners, what ends up happening is time horizons shorten.”

  • Dorsey left the CEO role abruptly in late 2021 with immediate effect, and the board named Parag Agrawal, then the chief technology officer, as CEO and Bret Taylor as chairman, with Taylor simultaneously becoming co-CEO of Salesforce.

    “It's not, I'm giving six months notice, it's, I'm done today, and the new CEO is Parag Agrawal”

  • Activist Elliott's 2019 arrival and Silver Lake's later investment, through a secondary purchase and convertible, pushed Twitter to adopt an aggressive operating plan and agree that Dorsey would continue as CEO.

    “Silver Lake comes in and injects cash through a secondary in a convert and bought shares.”

  • Agrawal restructured the leadership team in his first week so that Kayvon Beykpour owns user growth and development cadence, Bruce Falck owns monetization and ad development, and Ned Segal serves as CFO, giving each executive accountability for a specific KPI.

    “basically put forth three people and assigned really clear accountability on the various KPIs”

0.36

A creator-user network effect makes Twitter defensible, and its future depends on balancing stakeholders.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Twitter's defensibility comes from a network effect between creators and users: high-quality creators attract users, and the users attract more creators, and because these relationships are created inside Twitter rather than stored in phone contacts, they are hard to port elsewhere.

    “That to me really is the core flywheel of the business. That's the moat; it's a network effect between creators and users”

  • Twitter's future value depends on balancing relationships with owners, employees, and users, and if it executes well it could compound for a decade, but if it fails it could be cut short.

    “Twitter has a decade of potential compounding in front of it, but if they don't, it could be cut quite short.”

  • Twitter's strategy aims to give creators the tools to engage followers so creators keep posting on the platform, which keeps the feed fresh and engaging for users.

    “Twitter needs to do a great job of making sure there's never any incentive for their creators to go elsewhere.”

  • Dorsey served as CEO of both Twitter and Square, which he founded and owns more of, and faced constant criticism for that dual role during a period of congressional scrutiny of social media companies.

    “Jack at the time, he was the CEO of two major companies, the other being Square, which he founded and owns a lot more of Square than Twitter”

0.34

Poor stock performance and dilution show that maximizing IPO valuation is a flawed goal.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Twitter went public in November 2013 at a first trade of 45 dollars and traded around 34 dollars at the time of recording, so the stock was down after eight years even though revenue grew about 7.5 times and compounded at 29 percent.

    “Twitter went public in November of 2013. Its first trade post IPO was at $45. Today... it's trading around $34.”

  • Twitter's rising share count from stock-based compensation should be treated as a real cash cost, even though management may not fully understand that cost.

    “It's not clear that the management team really understands exactly what share issuance costs, but we do. So I'm just going to assume that that's really a cash cost.”

  • Maximizing a company's IPO valuation is not obviously good for long-term health, because when the price implies expectations the company cannot execute, the gap produces discontent later.

    “you are planting the seeds today for discontent tomorrow”

0.20

Subscriptions and TweetDeck can add high-margin recurring revenue.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Twitter's subscription products, including Twitter Blue premium tools and a monetized TweetDeck, could generate high-margin recurring revenue, with a rough estimate of 3 million users at $5 per month adding about $180 million of margin and a business worth about $10 billion at 20 times profit.

    “Can Twitter penetrate 1% of those with a $5 a month on Twitter subscription platform?”

  • TweetDeck, a power-user tool that has not been overhauled in about eight years, could be charged at hundreds of dollars per year, and 500,000 paying users at $500 per year would produce about $250 million of high-margin revenue.

    “Could you have half a million users of that paying $500 a year? I think you could, which would be easy math.”

  • Twitter Blue premium features such as ad-free articles, undo tweet, and NFT profile display are effectively 100 percent margin products that could evolve into a tiered subscription.

    “Those are effectively 100% margin products.”

0.20

Interest-based model and modular rebuild enable faster product iteration.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Twitter differs from other social platforms because users build their experience around interests rather than existing friends and family, making it an interest network where news breaks and expert discussion happens in the background.

    “you're not generally building your experience around your existing social graph of friends and families”

  • Twitter's historical onboarding forced new users to choose among famous accounts and find micro-interests manually, creating high friction compared with TikTok, which begins with engaging content and learns preferences from swipes.

    “there is a real friction to turning Twitter into a useful service for you”

  • Rebuilding Twitter as separate modules, like Lego blocks for timeline, search, trends, ads, and onboarding, lets the company run the existing service while rebuilding it and create new product variations more quickly.

    “As you modularize it, you can start to create new variations on it.”