What this covers

Josh Clarkson walks Matt through the mechanics of private credit, organizing it with a strategy versus wrapper framework. Strategy is what gets lent (direct lending, asset-based finance, venture debt, NAV financing). Wrapper is the vehicle delivering it (drawdown funds, public or nontraded BDCs, CLO ETFs). The history runs from life insurers as the original lenders, to the 1980 creation of the BDC amid stagflation and Regulation Q, to the financial crisis, after which direct lending moved from serving borrowers without market access to competing with the syndicated loan market and high-yield bonds.

The middle of the episode is product detail. BDC economics get close attention: the 90 percent payout that avoids corporate tax, net investment income as the key metric, and why it should cover the dividend rather than return capital. Price-to-NAV is treated as a rough benchmark of a manager, with caveats. The episode also covers nontraded BDCs in wealth channels, ETFs such as BIZD and BB-rated CLO funds, and an anecdote about how externally managed BDCs became possible. On the loan side it covers unitranche leverage of 6x to 7x EBITDA, delayed draw term loans, and pricing around 500 to 650 basis points over the base rate.

The contested turns concern banks and risk. Josh describes SRT trades and joint ventures, then argues that BDC leverage of roughly 1x leaves bank lines far senior to a large equity cushion, in contrast with pre-crisis banks at 10:1 or more. He cites COVID margin calls that hurt equity holders but not banks, and he separates credit risk from systemic risk. He also claims rising base rates helped the sector more than credit worries hurt it, and that tighter diligence and documentation mitigate liability management exercises.

Sharpest takeaway

Josh Clarkson argues private credit is a collaborative, bank-partnered ecosystem whose real risk is investor loss rather than systemic risk, and that the industry's next differentiator will be a distinct brand and expertise rather than the structures themselves.

  • Banks are the senior lenders to private credit funds, and the 1x equity cushion absorbs most losses before the bank line is touched
  • Private credit and banks increasingly partner through SRT, joint ventures, and bank-originated assets, so competition is only deal-by-deal
  • Homogeneous floating-rate strategies make brand, expertise, and positioning the main way managers stand apart

The argument · threads9 threads · 58 claims
0.85

Bank partnerships and low leverage keep private credit losses from impairing equity cushions or systemic stability.

12 pointscentrality 5/5
  • In bank-private credit joint ventures, the bank originates assets into an off-balance-sheet vehicle mostly funded by the private credit firm, which typically owns the majority of equity while the bank holds a minority stake, often around 12.5 percent in the U.S., and provides senior leverage.

    “The bank owning -- I think it's 12.5% very often in the U.S., and then providing senior leverage on top.”

  • Although regulators want risk moved out of insured depository banks, policymakers do not want a massive withdrawal of credit from the economy, so someone must supply that credit, and well-managed private credit working with banks can do so with less systemic risk.

    “I don't think anybody wants the economy to face a massive withdrawal of credit. So if you don't want that massive withdrawal of credit and the concomitant job creation and economic growth, somebody needs to be providing that credit.”

  • Significant risk transfer (SRT) deals, also called reg cap trades, let banks offload loan portfolios to private credit lenders who take first-loss positions, giving banks regulatory capital relief while they keep customer relationships.

    “a private lender essentially takes a first loss position on a defined pool of bank collateral”

  • SRT deals have been common in Europe and are growing quickly in the U.S., with some firms specializing in them and large firms building the capability more quickly now.

    “These have been relatively common in Europe. They've been getting more common in the U.S. recently.”

  • Although banks and private credit funds compete deal by deal for financing, the broader ecosystem is much more collaborative, with banks and private credit firms partnering through leverage provision, risk transfers, and joint ventures.

    “there is much more of a partnership and a collaboration dynamic, especially more recently”

  • Josh personally does not believe the growing interconnections between banks and private credit create systemic risk, despite concerns raised by others.

    “I personally do not believe it does”

  • BDC leverage is limited by statute, originally to 1x and later raised to 2x, though very few go near 2x; most sit around 0.75x to 1.5x, with bank lines subordinated to nothing and bank leverage of 1x to 1.5x compared with banks' own roughly 10:1.

    “part of that statutory creation is a limit on their leverage. Originally, it was 1x. Some changes were made so it can go up to 2x.”

  • Because private credit BDCs are levered only about 1x, mostly senior secured, and funded by locked-up or permanent capital, the bank line sits far senior to a large equity cushion. Losses would have to be far beyond historical levels to impair it, unlike pre-GFC banks levered around 10:1 or 20:1.

    “you were only 1x levered on generally senior secured risk, so it's not something where the equity is going to be wiped out overnight in some kind of 10:1 or 20:1 levered structure like pre-GFC banks”

  • Loss rates for many leading BDCs and other private credit strategies are in the very low single digits.

    “when you look at the loss rates for many leading BDCs and other private credit strategies, they are in the very low single digits”

  • Fund-level borrowing is usually about 1x the equity assets and is secured only by the loans in the fund, with generally no direct recourse to the general partner, though guarantees are possible in some structures.

    “it is usually 1x the equity assets and just secured by the loans in the portfolio”

  • Many private credit funds, especially in direct lending, use moderate leverage of roughly 0.75x to 1.5x, and banks usually provide the senior portion of that leverage.

    “many private credit funds, especially in the direct lending space, use a moderate amount of leverage, usually between 0.75 and 1.5x”

  • If a private credit vehicle were forced to sell loans, a bank would likely step in to take over and resell them, and the low 1x leverage on senior secured risk means equity would not be wiped out overnight.

    “I would think that a bank would be able to step in, take over the loans, try to resell them, work something out there”

0.69

Private credit has grown large through direct lending and sector, delayed-draw, and specialization shifts.

11 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Private credit loans may be underwritten on an EBITDA basis, an asset valuation basis, or an ARR basis, and that choice varies widely by fund type.

    “whether those assets are underwritten on an EBITDA basis, on an asset valuation basis, some kind of ARR basis, that can vary hugely by the type of private credit fund”

  • Private credit overall is estimated at about $3 trillion, with direct lending at roughly $1.5 to $1.7 trillion, making direct lending over half the market.

    “people estimate private credit writ large to be $3 trillion and direct lending to be $1.5 trillion, $1.6 trillion, $1.7 trillion”

  • A unitranche combines first-lien and second-lien debt into one loan, typically levered 6x to 7x EBITDA versus roughly 4x to 5x for first lien and 5x to 7x for second lien; the first $1 billion unitranche came in 2016, and $1 billion to $3 billion deals are now common.

    “So in 2016, you saw the first $1 billion unitranche”

  • Private credit must be framed along two axes: strategy (what is lent, such as direct lending, asset-based finance, venture debt, or NAV financing) and wrapper (the vehicle through which it is delivered, such as drawdown funds, public or nontraded BDCs, or CLO ETFs).

    “That's a very important distinction about strategy versus wrapper, and both are very important in this market.”

  • The financial crisis was a watershed for private credit, after which direct lending shifted from serving small and midsized borrowers without capital market access to competing directly with syndicated loans and high-yield bonds for larger deals.

    “the financial crisis, as Armen pointed out, was really a light switch moment, watershed moment”

  • Direct lending is comparable to syndicated term loans, usually underwritten on EBITDA or sometimes ARR, and is mostly used to lend to private equity-owned companies for acquisitions or growth, which is where it competes with the syndicated market.

    “The vast majority of it is being led to leverage sponsor-backed issuers.”

  • Delayed draw term loans let sponsors running buy-and-build strategies access incremental capital without a new loan offering, and without paying interest on undrawn capital, which makes private credit attractive.

    “the ability to access incremental capital without doing an entirely new loan offering, but also not paying interest on a lot of capital that you're not immediately using, is very attractive”

  • Sector-specific private credit growth comes from two sources: debt-heavy sectors such as LBOs, aviation, and real estate shifting from bank or capital markets to private financing, and asset classes such as life sciences and venture-backed companies that historically used no debt but now can use tailored debt.

    “One is sectors that have traditionally been fairly debt-heavy, like LBOs, aviation, real estate.”

  • Josh expects sector-specific private credit funds to keep growing, but the majority of fundraising will remain in diversified, sector-wide funds.

    “you will continue to see growth in the sector-specific fund area, but that the majority of it will continue to be through diversified sector-wide funds”

  • Because private credit strategies are by design relatively homogeneous, providers, especially smaller ones, will increasingly need to carve out a defined brand and expertise, such as nonsponsored lending, stress lending, or first-lien-only safety, to be known in the market, particularly as they raise money from the wealth channel.

    “it will be increasingly important for different private credit providers overall and then within their funds to really carve out a brand”

  • Private credit will become an increasingly important part of the alternative-asset GP fundraising mix, and investors in public alts GPs need to consider how that public alt fits into the private credit landscape.

    “it is very important now, and it will be an increasingly important part of the alts GP fundraising mix”

0.64

BDCs are converging toward institutional quality and broader investor access through public listings and ETFs.

9 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Nontraded BDCs have driven much of private credit's growth in wealth channels because they are accessible, investors commit on day one with no capital calls, they receive 1099 tax reporting and quarterly liquidity, and they typically carry fees a bit lower than publicly traded BDCs.

    “a nontraded one is much more accessible for that retail or wealth audience because there's no capital calls.”

  • Strategy-specific private credit funds, such as life sciences, aviation, and SRT, are common in the institutional context for sophisticated allocators who want pure exposure, while retail and wealth vehicles tend to be comingled.

    “you'll very often see strategy-specific funds in the institutional context for that very sophisticated allocator”

  • Many people's first exposure to BDCs came from David Einhorn's book Fooling Some of the People All of the Time, which described an early-2000s BDC engaging in sketchy practices and probably fraud, unlike today's BDCs.

    “many people in the financial world's first exposure to BDCs came from the David Einhorn book, Fooling Some of the People All of the Time”

  • Large managers such as Ares, Blue Owl, Oaktree, New Mountain, Golub, and Sixth Street run top-tier BDCs that invest in the same assets and strategies as their vetted institutional funds, making them institutional-quality products now offered to a wider investor base.

    “these are top-tier institutional quality asset management firms”

  • BDCs avoid corporate-level taxation as long as they pay out 90 percent of taxable income annually, a structure similar to a REIT.

    “as long as you pay out 90% of your taxable income on an annual basis, there's no corporate taxation similar to a REIT”

  • Early BDCs were internally managed and could grow only so much because the manager could not run other vehicles; a wave of externally managed BDCs then arose before the financial crisis, and some did well while others struggled.

    “you're limited in how much you can grow an internally managed BDC, since you can't have other vehicles that the manager is running”

  • Perpetual private BDCs can stay private indefinitely, while limited-term private BDCs are often converted to public ones; several BDCs IPO'd earlier in the year, and private BDCs are often merged into flagship public BDCs for cost synergies and scale.

    “there are also, sometimes, private BDCs that have a limited term, and those are often converted to public ones”

  • Three BDCs went public earlier in the year, which Josh interprets as a sign of confidence in the public BDC sector despite some arguing that private BDCs are overtaking public ones.

    “you saw three BDCs go public earlier this year, which, by the way, is a great sign of confidence”

  • Public ETFs now offer exposure to BDCs, such as BIZD and an actively managed Putnam fund, and to CLO tranches that range from AAA down to BB, with BB CLO ETFs the closest in risk and return profile to a direct private credit loan.

    “there are now ETFs composed of CLO tranches. And as those are growing -- historically, it was mostly like the AAA tranches”

0.38

Investors earn higher returns as compensation for bearing credit risk and illiquidity.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • An investor seeking a low-to-mid double-digit yield who takes a loss was taking risk for that additional return, and that is simply how finance works: more risk for more return.

    “that is, generally speaking, the way that finance in the world works is there's more risk for more return”

  • Life insurance companies were the original private credit providers, writing loans against buildings and assets hundreds of years ago, and today they are a major source of private credit growth seeking higher yield per unit of risk and often an IG-rated structure.

    “Going back hundreds of years, though, life insurance companies directly wrote loans against buildings and against assets, and were in many ways, the original private credit providers.”

  • Direct lending loans typically price at the base rate (now SOFR, formerly LIBOR) plus about 500 to 650 basis points, with spreads tightening recently and widening sharply in dislocations, while the bank revolver sits at base rate plus low single digits, leaving a wide spread between the two.

    “The asset side of the books may be something like a base rate, which is now SOFR, used to be LIBOR, plus 500, 550, 650.”

  • There is now broad acceptance that private credit offers advantages over syndicated solutions, such as privacy and certainty, irrespective of market environment, although the spread it commands over liquid markets varies with market openness.

    “there's certainly now an acceptance that there are advantages to the private credit solution over a syndicated solution irrespective of the market environment”

0.29

Sponsor-backed lending dominates private credit, though nonsponsored lending offers better terms.

6 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Nonsponsored lending usually offers better spread, lower leverage, and better terms than sponsored lending, but it is a more fragmented market that is harder to source because it lacks the repeat deal flow sponsors provide.

    “nonsponsored is a very interesting part of the market. And you can usually get better spread, lower leverage, better terms.”

  • The vast majority of S+600 lending in the world goes to sponsor-backed companies, so investors who need that floating-rate return profile access it largely through sponsor lending.

    “The vast majority of S plus 600 lending in the world, I strongly suspect, goes to a sponsor-backed company.”

  • It is tough to build a private credit platform of $50 billion or more without doing sponsored lending, so many firms differentiate by offering both sponsored and nonsponsored capabilities.

    “it is tough to build a $50 billion-plus private credit platform not doing sponsored stuff”

  • Private equity sponsors have always been major users of sub-investment-grade capital, largely invented the sub-investment-grade capital markets, and have a symbiotic relationship with leveraged finance that is continuing into the private era.

    “They largely invented the sub-investment-grade capital markets”

  • Sponsor-backed or LBO-type loans make up roughly two-thirds of the private loan market, which is a fair figure for sub-investment-grade private credit, and sponsor-backed lending is the majority in direct lending.

    “Certainly wouldn't correct the data point.”

  • Lending to sponsor-backed companies has pros and cons: the sponsor is a sophisticated counterparty who negotiates hard but also supports the business and wants a long-term lender relationship, and the company has been diligenced by a sophisticated investor.

    “you have a well-resourced, experienced sponsor there, who will support the business and usually wants to have a collaborative, long-term relationship with that lender”

0.24

Credit risk and systemic risk are distinct questions that need separate discussion.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • People conflate credit risk (private credit lenders making risky, untested loans and investors losing money) with systemic risk, but these are two distinct questions and should be discussed separately.

    “those are two very separate conversations”

  • During COVID, some public BDC vehicles fell out of compliance with bank lines and were margin called, forcing dilutive or punitive equity raises that cost equity holders money, but the bank was never impaired.

    “some vehicles fell out of compliance with some of those bank lines, they got kind of margin called by those bank lines”

  • Private credit investors live in a relative-return world, since institutional allocators and retirees needing income cannot simply wait out a downturn in an absolute-return stance.

    “We live in a relative return world.”

  • Liability management exercises, low recoveries in leveraged loans, and aggressive sponsors are mitigated in private credit by deeper diligence and tighter documentation than in syndicated loans.

    “a lot of these things you're reading about with really aggressive liability management exercises, leverage loans having very low recovery rates because of new stocks and more aggressive sponsors will be mitigated in the private credit sphere”

0.24

Higher base rates create rescue lending opportunities despite slower deal activity.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Higher rates reduce M&A, especially in the sponsor world, so private credit's golden age has seen fewer deployment opportunities than hoped.

    “Less M&A happens when rates are high, especially in the sponsor world.”

  • Higher rates create opportunities for rescue-type lending: lenders with fresh capital and expertise can enter capital structures with mezzanine or second-lien solutions and earn well-compensated risk premiums without buying distressed equity.

    “you can come into a capital structure and you can be more than well compensated for the risk you're taking to craft some type of mezz second-lien solution”

  • Because private credit assets are floating rate, higher base rates raise nominal returns, and over recent years the rise in base rates has been a bigger tailwind for the sector than the headwind from increased credit risk or chilled deal activity; public BDCs outpaced the S&P in 2021.

    “the rise in base rates has been way more of a tailwind than the increased credit risk or chilled deal activity has been a headwind for the sector overall over the past few years”

  • Rising rates have pinched some existing portfolio companies, and private credit's bilateral relationships let lenders negotiate fixes such as sponsor equity injections, tighter docs, better non-call terms, or minimum MOIC provisions to prevent refinancing out.

    “one of the advantages of private credit is you have that bilateral direct relationship so that you can have a commercial conversation around, can we pick some interest?”

0.21

BDC evaluation centers on loss history, earnings coverage, ROE, and price-to-NAV.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • For public BDCs, the historical price-to-NAV multiple is a rough benchmark of how the market views a manager, but multiples are not directly comparable across BDCs with different strategies such as venture debt and cash flow lending.

    “that historic trend of where they've traded versus NAV is often a rough benchmark of how the market views that manager”

  • Investors evaluating a BDC should examine its historical loss rates and recoveries, since these show underwriting quality, and ROE is an important earnings indicator when the BDC functions like a lending institution.

    “You also want to pay very close attention to the historical loss rates and the recovery, since obviously, it's a credit product”

  • For public BDCs, net investment income, meaning interest earned minus interest costs and expenses plus fee income and prepayments, is the most important earnings metric, and it should cover the dividend so the investor gets return on capital rather than return of capital.

    “Those are some net investment income, which is the most important earnings metric.”

0.07

BDC structure traces back to 1980 policy and debt-financed precedents.

3 pointscentrality 1/5
  • The BDC construct was created in 1980 in response to banks being unable to lend as much to small and midsized businesses as the government wanted, amid high interest rates, stagflation, and Regulation Q.

    “It's created in 1980, actually, in response to similar dynamics to what you see today in terms of banks not being in a position to lend as much into small and midsized businesses”

  • The Ochs family bought the New York Times with largely debt financing from New York Life, a large life insurer, which was willing to lend because it wanted to be favorable to business in the era of William Jennings Bryan and the Cross of Gold.

    “the New York Times was bought by the Ochs family with basically, I believe, all debt financing from -- I think it was New York Life.”

  • The rise of externally managed BDCs was enabled when a lawyer working for someone trying to set up an internally managed BDC found an old provision and an old bond fund structure that let the adviser earn a percentage of revenue.

    “the rise of the externally managed BDC was actually when some lawyer was working for one of the people”