Mitsubishi Corporation: A Japanese Trading Company
What this covers
Krishna Mohanraj takes Mitsubishi Corporation, one of Japan's sogo shosha, from its origins to its present-day portfolio. The history begins with Commodore Perry's arrival in 1853-54, which pushed Japan toward private entrepreneurs for industrial build-up, and with Yataro Iwasaki's 1874 contract to carry troops for the Taiwan expedition. It then covers the Zaibatsu at their peak of about 60% of market capitalization, their wartime production of battleships and the Zero fighter, the occupation's breakup of Mitsubishi into 117 pieces, and its reconstitution within a couple of years as a looser network.
The business discussion is the most contentious part. Krishna likes the group's metallurgical coal exposure. He argues that about 70% of steel still comes from blast furnaces, that electric arc furnace share has barely moved from 29% since 2012, and that permitting, bank and insurer reluctance make new mines nearly impossible to open. On the non-resource side he lists Southeast Asian auto distribution, food (including Cermaq, the third-largest salmon producer), and North American and European utilities. Lawson gets a close look: a consolidated convenience-store market, 14,600 stores, and supply from Mitsubishi's distribution, feed and processing arms.
The closing argument concerns governance and valuation. Krishna dates Japan's capital-efficiency push to the 2014 Ito Review and points to net investment falling from about 17% of equity to about 2%. He argues that Western-style activism tends to fail in Japan, and that management should be judged by actions rather than CEO talk. He also advises analysts to skip detailed spreadsheet forecasts and value the company on a sum-of-the-parts basis.
Mitsubishi Corporation is best understood as a collection of long-lived ownership interests whose value comes from decades-old partner networks and a recent shift toward capital efficiency, so it should be valued by sum-of-the-parts and judged by actions rather than management rhetoric.
- Roughly half of profit comes from resource JVs (met coal, copper, iron ore, LNG) and half from non-resource stakes, so the company works as a portfolio rather than a trading house
- Long-standing partnerships such as the 45-year Ayala relationship function as moats that are hard to replicate
- Capital returns have risen as net investment fell from about 17% of equity in 2012 to about 2% recently, and the market is only slowly pricing this in
Improving capital allocation and falling net investment make Mitsubishi attractive on normalized earnings and returns.
- The investment case for Mitsubishi rests on four attributes: a well-managed business, a strong global presence and talent pool, a diversified and ultra-conservative balance sheet, and a clear path to improving capital efficiency and shareholder returns, all available at an attractive price.
“Here, you have a well-managed business, strong global presence and talent pool, diversified, ultra conservative balance sheet.”
- Krishna's normalized earnings estimate for Mitsubishi is between JPY 800 billion and JPY 1 trillion per year, which is roughly a 6% to 7% earnings yield on the current market cap, and with improving capital allocation this supports mid-single-digit profit growth and a low-mid-teens expected return at current prices.
“So the JPY 800 billion to JPY 1 trillion is roughly a 6%, 7% earnings yield on the current market cap.”
- Buffett's initial Berkshire Hathaway investment in the trading houses, made about four or five years ago, looked to Krishna like an arbitrage in which Berkshire borrowed at near-zero cost in yen to finance a slice of global GDP, and Berkshire's size limits its opportunities to deploy capital for the long term.
“it seemed like it was purely an arbitrage. He could borrow essentially at zero cost in yen and finance the purchase of effectively a slice of global GDP”
- Mitsubishi is best valued on a sum-of-the-parts basis with a conglomerate discount applied, using reasonable assumptions for unlisted parts, and that yields a reasonable estimate though not a precise one.
“typically for a conglomerate like Mitsubishi, you value it on a sum of the parts with some sort of conglomerate discount attached.”
- The market is only now seeing capital returned for the first time from these companies, and Mitsubishi's amount of change over the last ten years is astonishing, so the Buffett endorsement matters but the actual capital return is what the market is responding to.
“it's equally important that the market is seeing capital return for the first time from these companies.”
- The 2014 Ito Review stated that increasing capital efficiency in the broadest sense is crucial from the perspective of Japan's survival, which Krishna sees as the starting point of Japanese corporate capital efficiency reform.
“It said, increasing capital efficiency in the broadest sense is crucial from the perspective of Japan's survival.”
- Mitsubishi's net investments (investments net of disposals) were about JPY 840 billion against an equity base of about JPY 5 trillion in 2012, roughly 17% of equity, while last year net investment fell to about JPY 125 billion on an equity base nearly double that, or about 2% of equity.
“So as a percentage of equity, that net investment number has come down to 2% from 17%.”
- Although the trading house moniker made sense in the past, today Mitsubishi is a constantly evolving mix of businesses that behaves like a slow-moving battleship, divesting and investing over long horizons rather than trading goods.
“the trading house moniker, it made sense a while ago. But today, as we said, it is less of a trading business.”
- The thesis for Mitsubishi is very similar to that for the other trading houses, all of which are seeing improved capital allocation, so the differences lie mainly in business mix, future investment areas, and clarity of capital allocation priorities.
“the thesis for Mitsubishi is very similar to the thesis for pretty much any of the other trading houses.”
- Combining a 6-7% earnings yield with mid-single-digit profit growth from improving capital allocation implies a low mid-teens expected return at current prices, lower than when the position was initiated.
“we end up with a reasonable mid-single-digit type profit growth over time. Given that, we think at current prices, you'll end up with low mid-teens type return going forward.”
Management should be judged by actions, capital efficiency, and adaptability, not CEO rhetoric or charismatic communication.
- For Mitsubishi, management quality should be judged by actions such as divestments, stake reductions and capital returns rather than by CEO rhetoric, because a collectivist, long-term culture makes the CEO less central and the actions are more informative than the talk.
“The biggest learning from this is that actions matter more than words.”
- Last year the Tokyo Stock Exchange began naming and shaming companies, creating peer pressure that equated being a good Japanese corporate citizen with being capital efficient, which Krishna sees as the dynamic that finally drove change.
“All the way up to last year when the TSE basically started naming and shaming companies, it initiated this dynamic of peer pressure”
- Management's strategy is to reduce noncore stakes and cross-holdings, improve capital efficiency in nonperforming businesses and exit those that do not improve, and the portfolio contains good assets alongside bloat such as poor businesses and cross holdings.
“One, a focus on ROE. They want to improve capital efficiency in nonperforming businesses and if they can, they want to exit.”
- The sharp decline in net investment has led to a significant reduction in net debt and a significant improvement in ROE, and the market is slowly beginning to accept that the situation is changing.
“And not surprisingly, this has led to a significant reduction in net debt, significant improvement in ROE.”
- After Buffett and Greg Abel met with Mitsubishi and the other trading house managements last year, Buffett sounded far more enthused about management, praising shareholder friendliness, reasonable compensation, reluctance to issue stock, and capital returns.
“last year, he and Greg Abel went and met with the managements, and we think that's for the first time.”
- In Japan, corporate change has to come from within and carry a collectivist flavor, so Western investors pushing shareholder-return activism have usually failed, because an outsider demanding change for share price gains triggers the opposite reaction in Japanese culture.
“In corporate Japan, change has to come from within and has to have a collectivist flavor. It's a collectivist culture asking for change in the name of shareholder returns and stock price going up is not going to work.”
- Outside investors in international markets must have patience and humility and appreciate how cultural norms are changing, since cultural dynamics and their evolution matter as much as the financial metrics.
“You need to have patience. You need to be a little bit humble to just understand and appreciate how cultural norms are changing.”
- Mitsubishi's defining characteristic over 150 years is its adaptability, its repeated ability to redefine what it means to be a Japanese corporate citizen at each point in time rather than preserving a fixed form.
“I'll start with the punchline, the adaptability of the firm. Mitsubishi has been through a lot of change and has simply adapted and changed form.”
- Western CEOs are often talkers optimized to play to the stands and say what investors want to hear, whereas Mitsubishi's communications are numbers, metrics and dull statements, so investors should look at reported metrics rather than CEO charisma.
“The typical CEO, especially the western CEO, is a talker, extremely good at playing to the stands”
- Mitsubishi has roughly $135 billion in enterprise value and about $150 billion in revenue last year, yet it is not widely followed or written about in the public domain.
“It's a huge enterprise, about $135 billion in enterprise value, about $150 billion in revenues last year.”
- The government selectively favored a few wealthy families, producing zaibatsu such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, which at their peak accounted for about 60% of the market cap on their stock exchange.
“And I think they become so dominant at one point, that's 60% of the market cap in their stock exchange.”
- Krishna's two transferable lessons from Mitsubishi are to look for actions over words and to remain attentive to cultural change with patience and humility when analyzing businesses in different cultural settings.
“The first, the idea of looking for actions over words.”
- Berkshire can deploy large amounts of capital for the very long term in ways few investors can, so its approach to Mitsubishi is not something an independent or retail investor should copy.
“Berkshire's size, there are so few places that he can deploy large amounts of capital for the very long term.”
Mitsubishi's network moats and substance-over-talk management make it a quality business.
- Mitsubishi's strategy shifted with each Japanese economic era: rebuilding global supplier networks in the 1950s, downstream distribution and exports in the 1960s, oil asset procurement and large-scale project organizing in the 1970s, restructuring during the 1980s and 1990s, commodity-driven gains from China in the 2000s, and a capital-efficiency focus from the 2010s.
“'60s, you see high growth. You see them expanding into downstream distribution and exports.”
- Mitsubishi's secret is its global network and decades-old relationships, which function as a set of moats built over a very long period, since in a trading business the more well-connected the network, the more valuable it is.
“The more well-connected people in the network, the more valuable that network is.”
- A key lesson Krishna takes into other investments is to look for specific actions over generic talk, because management quality shows up in what a company does rather than in what it says.
“The first, the idea of looking for actions over words.”
- Mitsubishi's culture is not star-CEO driven: the CEO's name does not come to mind for Krishna, and the company seeks no headlines or magazine covers, so a star CEO is not a key thesis component.
“Mitsubishi is an exception in the sense that you don't even think about the name of the CEO.”
- Mitsubishi is highly prestigious as an employer in Japan, ranking around number two in recent annual rankings of desirable employers by Japanese blogs, which lets it attract the best Japanese talent.
“I believe they are like number two this year, number one last year.”
Long-term commodity and energy-transition investments, mainly through JVs and partnerships, drive Mitsubishi's strategy.
- Mitsubishi's current midterm plan puts about half of all new investment into metallurgical coal, utilities and LNG, with smaller allocations to convenience stores and salmon farming, and the company invests mainly through JVs and partnerships rather than high-profile acquisitions.
“half of all the investments are going into metallurgical coal, utilities, LNG, and some into convenience stores and salmon farming type businesses”
- Because a commodity business generates surpluses in cycles, Mitsubishi had to build networks to offload them, and after decades it became well versed in working with raw material suppliers and buyers worldwide, making reputation and long-term thinking institutionalized.
“Eventually, they would start producing a surplus as you can expect in a cyclical business. And then they'll have to start finding networks to offload that surplus.”
- Because Mitsubishi invests in some of the largest copper mines and LNG projects, which require a long-term view, it has earned a reputation as an excellent long-term partner, with mining companies in Latin America and Australia consistently praising it.
“If you speak with mining companies in Latin America, Australia, you'll constantly hear consistent praise for them as long-term partners”
- Mitsubishi intends to invest in secularly growing commodities such as copper, LNG and met coal, and believes it has the assets and capability to play a role in the energy transition.
“They believe they have the assets and the capability to play a role in the energy transition.”
- Electric arc furnace steel share was 29% in 2012 and has barely moved in the past decade even as total steel production grew, so the widely discussed shift toward EAF steel is slower than headlines imply.
“the percentage of steel being produced by electric furnaces was 29% in 2012. It's barely moved in the last 10 years”
- Most of Mitsubishi's resource businesses have solid lives of 30-plus years and will be needed for decades, which justifies using normalized earnings for them, whereas a mining company with a short mine life would not warrant that treatment.
“the vast majority of Mitsubishi's resource businesses all have solid long lives, 30-plus years and will be used and necessary in the world for decades”
- Met coal is essential to building the infrastructure of the energy transition, such as wind turbines and EVs, because it is the key input to steel, so its role in green transformation is central despite being a fossil commodity.
“met coal is a poster because it allows for building all the infrastructure, the wind turbines, the EVs that are enabling the energy transition to happen.”
Mitsubishi is best seen as a diversified mix of resource and non-resource ownership stakes.
- Mitsubishi Corporation today is better thought of as a collection of ownership interests in many businesses rather than a traditional trading house, and roughly half of its profit mix comes from resource assets and half from non-resource assets.
“today, you should think of Mitsubishi more as a collection of ownership interests in different businesses.”
- The non-resource half of Mitsubishi includes about 15% in Southeast Asian auto distribution (with Isuzu and Mitsubishi Motors), about 10% in food (Lawson convenience stores, a small KFC Japan stake, and Cermaq, the third-largest salmon producer), about 10% in North American and European utilities, and a mixed bag of industrial materials, chemicals and urban development.
“You got about 15% in auto distribution in Southeast Asia. That's basically your full auto value chain.”
- Mitsubishi's resource half includes high-quality, long-life assets in metallurgical coal (including a 50% stake in BMA, the largest seaborne met coal mine in Australia, alongside BHP), copper (the Escondida mine in Chile and a 40% stake in the Quellaveco mine in Peru with Anglo American), iron ore, LNG and nickel, mostly held through JVs with major miners.
“So you're talking BMA, which is the largest seaborne metallurgical coal mine in Australia. They have a 50% stake in it along with BHP.”
- About 70% of global steel is produced in blast furnaces, which require high-quality met coal with no current substitute, and while electric arc furnaces will gain share over time, blast furnaces still being built in Asia mean met coal demand is roughly flat over the next few decades.
“About 70% of global steel production is done this way, blast furnace takes iron ore and met coal or coking coal, as key inputs and produces steel.”
Government ties and postwar reconstitution explain Mitsubishi's enduring resilience.
- Because of their link with the government and an increasingly militarized state, the zaibatsu including Mitsubishi played a major role in the Second World War, producing items such as Japan's biggest battleships and the Zero fighter plane, a history the firms have little reason to discuss.
“given that link with the government and given the fact that the government is becoming increasingly militarized, they play a big role in the war.”
- After Commodore Perry's ships arrived in 1853-54, Japan concluded it had to build a Western-style army and navy and learn from the West; because it needed a strong industrial base, it turned to private entrepreneurs, which seeded a business-government collaboration that persists to this day.
“Here is when you start to see the beginnings, the origin of the strong collaboration between business and government in Japan. A theme that will continue over the decades, a theme that continues till today.”
- After U.S. occupation forces broke Mitsubishi into 117 pieces to eliminate Japan's ability to rearm, the Japanese government circumvented U.S.-imposed anti-monopoly laws and encouraged scale, so the group reconstituted within a couple of years in a new form.
“So Mitsubishi is now already broken up into 117 pieces, but somehow the pride, the networks, the membership and allegiance with the family name is still not broken up.”
- Mitsubishi Corporation is one of seven remaining sogo shosha (general trading houses), down from a much larger number, as the group shrank through crises including the fallout of Japan's 1980s bubble.
“There are seven of them now. At one point, there were a lot more, but over time and through various crisis, including the fallout of the Japanese bubble in the 80s, that number has shrunk to seven.”
- The postwar keiretsu kept Mitsubishi's identity without the family structure, becoming a horizontal network of relationships rather than a family-controlled group; the government did not mandate this structure but created conditions for it to evolve.
“The new structure, they call it keiretsus. It is simply the absence of the family. So it's no longer family-related. It's more of a horizontal relationship structure.”
- In 1874 Yataro Iwasaki won a government contract to transport troops for Japan's first modern military expedition against Taiwan, after the steamship company YJK declined; he used this single contract to rename his firm Mitsubishi Steamship Company and build it into Japan's premier shipping company.
“He wins this government contract, mostly because the government is desperate. And using this one contract as a base, he renames the firm, calls it Mitsubishi Steamship Company.”
- Within about a year of its founding, Mitsubishi Steamship took on U.S. and British shipping rivals, engaged them in a price war, and forced them to abandon the key Yokohama-Shanghai route, a significant win since Japan had been dependent on foreign ships for commercial lanes just years earlier.
“Within a year or so, he takes on the U.S. and British rivals in shipping, gets into a price war with them and forces them to abandon the key Yokohama-Shanghai shipping route.”
- Four large zaibatsu families (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda) became so dominant that they reached about 60% of the market capitalization on the Japanese stock exchange, benefiting further from World War I when European firms were out of business.
“And I think they become so dominant at one point, that's 60% of the market cap in their stock exchange.”
Lawson's stable cash flow and vertical integration anchor the business model, though its direct profit contribution is small.
- Lawson originated as a convenience store business in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, but today it is predominantly a Japanese business, with about 70% of its profits from Japanese convenience stores and the rest from supermarkets, overseas convenience, entertainment, travel and financial services.
“So 70% of the profits today come from Japanese C-stores.”
- Lawson is low growth due to Japanese demographics but is a highly stable source of cash flow and a reliable demand source for Mitsubishi's cyclical commodity businesses, and while it contributes only about 3-4% of Mitsubishi's profits directly, its linked food businesses multiply its impact.
“Lawson might be, say, 3%, 4% of Mitsubishi's profits, but the impact goes much higher if you think about all the allied businesses that are linked to Lawson.”
- Japan's convenience store industry is highly consolidated, with 7-Eleven, FamilyMart and Lawson together accounting for over 85% of sales, with Lawson around 22%, and FamilyMart is 100% owned by ITOCHU.
“three players, 7-Eleven, FamilyMart and Lawson account for 85-plus percent of sales in Japan, with Lawson around 22%.”
- Because the number of convenience stores in Japan is not growing, growth must come from product and services that improve same-store sales, and Lawson operates 14,600 stores in Japan as of late last year.
“Growth really has to come from product and services because in Japan, the total number of C-stores is not growing.”
- Lawson, a half-owned Mitsubishi convenience store chain, is being taken private by Mitsubishi and KDDI, but Mitsubishi will continue to own half, so little changes economically except that Lawson will no longer be listed.
“So really, not much is changing, except Lawson will no longer be a listed entity.”
- Mitsubishi improves Lawson's profitability through vertical integration: Mitsubishi Shokuhin, a distribution company with Lawson as its largest customer, plus livestock feed, poultry, chicken and seafood processing, and flour milling businesses all supply products into Lawson's stores.
“Mitsubishi owns a distribution company called Mitsubishi Shokuhin that has Lawson as its largest customer.”
- The crux of Mitsubishi's business model is how its operating companies work together, and the secret sauce comes from the network rather than any single vertical, even though metallurgical coal exposure is an important and undervalued one.
“I think the crux of the business model is how they all work together.”
Relationships and well-managed assets matter more than detailed modelling or the size of stakes.
- Analysts covering a complex conglomerate like Mitsubishi should resist the urge to build detailed Excel models or nail down five-year revenue numbers and instead think big picture, with creative valuation work, because what matters is owning well-managed assets bought below their worth.
“You need to stop with the geeky urge to build fancy Excel models or wanting to nail down five-year revenue numbers”
- In his letter, Buffett indicated one attraction of investing in the sogo shosha is that they might lead to partnership opportunities around the world, which Krishna sees as a positive for Mitsubishi's ongoing deal flow.
“one of the attractions is that investing in the sogo shoshas might lead to opportunities for partnership around the world.”
- Krishna's team does not get the benefit of Berkshire-style funding, so their decision on Mitsubishi remains a case-by-case, bottom-up stock pick, although Berkshire is a valuable liquid partner that helps buffer cyclicality in the resource assets.
“we don't get the benefit of the GPN funding, it's still a case-by-case, bottom-up stock picking decision.”
- Mitsubishi's 45-year partnership with Ayala Corporation in the Philippines spans automobiles, real estate, technology, water, power and infrastructure, and even after a recent partial stock sale Mitsubishi will still own roughly $300 million of Ayala stock, so the value lies in the relationship rather than the stake.
“this is a relationship that's 45 years old. The partnership goes across multiple sectors in the Philippines”
Metallurgical coal is an undervalued, supply-constrained core exposure, preferred over iron ore.
- It is almost impossible to open new coal mines because of permitting obstacles, bank financing reluctance, and insurers' hesitation to support coal, so supply growth is constrained and supports met coal prices for decades.
“It's almost impossible to open new coal mines. Besides not being able to get approvals, you won't get bank financing, insurance providers hesitate to support anything to do with coal.”
- Krishna prefers met coal over iron ore because the seaborne iron ore market depends heavily on China while the seaborne met coal market is more diversified, and Mitsui's iron ore exposure is by far its largest segment.
“The seaborne iron ore market is very much dependent on China versus with met coal, the seaborne market is a lot more diversified.”
- Mitsubishi's large metallurgical coal exposure is one of the most important parts of the business, which management believes is undervalued and will play a significant role in the energy transition, and which Krishna's team likes.
“they certainly believe that that is undervalued and it's going to play a significant part in the energy transition.”
Trading house peers differ mainly in business mix, contrasting Marubeni, ITOCHU and Sumitomo with Mitsubishi.
- ITOCHU has the highest ROE of the group and strong management, but it has greater China exposure through iron ore and its CITIC stake, and higher exposure to the Japanese consumer, which benefits when the yen strengthens but faces demographic headwinds.
“ITOCHU, very well run, has the highest ROE of the group.”
- Marubeni has meaningful met coal, iron ore, copper and LNG exposure like Mitsubishi, but its biggest difference is a large U.S. agricultural business, Helena, which exposes it to corn and soybean price swings.
“Marubeni owns a large U.S. ag business, Helena, so you get exposure to the price vagaries of corn, soya bean”
- Sumitomo, one of the original zaibatsu, is more oriented toward heavy industry, with steel products, ship and aircraft leasing and infrastructure, so it differs from Mitsubishi's more diversified mix.
“Sumitomo is a little bit more oriented towards heavy industry, so you get steel products, ship, aircraft leasing, infrastructure”