What this covers

This is a conversation between host Matt and investor Parsa Kiai about CompoSecure, the maker of metal payment cards for issuers such as American Express and Chase. It begins with the numbers. In 2024 the core card business did a little over $400 million in revenue on about 31 million cards, at an ASP near $13 against a cost of roughly $6.20, with 53% gross margins and almost no capex or marketing. The history covers the 2003 Amex metal card, the first EMV chip card, large-scale NFC mailer cards, and the 2021 SPAC merger at a $1 billion enterprise value. LLR's earlier $100 million purchase of a 60% stake, which brought in Jon Wilk, is also covered.

The middle of the discussion is about why issuers pay. A premium card earns $750 to $1,500 in annual interchange, and the metal card costs about $12. Parsa also cites spending data on high-fee cardholders, a claim he frames as contested. The risks get equal time: Apple's digital-only card and Goldman's reported losses, a payments mix in which credit cards are about 35% of transactions and cash 17%, and a purchase price of about 5x normalized free cash flow that already priced in disintermediation within three to four years. Arculus, the cold wallet unit, gets a candid treatment. Revenue grew from under $2 million to almost $11 million, but it lost about $20 million operationally and went from shiny asset to perceived liability. Its larger use is authentication.

The last stretch turns to Dave Cote, his Honeywell and Vertiv record, and his operating system and M&A method. It ends on Resolute Holdings, which takes a 10% royalty on CompoSecure's EBITDA, and on Parsa's argument that its valuation implies much higher EBITDA than the market assumes.

Sharpest takeaway

Parsa Kiai argues CompoSecure is a mission-critical, low-cost supplier whose premium metal cards are a high-ROI customer acquisition tool for card issuers, so its moat holds despite Apple Pay, competition, and the SPAC history, and Dave Cote's M&A and Resolute structure could unlock value.

  • Premium metal cards cost issuers about $12 against roughly 100x return, so issuers are unlikely to switch suppliers over small savings
  • Dave Cote's operating-system approach and disciplined M&A, plus the Resolute Holdings structure, can drive EBITDA growth
  • Physical cards persist because customers still value them and cash remains a major payment method, so mobile wallet disintermediation is a long-term rather than near-term risk

The argument · threads9 threads · 61 claims
0.85

Dave Cote's disciplined M&A operating record will re-rate an undervalued CompoSecure toward a higher multiple.

10 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Dave Cote became CompoSecure's controlling shareholder in August 2024 by buying out the private equity sponsors and co-founder Michele Herslow, a watershed moment for the company.

    “He became the controlling shareholder by buying out the private equity sponsors and the co-founder, a lady named Michele Herslow.”

  • Dave Cote's track record rests on an operating system focused on operational excellence and capital allocation, where a large part of value creation comes from exceptionally astute M&A covering deal origination, integration, and paying the right price for the right business.

    “It is a focus on capital allocation, and a large part of that is exceptionally astute M&A, which comes from deal origination, integration, and paying the right price for the right business.”

  • The investment is split into CompoSecure 1.0, a broken IPO with a hidden gem business trading at a fraction of core value before Cote, and CompoSecure 2.0, a more respected business with near-term tailwinds and longer-term potential under the CompoSecure Operating System.

    “There's CompoSecure 1.0, which was before Mr. Cote's involvement when it was a broken IPO with a hidden gem of a business that was trading at a fraction of its core value.”

  • When CompoSecure was first bought, the stock traded at about 5 times normalized free cash flow, pricing in disintermediation in three to four years, while the investors concluded cards would last at least five years and still grow double digits.

    “The company was trading at five times normalized free cash flow.”

  • CompoSecure's M&A will likely target payments hardware, technology, software, security, and authentication adjacencies first, with longer-term diversification reducing customer concentration and disintermediation risk and supporting a higher multiple.

    “we would anticipate it is in the payments hardware, technology, software, security, and authentication verticals”

  • Resolute's compensation is tied to CompoSecure's EBITDA, creating a long-term alignment question, though Cote's controlling interest in both companies makes this a manageable rather than near-term concern.

    “there's a structure in which they get paid on the EBITDA of CompoSecure.”

  • Cote's M&A approach uses a robust internal pipeline so no deal is desperate, targets good businesses with strong competitive positions that are underinvested, pays a fair but not excessive price, and begins integration before the deal closes, applying the operating system.

    “One of the first would be to build a robust internal pipeline of potential deals so you're not wedded or desperate on any single deal.”

  • During Dave Cote's tenure as Honeywell CEO from 2003, revenues rose 100%, EPS rose 400%, and the stock rose 500%, more than double the S&P 500, and as Vertiv chairman the stock rose about 600% over five years.

    “by the time he left 15 years later, revenues were up 100%, EPS was up 400%, and the stock was up 500%, more than double what the S&P did.”

  • Dave Cote bought a controlling interest in CompoSecure at $7.50 per share last year, and today the stock trades near $20 and Resolute Holdings near $80, which Parsa cites as evidence of a good deal.

    “last year he bought a controlling interest in CompoSecure at $7.50 a share, and today you get a share of CompoSecure at $20 and Resolute Holdings at $80.”

  • During the five years Dave Cote was chairman of Vertiv, a company supplying liquid cooling for data centers, the stock rose close to 600%, and CEO Jon Wilk described him as hard-charging and relentless.

    “In the five years that he was chairman, that stock went up by close to 600%.”

0.59

Premium metal cards earn issuers outsized returns for a tiny cost, so issuers keep paying for them.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Cardholders with premium cards above a $500 annual fee spend about $3,000 per month versus about $1,000 for lower-fee cards, and the top 10% of cardholders account for nearly 50% of consumer spending, making the high-end customer the prize issuers compete for.

    “10% of cardholders are responsible for nearly 50% of all consumer spending.”

  • American Express earns about $75 billion in revenue and roughly $20 billion in pre-tax, pre-provision profit, and its physical card cost of about $10 per card amounts to roughly 0.2% of its cost base, which explains why the card is cheap relative to its value.

    “That cost of goods sold is 0.2% of their cost base.”

  • A generic plastic card costs about $1.25 but, because its users spend less and generate higher credit losses and churn, its return on investment is less than a fifth of that of a premium metal card.

    “we estimate that the return on investment on a generic plastic card is less than a fifth of what it is on a premium metal card.”

  • Even after public disclosure of CompoSecure's high margins and average selling prices, the company has seen no customer attrition or market share losses, because the metal card is a valuable tool for issuers pursuing high-end cardholders.

    “you have not seen customer attrition, you've not seen market share losses because it is such an incredibly valuable tool for their issuers”

  • A premium card generates about $750 to $1,500 in annual interchange, of which roughly half is returned as rewards, producing $1,200 to $1,600 in annual profit per card, while the metal card costs issuers about $12, roughly 100 times return on investment.

    “So you're looking at something like 100 times return on your investment.”

  • The durable lesson is to find overlooked, poorly understood businesses that are mission-critical to large, entrenched customers at a cost that is tiny relative to the customer's return, such as a $12 card for Chase and Amex, a Transdigm widget, or Air Products gas supplies.

    “finding overlooked and not well understood businesses that are actually mission critical to large, entrenched, and growing customers with a cost that is minuscule compared to the ROI”

0.59

Physical premium cards will persist and grow despite mobile wallets and digital-only alternatives.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Apple's digital-only card did not resonate with high-end consumers as expected, and Goldman Sachs reportedly lost substantial money on it before the program was being moved toward J.P. Morgan.

    “It really did not resonate with the high end consumer.”

  • American Express's 2016 product refresh with a higher annual fee raised net new account acquisition by 50%, and its 2025 refresh doubled acquisition versus 2016, showing that customers still value physical premium cards despite mobile wallets.

    “net new accounts acquired went up by 50% over the pre-refresh period.”

  • Credit cards are the most used payment form at about 35% of transactions, debit cards about 30%, and cash about 17%, so physical payment instruments will persist longer than expected.

    “So credit cards are number one at 35%, debit cards are at 30%, and 17% of transactions are still done with cash.”

  • There are about 18 billion payment cards in circulation, still growing about 4% per year, and about 4 billion new cards are issued annually, mostly to replace expired, lost, or stolen cards, so the business has a recurring replacement base.

    “There's about 18 billion payment cards in circulation.”

  • Even if CompoSecure's share of premium metal cards falls from about 90% to 75-80% as penetration rises from 1% to 2-3%, unit and dollar growth would remain large, giving a long runway for organic growth.

    “even as your market share goes from basically being virtually the only player at a 90% market share to 80 and 75 or something.”

  • Digitally native firms such as Coinbase, Robinhood, and Gemini are launching physical premium metal cards as acquisition tools, and all of them are CompoSecure customers, which undercuts the view that digital wallets make physical cards obsolete.

    “all of them are coming out with brand new premium cards that are physical metal cards as a customer acquisition tool, and they are all CompoSecure customers.”

0.52

Arculus, despite early underdelivery, and cross-selling into issuer relationships add growth upside.

8 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Arculus, CompoSecure's digital cold wallet, has its larger use case in security and authentication, letting a metal card act as an authentication token for passwordless login, reduced fraud, and faster approval of high-value transactions.

    “its larger use case, in my view, is really on the security and authentication side.”

  • Arculus's early expectations were too high and its revenues had not materialized, so a few years after the SPAC it generated about a $20 million operating loss and shifted from a shiny asset to a perceived liability.

    “It was generating about a $20 million operating loss, and it went from being the shiny toy to a liability.”

  • Arculus carries roughly 80% gross margins, and its revenue grew from less than $2 million in 2023 to almost $11 million in 2024.

    “you saw that Arculus has 80% gross margins and that its revenues had grown from less than $2 million in 2023 to almost $11 million in 2024.”

  • Chase Sapphire uses EMV but has not incorporated Arculus security and authentication tools, so the long-standing relationship offers a cross-selling path for Arculus revenue.

    “you're using the EMV technology, but you really have not incorporated all of the security and authentication tools yet.”

  • The main catalysts are strong American Express results with raised guidance, Arculus turning from a small cash drain to positive cash flow, cross-selling in security and authentication, and the debut of Cote's M&A.

    “getting Arculus to the point where it starts being a material contributor, starts having a positive cash flow contribution instead of a small negative”

  • Comparable companies suggest Arculus could address a market worth more than $300 million, with Ledger at roughly $70 million in cold wallet revenue and Yubico at roughly $250 million in enterprise security device revenue.

    “they have maybe $70 million of revenue selling crypto cold wallets. Then you look at a company like Yubico”

  • After Amex, CompoSecure helped Chase launch its first metal card, Chase Palladium in 2009, which was the predecessor to the Chase Sapphire card, and Chase remains a premier customer today.

    “It was called Chase Palladium in 2009, and again, Chase today, many, many years later, is still a premier customer.”

  • Jon Wilk, who was in the room for the first Chase Sapphire card, applied issuer-side questions about what issuers and premium cardholders need, which drove growth with Amex, Chase, Capital One, Delta, and Amazon co-brands.

    “he had the vision and the experience being on the issuer side, saying, 'What does an issuer need?'”

0.52

Premium metal card economics sustain high margins through low unit costs and a dominant market position.

8 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The roughly $6 unit cost of a premium metal card is driven by an EMV chip costing about $1, stainless steel, recycled aluminum from a Boeing 737 fuselage used for a Delta card, and Corning Gorilla Glass for a glass card, and this manufacturing sophistication sustains the margins.

    “They've used recycled aluminum from a Boeing 737 fuselage to make a Delta co-branded card.”

  • In its 2024 10-K segment disclosure, CompoSecure's core metal card business reported 53% gross margins, 40% core EBIT margins, and 42% EBITDA margins, with very little capex and virtually no marketing spend.

    “you could see that the metal card business has 53% gross margins and core EBIT margins of 40%.”

  • In 2024 the core card business generated a little over $400 million in revenue from about 31 million cards at an average selling price near $13, with each card costing about $6.20 to make, yielding a gross margin just over 50%.

    “So the average was about a $13 ASP for your card business.”

  • Steamboat's baseline expectation is 10% organic growth, with premium metal card units growing high single-digit to low double-digit and ASP rising at low single digits in smaller issuers, then Arculus and potential Cote-led M&A adding upside.

    “I would say as a baseline we anticipate 10% organic growth, and then you add Arculus, and then you add potential M&A from David Cote”

  • The core metal card business has virtually no marketing spend because CompoSecure is the dominant supplier that issuers already know, so others come to it, which supports its high margins.

    “there's virtually no marketing spend at the core metal business because you're really the dominant player in the industry.”

  • TransDigm sells proprietary widgets around $200 that go on a $100 million Boeing aircraft, and Air Products supplies small key inputs to multibillion-dollar refineries and chemical plants, both examples of the same mission-critical, low-cost pattern as CompoSecure.

    “a company like Transdigm that will sell a proprietary $200 widget that goes on a $100 million Boeing”

  • As American Express and Chase grow from about 13 million to 20 or 25 million cards, their ASP should fall, while smaller-volume fintech cards priced at $50 to $500 per card push the aggregate ASP up at a low single-digit rate.

    “If you start making 20 or 25 million, I anticipate that your ASP goes down.”

  • Card issuers give back about half of interchange revenue as rewards to customers, because that spend is worth keeping the customer relationship, and rewards cost roughly $375 to $750 per premium card annually.

    “So they have to give something about half of the interchange back to these customers.”

0.46

CompoSecure has led the premium metal card category since its 2003 American Express debut.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • CompoSecure manufactures, designs, and distributes the premium heavy metal credit cards for most large premium issuers, identifiable by the CS marker beside the serial number on cards such as American Express Platinum or Chase Sapphire.

    “you'll see a serial number, and in between it with the letters CS for CompoSecure”

  • CompoSecure went public via a SPAC merger with Roman DBDR in 2021 at a $1 billion enterprise value, during a period when SPACs had a poor reputation and a bear market created the entry opportunity for the later investment.

    “SPACs didn't have a great reputation at the time. We hit a little bit of a bear market, and it provided an opportunity for our involvement in Compo 1.0.”

  • Premium metal cards are under 1% of the roughly 4 billion cards issued annually but grow three to four times faster than the aggregate card base, and CompoSecure holds roughly an 80% share of that segment.

    “Of the 4 billion cards issued annually, less than 1% of that are premium metal credit cards. But those premium metal cards are growing three or four times faster”

  • CompoSecure was the first to put an EMV chip in a credit card and the first to deploy large-scale NFC dual-interface mailer cards, innovations that much of today's premium card feature set builds on.

    “They were the first ones to put an EMV chip in a credit card.”

  • By happenstance, CompoSecure worked with American Express in 2003 to introduce the first-ever metal credit card, when credit cards had always been plastic before that.

    “By happenstance, they worked with American Express in 2003 in introducing the first-ever metal credit card.”

  • CompoSecure grew out of a family plastic business started by the Herslow grandparents in the 1950s, and John and Michele Herslow founded CompoSecure in 2000.

    “they eventually founded CompoSecure in 2000.”

0.40

Competitors and mobile wallets are the main medium and long-term risks.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Near term the business looks sound, but over the medium and long term the main risks are well-capitalized competitors like Idemia and Thales, the eventual loss of monopoly position, and mobile wallets as the elephant in the room.

    “long term and medium term you gotta keep an eye on competition.”

  • Idemia and Thales are both competitors and resellers for CompoSecure, using their larger sales forces to reach international issuers while relying on CompoSecure for manufacturing and technical know-how.

    “Idemia and Thales, interestingly, they're both competitors, but they're also actually resellers.”

  • Idemia, Thales, CPI Card Group, and FCS are encroaching on metal cards, but Chase and American Express are unlikely to shift production away from CompoSecure because at about $12 per card the savings do not justify the risk of a less experienced supplier.

    “the cost of a CompoSecure card at $12 or lower for these issuers is not enough to risk a lower quality or less experienced supplier.”

  • Mobile wallets are a real long-term risk to physical cards, maybe over 20 years, but in the near term, and even over the next few years, the signals point the other way, so the risk is one management must keep ahead of rather than an immediate threat.

    “while I do think that in 20 years or some long time period this does become a bit of a risk”

0.26

Resolute Holdings' fee structure aligns its team with growing CompoSecure EBITDA.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Resolute Holdings, spun out to CompoSecure shareholders to allocate capital and run M&A, earns a 10% royalty or management fee on CompoSecure's EBITDA, which aligns its team with growing EBITDA many-fold.

    “Resolute gets a 10% share, a 10% royalty, if you will, or management fee on CompoSecure's EBITDA.”

  • Resolute Holdings is valued at about a $700 million market cap on roughly $15 million of revenue, and applying a high-growth asset manager multiple implies CompoSecure's EBITDA should be double or more of today's level, which the market has not priced in.

    “If you look at Resolute Holdings, it's valued at about a $700 million market cap.”

  • Brad Jacobs's QXO receives a halo valuation because of his shareholder-value track record, and Resolute's structure applies a similar logic by separating capital allocation into its own vehicle.

    “it receives a bit of a halo valuation because of Brad's incredible track record of creating shareholder value.”

  • CompoSecure spun out its asset management and capital allocation business into Resolute Holdings, which was distributed to CompoSecure shareholders and is tasked with allocating capital and doing strategic M&A for CompoSecure first and possibly on its own later.

    “we've spun out the asset management side, we've spun out the capital allocation business into something called Resolute Holdings.”

0.23

Long-term American Express and Chase relationships are symbiotic, easing customer concentration concerns.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • American Express, 22 years after the first metal card, and Chase, after launching its first metal card in 2009, remain key long-term customers whose relationships have grown over time.

    “American Express today, 22 years later, is still a key partner and customer.”

  • Private equity firm LLR paid $100 million for a 60% stake in CompoSecure and brought in senior payments executive Jon Wilk, who had Bank of America and Chase experience and was in the room for the first Chase Sapphire card.

    “They paid $100 million for a 60% stake in the business.”

  • Initial concerns about customer concentration with American Express and Chase eased as the investors learned how symbiotic the relationships are, with multi-year contracts renewed and extended repeatedly.

    “the number of times that those contracts have been renewed and have been increased in tenure really speaks to how important that relationship is.”