What this covers
This Business Breakdowns episode has Connie Chan walking through how WeChat works, from its 2011 launch to its role as what she calls an operating system for the Chinese internet. WeChat generated over $17 billion in 2021, about 20 percent of Tencent's revenue, from advertising, WeChat Pay, and service fees. The build-out runs from Official Accounts in 2012 to Mini Programs, which exceeded $400 billion in transaction volume in 2021 and are often built before a full native app.
The middle of the conversation is product mechanics. A Service Account can push only four messages a month, and a brand that spends them early goes silent. Group members cannot see each other's names or phone numbers. There is no ranking or recommendation push, so discovery depends on intent or referral. Chan also explains the payments story: the 2014 Red Packets feature led users to link bank cards to claim even pennies, which seeded stored balances and routine one-tap payments. Allen Zhang's principle of treating the user like a friend, and Tencent's willingness to shield him from revenue targets, run through all of it. She also notes that email was barely used and SMS was scam-ridden in China, so messaging was not fragmented.
The last stretch compares this with Western companies. Chan argues mobile ads force mobile-first firms toward other models, a point marked as contested. She contrasts horizontal expansion with vertical expansion, and cites backward-compatibility burdens and the need for top-down commitment. DoorDash's Sephora link-up and Douyin's commerce business serve as examples of the approach.
Connie Chan argues WeChat succeeded as a super-app because Tencent let its designers protect user trust and patiently monetize without ads, and that Western companies fail to replicate this because they are PC-first, ad-dependent, and unwilling to take short-term revenue hits.
- WeChat built a super-app by opening its traffic to third-party developers via Official Accounts and Mini Programs, not by building every service itself
- User trust, capped messaging, and a non-ad revenue base let WeChat monetize through payments and services without degrading the experience
- Western firms struggle because mobile-first design requires abandoning legacy PC-era frameworks and short-term ad revenue, which needs top-down commitment
Restraint on ads and interruptions builds user trust that funds revenue beyond ads.
- WeChat deliberately does not rely solely on advertising, since ad-dependence degrades user experience and brand trust, limits diversification, and requires a large user base that new startups lack.
“it's not 100% advertising based, which is often the thing that we always default to here in the West.”
- WeChat generated over 17 billion dollars of revenue in 2021, roughly 20 percent of parent company Tencent's revenue, from advertising, WeChat Pay, and various other service fees.
“In 2021, they generated over $17 billion of revenue. That equates to around 20% of Tencent”
- Three or four years before the interview, WeChat limited users to about two ads per day, and while the number had risen, it remained low relative to the hours users spend in the app.
“they used to limit the number of ads that user would see to, say, two ads a day.”
- WeChat separates subscription accounts into their own folder, similar to Gmail's promotions tab, so brand content does not clutter the main inbox and users can unsubscribe with a swipe, removing the company's ability to contact them.
“And if it's a subscription account, it's separately folded, just like promotions are separately folded in your Gmail.”
- WeChat's restraint on advertising built enough trust that it could launch a successful payment platform, WeChat Pay, which now handles transactions with businesses inside and outside the app, including at Starbucks and restaurants.
“that has actually allowed them to build trust in the brand that they could launch a very successful payment platform.”
- WeChat limits Service Accounts to four pushed messages per month, and if a brand uses them up early it cannot message the user for the rest of the month, which gives consumers more control and cleaner inboxes than email marketing.
“They can only push me messages four times a month. There's a limit.”
- Western websites sell users' email addresses and phone numbers to third parties, which fuels spam and makes email marketing less and less efficient over time.
“I know that e-mail address gets sold to someone else.”
- Ads on phones occupy the full screen width and are harder to scroll past than desktop side-rail ads, so mobile-first companies are forced early toward business models like paid memberships, live video, or tipping rather than ads.
“if you're truly a mobile-first, you are forced very early on to think of a business model that's not ads.”
- Many Chinese apps open with a disruptive pop-up ad, a practice that WeChat refuses, reflecting the friend principle that promotional content should not come before a greeting.
“a lot of Chinese apps usually have this very disruptive pop-up ad the moment you open the app”
- WeChat's design aims to get users to the information or task as fast as possible so they can get in and out, and trust produces hundreds of short sessions per day rather than long, aimless sessions.
“the idea is not just to keep this user in this app for as long of a session as possible.”
- WeChat rolled out features patiently, so a new user sees almost nothing in an empty app until they have friends, and it took a long time to add a TikTok-style video feed.
“it took a long time for them to add that feature in.”
- Trust in WeChat's identity and privacy design, similar to how users trust Apple as an OS, is central to its ability to become an ecosystem, and protecting user trust is key for building new Western consumer products.
“protecting that user trust is so key.”
- Allen Zhang's North Star is to treat the user like a friend, which in product terms means never opening with promotional or transactional prompts such as pop-up ads, because that causes the user to disengage.
“treat your user like a friend is one of his North Stars.”
- Apple ranks highly among Gen Z survey respondents as a brand they love and trust, which makes it a good example of a company that treats users like friends.
“Apple usually ranks pretty highly on that list.”
- WeChat does not show read receipts, which avoids the anxiety of seeing that a message was read but not answered and lets people send a message and move on, shortening sessions and increasing the number of short visits.
“By design, WeChat doesn't have that.”
- When Official Accounts first launched in 2012, there were few guardrails and users were bombarded with content from brands and influencers until limits like four articles per month were added.
“you would get bombarded with a lot of content in the same way that we're bombarded with all this unnecessary e-mail content”
- Within Tencent, Allen Zhang was able to protect the customer experience and make product calls that hurt short-term revenue but improved long-term retention and brand trust, because the parent did not force revenue targets through disruptive ads.
“Allen Zhang was able to make all of these product calls that actually, in the short term, are bad for revenue, but in the long term, are better for retention”
- WeChat's unified identity gives users control and privacy because businesses cannot see or reach users' phone numbers or email addresses, which is counterintuitive compared with Western apps where identity data is sold and used for spam.
“The unification of everything happening in WeChat... actually gives the consumer a lot of control and privacy.”
- A new WeChat user with no friends on the platform sees an almost empty app, because the product is designed to protect users and does not fill the feed with content.
“If you're not friends with any one on WeChat, it's like an empty app.”
- WeChat historically limited users to about two ads per day, and Connie argues that even modest ad density changes how users feel about the brand, while Instagram users see far more ads in a short span.
“they used to limit the number of ads that user would see to, say, two ads a day.”
Western firms lag Asian mobile-first products due to fragmented messaging and ad-driven incentives.
- When WeChat launched in 2011, most people in China did not use email regularly and SMS was plagued by scams, so messaging was not fragmented and WeChat could quickly become the dominant communication platform.
“the majority of people in China didn't use e-mail regularly. They didn't even have an e-mail address.”
- WeChat's interest-based group chats thrive because members do not see each other's real names or phone numbers, unlike WhatsApp groups, which expose phone numbers and feel intrusive to the user.
“those users don't necessarily know my real name, and those users don't have my contact information.”
- Messaging in the US is now highly fragmented across many apps like Signal, Instagram DMs, Twitter DMs, LinkedIn, email, Slack, and iMessage, making it very difficult for messaging to serve as the wedge for a new Western super-app.
“there is no unifying platform for communication here, it's very difficult for messaging to be that same wedge”
- ByteDance's Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, is already a major commerce platform where short-form video converts directly into purchases of products, services, tickets, and entertainment.
“that one is very much already a huge commerce transaction platform.”
- Connie's investing approach is to study products that work in Asia, especially mobile-first Chinese products, then find Western teams to adapt those learnings, while expecting only a fraction of deals to come directly from this inspiration.
“I get ideas from looking at things that are working in Asia.”
- Many people still search for flights on their phones but complete large purchases on a computer because they trust the desktop more, even when it is the same website, which keeps Western companies stuck in PC-first habits.
“people might search for flights on their phone, but they're going to go to their computer to purchase the ticket.”
- Smartphones offer microphone, compass, location, and front and back cameras that computers lack, so products designed only around smartphone capabilities can offer experiences that web-first products cannot match.
“Easy access to your microphone, a compass, the location, front and back camera.”
- Western companies struggle to innovate because they must build web and mobile experiences with backward compatibility, which slows mobile-native innovation; Tencent avoided this by having a separate team build the smartphone-native WeChat without QQ's constraints.
“they were not saddled with the requirements of backward compatibility or using the same design frameworks as QQ.”
- Replacing ad space with a button that drives third-party lead generation forces a short-term revenue hit, which is difficult for Western companies because their newsfeed P&L owners are measured on ad revenue.
“I will take a short-term revenue hit. And that is very difficult for so many western companies to adopt”
- Western companies must build for both web and mobile with the same features and backward compatibility, which makes development taxing and distracting, slows innovation, and makes it hard to grow quickly by owning users.
“because they have to build for both, it's more taxing, it's more distracting.”
- Unless a company already has massive user scale, an advertising business is very difficult to build because ad engines are hard to build and there is not enough revenue, so new startups today cannot be ad-based.
“unless you're already a company that has a ton of users, it's very difficult to rely on advertising as a business model”
Red Packets and fee-light integrated payments create a routine, friction-free transaction flywheel.
- WeChat launched Red Packets in 2014 as a gamified group gifting feature, and the viral give-and-get behavior made users link bank cards at scale, which seeded WeChat Pay far faster than one-to-one transfers would have.
“this is when WeChat first put out the framework for what is WeChat Pay today”
- Because payment credentials are integrated into the app rather than handled separately, transactions can become one-tap actions, which would make ads far more effective if they were tied to saved payment credentials on platforms like Instagram.
“imagine now all these things can be one tap transactions.”
- Once users link a bank card and keep a balance inside WeChat, they start thinking of the app as a place to transact, and one-tap payments for rides and purchases create a flywheel that makes transactions routine.
“you start thinking, oh, where else can I use it?”
- WeChat takes no 30 percent cut on transactions inside the app, charging only a payment fee similar to PayPal, which developers perceive as more level than Apple's app-store model.
“There is no 30% take rate off of transactions that are happening inside of WeChat.”
- Mini Programs reduce user friction by moving website and app tasks into the chat app, so users complete the same action with fewer clicks and no separate app store download or login.
“You're taking away the user friction. You're allowing the user to have to click fewer buttons”
- Mini Programs had transaction volume exceeding 400 billion dollars in 2021, and developers often build a mini program before a full native app because it is faster to build, works on both iOS and Android, and plugs easily into WeChat.
“in 2021, their transaction volume was over $400 billion.”
- Users who received only pennies from group red packets still linked their bank cards to claim them, which made stored balances and later payment use possible.
“even if you only got pennies each time they would add up and you might still link your bank card”
- No Western company has yet built a commerce and enterprise layer inside a consumer app the way WeChat does, though TikTok and Instagram may one day move toward transactions.
“can it one day become commerce-oriented, transaction-oriented”
- WeChat had 1.3 billion monthly active users in Q1 2022, and only about five or so apps have crossed the 1 billion monthly active user threshold, so it is one of very few apps at that scale.
“Earlier this year, Q1 of 2022, 1.3 billion monthly active users. I think there's only maybe five or so apps that have crossed the 1 billion monthly active user mark.”
- Super-app thinking is becoming a common Western strategy, and Connie argues the key remaining question is whether platforms like TikTok or Instagram can shift from content and entertainment into commerce, which depends on the user trust that WeChat has built.
“can it one day become commerce-oriented, transaction-oriented and what that transition might look like.”
WeChat's vertical super-app layer deepens daily use of existing traffic.
- A super-app means leveraging all existing traffic and distribution to help users find products or services they were not originally coming to the app for, with third-party developers plugging into the platform rather than the platform building everything itself.
“Super-app to me means that you are leveraging all your existing traffic and your existing distribution, and you are helping that customer find other products or services that they weren't naturally coming to you for in the first place.”
- WeChat's unified identity means users do not need a separate login for each service, as they do on iOS, which lets one account and one identity carry across messaging, payments, and commerce.
“I've got a different login for every one of those damn apps on my iOS, on my iPhone. Very different in WeChat.”
- The right success metric for a vertical super-app is how many times a day users open it and how core it is to their daily habits, not the raw number of users.
“focusing not on number of users, but more importantly, how many times a day are you relying on this app.”
- WeChat functions as an operating system or browser layer for the internet in China, because it is the one app users cannot live without and can fully function with alone, whereas in the West the operating system sits at the hardware level with Apple.
“I also think of WeChat as an operating system or like a browser to the Internet.”
- Western companies typically expand horizontally by taking one feature that works in the US to more countries and chasing user counts, whereas Asian companies like WeChat expand vertically by deepening what they do for each user across many daily needs.
“in the West, we often think of horizontal expansion, meaning we have one feature that's taking off, let's go expand to other countries.”
Ecosystem building requires executives to accept short-term revenue cannibalization.
- Tencent's decision to build WeChat as a smartphone-native successor to QQ is admirable self-disruption, because they accepted the cannibalization of a profitable messaging app instead of squeezing a PC product into a phone.
“maybe smartphone needs something brand new.”
- Operators should understand that business model changes like ecosystem partnerships require accepting short-term revenue losses for long-term diversification and ecosystem building, which must come from executives.
“I want to build a different kind of ecosystem. I want to work with more partners.”
- Uber placing UberEats back into its main app reduces duplicate customer acquisition costs, since a single app avoids paying twice to acquire the same user.
“why am I paying for twice the CAC, when I can instead put it in one app.”
Parallel internal teams and patient system evolution produced WeChat's success.
- Tencent had two teams compete to build the next messaging product, and Allen Zhang's team built WeChat, which took off, a management approach Connie considers powerful and underused in the West.
“Tencent actually had two teams build it to see which one will build a better one.”
- Following the Systems Bible view, complex systems that work are not designed from scratch but evolve from simple working systems, and Connie agrees WeChat's feature set grew patiently in this way.
“I think so. I think the feature set has also grown in a very patient way.”
- Running parallel internal teams on the same product is a management philosophy common in Chinese companies, which the speaker considers powerful but unpopular in the West.
“that is also a management philosophy that happens inside a lot of Chinese companies, which I think is really powerful, not popular here in the West”
Super-app ecosystems are a universal model Western companies can adopt with top-level buy-in.
- WeChat is used for work communication as well as personal chat, replacing work email, Slack, and document tools inside one app, a consumer-to-enterprise crossover Connie has not seen in the US.
“WeChat is used for personal communication, but it is also used for work communication.”
- DoorDash linking a Sephora membership so users can order makeup for same-day delivery is an example of super-app thinking, because the user no longer needs a separate browser visit to the retailer.
“I can put in my Sephora membership number and order makeup and get it delivered that day.”
- A WeChat-style ecosystem strategy usually fails in Western companies unless it is understood and embraced from the top, because it changes team structure, feature prioritization, and short-term revenue, and junior staff who see it cannot influence the product.
“it doesn't generally work unless it is top-down understood and embraced by a company.”
- Official Accounts launched in 2012, about a year after WeChat, and created the one-to-many business relationship that Mini Programs later extended to full-featured apps without requiring an app store download or separate login.
“So Official Accounts started much earlier than mini programs. This started in 2012”
- The super-app framework is not China-specific but a universal model that Western companies can adopt, and more founders and executives are beginning to embrace it.
“it's really a universal framework we can adopt.”
- WeChat has no app-ranking or recommendation push for official accounts or groups, so discovery depends on user intent or referral, which pushes the burden of proving value onto developers and gives small developers more room to grow.
“In WeChat, there is no app ranking equivalent.”
- Allen Zhang's principles include a decentralized ecosystem, technology meant to make users more efficient, and the idea that KPIs are not everything, which Connie says explains why WeChat remains open to large new businesses like Pinduoduo.
“decentralized ecosystem is definitely one. User is your friend, technology is meant to make you more efficient. KPIs are not everything”
Tencent's other revenue let WeChat stay unprofitable and prioritize user experience.
- WeChat benefited because Tencent had other revenue sources, so WeChat did not have to be profitable on day one and spent a long time unprofitable, which gave the team room to prioritize user experience.
“WeChat benefited a lot from the fact that it had Tencent that had other sources of revenue”
- An elegant business model is self-sustaining and profitable without needing a home-run in user penetration or retention, grows organically through user word of mouth, and diversifies revenue beyond advertising through subscriptions, membership, or other value.
“Elegant to me means self-sustaining.”
- Hundreds of billions of dollars of transactions happen inside WeChat every year, making its payment rails a substantial transaction system.
“hundreds of billions of dollars of transactions happen inside of WeChat every year”
- Allen Zhang created a subscriptions folder early on because unfiltered brand content would make the app unusable, and the decision was only affordable because WeChat sat inside Tencent, just as Gmail can afford a promotions tab inside Google.
“Gmail can afford to do that because it's inside Google. And in the same way, I think WeChat can afford to do that because it was inside Tencent.”
Regulatory uncertainty and non-obvious long-term investment criteria frame the outlook.
- Connie says she is less willing to predict how China's tougher regulatory stance will affect WeChat, but notes the uncertainty applies to every tech company operating there.
“There's just uncertainty there, but it applies to every tech company that's operating there.”
- Connie's investment criteria are elegant business models, founders building for the long term, and total addressable markets or user behaviors that are not yet obvious.
“I'm always looking for really elegant business models. I'm looking for people who are building for the long term.”