Chemed: Empire of Care
What this covers
Zack hosts Chadd Garcia for a tour of Chemed, the holding company that owns Roto-Rooter and VITAS. The record comes first. Since 2004 Chemed has generated about $3.7 billion of free cash flow, bought back $2.5 billion of stock, and cut its share count from 25 million to 15 million. EPS has grown roughly 20-21% a year. Chadd also covers the origin of the VITAS stake: convertible debt that financed a private equity buyer and gave Chemed 20%, later 37%. Management, he says, is agnostic about which business it owns and would sell either at a great price.
Most of the substance is hospice economics. Medicare pays most palliative bills, caps spending at $34,560 per patient (about 170-175 days at roughly $200 a day), and limits high-acuity care to 20% of a bill. Short hospital-referred stays can lose money on upfront costs, while longer-lived assisted-living patients risk exhausting the cap, so a mixed referral base works as a pressure valve. Market selection matters too. Los Angeles County has about 1,900 operators and Florida about 50, and VITAS favors stringent, populous states, where Chadd cites margins of 15-22% against 6-9% for the bottom half of the industry. The COVID stretch gets detailed treatment: $37 million of nurse retention bonuses, negative comps through Q4 2022, then recovery. A demand forecast has annual US deaths rising from about 3 million to just under 4.5 million.
The remainder covers Roto-Rooter's three models (company-owned branches, franchises, and contractors paying a 28% royalty) and its small, retirement-gated franchise buybacks. Chadd also reads Chemed's False Claims Act fine as a sign of management integrity, which is the most debatable claim in the conversation.
Chemed compounds value through two asset-light, acyclical, cash-generative businesses, Roto-Rooter and VITAS hospice, run by a management team whose stated goal is free cash flow per share, with capital allocation and reimbursement-aware market selection as the main levers.
- Both businesses are fragmented, people-intensive, low-capital, and high-return, so cash builds and gets returned through buybacks
- VITAS wins share in disruptions by choosing high-population, stringent-regulation markets and investing in nurse retention when competitors cannot
- Medicare hospice caps are managed on a portfolio basis, letting VITAS blend hospital and assisted-living referral sources
Disciplined capital allocation toward highest free cash flow per share compounds Chemed steadily at low risk.
- Chemed's management says its business is to grow free cash flow per share and is agnostic about how it does so, so it would exit either business at a great price and enter a great new business if one appeared.
“they said our business is to grow our free cash flow per share, and we're agnostic on how we do it.”
- Chemed was spun out of W.R. Grace in the early 1970s, carrying a specialty chemicals business (the chem part) and Omnicare, a pharmacy services business (the med part) that CVS later bought roughly a decade before 2025.
“The business was formed in the early 1970s when it was spun out from W.R. Grace, which was a chemical company.”
- In the 1980s Chemed bought Roto-Rooter and a year later spun out Omnicare, leaving Roto-Rooter and the specialty chemicals business as the remaining operations.
“The first one was they bought Roto-Rooter, the plumbing services business. And then a year later, they spun out Omnicare.”
- Chemed financed a private equity sponsor's purchase of VITAS with convertible debt that gave Chemed a 20% stake, which grew to 37% over time.
“They put some convertible debt into VITAS to finance the transaction that gave them a 20% stake in the business. Over time, that position grew to be 37% in the business.”
- When the sponsor said in 2003 it was ready to sell VITAS and named a price, Chemed declined to sell at that price and instead bought the remaining VITAS stake.
“And they're like, well, we're not sellers for that price. We're buyers. And so they ended up buying the remaining stake of VITAS.”
- In the 1990s a buyer approached Chemed with a price too good to pass up for its specialty chemicals business, so Chemed sold it and received a large cash pile that it later used to finance the VITAS deal.
“the price was too good for them to pass up. And so they sold their namesake specialty chemicals business. That gave them a pile of cash.”
- Since 2004 Chemed generated about $3.7 billion of free cash flow after $600-800 million of capex, spent about $700 million on acquisitions, paid $300 million in dividends, and bought back $2.5 billion of stock, cutting the share count from 25 million to 15 million.
“they generated around 3.7 billion. That's net of 600, 700, $800 million worth of capital expenditures”
- Chemed pays a de minimis but growing dividend so that it satisfies investors who require a dividend and those who require a growing dividend before starting a position.
“Some investors require a dividend in order to own a company. Other investors require that that dividend be growing in order to start a position”
- Chemed would separate its two businesses only if it traded at a protracted holding-company discount, which Chadd does not currently see; instead management would buy back stock.
“if this ever trades at a protracted holdco discount, and I don't think that's the case.”
- Roto-Rooter grows revenue about 6% a year and has about 25% EBITDA margins, with earnings growing about 12% because margins have been expanding.
“they have grown their revenue about 6% clip... they have about 25% EBITDA margins. But because their margins have been expanding, their earnings growth has grown about 12%.”
- Branches earn roughly two-thirds of Roto-Rooter's EBITDA, contractors about 21%, and franchise fees about 6%, and franchise fees are the highest-margin stream because they cost little to earn.
“21% of their EBITDA comes from their contractors.”
- Chadd calls Chemed the HEICO of the Midwest because HEICO's CEO Laurens Mendelsohn says the company is in the business of growing free cash flow per share rather than any one industry.
“I call it the HEICO of the Midwest, though.”
- Combined with buybacks, Chemed's EPS grows about 20-21% a year and its stock compounded at a similar rate over 21 years, a result Chadd attributes to low-single-digit revenue growth, low-double-digit earnings growth, and share repurchases.
“when you combine it at a corporate level and you layer in all the share repurchases they have, their EPS grows about 20-21% and their stock price over the last 21 years has compounded about the same rate.”
- It is hard to judge a management team's capital allocation ex ante, but it is easier when the business structure itself generates ample cash and requires little reinvestment, so the decision space is narrow.
“it's often very hard to determine if a management team ex ante is going to be a good capital allocator. But I think it helps if structurally there's just a business that's set up to do it.”
- Chemed's compounding through capital allocation and steady operations is a get-rich-slowly strategy rather than a high-risk growth bet.
“This is like the get-rich-slowly strategy.”
- Chemed holds cash and steps in with large buybacks when the stock drops below intrinsic value, which is the management pattern Chadd sees over time.
“And when the stock price drops below its intrinsic value, you step in in size, which is what this team has tended to do over time.”
- Chadd cites Ecolab and AutoZone as examples of companies that run programmatic buybacks, as one model for how Chemed could deploy its excess cash.
“You can do a programmatic buyback. You might see Ecolab or AutoZone, or you can just let the business build cash.”
- Chadd reads Chemed's False Claims Act fine as evidence of management integrity, because the company was treating high-need patients when reimbursement was too low while many industry peers were not.
“When you go back to the fine that they paid for the False Claims Act charges, it seemed to me that in that situation they were treating high-need patients when the reimbursement rates were too low.”
Rising deaths and cost-saving home hospice care create durable palliative demand resilient to government disruption.
- About 30% of Medicare expense goes to healthcare in a person's final year of life, and most of that is concentrated in the last six weeks.
“30% of Medicare's expense comes in the form of paying for healthcare in the last year of a person's life. And most of that is within the last six weeks.”
- US annual deaths rose from about 2.5 million before COVID to about 3 million today and are projected to climb to just under 4.5 million a year and then plateau for a long time, creating rising demand for palliative care.
“Right before COVID, there were two and a half million Americans who passed away every year. Presently, we have about 3 million that pass away.”
- About 99% of VITAS care is delivered in patients' homes, with inpatient care at about 1% for patients whose needs cannot be managed at home.
“They do have inpatient care, but that's like 1% of the service. 99% would be in a person's home.”
- Hospice enrollment requires three signatures: the attending physician attesting the patient is terminal, the hospice's physician concurring, and the patient or proxy agreeing to enroll.
“there are three signatures that are required that sets up a check and balance.”
- Hospice trains family caregivers to handle episodic crises at home, preventing expensive emergency room visits, ambulance transports, and hospital stays that would otherwise consume Medicare dollars.
“The hospice industry and VITAS train these caregivers on how to deal with episodic events so their patients don't end up in hospitals”
- Chadd's core thesis is that hospice saves the government money, so the government should support it over the long term even though it can act irrationally short term, as in its slow COVID-era rate adjustments.
“One of my core theses on this business is that it saves the government an ample amount of money and the government should want to support it over the long term.”
- VITAS's margins are two to four times those of the bottom half of the industry, giving it a margin of safety to exploit short-term government disruptions.
“VITAS' margin structure being 2, 3, 4 times higher than that of the bottom half of the industry provided them with ample margin of safety”
- VITAS is a hospice and palliative care provider that offers patients in their final days comfort-focused care as an alternative to curative treatment that is expensive, often ineffective, and may do more harm than good.
“You can continue to try to receive curative care, which is quite expensive and oftentimes ineffective. It may actually do more harm than good.”
- Between 2012 and COVID, VITAS had almost no quarters of negative growth, and its COVID-era dip came from hospitals and assisted living facilities shutting outsiders out, impairing sales access.
“When going from 2012 to COVID, there were hardly any quarters where they had negative growth.”
- Hospice has upfront costs for paperwork, medical supplies, and pharmaceuticals, so patients who die within days of admission can leave the provider at a loss, which makes short hospital-sourced stays a risk.
“When you take somebody into the program, you gotta fill out all the paperwork. You have to order medical supplies, you have to order pharmaceuticals for the patients.”
- Patients coming to hospice from assisted living facilities tend to live longer, so those facilities risk exhausting the $34,560 per-patient cap, which makes them a natural outlet for a provider like VITAS to take overflow.
“People that come into a hospice program from an assisted living facility tend to live longer than those who come in from hospitals.”
Roto-Rooter and VITAS offer acyclical, high-return demand that needs few assets but many people.
- COVID boosted Roto-Rooter through work-from-home usage that wore out homes and pulled forward replacement demand, while inflation may have pushed some customers toward do-it-yourself repairs afterward.
“there was a massive pull-forward in demand and a massive new demand because people were using their homes more.”
- About 70-75% of Roto-Rooter's service calls are emergency or same-day, and customers are generally price insensitive because they will not wait days for a clogged sink fix.
“About 70-75% of their service calls typically are emergency care or same-day of service.”
- Roto-Rooter's revenue is driven by population growth and new household formation, and speed of response determines share within that base.
“Roto-Rooter's revenue is driven by population and new business and new household formation.”
- Roto-Rooter holds roughly 2-3% of the overall plumbing market and about 15% of drain cleaning, leaving a fragmented field where larger players can beat small local businesses on search and marketing.
“Roto-Rooter in plumbing overall probably has a 2 to 3% market share. In drain cleaning, they probably have a 15% market share.”
- Roto-Rooter had only about three negative-growth quarters between 2012 and 2023, showing acyclical demand for emergency plumbing.
“Roto-Rooter's had up until recently maybe three quarters between 2012 and 2023 where they had negative growth. The acyclical nature is pretty evident.”
- Both Roto-Rooter and VITAS operate in highly fragmented industries, require few assets but many people, generate high returns on capital and free cash flow, and are fairly acyclical.
“both of the businesses are highly fragmented industries... Neither of them require many assets, but they are people-intensive.”
Medicare rules and hospice consolidation may favor well-capitalized operators like VITAS over rivals.
- The government pays about 96% of palliative care bills, 93% of which comes from Medicare, making Medicare the dominant payer and the key counterparty for hospice providers.
“The government pays for 96% of the bills for palliative care services, and 93% of that is Medicare.”
- VITAS is paid mainly a per-day reimbursement rate for care, with add-ons such as respite care and higher-rate inpatient care for serious patients, and its largest cost is nurse labor.
“it's easiest to think about it in an average reimbursement rate per day of care.”
- VITAS exceeds the Medicare cap for high-acuity patients at times, which costs money but is the right thing for patients, and a False Claims Act fine came from treating high-need patients when reimbursement was too low.
“When you go back to the fine that they paid for the False Claims Act charges, it seemed to me that in that situation they were treating high-need patients when the reimbursement rates were too low.”
- Medicare caps apply on a portfolio basis, so hospital-referred patients with short stays can lose money while assisted-living patients who live longer risk exhausting the cap, and VITAS can use a varied referral mix as a pressure valve.
“both of these limitations are done on a portfolio basis, not on an individual basis.”
- Medicare limits high-acuity care to 20% of a hospice bill and caps total spending per patient at $34,560, which at about $200 a day allows roughly 170-175 days of care before payment stops.
“the government limits high-acuity care payments to 20% of an overall bill. ... the maximum that can be spent is $34,560.”
- Medicare sets hospice reimbursement rates once a year and partly tied to inflation, so during high-inflation periods the rates lag and well-capitalized providers can take market share.
“The government sets the reimbursement rate and they do it once a year. And it's based to some extent on inflation.”
- Hospice may consolidate around independent portfolio players like VITAS or around providers partnered with hospitals and assisted-living facilities, and if independents lose, Chemed could buy partners or sell VITAS.
“Is it going to consolidate where independent entities like VITAS become the dominant players?”
- State regulations on who can enter hospice vary widely, with Los Angeles County having about 1,900 hospice operators while Florida has about 50, so VITAS favors stringent states to limit competition.
“LA County by itself has probably 1,900 different hospice operators, whereas in the state of Florida there's probably 50.”
VITAS's nurse investment, sales execution, and leadership position it to gain share.
- VITAS spent $37 million on nurse retention bonuses and $3 million on recruiting, then posted negative comps from Q4 2020 through Q4 2022 before returning to single-digit and then low-to-high-teens comps, positioning it to take share as referral sources reopened.
“They put $37 million into retention bonuses for their nurses, and then they spent another $3 million recruiting new nurses”
- VITAS holds about 12% of the hospice market and grew revenue about 6% a year with earnings growing about 12%, reaching roughly $1.6 billion of revenue at 16-20% EBITDA margins.
“VITAS is probably 12% of the hospice market.”
- VITAS wins patients through sales representatives who work inside hospitals and assisted-living facilities, and COVID visitor restrictions impaired that marketing and produced negative comps.
“You have sales representatives that go into hospitals that talk to patients, that talk to families.”
- CEO Kevin McNamara, about 70, rose from Omnicare to general counsel, then Chemed president, then CEO, and Nicholas Westfall, VITAS CEO, is probably next in line given his age and VITAS's relative size.
“It would be my guess that he's probably next in line for the CEO job, given his age and VITAS's relative size to their overall business.”
- VITAS deliberately serves higher-population areas so it can manage nurse utilization better, producing 15-22% margins versus 6-9% for the bottom half of the industry.
“So they only operate in higher-population areas. And that allows them to better manage the utilization of their assets, which is namely their people”
- During the post-COVID labor shortage VITAS ran a substantial nurse retention program and lobbied the government to raise reimbursement sooner, to protect the bottom half of the industry rather than its own margins.
“VITAS was reaching out to the government to advocate that they up the reimbursement rates sooner than the government normally would. That was done to save the industry, not protect their margins”
Chemed grows organically through boots-on-the-ground sales in fragmented, under-followed industries.
- Both Roto-Rooter and VITAS have grown mostly organically, with Roto-Rooter using money for acquisitions to buy back franchises and VITAS using mostly greenfield expansion, except for one recent $85 million acquisition.
“Both of them grew organically. And then with respect to Roto-Rooter, they put some money into acquisitions to acquire some of the franchises.”
- VITAS wins market share through a boots-on-the-ground sales force that visits hospitals and assisted living facilities to talk with patients and families, which is similar to how Roto-Rooter builds its business.
“You have sales representatives that go into hospitals that talk to patients, that talk to families.”
- Roto-Rooter's franchise acquisitions were historically small, with the main exception being 2018 and 2019, when it spent just under $200 million cumulatively on M&A.
“So if you look at 2018, 2019, they did a couple large transactions where cumulatively they spent just under $200 million M&A at Roto-Rooter.”
- The hospice industry is highly fragmented, with independent large players such as RAM Holdings, nonprofits, and hospital- or assisted-living-affiliated providers, which means scale advantages are real but the field is far from consolidated.
“It is highly fragmented. Now, there are large players that are independent. RAM Holdings has one.”
- Chemed's management is hard to access because it is covered by only one to three smaller sell-side firms and attends conferences that are hard for outside investors to reach, which is part of why the stock stays under-followed.
“They are covered by one, two, three sell-side firms at any given time.”
Roto-Rooter's branch-centric mixed model shapes its margins, marketing efficiency, and earnings profile.
- Chemed is under-known despite strong performance, with only one to three analysts covering it at any time, and only one analyst on its first-quarter 2020 earnings call.
“there was one analyst on the call. Still today, not too many people know about it.”
- Roto-Rooter historically spends under $10 million a year buying back franchises, with the exception of about $200 million across 2018-2019, and the gating factor is when franchise owners want to retire, not price.
“When I talk to the CFO about it, the price isn't really as much of an issue. The determining factor is just when the franchise owner wants to retire and exit the business.”
- Roto-Rooter's leads fell 7-8% while revenue still grew, which Chadd reads as less aggressive search-engine marketing producing fewer but higher-converting leads.
“Revenue grew overall, but leads coming in were down 7-8%.”
- Roto-Rooter operates three models: company-owned branches in large metros, franchises that pay a small fee with little corporate support, and independent contractors in mid-market or rural areas who pay a 28% royalty in exchange for back-office and marketing support.
“For the benefit of being an independent contractor to Roto-Rooter, you get the benefit of all the back-office help and the marketing help and then you pay them a 28% royalty fee.”
- Roto-Rooter's excavation work with contractors on large jobs is growing and is more competitive, so management has accepted somewhat lower margins to win high-volume work.
“They've talked about the margins coming down a little bit because they're pricing to be a little bit more competitive in that business, but again, it drives large volumes.”
- Roto-Rooter was founded in the 1930s by Sam Blanc, who invented a drain-cleaning machine by attaching a cable with blades to a Maytag washing machine motor, replacing excavation for severely clogged drains.
“Sam invented a drain-cleaning piece of equipment by taking a Maytag washing machine motor and attaching a cable to it with some blades.”
- Management would sell Roto-Rooter only if someone offered a price too good to pass up, since it is a great business they are happy running.
“the only reason why they would sell it is that somebody offered them a price that was too good to pass up.”
- Roto-Rooter is the smaller of Chemed's two businesses, contributing roughly 30 to 35% of earnings.
“Roto-Rooter is now the smaller of the two businesses, probably 30, 35% of the earnings.”
- Company-owned Roto-Rooter branches generate about two-thirds of its EBITDA because they are run as normal corporate income statements, with corporate controlling operations more tightly than it does with franchises and contractors.
“It looks like around two-thirds of their EBITDA is from their branches, whereas the remaining third are split between contractors and franchisee fees”
- Roto-Rooter's EBITDA margins have been about 25% in a typical year, and branch performance was strong on the latest call, with Chadd noting branches benefit from more corporate control than franchises.
“It's about 25% EBITDA margins in any given year”
- Roto-Rooter's residential drain cleaning is about 17% of sales and residential plumbing about 13%, with the commercial business making up the rest and serving B2B customers that also need drain cleaning and plumbing.
“So you have the residential drain cleaning business, which is probably about 17% of sales. You have another 13% for residential plumbing.”
- Roto-Rooter began posting negative comparable sales in Q1 2023, which Chadd attributes to several overlapping problems including demand pull-forward, DIY substitution, and private equity competition.
“They started in the first quarter of 2023 with some negative comps and those problems have persisted a bit.”
Private equity roll-ups threaten Roto-Rooter's general managers and will likely struggle.
- Within a year and a half to two years, about half of the general managers who left Roto-Rooter for private equity had returned, which Chadd reads as evidence that owning a business beats renting one.
“Within a year and a half, two years, half of the general managers had returned to Roto-Rooter.”
- Roto-Rooter tried rolling up HVAC businesses in the 1990s and it did not work, so Chadd is skeptical that private equity multi-trade roll-ups of plumbing plus HVAC will succeed.
“Roto-Rooter tried rolling up HVAC in the 90s. It didn't really work out well for them.”
- Starting in 2021 private equity competitors hired away about 20% of Roto-Rooter's general managers, and their departures took the next management layer with them.
“In '21, the private equity players picked off about 20% of the general managers of Roto-Rooter.”
- The main private equity plumbing rivals Roto-Rooter encounters are Apex, backed by Alpine Investors, and Ben Franklin, owned by Authority Brands.
“One is called Apex, which is backed by Alpine Investors. One's called Ben Franklin, which is owned by Authority Brands.”