What this covers
This is a conversation between host Zack and Kat Cole about how Cinnabon, a business built on mall and airport franchise stores, moved into fast food, grocery and packaged goods. It starts with the product. A large size, specially milled Makara cinnamon, rolls pulled early and held hot, and ovens placed at the front of the store produced a gooey center and an aroma that competitors struggled to copy. Cole credits the aroma with over half of impulse purchases. From there the discussion moves to the Burger King launch, the later Focus Brands era, and the internal debates that preceded each step.
The range is mostly strategic frameworks. Cole separates what a brand stands for from what it sells, calling the former its equity bucket, and judges extensions by whether they fit that meaning. She also scores brands on the Relevance and Differentiation Framework. Her reframing of a stalled fast-food decision from whether to how is presented as a practical way past fear, and she describes steering growth between two Bowling Bumpers: competitive fear and financial discipline.
Some claims are contested. She argues that ubiquity need not erode value, against the usual scarcity logic. She also warns that owning no assets and only licensing IP ends in a white-label ingredient supplier. The conversation covers the post-recession slump in franchisee economics, where deferred CapEx, higher prices and lost confidence hurt. It also covers trust-building with franchisees, willingness to share profit with distribution partners, and the choice to rent, build or buy capabilities.
Cinnabon scaled into a multi-channel licensing business because it protected a highly differentiated core product and franchise base, and the licensing revenue funded that core rather than cannibalizing it.
- Licensing and CPG channels grew without shrinking franchising because the profits and marketing from those channels were reinvested in the franchise base
- Brand expansion is only permissible when it draws on a clearly defined equity bucket, not on the brand's ubiquity alone
- Relevance and differentiation must both be maintained; licensing without a healthy core leads to commoditization
Alternate-channel expansion creates latent demand and funds the legacy brand's renewal.
- The profits and marketing money from licensing and innovation channels were used to co-invest in franchisee remodels and the marketing fund, so the legacy business improved before the recession-driven sales recovery arrived.
“both the money and the marketing that came from expanding the product in alternative innovation channels would be the exact thing the legacy business needed”
- Leaders feared that launching a new product in alternative channels while the legacy channel struggled would cause one to overtake the other, a fear Kat calls understandable but not fully rational.
“the fear not necessarily a rational one, but an understandable one is that if you go put a new cool product in some other channel”
- Cinnabon's omnichannel success rests on three pillars: a highly differentiated, consistently made core product that creates latent demand elsewhere; influential franchisees who backed the expanded view; and a leadership team willing to endure difficult internal debate.
“One is the brand itself being insanely differentiated and high quality. ... The other is the people's side.”
- Eating a fresh-baked Cinnabon creates emotional and nostalgic associations that generate latent demand, so consumers later seek the taste in grocery or other channels.
“breathing life into emotion and memory and nostalgia into consumers who later want a little taste of it somewhere else”
- Successful license deals and collaborations work when each partner contributes what it uniquely has, so the combined result is greater than the sum of the parts, with the partner's credibility lifting the other's product positioning.
“finding what each of you has and bringing it together so one plus one equals three or more”
- Cinnabon's first large licensing deal with Pillsbury, a General Mills division, was a grocery refrigerated dough partnership that gave Pillsbury a premium tier and gave Cinnabon distribution and shelf presence.
“Pillsbury recognized it owned a certain tier of refrigerated dough, which was more entry and mid-market, mass market”
- Taking revenue and cash from profitable innovation channels and plowing it back into the franchise business, including retelling the brand origin story and reminding consumers of the core product, refills the brand equity bucket.
“literally taking points of revenue, points of cash from those very profitable innovation channels, and actually plowing it back into the franchise business to refill that equity bucket”
Disciplined stewardship must rebuild franchisee trust before any rapid expansion.
- The founders kept Cinnabon corporately owned for years, avoiding franchising because they did not want their business in someone else's hands and could self-fund growth from high profits, and only began franchising after a buyer earned their confidence.
“They didn't want their baby in someone else's hands. They were printing cash in those early days”
- Building trust with franchisees and stakeholders first, even if it means moving slowly at the start, allows a company to move much faster later, because a lack of trust lets key stakeholders block expansion in costly ways.
“You can move from 'walk to run' pretty quickly if you build trust, but if you don't have trust, the franchisees or any key stakeholder can get in your way”
- A crisis of franchisee confidence and fear about the future is more damaging than the numbers alone, because people who do not believe tomorrow will be better than today will not invest, and leadership has to rebuild that belief.
“you're in a bad place when people don't have some belief that tomorrow will be better than today.”
- An influential group of franchisees who believed in an expanded view of the brand was essential to leading the system into omnichannel expansion, even though not all franchisees agreed.
“There were enough franchisees, not all of them, but an influential few who believed and could get on board”
- Rather than debating whether to put Cinnabon in fast food, the team reframed the question to how it could protect the brand, name, product, and operations while being financially rewarded, which broke through the fear that had stalled the decision.
“instead of asking, "Well, should we do it or should we not do it?" we changed to, "How could we do it?"”
- Leaders are blinded by their own progress, and the very things that made a brand successful recently may hold it back from the next growth curve, so a leader must use the past as a driver rather than an anchor.
“we're all blinded by our own progress, and the very things that have made a brand successful in the most recent months or years may be the very things that hold it back”
- Fast-growing channels like delivery are margin-compressing, so a company must find savings elsewhere in the P&L to fund investment in those top-line growth drivers.
“the very channels that are growing fastest, like delivery are naturally margin compressing. You got to save points somewhere else in the P&L”
- Growth is best steered between two bumpers: a competitive 'if we don't, the competition will' fear that drives action, and financial stewardship with the 'just because we can does not mean we should' discipline to avoid distraction.
“One bumper is this phrase if we don't, the competition will. ... On the other side is just because we can do something does not mean we should.”
- Focus and Cinnabon declined about three times as many opportunities as they pursued, though few people know about the rejected opportunities.
“there are three times as many we said no to, but no one knows those stories”
Expansion keeps brand value only when every new product stays tied to core meaning.
- Being everywhere need not destroy brand value; a brand can stay valuable through ubiquity if its expansions are tied to what the brand stands for, challenging the traditional view that scarcity drives value.
“there is a way to make ubiquity or being in many places, actually a creative to the brand if you understand what the brand stands for”
- A brand's equity bucket is the set of what it stands for, separate from what it sells, and any new product that draws on that equity is permissible only if it is consistent with the core meaning, even if it is not in the same product category.
“Understanding what a brand is, what it stands for, separate from what it sells is a part of brand architecture work”
- Brand health depends on balancing relevance and differentiation, and a company that turns its back on the core to focus only on innovation channels is heading toward brand death.
“if I'm right, that real brand health is about the balance of those two things, then turning your back on the core and only looking forward to innovation”
- Cinnabon extended into coffee, ice cream, and cereal, and although each extension draws on the brand's equity account, all were acceptable because they remained tied to the core indulgence meaning.
“if we go into coffee, if we go into ice cream, if we go into cereal, all of which we did, it is still technically drawing on the equity bank account.”
- Cinnabon's brand stands for moments of indulgence, expressed in its tagline 'life needs frosting,' and it should own that indulgence honestly by making the treat so worth the guilt that consumers accept it.
“we might not be good for your butt, but we're good for your soul”
Licensing profits depend on a healthy core brand and a committed franchise base.
- A franchisee's challenge 'why do you even need us?' revealed the risk that franchisees feel sidelined by licensing growth, and the honest response is that licensing still depends on a healthy franchise base.
“he goes, "Why do you even need us?"”
- Licensing is far more profitable for a franchisor than franchising on a flow-through basis, with licensing margins around 70%-plus EBITDA, yet licensing depends on a healthy core brand and would collapse into commodity without one.
“this 70 plus percent EBITDA margin licensing business partnerships, own no assets”
- Franchisees gain from the ecosystem because licensing and innovation channels fund marketing that tells the brand's story at a scale individual franchisees could never afford alone.
“there are all these other marketing engines out there telling their story that they can never afford to do on their own”
- A strategy of only licensing IP and owning no assets would erode the brand over time, becoming a 'license of a license of a license' that ends as a white-label ingredient provider, destroying differentiation.
“What you probably become is a white label ingredient provider. It is a long road to commoditization”
- The franchisees who most wanted the business to succeed were often the most resistant to new initiatives, because they had become disillusioned about which elements still added value and feared that new products would dilute the core.
“The very people, the franchisees who have the most vested interest in seeing the business succeed, were the very people who fought it the most”
A differentiated, hard-to-copy core product and placement drive the brand's demand.
- When Kat joined in 2010, Cinnabon had low relevance but still radically high differentiation, which signaled that the brand had something worth salvaging.
“Relevance was low, yet differentiation was still radically high.”
- Cinnabon's early product decisions, including a large size, a specially milled Indonesian cinnamon, pulling rolls from the oven earlier, and holding them hot, created a gooey center that was difficult for competitors to duplicate and became the basis for its differentiation.
“if they baked it in a certain way and pulled it out before many others would from the oven, it would have this ooey-gooey center”
- Placing the ovens at the front of a small mall store, after learning the layout by accident, produced an aroma that drove over half of impulse purchases, and moving the ovens to the back in the second unit materially reduced sales.
“we would later learn over half of the impulse and transactions. In the second unit, they decided to put the ovens in the back and sales dropped materially”
- Mall and airport locations capture shoppers, travelers, and vacationers who are in the highest permission mode to indulge, which made them the right location for an indulgent treat business.
“That is the highest permission behavior to indulge that humans give themselves.”
Mall-based economics left franchisees exposed when traffic and financing declined.
- Franchisees could not finance store remodels during the downturn because banks would not lend to a small, sugar-and-fat bakery business located in a mall during the Atkins craze and the Great Recession.
“the last business owner a bank would give a loan to is someone who is building a bakery business famous for sugar and fat”
- Cinnabon's relevance and franchisee economics declined after the Great Recession because it was concentrated in malls and airports, and franchisees deferred capital expenditure, raised prices, cut quality, and lost confidence.
“There were years of deferred CapEx. No one updated their buildings, they looked old and dated.”
- Mall rents for Cinnabon ran 18% to 22% of sales, roughly two to three times streetside rent, so the model only worked if top-line traffic held up, which it stopped doing during the recession.
“which ranged from 18% to 22% of sales. It is literally 2X to 3X streetside rent, but the math works when the top-line comes.”
Brands should partner for missing capabilities, sharing profit with partners who multiply distribution.
- Some fast-food chains refused to put another brand on their menu and chose to build their own product, but Kat argues that they would lack credibility in cinnamon rolls if their expertise lies elsewhere.
“Good luck getting credibility in cinnamon rolls if your expertise is burgers or fried chicken.”
- Competing in restaurants today is very expensive because it requires data access, technology and infrastructure investment, and cost-of-goods control, and scale makes these easier than a single brand can achieve alone.
“it's incredibly expensive to compete in restaurants today.”
- Focus Brands' centralized licensing group and channel expertise let newly acquired brands like Jamba and Auntie Anne's enter other channels faster and with more franchisee confidence than standalone brands could.
“That happened smarter, faster, and with more confidence with the franchisees, because Focus brands had a team that had seen how the movie ends”
- A company should be willing to give up a meaningful share of profitability to partners who can multiply its distribution, because that partner's value justifies sharing the pie.
“Don't be afraid to give up a point, two points, 10 points. If someone else can 10 X your points of distribution, why would you not share a meaningful percentage of profitability”
- Companies should know what their brand stands for and where it has permission to go, then decide honestly whether to rent, build, or buy the capabilities they need, as Focus learned by selling manufacturing plants it had built or bought.
“And be honest if you need to rent, build or buy them. We tried manufacturing. It was a bad idea.”
Franchise and packaged channels reach large sales volumes across many countries and retailers.
- Cinnabon's annual consumer product sales through franchising and licensing range from one to two billion dollars per year, and can swing by hundreds of millions in a given year because of large foodservice partnerships.
“the annual sales of consumer products around the world through franchising and licensing will range anywhere from one to two billion in sales per year”
- Cinnabon's international franchise footprint spans about 60 countries, with heavy concentration in the Middle East and close to 150 locations at one point in Saudi Arabia alone, and the brand has been in the Middle East for over 25 years.
“At one point, there were close to 150 locations in Saudi alone. Cinnabon's been in the Middle East for well over 25 years.”
- Franchising typically accounts for about 30% of Cinnabon's dollars and transactions while alternate channels make up about 70%, a split that can shift by roughly 10 points by year, yet the franchise business still grows.
“typically somewhere between 30% franchise, 70% alternate channels. As the years go on that could shift up or down by 10 points”
- Cinnabon's packaged products are sold at over 100,000 points of retail distribution including grocery stores, hotel chains, gas stations, and other restaurant chains.
“in over 100,000 points of retail distribution”
Ownership history and the Focus Brands structure shape Cinnabon's scale and purchasing.
- Cinnabon passed through several owners, including AFC Corporation (then owner of Popeyes), before Roark Capital acquired it along with Carvel and later combined them into Focus Brands.
“The business actually went through, before it ever landed with Focus Brands, went through many changes in ownership”
- Cinnabon began in Seattle as a venture by father Rich Komen and son Greg Komen, who partnered with baker Jerilyn Brusseau, after they failed to license the rights to expand the T.J. Cinnamons chain, which declined to franchise.
“Rich and Greg actually attempted first to license the rights to expand another cinnamon roll chain”
- Focus Brands is a holding company owned by Roark Capital, a private equity firm, that houses Cinnabon and Carvel as separate operating companies, with Focus as the franchisor.
“So you've got Carvel and Cinnabon, so you have two brands, separate companies in a holding company called Focus Brands.”
- Owning multiple brands gives Focus Brands greater purchasing scale, such as lower napkin and supply-chain prices, which lowers costs for franchisees, although different brands buy different items, making consolidation harder than it appears.
“you get a lower price on napkins, and then you start adding brands”
The Burger King cinnamon roll partnership was a deliberate, research-driven success.
- Burger King's need for a sweet product was met after testing alternatives, because customer research kept pointing to a smaller cinnamon roll rather than pie or cheesecake options.
“what the research kept coming back to is a small cinnamon roll.”
- A smaller, cheaper cinnamon roll can grow the customer base and keep basket size intact, because the population wanting the large, expensive item is shrinking while the population wanting a half-price item grows, and buyers often add a drink or buy two.
“the universe of people who want to buy the big thing and the expensive thing is a shrinking population. And the group of people who want to buy the small thing that's half the price is a growing population.”
- The Burger King cinnamon roll partnership was not accidental; Focus Brands deliberately invested in foodservice channel development after earlier licensing successes with Taco Bell and grocery.
“It wasn't an accident. It didn't happen out of thin air.”
- Cinnabon required the Burger King product to be baked fresh in-store all day rather than shipped pre-baked, because a cinnamon roll that is reheated or microwaved would damage the brand experience.
“It had to be baked fresh from that state and maintained all throughout.”
- The Burger King cinnamon roll partnership ran for its full three-year contract, was among Burger King's highest-volume and most profitable gross-profit items, and also lifted Cinnabon's mall sales through added visibility.
“it was certainly one of the highest volumes and profitable in terms of gross profit skews for Burger King during its three-year run”
- The Burger King product required three stakeholders: Burger King as the retailer needing an indulgent baked good for early morning and late-night, Cinnabon wanting faster distribution, and General Mills as manufacturer protecting ingredients, process, and IP.
“that is the three-legged stool.”