What this covers

This is a conversation between Patrick and Chris Cole, a volatility investor, that starts with a 1962 bomber crash in North Carolina. A weak fail-safe was all that stopped two nuclear weapons from detonating. Cole uses the story and the arms-race prisoner's dilemma to show how apparent stability can hide rare, extreme outcomes. He then applies the same logic to markets, comparing central-bank behavior since Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" to forest-fire suppression, and arguing that the largest risk is social rather than a 20 to 30 percent market decline.

The middle of the conversation covers practical construction. Cole calls value investing a short convexity strategy and explains why bond yields can no longer provide the old hedge. He criticizes tail-risk funds that are down 40 to 50 percent since 2012 because their insurance costs too much. His alternative is to sell the first moderate market move for carry and buy the second, larger one, and to hold systematic CTA and contrarian macro exposure. The Dennis Rodman rebounding analogy illustrates how these assets work. He also pushes back on how Nassim Taleb's ideas are usually read, as being about disaster rather than robustness.

The conversation then widens and gets more contested. Cole links Weimar hyperinflation to Hitler, says World War II rather than the New Deal ended the Depression, and compares quantitative easing to John Law and Roman debasement. He argues that buybacks funded by cheap debt now eclipse S&P 500 operating earnings. Patrick presses on whether technology and productivity could let society grow out of its debts and pensions, and Cole answers that technology is producing deflation and underemployment. The last turn treats human life as a finite option.

Sharpest takeaway

Cole argues that most portfolios and institutions are short convexity, so central-bank suppression of volatility is building hidden tail risk, and a small, cheap long-convexity position is a rational hedge that works in portfolios and in personal life alike.

  • Central banks since 2012 suppress market drawdowns, which moves risk forward rather than destroying it
  • Stability achieved by suppressing small volatility increases the probability of large, rare shocks
  • Long-convexity positions cost little in carry and pay off non-linearly in dislocations, like Rodman's rebounding

The argument · threads8 threads · 65 claims
0.85

Cheap anti-correlated convex hedges defend portfolios when costly insurance and conventional diversification fail.

13 pointscentrality 5/5
  • A practical convexity approach is to sell the first moderate market move for carry and buy the second, larger move, which leaves the portfolio negatively exposed to about a 5 percent decline while strongly positive on a 10 to 30 percent decline, making insurance much cheaper to carry.

    “you might sell the first movement in markets for carry, and buy the second movement, so you're selling linearity for carry, and you're buying the non-linearity”

  • The best macro investors embed convexity in their process: they are wrong 8 or 9 out of 10 times, but a few correct, inexpensively structured bets pay for all the losses and more, so they need not bet on the world ending.

    “he is wrong 8 out of 10, 9 out of 10 times. It's just that the one or two times that he's right, it pays for all the other times that he's wrong, and more”

  • The average tail risk fund has been down 40 to 50 percent since 2012 because its insurance is too costly, and a 50 percent loss requires a 100 percent gain to recover, so tail hedges must be cheap enough to carry.

    “if you're losing 10% a year, the average tail risk fund is down 40-50% since 2012. And if you're down 50%, you have to make a hundred percent just to be back at even”

  • Combining the CBOE long volatility hedge fund index with the S&P 500 since 2005 has beaten the average hedge fund by about 90 percent, and a naive 50/50 mix of long-vol or tail-risk indexes with equity beta also dramatically outperformed.

    “If you combine that with the S&P 500, since 2005, that's beaten the average hedge fund by 90%”

  • The market dropped 20 percent in a single day in 1987 and rebounded quickly, a high-volatility episode contained within a year that few people remember.

    “the market dropped 20% in one day, and then, rebounded very, very quickly”

  • Dennis Rodman, who could not score, turned teams good or great by rebounding, and similarly anti-correlated convex assets such as long volatility, systematic CTAs, and contrarian global macro rebound the misses of value stocks and bonds, creating non-linear portfolio benefits.

    “It's almost like Dennis Rodman for the portfolio.”

  • Long volatility strategies have underperformed over the last four years, but Cole argues the late 1990s and 1987 show high volatility can coexist with high asset prices, so the strategy's value is not only 2008.

    “Certainly, there's been an under-performance over the last four years”

  • Dennis Rodman secured about 30 percent of defensive rebounds and 17 percent of offensive rebounds and was six standard deviations from the mean in rebounding, a degree of difference no other player achieved in any stat, and modern analytics rank him among the top 20 players ever.

    “Rodman secured about 30% of the defensive rebounds, 17% of the offensive rebounds. He was six standard deviations away from the mean”

  • Combining value investing with a long convexity strategy creates a very powerful combination because the convex exposure protects during crises that value investing otherwise suffers through.

    “If you take that, you combine that with value investing, you have a very, very powerful combination.”

  • A small allocation to convex exposure can be paired with traditional linear assets like beta, value, or carry, which can be levered slightly to pay for the cost of tail protection.

    “you can actually lever those up slightly to pay for the cost of the tail risk.”

  • Long volatility strategies sell volatility when it is expensive and recycle the proceeds into convexity, minimizing the cost of carry, and the exposure can be ramped up or down based on market developments.

    “we'll sell volatility where it's expensive, and recycle it into convexity to minimize the cost of carry.”

  • Institutions should build a defensive component from long volatility tail risk, systematic CTAs, and contrarian global macro, which are all long convex and anti-correlated, and combine them in a portfolio.

    “the institutions that try to implement, they might actually have a defensive component to their portfolio”

  • In 2008, when conventional diversification failed, long convex asset classes such as long volatility and systematic CTAs performed strongly and would have turned disaster into a good outcome for a portfolio.

    “When diversification failed, these asset classes, because they're positively exposed to change, did really, really well”

0.85

Engineered volatility suppression and low rates concentrate risk, creating dislocations and larger, less controllable crises.

13 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Prisoner's dilemma equilibria like the arms race produce a false peace in which mutual distrust and massive arsenals create apparent stability while hiding the potential for extreme, low-probability events.

    “you end up in this equilibrium of false peace, and the greatest idea of prisoner's dilemma is actually the arms race”

  • Suppressing small volatility, whether in marriages, avalanche control, or forest fire suppression, increases the probability and size of large, uncontrolled events, so central banks suppressing intermediate risk are repeating the same mistake.

    “When they tried to do forest fire suppression, it resulted in bigger, and bigger, and bigger fires. Today, what central banks are doing is completely analogous”

  • Giant sequoia trees release their seeds only when they sense a forest fire, which clears bad trees; the forest service now uses controlled burns after suppression policies produced bigger fires.

    “the Sequoia trees in the great Sequoia Forest, they will not release their seeds until they sense a forest fire”

  • What actually got the U.S. out of the Great Depression was winning World War II: wartime production mobilized an existential threat, and afterward the U.S. was the only industrial superpower left standing, a growth model economists ignore.

    “what got us out of The Great Depression is that we won a world war”

  • A 1962 bomber carrying two nuclear weapons crashed in rural North Carolina, and only a weak fail-safe trigger prevented detonation, which would have exceeded Hiroshima's power over a hundred times.

    “A bomber crashed in rural North Carolina, and was carrying two nuclear weapons. If either of them had detonated, it would have been over a hundred times the power of Hiroshima.”

  • Share buybacks funded by ultra-low-rate debt have eclipsed the operating earnings of the S&P 500, because tech companies already have engineers and so borrow to repurchase stock rather than invest in plants and workers.

    “now we have a dynamic where share buybacks have eclipsed the operating earnings of the S&P 500”

  • Bund yields fell from about 4.5 percent in early 2008 to negative and US Treasury yields from about 4.2 percent to around 1.7 percent, so earning the same convex fixed-income benefit now would require rates around negative 3 to 5 percent.

    “the German Bund was around 4.5%, the U.S. Treasury was around 4.2%. Today, the Bund has gone all the way negative to flat, U.S. treasuries are around like 1.7%”

  • One of the most frightening scenarios is simultaneous destabilization of stocks and bonds if the financial system cannot tolerate a 100 to 200 basis point rise in rates over a year, which would be disastrous and force governments to respond.

    “a destabilization of both stocks and bonds. There's a question, will the global financial system be able to tolerate a 100 or 200 basis point increase in rates”

  • Technological advances causing deflation and productivity growth can leave large parts of the workforce systematically underemployed, and policy makers applying old stimulus tools to new technology regimes can worsen dislocations.

    “policy makers that are responding using old tools to a changing game”

  • Engineered stabilization like quantitative easing resembles John Law's paper money schemes and Roman coinage debasement, and history suggests such regimes do not end in a controlled soft landing.

    “that is no different than what John Law did, what the Romans did with coinage.”

  • Cole cites Devil Take the Hindmost and Niall Ferguson's work as examples of historians warning about central bank suppression of volatility.

    “if you read Devil Take the Hindmost, and you read the work of Niall Ferguson”

  • Central bank actions are analogous to forest fire suppression, since they remove intermediate and small risks while building the potential for large risks, and the largest risk is social rather than market-based.

    “Today, what central banks are doing is completely analogous to all of these different factors.”

  • A substantial number of people make a living driving, and self-driving cars will put them out of work, a concrete example of technology-driven displacement.

    “all of a sudden all those people are going to be out of jobs when there's self-driving cars”

0.62

Life and investing should pursue non-linear positive payoffs through small repeated failures, not merely avoid disaster.

9 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Almost nobody would swap places with Warren Buffett at his late-80s age despite his roughly 66 billion dollar net worth, which implies people value their time and health in the billions and should maximize both.

    “almost nobody says yes to that trade. Everyone says, no. Well, how much do you value your time then? Your time is valued in the billions”

  • Taleb has done a great service with antifragility, fragility, and black swan ideas, but people focus too much on disaster, when the core concept is robustness and profiting from change in general, not only catastrophe.

    “people have many times focused on the core concept of disaster, and it doesn't necessarily need to be a disaster”

  • Human life resembles a long option: we are exposed to many non-linear possibilities, but time is linear and each option has a finite expiration, so satisfaction should be pursued by converting linear time into non-linear experience.

    “I like to think of human life almost like an option - we have non-linear payoffs, but we're linearly exposed to time”

  • A positive black swan is any surprise non-linear benefit, where a linear expectation yields a non-linear payoff, such as a bedroom startup becoming Facebook, Dell, or Apple, or one person among thousands changing a life.

    “I think a positive black swan is any surprise non-linear benefit”

  • Cole meditates about 20 minutes daily, exercises daily with weights, running, and yoga, and reads something challenging outside investing to form new neural connections, which he treats as daily practices with non-linear payoffs.

    “I meditate daily. That's been powerful. I exercise daily, that's powerful. And I try to read something challenging”

  • Ed Catmull's book on Pixar shows that encouraging many small failures and learning from them is a form of convexity in creative process.

    “they encourage lots of little failures. That's an example of convexity in the process”

  • Organized crime and the desperate outcasts in Sorcerer are short volatility, because they got into their predicaments by shorting volatility and then make bigger short convexity bets to escape, rarely learning.

    “Organized crime is a form of short volatility, short convexity.”

  • In The Road Warrior, Mad Max has nothing left to lose and few linear losses, and by taking a selfless risk to protect a community he achieves non-linear spiritual growth and regains his humanity.

    “he really, he's lost everything. He really has very little more to lose, very little linear losses, but by putting himself out there in a moment of self-sacrifice”

  • Small linear costs such as pride, time, or effort can be exchanged for potentially exponential personal gains, such as meeting a life partner, learning, or building habits like meditation and exercise.

    “Just a very small linear loss, which might simply be pride, or a small linear amount of time, with the potential exponential gain”

0.37

Most portfolios are short convexity, dividing strategies into short-convexity and long-convexity camps.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Most investor portfolios are roughly 97 percent short convexity and only 2 to 3 percent long convexity, and many investors learned this painfully during the financial crisis and other risk-off periods.

    “most people's portfolios tend to be 97% short convexity and maybe 2% to 3%, if that, long convexity”

  • Nearly all investment strategies fall into one of two camps: short convexity strategies that earn steady positive payouts but suffer large, sometimes exponential declines occasionally, or long convexity strategies that bleed small amounts while waiting for occasional large gains.

    “it would tend to fit into one of two camps, either long volatility, long convexity strategies, and short volatility, short convexity strategies”

  • Tail risk is true insurance that protects against both endogenous and exogenous shocks, while long volatility is an active alpha strategy that sells expensive volatility to fund convexity and focuses mainly on endogenous risk, possibly missing external shocks.

    “The difference between tail risk and long volatility is that tail risk is a true insurance policy, whereas long volatility is an active management strategy”

  • Value investing is a short convexity strategy because it harvests an equity risk premium and is exposed to endogenous crises in 1928, 1998, and 2008, though it benefits from the behavioral inefficiency that crises create.

    “value investing extracts a equity risk premium, and during large scale declines in markets, value investing is not immune to the crisis”

0.37

Central banks now respond to markets, pulling returns forward and widening wealth disparity.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Central bank stimulus cannot destroy risk; it only moves returns from the future into the present and pushes present tail losses into the future, so the risk accumulates rather than disappearing.

    “You can't destroy risk. What they've done is they've taken returns from the future, and they've brought them to the present”

  • Cole is worried that central bank suppression of volatility, which funnels money into asset prices and widens wealth disparity, could lead to a financial crisis and a democratic backlash, and that democracy will not survive it.

    “I'm actually worried that democracy will not survive what they're trying to do.”

  • Stretched valuations and extremely low interest rates are the best current signs that returns have been pulled forward from the future, which is why forecasters expect low single-digit equity returns and near-zero real bond returns.

    “valuations and low interest rates are kind of the best current signs of that problem”

  • Since 2012, central banks have shifted from responding to economic conditions to responding to market conditions, stepping in with stimulus or jawboning whenever markets draw down, starting from Draghi's whatever it takes speech and extending through QE3 and later ECB actions.

    “beginning in 2012, central banks began responding to market conditions rather than economic conditions”

0.32

Convex exposure is sized from defined payoff scenarios and accessed through creative macro thinking.

8 pointscentrality 2/5
  • During the 2010 flash crash the market dropped 10 percent and recovered within minutes, and Cole's mistake was adjusting hedges during the spike, so the lesson is not to change hedges mid-dislocation.

    “I learned not to change your hedges that day”

  • Owning gold through an ETF like GLD defeats the purpose of holding gold, so investors should hold physical gold, which Cole considers a right-tail convex asset class and part of a defensive portfolio.

    “I don't own fiat gold. I don't think owning GLD, I think it defeats the purpose of owning gold. I think, you need to own physical gold”

  • There are few retail products offering long volatility exposure, so the average investor with 20,000 dollars cannot easily replicate institutional convexity strategies, leaving only systematic CTAs and contrarian global macro as accessible routes.

    “there's actually a lack of retail products out there. It's very hard for the average guy with $20,000 to invest”

  • Position size for convex exposure should be determined by first defining the change one wants protection from or exposure to, such as a 10 percent, 20 percent, or 50 percent decline or a 50 percent rally with volatility, and then computing the expected payout.

    “I think one needs to look at the different payouts. What is one hoping to get, and what type of change do you want to be positively exposed to?”

  • Global macro investing requires envisioning a reality different from today and assigning probabilities, a skill set Cole sees as similar to that of filmmakers and technical artists, so creative and logical thinking combine powerfully.

    “someone has to envision a reality that is different than the reality we have today, and understand how to structure instruments to profit from that potential reality shift”

  • Systematic CTAs and contrarian global macro managers can offer retail investors anti-correlated, convex exposure, since CTAs contain a long volatility component and contrarian macro can be systematized.

    “systematic CTAs, have a long volatility component to them. That's an asset class that is available from a retail perspective”

  • The tapestry in Cole's paper The Volatility and the Allegory of the Prisoner's Dilemma, by Andy Diaz Hope and Laurel Roth, depicts cooperation and competition across time within a Tower of Babel-like structure.

    “it's a tapestry actually that actually shows cooperation and competition across time.”

  • Global macro investors do not need the world to end; they form creative ideas about how reality might shift, such as a currency peg breaking or a political regime changing, and express them through inexpensive structures in mispriced instruments that are positively exposed to that change.

    “The world doesn't have to end for him to make money.”

0.23

Certainty is dangerous, since Cole's odds of being wrong about engineered outcomes remain under one percent.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • For a long volatility manager, the question of being wrong is existential, because if central banks can engineer permanent absence of 20 percent drawdowns, the strategy has no payoff, which Cole and his staff ask constantly.

    “It is an existential question if you're a long volatility manager.”

  • The day Lehman failed was not the end of Artemis's gains but the start of a journey, because Cole recognized the opportunity was expanding and chose to put on more risk rather than take profits.

    “it was the beginning of a journey, not the end of one, as most people would imagine”

  • Cole assigns a less than 1 percent probability that he is wrong and that central banks will engineer the outcome, because the burden of history and math argues against a decade-long engineered soft landing, while volatility will appear as market, social, or war vol.

    “I am very reasonably certain this will end in some element of vol, whether it's market vol, whether it's social vol, or whether it's war”

  • Ben Bernanke claiming to be 100 percent certain he is correct is frightening, because the smartest people are never fully certain, and certainty signals a failure to account for unknown risk.

    “When Ben Bernanke says he's a hundred percent certain that he's correct, that scares me.”

0.21

Historical policy failures show economic stress turning into political backlash and social instability.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Without the Weimar hyperinflation of the early 1920s there would have been no Hitler, because the suspension of constitutional controls Hitler later used was initiated to control the hyperinflation, and middle-class anger was misdirected into xenophobia.

    “I don't think there is a Hitler if there's not a Weimar Republic hyperinflation in the early '20s”

  • Historians like Niall Ferguson recognize the recurring pattern of volatility suppression, money funneling into assets, crisis, and wealth disparity, which economists miss, and that is why historians are criticizing central banks.

    “Why are all the historians criticizing central banks, and the economists are all behind it? Because the historians know, and they've seen this time and time again”

  • Pension systems assuming 8 percent actuarial returns face a choice between a massive mean reversion in earnings or benefit cuts, and angry politically strained populations will respond badly, making social response the biggest risk rather than a 20 to 30 percent market decline.

    “some of these systems have actuarial expected returns of 8%. That's their baseline expectation”