Uber: The Undeletable App
What this covers
Patrick hosts this Business Breakdowns conversation with Ram and Mario, who treat Uber as a case study in how a two-sided marketplace is built and defended. It starts with the marketplace logic, in which customer value rises with local supply. Then it moves to Uber's origins: replacing taxis and their roughly 6 percent card fees, sending template-driven teams of young consultants into new cities, and tracking "zeros," the moments a rider opens the app and finds no driver. The target ratio of one driver per 20 people recurs as the key operating metric.
The middle of the discussion covers a lot of ground. On competition, Ram forecasts a stable Uber/Lyft split of roughly 65-70 to 30-35 and cites credit card panel data on pricing, and Mario disagrees on parts of this. They discuss why rivals such as Ola and DoorDash enter markets where the number two is weak. Mario defends the company's early rule-breaking and expects regulation to stay a cat-and-mouse game, and he reads surge pricing as evidence of price inelasticity. The financial case rests on segment EBITDA for mobility, Q2 2020 profitability despite collapsing demand, and international rides with margins above 60 percent in some countries. Delivery is framed as a driver-supply and cross-sell play, with advertising estimated at $2 to $3.50 per order. Autonomous vehicles are treated as a distant, hybrid-period threat.
The sharpest turn is internal. Ram points to hiring data showing DoorDash closing engineers in about 40 days against Uber's 60, and says he would accept years of zero EBITDA if Uber stayed a talent magnet. Mario adds that investors misread consolidated losses by not separating segments.
Mario and Ram argue Uber is an undeletable, scale-advantaged marketplace whose mobility business alone can fund the company, so recent service complaints and consolidated losses are noise; the real risks are talent loss and capital allocation, not competition or demand.
- Uber's ride-hailing scale and data create moats that competitors and regulators are unlikely to overcome
- Mobility segment EBITDA, estimated at $4-6B a year, can fund growth and make delivery and freight optional
- Engineering and product talent is slipping, which both speakers see as the main long-term threat
Mobility is a good business whose margins and free cash flow justify Uber's investment and capital discussions.
- Uber is an unquestionably good business: it is a classic marketplace brokering between two fractured groups, riders and drivers, at unprecedented scale while monetizing an everyday use case of local movement.
“It's brokering between two fractured groups, riders and drivers. It's doing it at an unprecedented scale.”
- Uber is a generator, not a consumer, of capital, and the investment community misreads consolidated losses by not peeling back segments, so a large amount of cash will become a light-switch moment for investors.
“This is not a consumer of capital. This is a generator of capital, and we haven't even gotten to that.”
- Even if freight and delivery were worthless, a good outcome in the mobility business alone would still produce a positive investment return, which is rare for a company of this size.
“if everything else actually somehow, which is not going to be the case, freight and delivery somehow were worthless, I think you'd still get a positive return”
- A board should always compare capital return with investment opportunity, and Uber does not need to return capital now, but a cash-rich future makes it reasonable to discuss.
“it's a really good discipline for a board and management team to always be thinking about capital return versus investment opportunity.”
- Annualizing Q4 2019 bookings with modest growth yields about $4.2 to $4.3 billion of core mobility segment EBITDA in the first normalized 12 months after COVID, around a 32 percent EBITDA margin after allocating half of unallocated overhead, which Mario believes supports most of Uber's market cap.
“We think there's 4.2, 4.3 billion of segment EBITDA for core mobility over those first 12 months”
- Incremental ride volume leverages fixed expenses, so the delta in segment EBITDA over the delta in revenue was very high in late 2019, implying significant margin expansion potential in core mobility.
“incremental rides really helped leverage the fixed expenses”
- The mobility business is a good business that should deliver positive returns, so if it fails to do so, it would be because of poor management rather than a misreading of the economics; Mario sleeps well because mobility alone justifies the position.
“if it doesn't turn out to be a good business, it'll be because it wasn't managed properly.”
- The mobility business is a generator of capital rather than a consumer of it, and it may soon produce enough free cash flow to prompt shareholder-return questions such as buybacks or dividends.
“This is not a consumer of capital. This is a generator of capital, and we haven't even gotten to that.”
Uber's app, data, scale, and local-movement expertise form a moat that competitors and regulation cannot easily overcome.
- Uber's app is undeletable because it stores payment, ride history, and saved places and gives a real-time price quote users trust, so even users who curse at it after a bad experience will not delete it.
“I have called the app undeletable.”
- Uber prices its service better than anyone because its data reveals rider intent through day part, destination type, and address, and no entity except Google Maps has more local movement data.
“Think about all the ways that they have to discern intent based on day part, based on address.”
- Companies should explore advertising models within their business, and Uber's data about local movement is an advertising asset that could be monetized.
“I think a lot of these companies would do well to see if there's an advertising model within their business.”
- Not every state or country will require Uber drivers to be employees, and the player with the most scale is best able to absorb differing regulatory regimes worldwide.
“Every state is not going to demand that Uber drivers be employees, nor will every country”
- Regulation of Uber will be an ongoing cat-and-mouse game without a final victory, and the company's aggressive rule-breaking was necessary because playing by the rules does not allow a new entrant to reach the scale needed to change a market.
“I think it's going to be an ongoing game of cat and mouse.”
- Uber's superior scale gives it returns on capital and marketing spend advantages that are almost insurmountable, so new ride-share entrants will rarely be taken seriously in most markets, similar to Netflix spreading production costs over a larger subscriber base.
“Uber has that advantage, and I think it's almost insurmountable”
- Uber's expertise in how cities move and the local demand for many types of trips is a massive moat, and because autonomous vehicles will need a long hybrid period to serve a portion of demand, they pose little near-term threat to Uber's business.
“I think that data is just massive moat, as big as they come.”
Delivery and super-app ambitions can extend Uber's mobility position, though they remain secondary to it.
- Uber's international delivery business was nearly breakeven in Q2, and a mobility business sitting under a marginally profitable delivery business market by market is a potentially excellent end state.
“They nearly broke even internationally on delivery in the second quarter”
- DoorDash lacks a mobility business, which Mario considers a crucial piece of the puzzle because it gives Uber a cash cow to fund on-demand services worldwide and makes Uber a near-permanent part of any on-demand conversation.
“they are lacking what I consider being a very, very important piece of the puzzle, which is the mobility business.”
- DoorDash benefited from unusual events including COVID-19, but Uber Eats left the door open by focusing too much on urban centers and competing with Grubhub, which was a strategic mistake that let DoorDash scale.
“Uber was overly focused on urban centers and competing with Grubhub, which is now part of Just Eat takeaway. And that was probably a strategic mistake.”
- Uber could become a super app for on-demand transportation and other services, analogous to how PayPal grew from a tool for moving money between friends into a broad digital wallet.
“there is the potential for a super app for on demand transportation and other services sitting within Uber.”
- Uber has not found the right formula for loyalty and membership yet, and there is more to tweak before a loyalty program would be exciting.
“I don't think they've exactly found the right formula yet.”
Peak-time price spikes and long waits signal strong, inelastic demand, and the pre-virus service level will return.
- High prices during peak times signal price inelasticity and a supply-demand imbalance, with demand returning faster than supply, and the pre-virus service level is attainable so the wait-time problem will resolve.
“I think if anything, it demonstrates there's price inelasticity in the marketplace here.”
- A single bad ride or anecdote is not a valid basis for judging a company of Uber's scale, so investors should not draw conclusions about the business from personal experiences.
“your ride does not an investment thesis make.”
- There is no evidence that the service level that existed before the virus is unattainable, and the pre-coronavirus marketplace was not artificial, so the longer waits will eventually reverse and the share price opportunity will be gone when they do.
“I think there's no evidence whatsoever that the level of service that existed pre virus is unattainable. I think it's absolutely attainable.”
- High prices during peak times show that riders are price inelastic and that some riders will pay more, so the service's price signal is a sign of strength rather than a problem.
“I think if anything, it demonstrates there's price inelasticity in the marketplace here.”
Overreaching capital use and non-mobility units like freight distract from mobility, which could be better off without them.
- Uber raised enormous capital when capital was plentiful and used it as a weapon, which pushed the company into ventures it might not have entered otherwise, because management was overconfident in its long-term monopoly position in local tolling.
“Did that push them into businesses that they might not have organically entered otherwise? Yeah, that was probably the case.”
- Uber's freight business is a distraction from the mobility and delivery opportunities, and it probably does not belong under the Uber umbrella over time, since board attention is limited.
“I kind of relegate freight to something that over time I would think probably doesn't belong under the Uber umbrella.”
- If Uber shut its US delivery business, the stock might rise because what remained would look more like DoorDash, which trades at a very high valuation, and international delivery is nearly breakeven.
“I've joked internally, if they shut down the US delivery business but the stock price go up”