What this covers

Chris Bloomstran talks with host Patrick about how he judges business quality, using case studies rather than a checklist. Costco is the opening example: it cut gross margin from about 14% to 11% to pass scale to customers, and its returns roughly doubled anyway. The discussion also covers how immature new stores drag down company-wide returns. Richemont serves as the luxury counterpart. Its roughly 65% gross margins reflect brand rather than materials, and it bought back inventory and melted watches instead of marking prices down.

The accounting section is the most contested. Bloomstran estimates that write-offs consume about 15% of S&P 500 operating income over the long run, so reported return on equity is overstated. He also runs pension return assumptions through earnings at 4% and argues that heavy capex makes free cash flow understate a growing business. Incentive design gets similar scrutiny, including General Mills' sales-growth hurdle sliding below zero, and why his team now reads 15 years of proxies.

Berkshire takes up a large share of the conversation. Topics include the 1998 General Re purchase, the breakdown of Berkshire's value, and Bloomstran's objection to dropping book value per share. Other threads: KKR's buyout of Dollar General, Amazon's rural shipping costs, battery-truck weight limits for long-haul diesel, and his Anchoring Bias error of selling Ross Stores. He and Patrick also disagree over Mastercard and Visa, and whether regulatory risk should have kept him out.

Sharpest takeaway

Bloomstran argues that quality means a business that can reinvest capital at high incremental returns under aligned management, and that reported GAAP numbers must be adjusted (for write-offs, pension assumptions, and capex masking) to see true economic returns.

  • Incremental return on capital and management's capital allocation are the core tests of a quality business, and incentive plans often fail to reward them
  • Owning control of distribution and maintaining brand value beats short-term margin defense, as shown by Richemont, Disney, and Cummins
  • Headline earnings, ROE, and free cash flow mislead without adjustments for write-downs, pension return assumptions, and growth capex

The argument · threads10 threads · 65 claims
0.76

Business quality bought at a low price forms the margin of safety.

7 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Bloomstran's biggest investing mistake was trimming and then exiting Ross Stores at around 20 times earnings after a 2.5x gain, anchored to the original 10x purchase price, and never buying back, forfeiting enormous upside as the stock grew more than 20 times while unit growth and margins expanded.

    “We sold it for price and made the mistake of never circling back and buying it because I think we were anchored at some level in the fact that we paid 10 times earnings for it.”

  • Bloomstran defines his investing as buying outstanding businesses run by outstanding managers, thinking about quality well before price, and employing a dual margin of safety that combines business quality with a low purchase price.

    “We think about quality and price, but we think about quality way before we think about price, but we like to say we employ a dual margin of safety in the process.”

  • Bloomstran owned Mylan several times on the thematic thesis of a generic-drug opportunity created by the patent cliff under Hatch-Waxman, but the firm's suspect accounting, revolving CFOs, and high executive pay led him to conclude it lacked business quality and to walk away after making money.

    “We owned Mylan labs a couple of different times on the notion that you had this giant patent cliff with the big branded pharma.”

  • After decades of mistakes, Bloomstran's definition of quality has tightened so that his portfolio companies are effectively unlevered when cash is netted against debt, though he does not require net-unlevered balance sheets as a rule.

    “our businesses are effectively unlevered. And we don't go in with a notion that we're only going to businesses that are net unlevered when you strip the cash out.”

  • Bloomstran has understood Visa and Mastercard for years but never bought them on price, and the firm's rationale of perceived regulatory threat is an error of omission, though he believes both will be much bigger, more profitable businesses in ten years absent regulatory crushing.

    “we've understood them and we've just never owned them for price. And in the back of our minds today, we kind of justify that lack of ownership, really that total error of omission to perceived regulatory threat.”

  • In January 2000, Bloomstran judged Microsoft's $620 billion market cap on about $20 billion of sales to be unjustifiable, because extrapolating its historic 65% annual share compounding for 15 years would imply a market cap in the quadrillions, so he predicted shareholders would lose money for 15 years, which came true even as the business compounded.

    “you extrapolate forward for the next 15 years that 65% growth in share price. Your market cap would have been in the quadrillions of dollars.”

  • Buying a stock for low price without growth or a catalyst risks a value trap, because a return-to-par thesis fails if the business does not grow, though growth is only one part of the value equation.

    “if you wind up buying a business for a price reason. And you've got a return to par motivation. Well, if you don't have a catalyst and if you don't have growth to bail you out, you may have yourself a value trap.”

0.65

Management alignment and incentive design determine whether shareholders actually benefit.

8 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Because owning businesses for a long time means sharing a future with management, Bloomstran gravitates to businesses run by people who share the firm's value system and morals.

    “if you're gonna own businesses for a long time, if you're going to start a business with somebody, we better have a hell of a lot of respect for our core sets of values and our morals.”

  • When a bonus metric is free cash flow, management can raise payouts by cutting advertising and capex and even harming the brand, because the metric rewards cash extraction rather than value creation.

    “if one of the two metrics is free cash flow, you can cut advertising, spending, you can cut CAPEX, you can kill the brand of the business that you're running, but you can drive the free cash.”

  • General Mills' bonus hurdle for organic sales growth fell from about 3% roughly a decade ago to 1.4 percent to a negative 1.4 percent today, so management is effectively paid to shrink the business while receiving performance pay.

    “the hurdle today is a negative 1.4% organic growth rate. And it's stunning. We're going to pay you performance comp to slowly shrink the business.”

  • Bloomstran's team now reads 15 years of proxy statements rather than three, because the record shows how boards repeatedly move incentive hurdles, which is more revealing than a short window.

    “we've gone back and we've started looking at businesses and taking a series of 15 years’ worth of proxy statements. What that does is gives you a sense of where changes have been made.”

  • Long-term ownership makes management more willing to talk, because Bloomstran focuses on durable strengths and 10-to-15-year disruption risk rather than quarterly earnings, which managers come to value.

    “through longstanding ownership of businesses, managements are a lot more comfortable to talking to us because we're never interested in what quarterly earnings are going to be”

  • KKR's take-private of Dollar General used 3 to 4 times leverage at 12 to 13 percent coupons, with management's options vested to enable the deal, and the firm and bankers collected fees and repricing gains that were not reinvested in the business, leaving it with heavy debt.

    “The leverage that was employed was probably 3-4X to the equity that was put in... It was done at coupons of 12 to 13%.”

  • General Mills paid about $8 billion for roughly $1.2 billion of Blue Buffalo revenue, yet its incentive calculation ignores the first year of an acquisition, so the deal's return on capital does not affect pay and the firm can overpay for top-line growth.

    “So you don't get the calculation for comp in the first year you make an acquisition, but you have a business that's clearly growing the top line.”

  • Many companies pay executives on top-line growth, EPS, or cash metrics but not on asset, equity, or capital returns, so managers have no incentive to make acquisitions or investments that earn their cost of capital.

    “too many businesses don't have a return on capital. They don't have an asset-based return metric. They don't have an equity-based return metric.”

0.65

Returns on retained capital and book value, not earnings or prices, measure real value creation.

8 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Assessing how management and boards keep and redeploy retained profits at high incremental returns on capital is probably Bloomstran's most important job, because retained earnings the company does not pay as dividends determine long-run compounding.

    “return on incrementally invested capital is probably one of my most important jobs to assess how well these management teams and these boards are keeping our portion of profits”

  • Costco cut gross margin from about 14% to 11% and passed purchasing scale to customers, yet its system-wide return on capital roughly doubled and it earns about 21 to 22% today, which Bloomstran says is only 2 or 3 points helped by the tax code change.

    “But the returns on capital of the system are double what they were.”

  • Costco's new stores earned mid-to-high single-digit returns on capital while mature stores (defined as taking six or seven years to mature) earned mid-teens, so a company-wide 11% return reflected the immaturity of the installed base and understated future returns as the base matured.

    “Their brand new stores were earning kind of mid to high single-digit returns on capital, but the mature stores were earning kind of mid-teens returns.”

  • Berkshire's plan to stop reporting change in book value per share is wrong, because the company retains all earnings and about 60% of its book value in ten years will reflect retained capital invested at today's prices, so book value remains a real measure.

    “We're going to go away from reporting change in book value, per share, which is insane.”

  • Judging the Gen Re transaction by today's value of the 272,000 Berkshire shares issued (now worth about $80 billion, or about double their underlying value) misses the point; Gen Re shareholders contributed 35% of the assets for 17% of the company, but the surplus capital redeployed produced far more book value than the stock ownership would have.

    “Gen Re shareholders brought 35% of the assets to the party and only got 17% of the underlying ownership of Berkshire Hathaway.”

  • About 45% of Berkshire's value remains tied to property-casualty insurance and reinsurance, while utilities are worth about $50 billion and the company holds about $110 billion of cash, with much of its on-balance-sheet debt sitting in the railroad and utility subsidiaries without being an obligation of the parent.

    “it's an obligation of the underlying subsidiary. So you've got a business that's running with $110 billion in cash.”

  • Owning Costco for years taught the firm how capital works, especially how reinvested capital and incremental returns compound, making it the firm's best teaching tool.

    “our ownership of Costco is probably been the best teaching tool that I've had”

  • Berkshire's utilities are among the best in the business because they serve high population-growth areas, rely less on coal and nuclear, and make tax-advantaged reinvestments, while railroads are hard to displace because they form an oligopoly.

    “there's permanence to some of those businesses that they've bought”

0.57

Brand strength, distribution control, and density create durable franchise value resistant to online commerce.

10 pointscentrality 3/5
  • About 70% of Dollar General's business is in rural markets, where Amazon's per-basket shipping cost of over $13 to $14 for small orders makes delivery uneconomic, so Amazon must raise basket sizes before serving these areas.

    “70% of dollar General's business is done in rural markets... it costs you a hell of a lot more than 13 or $14 to ship.”

  • Bloomstran believes Costco and Dollar General are uniquely positioned to be impenetrable by online commerce, Costco through membership and Dollar General through rural density and small-basket economics that make Amazon's shipping uneconomic.

    “we think for different reasons, Costco and Dollar General are two businesses that are uniquely positioned as impenetrable by online commerce.”

  • Cummins bought independent service centers over the past six or seven years and brought them under its umbrella, so trucking fleets get maintenance from a network that services Cummins engines across brands, which Bloomstran calls a huge competitive advantage in controlling distribution.

    “they bought in independent service centers brought them under the Cummins umbrella... it's a huge, competitive advantage that they're not just servicing Cummins engines.”

  • Dollar General raised cooler doors per store from about eight to 17 over five years to sell produce, milk, and beverages, and it runs a small format with its own distribution (one center per roughly 1,000 stores), which Bloomstran says Walmart failed to replicate.

    “We watched the number of cooler doors go from an average of, I think, eight up to 17. Walmart tried this business and I think failed at it.”

  • Facing a China-driven demand slump, Richemont bought back inventory from retail partners, melted some watches to destroy their supply, cut ties with retailers, and accepted permanently lower operating margins rather than mark down prices, which Bloomstran says protects the brand over generations.

    “they're going to limit supply... we're going to permanently sacrifice our operating margin and control our distribution.”

  • Richemont runs about 65% gross margins, rising toward 90% on higher-priced watches, which Bloomstran says shows that the value of luxury watches comes from brand rather than gold or diamond content.

    “here's a manufacturer that does 65% gross margins... the gross margins can run into the 90%. It's not the value of the Rose gold. It's not the value of the diamonds, it's the brand.”

  • Bloomstran thinks Netflix may be a long-term viable competitor to Disney's streaming, but he is not sure, because younger consumers may still be drawn to content, and once Netflix loses licensed content it cannot replicate Disney's library.

    “I think Netflix may be a long-term viable competitor, but I don't know.”

  • Bloomstran invested in Disney because it took its content back from Netflix to distribute directly, and he believes the economics of controlling distribution are huge for a company whose IP is monetized across parks, retail, studio, and sports, with its library of intangible assets being invaluable.

    “We looked at the economics going over the top... we think the economics of controlling your distribution will be huge.”

  • Bloomstran says a common theme among recent purchases is control of distribution, with Nike, Disney, Richemont, and Cummins all taking distribution back in-house, though the firm did not set out to find that theme.

    “a common theme there on that front is very much control of distribution. We own. So names that we've bought that have taken distribution back in house would be Nike, would be Disney, would be Richemont would be Cummins”

  • The firm expects jewelry sales to grow roughly double the rate of watches over the next decade, which justifies accepting Richemont's lower operating margins from internet distribution.

    “Jewelry is probably going to grow at double that rate.”

0.43

Incentives and short-term stock declines should not override underlying business economics.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • During 2015, when Berkshire fell about 12.5% and the median stock fell about 20%, Bloomstran argued that the underlying businesses still increased in value, and that investors should focus on those economics rather than short-term stock prices, which firms cannot control.

    “our businesses had accreted in value over the year, despite the fact that stock prices were down.”

  • Semper's stock returns were about 10.5 to 11 percent annually for 20 years, roughly 500 basis points ahead of the market before cash drag (about 300 basis points after cash), but the firm underperformed badly from 2012 to 2015, earning about 8% a year while the market earned 22%.

    “Our stocks have done something like 10 and a half 11% for 20 years.”

  • Dollar General raised store manager pay at the expense of net and operating margin because replacing managers every two and a half to three years costs more than retaining them, so Bloomstran sees this as management that gets the economics.

    “They started paying their managers a lot more money at the sacrifice of net margin and operating margin, but they've realized we're a heck of a lot better off retaining our good managers”

  • Bloomstran says the kindest thing done for him was a childhood football coach, Ken Aker, who, after a loss at age nine, privately encouraged him, reinforcing his work ethic and shaping his drive for decades.

    “he came over in the middle of the meeting. He put his arm around me and he said some of the kindest things that anybody could have ever said.”

  • Dollar General's pre-buyout management got rich from immediately vested stock options, and the buyout was facilitated because a short-term stock dip six months earlier made the stock cheap enough for KKR to buy back below its prior high.

    “Was incentivized with immediate vesting of their stock options to allow the deal to take place.”

0.43

Reported earnings and ROE overstate true economics, requiring adjustments for write-offs, pensions, capex.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • For a growing business reinvesting retained earnings at high incremental returns, heavy capex makes reported free cash flow understate true economic profitability, so Bloomstran capitalizes and adjusts the numbers instead of using free cash flow at face value.

    “When you have a growing business that can reinvest retained earnings at high incremental returns, the CAPEX that's being spent masks underlying economic profitability.”

  • Berkshire bought Burlington Northern Santa Fe for about $34 to $37 billion at roughly two times capital when it earned about 9% on capital, and Bloomstran initially thought the return would fall to about 4.5% after pension adjustments, but the shift to market-based pricing made the railroad worth about $100 billion.

    “What I missed was the competitive nature of change within the railroad business... Yeah, we think that business today is worth about a hundred billion dollars”

  • Defined benefit plans assuming high returns understate true cost. Bloomstran uses a 4% return on plan assets, versus the 9% typically assumed about 25 years ago and 6.5% recently, and runs the difference through earnings, so companies with plans large relative to their business, like autos and heavy equipment makers, are avoided.

    “So we have just long assumed that a business that has a defined benefit plan. We've assumed its investments would on average earn a 4% rate of return.”

  • Bloomstran's analysis finds that about 15% of annual S&P 500 operating net income since the early 1980s has been consumed by write-offs and write-downs, with the figure higher in slowdowns and about 10% in recent years, so reported ROE overstates true returns on equity by about 2 percentage points for a 13% ROE business.

    “almost 15 of annual profits every year... 15% of the operating net income numbers, which are before write off some write-downs”

  • Investors should not rely on GAAP and IFRS earnings alone; they should adjust for recurring write-offs and write-downs, acquisition costs and litigation expenses, because these understate equity and overstate ROE, which is critical when analyzing individual businesses.

    “We really only begin with GAAP and IFRS reported numbers and dig a lot deeper.”

0.43

Stocks are bought only at modest valuations and sold at target prices, not held.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Bloomstran is sector agnostic and has found success in well-run property-casualty insurers and reinsurers, because the industry's chronically poor results keep individual stocks from being expensive, which lets the firm buy good companies at modest prices.

    “because collectively it's such a mediocre industry that the stocks themselves, the individual components of the various sectors never tend to be expensive.”

  • Five Below's unit economics are as good as any retail concept Bloomstran has seen, but at about 60 times earnings the stock is too expensive for the firm to buy, though he expects the concept to become much larger.

    “The unit economics of that business are as good as any retail concept I've ever seen, but it trades for 60 times earnings.”

  • Many true compounders now trade at 50 to 60 times earnings, which Bloomstran will not pay as a value investor, so the firm instead buys reversion-to-par businesses it plans to sell at a target price and does not hold for decades.

    “some of these things that truly are compounding businesses are trading for 50 or 60 times earnings today... I'm not paying 50 or 60 times.”

  • Subsea 7, one of Semper's largest holdings, is an oil-and-gas engineering business the firm expects to hold only until a target price, not for 30 years, because it does not produce the 10- or 20-bagger returns of a compounder, though it sees possible deepwater underinvestment.

    “That's a business that we have a price in mind at which we would sell the business.”

  • The firm bought Dollar General about two and a half years before the interview at a mid-teens multiple after the company cleaned up its balance sheet and the stock became cheap enough.

    “the stock had gotten cheap enough that we bought it, oh, geez, two and a half years ago paid kind of a mid-teens multiple”

0.26

Berkshire's history of opportunistic capital redeployment shapes its succession and prospects.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • In 1998, with Berkshire's stock portfolio at 115% of book value and trading at about 45 times earnings, Buffett bought General Re using Berkshire stock, which reduced stock exposure from 65% to 30% of assets and freed Gen Re's bond portfolio and surplus capital to fund the utility and railroad purchases later.

    “The common stocks had dropped from 115% of book down to 69% of book. The overall allocation of all of the assets dropped from 65% in stocks down to 30% in stocks.”

  • Bloomstran believes Berkshire's insurance and operating businesses have developed succession benches, but Ajit Jain's pricing skill is unusually concentrated, so shareholders should see Greg Abel and Ajit's successors more prominently, and an unresolved succession question could force runoff of some odd, one-off insurance policies.

    “if anything happens to Ajit and there's no bench underneath them, does that imply then that some portion of the business that they've written needs to be in runoff”

  • Bloomstran's 2015 letter on Berkshire's accounting, about 45 of 65 pages, was originally meant for about 40 to 50 clients and peers but was posted by Joe Koster and reached roughly 40,000 downloads and hundreds of inquiries, which led him to keep writing public letters.

    “I think that letter has been downloaded something like 40,000 times.”

  • Berkshire Hathaway began as a failing textile business that Buffett controlled from 1965, then pivoted to insurance by buying National Indemnity and assembling a float-funded collection of businesses such as See's Candies, a pattern of opportunistic pivots across its 55-year history.

    “they realized quickly that this was not a business that they could own for 30 years... they bought national indemnity and effectively kind of morphed from textiles to insurance”

0.23

Industry economics and substitution risk determine which businesses will grow.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • A regulated utility earning 9% on book equity but bought at twice book yields only about 4.5% on the purchase price, with dividends about 4%, so for income investors the stock offers little growth because utilities have no unit or population growth.

    “if it's earning nine on book... that nine gets driven down to a four and a half percent return when you pay twice book”

  • Class 8 battery trucks would weigh about 5,000 pounds more than diesel equivalents because batteries weigh about 10,000 pounds, which would cut roughly 10% of the 50,000-pound payload and, with limited range and charging downtime, makes battery replacement unlikely near term for long-haul trucks.

    “So you're adding 5,000 pounds. Well, that 5,000 pounds comes immediately off the load capacity of the 50,000 pounds. So you're losing 10% of what you can carry.”

  • Bloomstran expects jewelry sales to grow at roughly double the rate of watches over the next decade, since watches face competition from smartwatches like Apple Watch and are growing at only 4 to 6 percent annually.

    “I think watches are different animal... it's still going to grow at four or five or 6%. Jewelry is probably going to grow at double that rate.”

0.20

High broad market valuations keep return expectations conservative.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Bloomstran believes the overall stock market has mostly been overvalued relative to historical metrics, and expects the next 15 years to look like the last 15, with modest returns of about 4 to 5 percent per year.

    “I think the next 15 years may look a lot like the last 15, which is very modest returns out of the overall stock market.”

  • Broad market valuations have been expensive by most historical metrics over the firm's history, except around 2008 to 2009, which is why the firm uses conservative return assumptions.

    “broadly, at least as far as historical metrics go, the market's been very expensive.”