What this covers

Chris walks host Patrick through Berkshire Hathaway's history and structure. The story starts with a textile company Buffett bought in 1965, which failed, along with two other early stock-funded acquisitions that went essentially to zero. The pivot came with National Indemnity in 1967, which gave Warren Buffett an insurer whose float he could put into common stocks. The 1998 purchase of General Re, paid for in stock, tripled float from about $7 billion to $22 billion and let Berkshire shrink an overvalued equity portfolio.

The insurance section is the most technical. It covers how much premium an insurer can write against statutory surplus in auto insurance, and why Berkshire holds about 40 percent of global reinsurance surplus while writing only about 7 percent of the premium. Chris contrasts this with Swiss Re and Munich Re, which keep only 4 to 5 percent of their portfolios in stocks. He also makes the contested claim that insurance as an industry is roughly break-even at best.

The remainder moves through Berkshire's operating businesses and the wider economy. Topics include utilities and the roughly $35 billion put into wind, the $10 billion Occidental preferred investment, and the oil and refining capital cycle. Chris also argues that the 2017 tax cut did not lift corporate capex, and he describes short CEO tenures and the lack of stock options at Berkshire. He is candid about Berkshire's mistakes: Precision Castparts, a $10 billion writedown, and the long avoidance of technology. He closes on how he estimates Berkshire's economic earnings and why 1982's market valuations cannot return.

Sharpest takeaway

Chris Bloomstran argues that Berkshire Hathaway's compounding comes from using insurance float as permanent, low-cost capital, combined with disciplined underwriting, retained earnings, and a culture that refuses to grow for growth's sake, and that these structural advantages are largely unreplicable today.

  • Berkshire's insurance float let Buffett invest in common stocks at scale, and peers that copy the structure fail because they lack surplus capital and underwriting discipline
  • Berkshire retains earnings in a diversified set of businesses and reinvests them at returns above its cost of capital, while most public companies overpay for acquisitions or waste capital
  • Berkshire's Fort Knox balance sheet and culture of never impairing capital make the business durable and predictable, so its value is more knowable than most companies

The argument · threads13 threads · 72 claims
0.85

Insurance float and capital base are cheap leverage that fuels Berkshire's compounding and is hard to replicate.

12 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Float is a net liability reflecting premiums an insurer has collected in advance of paying losses, giving the insurer use of that capital for some period; short-tail lines like auto pay out quickly while long-tail lines like workers' comp can take years to develop, so underwriting must be intelligent upfront.

    “Float, as you know... is simply a net liability reflecting premiums that an insurance company has taken in in advance of paying losses. So you get the use of the capital for some period of time.”

  • From the 1970s through 1998, Berkshire ran effectively as a levered operation with about 10 to 15 percent more invested assets than book value because of float; it returned 28 to 29 percent a year, and even net of that leverage its stock picking ran several percentage points ahead of the S&P 500 over decades.

    “Berkshire ran effectively a levered operation... by having more invested assets in the insurance operation than Berkshire itself had in book value. So you had about 10 to 15% leverage in the portfolio.”

  • Through the high-inflation 1970s, Berkshire's insurance float let it pick up outstanding stocks such as Washington Post and Gillette, which worked out very well, and this pattern continued through the 1980s and 1990s.

    “throughout the 1970s, the high inflationary '70s, was able to pick off some outstanding stocks. Washington Post, Gillette.”

  • Berkshire carries roughly $110 billion of debt, about $75 billion in railroad and utility operations that is not the parent's obligation, while the roughly $3 billion net underwriting profit from float roughly offsets the interest on that debt, leaving the parent's balance sheet with essentially no net interest expense.

    “that net float balance of $150 billion, the underwriting profits of the insurance business, earning 3.5 Billion pre, 3 billion net, completely offsets the interest.”

  • Swiss Re and Munich Re keep only about 4 to 5 percent of their investment portfolios in common stocks, and even well-run US insurers hold only a small share, while Berkshire holds the majority of its float-supported investments in equities.

    “Swiss Re, Munich Re have 4%, 5%. Even really well run US insurers... only 3.5 Billion... is invested in common stocks. Markell. 30, 35%.”

  • Because Berkshire can invest its float largely in common stocks, it earns a common-stock return on that capital, whereas peers constrained to bond-like returns fall far behind; compounding a 3 to 6 percent premium return over decades creates an exponential difference in balance sheet growth.

    “the ability to earn a common stock return in a portfolio versus the rest of the industry that's diminished to having to only earn a bond market return is night and day.”

  • Allegheny held only about $3.5 billion of its $22 to $23 billion investment portfolio in common stocks, but inside Berkshire the float could be shifted to $16 to $18 billion of equities, earning a high single-digit return rather than a four percent bond return, which adds about $600 million of annual investment earnings.

    “Berkshire over time will flip that, and they'll have 16, 17, $18 billion of the reserves... that'll add $600 million of investment earnings to Berkshire's benefit”

  • Asked to attribute Berkshire's success to a hundred points, Chris says the float and insurance story is the dominant explanatory factor, since it was the foundation from which Berkshire's diversified compounding emerged.

    “It truly is.”

  • Berkshire's float-based compounding is largely a fluke of timing: it was built 50 to 55 years ago when stocks were cheap and the insurance industry was smaller, and Buffett himself has said he would not have used a holding company structure, so the model is very hard to replicate today.

    “I think it's a fluke of time. It's a fluke of the alignment of discipline and intelligent capital allocation that nobody else had.”

  • In 1982 the overall stock market traded at seven or eight times earnings on a 3 percent profit margin, with prices around 20 to 25 percent of sales, a valuation environment that is about ten times cheaper than today and cannot be repeated.

    “You go back to 1982 in the overall stock market traded at seven or eight times earnings on a 3% profit margin. They were trading at 20, 25% of sales. You 10 X that today.”

  • Buffett has said that if he could redo it, he would not have run his stock picking inside a holding company, and would not have bought the textile company, suggesting he might have done better as an outside stock picker.

    “even Mr. Buffett has said if he could redo it, he would not have done this thing inside of a holding company.”

  • The entire insurance operation pays about $40 billion of cash losses every year, but because of its capital base Berkshire is never going to impair its balance sheet.

    “The whole entirety of the insurance operation pays cash losses every year of about $40 billion. You're never going to impair the balance sheet.”

0.66

Retaining profits and reinvesting them at high returns, buying back shares only when cheap, is core compounding advantage.

10 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Buying Berkshire at about 12 times earnings gives an 8.3 percent earnings yield, and because Berkshire reinvests retained profits at 10 to 12 percent, it behaves like a bond with a far higher and growing yield than the 2 percent 30-year Treasury issued in 2020, which fell roughly 40 percent in price.

    “To me, the best way to explain Berkshire and the advantage of it is it's a bond where... at an 8.3% earnings yield... they're reinvesting at 10 to 12%.”

  • Berkshire's most obvious mistake was overpaying for Precision Castparts, a business already in trouble, and it has since written the asset down by $10 billion, but because the capital base keeps growing, such mistakes become rounding errors over time.

    “Precision Castparts being the most obvious front and center one, they overpaid for a business that was already in trouble. They've written that asset down by $10 billion.”

  • Berkshire's 1996 B-share offering document said neither Charlie Munger nor Buffett would buy the stock at those prices because they were not sufficiently undervalued, an unusual candor that reflects the company's culture.

    “Neither Charlie Munger, our vice chairman, nor I would buy our stock at these prices. We don't think they're sufficiently undervalued.”

  • Berkshire has issued shares only in acquisitions, generally when expensive, and has bought back stock only when it trades at a material discount to intrinsic value, including over $60 billion in buybacks in the last three or four years.

    “The only time Berkshire's used its share is in acquisition, and generally when it's expensive. The only times they've bought back the stock... they've only bought it back when it's trading at a material discount to intrinsic value.”

  • The core lesson of Berkshire is not which stocks to buy but where the capital comes from: a company should never be exposed to impairment, should buy assets it understands with predictable earning power, and should retain profit where it can reinvest it well.

    “Don't blow yourself up. When you buy assets, understand what you own... You've got very known, predictable earning power that you're not going to expose the company to impairment.”

  • Retaining profits in businesses that can reinvest them at high returns is a major advantage Berkshire has over most companies, which tend to acquire badly, overpay, or distribute cash that should be reinvested.

    “it's this notion that by retaining profit in a place where you can retain it and invest it well over time, I think that's a huge advantage to Berkshire that most companies don't enjoy.”

  • Berkshire's energy operation retains all of its roughly $4 billion of profit, and because utilities are capitalized roughly half debt and half equity, each dollar retained supports about another dollar of low-cost debt, giving a long runway for growth capex.

    “the energy operation that retains all $4 billion that Berkshire makes... when they retain four, they add another four in debt at very low cost terms.”

  • BNSF spent about $2 of capex per $1 of depreciation in its first ten years under Berkshire, but that ratio fell to about 1.5x and now sits near stasis, because the major infrastructure upgrades have already been completed.

    “The railroad was spending $2 in CapEx for every dollar in depreciation for the first 10 years that Berkshire owned it... So you're really almost in a state of stasis now there.”

  • A durable business is best judged by its capacity to reinvest profits at high returns over long periods, not by its current earnings, and Berkshire's pillars of success are its float and its reinvestment ability.

    “It seems like so much of this idea of durability is the reinvestment capacity of the business.”

  • Berkshire's stock portfolio earns value beyond its dividends because the retained earnings of companies like Apple and Coca-Cola are reinvested, so the portfolio's earnings yield of about 6 percent plus retained earnings produces roughly $21 billion of investment income, which can rise to $30 to $35 billion if returns exceed the earnings yield.

    “Buffett's called for years, 'Look through earnings.' And that's essentially, Berkshire's going to get dividends.”

0.56

Returns come mainly from investment portfolios and retained operating earnings, not from underwriting.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Berkshire can compound at 10 percent or more return on equity over the next decade, and by widening the spread between a 5 to 6 percent earnings yield and higher stock portfolio returns it could reach about 12 percent ROE, because its stock returns match the underlying businesses and it operates unlevered.

    “the ability to invest float intelligently... will allow Berkshire to compound and clip along at 10 plus percent returns on equity. You break in the differential... and you can get the ROE up to 12%.”

  • Chris estimates Berkshire's annual economic earnings at about $50 billion, built from roughly $3 billion net underwriting profit, about $5.5 billion in stock dividends, and about $21 billion of total investment earnings that include retained earnings of portfolio companies, with a plausible range to $30 to $35 billion of investment earnings depending on stock performance.

    “I go through all the math, I get to about $50 billion in Berkshire annual profits, and I make a lot of adjustments to accounting to get to that number. But I think it's a very conservative number.”

  • Berkshire bought Burlington Northern Santa Fe in the wake of the 2009 financial crisis for about $35 billion, and Chris now carries it at roughly $120 to $130 billion, with all of its profits upstreamed to the parent.

    “They bought things like the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad in the wake of the financial crisis in 2009 and stole it. A business that they paid 35 or so billion dollars for”

  • Berkshire's returns historically came largely from the investment portfolio rather than underwriting, since its insurance operation earns only about $3 billion net after tax on roughly $70 billion of premium, while the stock portfolio's earnings yield contributes many times more.

    “it's the investment portfolio that drives the bus. So when you look at where Berkshire's returns have come from over time, they have largely, largely, largely... It was really an insurance operation.”

  • Buffett bought Apple because he came to see it as a consumer products company with a moat rather than a tech company, since users locked into the Apple architecture of phone, tablet, and computer do not switch, and the stock could be bought around 12 times earnings.

    “I realized this really isn't a tech company anymore. It's really a consumer products company that has a moat. Because once you're in the Apple architecture... you're not leaving the architecture.”

  • Berkshire's energy operation, which retains about $4 billion a year, will reach about $8 billion of profit within seven years and become larger than the railroad, while the railroad, worth about $120 to $130 billion, will grow roughly in line with GDP and is unlikely to be disrupted.

    “The ability to spend money on CapEx there on a durably long basis means that a decade from now, seven years from now, the thing will be doing 8 billion. It's going to be larger in the next few years than the railroad.”

0.55

Culture, governance, and fair stakeholder treatment keep Berkshire durable and ethical regardless of who runs it.

11 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Berkshire management earns about $100,000 salaries, has never granted stock options or restricted shares to Buffett, Munger, or anyone, and directors receive a $2,000 annual retainer with committee chairs earning $6,000, and directors own significant shares they paid for themselves.

    “Management makes a hundred thousand dollars salaries. They have never given a single stock option or restricted share, not only to Mr. Buffett and Mr Munger, but to anybody.”

  • Buffett let Joe Brandon go as head of General Re after the government challenged the National Indemnity retroactive policy with AIG in the financial crisis, but the policy was later shown to involve a real transfer of risk, vindicating Brandon, and Brandon later became a potential successor-type executive.

    “Ultimately, Joe was absolutely vindicated. It was demonstrated there was conveyance of risk. It really, really was a retroactive policy.”

  • The best way for a young investor to learn about capital and business is to read Berkshire's chairman letters back to 1977, the annual meeting Q&A archive, and build a Berkshire model, and Chris believes a small Berkshire position is a better long-term investment than the S&P 500.

    “If you're a young investor learning how to invest, read the chairman's letters back to 1977.”

  • The Berkshire board's role after Buffett is to preserve the culture and keep activists out, and separating the chairman and CEO roles, as a proposal would do, is a mistake while Buffett is in place, because the company's ethics and capital discipline depend on that continuity.

    “This proposal to separate the role of chairman and CEO was insane. They're going to separate that role when he's no longer running the company.”

  • GE's culture of making the quarter and managing sell-side expectations led it to ignore leverage and off-balance-sheet liabilities, so its charge became growing bigger rather than avoiding bad business, which Berkshire's culture avoids.

    “when your culture is you got to make the quarter and you spend all your time with the sell side analytical community... ignore the leverage and ignore the off balance sheet liabilities”

  • Berkshire and Costco treat customers, employees, regulators, suppliers, and communities well, and that stakeholder fairness ultimately protects shareholders, so Chris uses these companies as the standard for management behavior.

    “I think it's the golden rule, Patrick, and I put Costco in the same bucket. But Berkshire goes out of its way to take care of its customers, take care of its employees, take care of its regulators”

  • Berkshire's culture of treating customers, employees, regulators, suppliers, and communities fairly, with shareholders taken care of, is the golden rule applied to business, and its 57-year history without major accounting abuses reflects this.

    “I think it's the golden rule, Patrick... Berkshire goes out of its way to take care of its customers, take care of its employees.”

  • Ajit Jain's underwriting skill is central to Berkshire, so Joe Brandon could be a strong succession candidate if Jain slows or retires, and Greg Abel will run the operations as CEO after Buffett.

    “Ajit Jain... I think Joe, ultimately at the point, if Ajit were to slow down or retire, I think he becomes a very, very good succession plan.”

  • The combination of insurance float, retained utility and railroad cash flows, and unlevered manufacturing businesses forms a flywheel that will persist regardless of who runs Berkshire, making the enterprise very hard to blow up.

    “That's the flywheel that's going to persist whether Mr. Buffett at the tiller or Greg is running it or whomever is running it. Very hard to blow this thing up.”

  • Berkshire is willing to let premium volume fall by 30 to 50 percent when pricing is inadequate and does not lay off underwriting staff, which allows it to be patient through the cycle.

    “Berkshire's content to sit there, not lay off their workforce when they shrink down, willing to see premium volumes drop by 30, 40, 50%.”

  • Critics who lament Berkshire's large cash balance misunderstand it, because Berkshire will deploy capital on attractive terms and avoids putting cash into businesses that could be destroyed by overexpansion.

    “The media and these boo birds that watch Berkshire and lament over this enormous cash balance. Why can't they spend it? ... They'll spend it on their time and they'll lay it out on very attractive terms.”

0.38

Berkshire's edge is disciplined, capital-light underwriting, since insurance alone is mediocre.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Insurance is a horrible business: the aggregate of insurance underwriters is no better than break-even over time, and the median insurer loses money on an underwriting basis, so most insurers cannot be counted on to generate profit from premiums.

    “But even if you get into the life side of the insurance world, it's a terrible business. It is a horrible business. The aggregate of insurance underwriters no better than break even over time. The average, the median will lose money over time on an underwriting basis.”

  • In private passenger auto insurance, an insurer can write about $3 of premium for every $1 of statutory surplus, so Geico writing roughly $40 billion of premium needs only about $15 to $20 billion of surplus capital.

    “In private passenger auto you can write $3 of premium volume for every dollar of statutory surplus... In Geico's case, which writes 40 billion... it only needs about $15 billion of surplus.”

  • Berkshire holds about 40 percent of global reinsurance industry surplus capital but writes only about 7 percent of industry premium, roughly $20 billion of about $300 billion, while the big European reinsurers write about a dollar of premium per dollar of capital.

    “Berkshire has 40% of the surplus and they write 7% of the premium volume.”

  • Berkshire's edge over other insurers is its willingness to walk away from insurance premiums when they are badly priced, a discipline few insurers exhibit, and this is what separates it from the industry's mediocre underwriting results.

    “It was through Berkshire's discipline and also through generally successful operating, but ultimately it was Berkshire's ability to walk away from insurance business, premiums when it was badly priced.”

0.35

Permanent capital avoids the short-termism and capital raising that burden peer insurers and CEOs.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Most public company CEOs stay only four or five years and are motivated to raise the stock price and grow the top line, which leads them to overpay for acquisitions and fail to invest in capex or R&D even when tax incentives exist; Berkshire's permanence avoids this.

    “If the average CEO is on the job for four or five years, you've got a high motivation to get the stock price up... So what they do is they acquire badly, overpay.”

  • Swiss Re and Munich Re have never seen a premium they did not like, so in each cycle of catastrophes, pandemics, or inflation-driven losses they must go back and raise new equity, whereas Berkshire's massive capital base means it will never blow itself up.

    “The Europeans, the Swiss, and the Munich Res have never seen a premium they did not like... they blow themselves up when you have a really bad year. Well Berkshire, with that massive capital balance, never going to blow itself up.”

  • Despite the late-2017 tax code change that lowered the marginal corporate rate from 35 to 21 percent and offered accelerated depreciation, companies did not meaningfully increase capex or R&D because they lack places to retain profit intelligently at high returns on capital.

    “We lowered the marginal tax rates from 35 to 21%... You didn't see a lick of increase in CapEx. You've not seen a lick of increase in R&D”

0.24

Buffett's serial pivots from textiles to insurance to utilities and railroads shifted Berkshire's center.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Buffett's first pivot was buying National Indemnity in 1967, which gave Berkshire an insurance operation to incrementally invest float in common stocks, after he had exited the market in 1969 by returning partnership money.

    “his big first pivot was buying National Indemnity, a small insurance company in Omaha, 1967. And with that insurance operation, the ability to incrementally invest portions of that float in common stocks over time”

  • Berkshire started as a textile company that Buffett bought in 1965, and the textile business failed; three of the first big businesses Berkshire used stock to acquire, the textile company, the diversified retailer, and Blue Chip Stamps, essentially all went to zero, showing Buffett's ability to pivot.

    “Started off as the textile company, which Mr. Buffett bought in 1965. The textile company failed. Three of the first big businesses that Berkshire bought and used their stock for... essentially all went to zero.”

  • Berkshire bought General Re in 1998 using its own stock, tripling float from about $7 billion to $22 billion and picking up a large fixed-income portfolio, which also let it shrink an overvalued equity portfolio that had been trapped at 115 percent of book value down to 69 percent of book value.

    “So he used Berkshire's stock to buy general reinsurance, which effectively allowed him to acquire triple their float. It went from 7 to $22 billion in float”

  • Buffett recognized that float invested in an overvalued stock portfolio was not a great asset, so the Gen Re deal's fixed-income float enabled diversification, and the next year Berkshire bought MidAmerican Energy, starting its shift away from insurance as the central business.

    “Mr. Buffett knew that the float was not going to be a great thing at that point because it was trapped inside of an overvalued stock portfolio, so the genius of then diversifying the bonds”

0.24

Chris holds Berkshire as a large, predictable position and expects it to beat the S&P 500.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • As a taxable investor, Chris has never paid taxes on Berkshire dividends because he has received none, and the majority of his return has come from retained earnings reinvested by Berkshire, since he bought at 7 to 9 percent earnings yields.

    “I've never paid a dime of taxes on dividends because I've not received them. And again, if I've paid earnings yields of 7, 8, 9 at the times that I've bought it, the majority of my return has come from what Berkshire has managed to do with the retained earnings.”

  • Chris believes Berkshire will outperform the S&P 500 over time and advises young investors to buy some Berkshire, arguing Munger has said it will be better than the market while Buffett is more modest about it.

    “To me, it's a better investment than the S&P 500 will be over time.”

  • Chris spends about one week per year updating his Berkshire model, which requires six to seven days to update subsidiaries and equity stakes, so the largest holding can be monitored efficiently while the company's core economics change slowly.

    “I've got it down to one week a year when I write my letter and it takes me six or seven weeks to write the letter.”

  • Berkshire trades at a remarkable discount to intrinsic value relative to the overall stock market, and Chris holds it as a very high portion of his portfolio because it is the most predictable earnings stream he knows.

    “Trades at a remarkable discount to what you'd call intrinsic value relative to the overall stock market.”

0.21

Acquisitions of operating businesses add insurance premium, earnings, and investment capacity to Berkshire.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Berkshire's manufacturing, service, and retail group, including Marmon, Precision Castparts, Lubrizol, Johns Manville, and Shaw, generates over $150 billion of revenue and about $11 billion of free cash flow, earning a high single-digit return on unlevered equity.

    “that thing does over $150 billion in revenues and throws off 11 billion in profit, and I think the ability to maybe sell some of those operations that are underperforming”

  • Berkshire is paying about $11.6 billion for roughly $9 billion of Allegheny equity, around seven times earnings, a small transaction relative to Berkshire's roughly $900 billion asset base but one that adds premium and investment capacity.

    “Berkshire's paying $11.6 billion for 9 billion in equity... and Berkshire's paying seven times earnings thereabouts for the business”

  • Berkshire's acquisition of Alleghany adds about $7 billion of insurance premium through three insurers, and inside Berkshire these units no longer need to buy expensive retrocession coverage or shed business, as Gen Re became durably more profitable after Berkshire retained its premium.

    “By being owned inside of Berkshire, that collection of three insurers will not need to go to at all or as aggressively to the retrocession market... Gen Re became immediately and durably more profitable being inside of the business.”

0.21

Berkshire favors predictable, understandable businesses like railroads and insurers over disruption-prone technology.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Buffett long avoided technology stocks because he did not understand them and was wary of disruption, which kept him out of Microsoft, where he was too close to Bill Gates on the board, and his IBM investment was a costly lesson in assuming server businesses are predictable.

    “We don't invest in tech because I don't understand it. And he genuinely was correct... he knows where his circle of competence is”

  • The BNSF railroad will not be disrupted by electric trucks, since it competes with Union Pacific in a near-duopoly with nearly identical route miles and economics, and trains are an ancient, efficient technology, so its earnings are predictable and grow with GDP.

    “Nobody's going to displace the Burlington Northern Santa Fe. They exist in the West with Union Pacific. They're almost identical looking companies.”

  • Geico is the second largest US auto insurer, running neck and neck with Progressive, and both are expected to pass State Farm within a few years without needing to grow much more.

    “Geico's the second largest auto insurer in the country, they're running neck and neck with Progressive. They're both going to pass State Farm at some time here in the next couple, three years”

0.21

Berkshire's utilities pair regulated return economics with renewable buildout and coal plant closures.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Berkshire's utilities have closed 16 or 17 coal-fired plants, plan to close 16 more by 2030, and expect to shut the remaining 14 by 2040.

    “They've closed 16 or 17 of their coal fired plants. They're in the process between now and 2030 of closing another 16. They'll have 14 left that they'll have finally closed by 2040.”

  • Berkshire's three utilities have invested about $35 billion in wind and billions more in solar and grid, giving them more renewable production than any other US utility, with roughly half of their power production from wind, solar, and hydro.

    “For what they've spent so far, and it's an investment in wind of almost $35 billion, Berkshire has more renewable production, when you take the collection of their three utilities, than any other utility in the United States.”

  • Electric utilities are monopolies that are allowed to earn a return on equity capital spent, typically high single digits depending on interest rates, which makes them attractive to reinvest retained profits, and accelerated depreciation gives an upfront tax benefit for big capital outlays.

    “you're allowed to earn, as an electric, a return from your rate base on your equity capital, kind of depending on where interest rates are in today's world, electrics are allowed to earn high single digit returns”

0.19

Economic earnings are estimated by stripping out gains and normalizing investment and underwriting results.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • To estimate Berkshire's economic earnings, Chris strips out realized and unrealized investment gains and losses, normalizes investment income using the earnings yield, removes underwriting volatility by assuming a normal 5 percent underwriting margin, and treats intangibles and pension accounting carefully, since Berkshire's diversification makes these adjustments teachable.

    “the flipping eliminating the realized and unrealized gains and losses from the income statement, and normalizing them with the earnings yield, which is conservative, eliminating the volatility and underwriting profits, and assuming... a normal long term, 5% underwriting margin.”

  • Buffett's chairman's letters back to 1977 and the CNBC archive of annual meeting Q&A since 1994 are an unusually complete education in capital allocation, and Berkshire's accounting and capital practices are a teaching model for analyzing almost any diversified company.

    “read the chairman's letters back to 1977... CNBC has this wonderful archive of the six and a half hours of Q&A”

0.15

Oil and gas scarcity keeps prices high, so Berkshire's Occidental bets reflect cyclical reality.

6 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Even with more electric vehicles, the world cannot do without oil and natural gas, because jet fuel, asphalt, plastics, and most refinery outputs remain essential, so underinvestment in supply will keep prices high.

    “We may have more electric vehicles, but you're not going to do away with jet fuel. You're not going to do away with asphalt. You're not going to do away with plastics.”

  • Berkshire invested $10 billion in Occidental preferred stock at an 8 percent coupon, providing the liquidity Occidental needed to close its Anadarko acquisition after losing a bidding war, with $200 million quarterly distributions and warrants attached.

    “Berkshire wound up investing 10 billion in a preferred, provided the liquidity that Occi needed to do that deal... they got a 8% premium on $10 billion or 8% coupon on $10 billion.”

  • Buffett changed his mind on oil and gas after the pandemic: he had been wary of the cyclical industry, but Berkshire bought Occidental preferred and later added common stock at high-50s prices, after the preferred dividends had initially been paid in shares that Berkshire sold in the teens and twenties.

    “Berkshire sold those shares in the teens and the twenties. And here we are a year and a half, two years later, and Berkshire makes a big common stock investment in Occidental in the high 50s per share.”

  • The US went from about 250 refineries down to 127, while globally about 3 million barrels per day of refining capacity closed since 2019, so high gasoline prices reflect a scarcity of refining assets that cannot be quickly rebuilt, not simply Russian-driven inflation.

    “Globally we've closed probably 3 million barrels of refining capacity net since prior to the pandemic... This is not a Putin inflation that we've got. This is a scarcity of assets.”

  • Occidental's carbon capture operation injects captured carbon, such as from cement manufacturing, into depleted oil wells to create solidified carbon reserves, and it is financially viable mainly because public policy grants large tax subsidies to such social-good investments, which Berkshire already benefits from through wind and solar.

    “It's very expensive technology, but we're doing it for tax reasons. Berkshire's investments in wind and solar are very highly tax subsidized.”

  • Oil and gas is a classic capital cycle business: overspending from 2012 to 2014 led to overbuilt capacity and a 2015 price collapse below $100 that bankrupted many producers, after which consolidation and disciplined spending by majors like Exxon and Chevron created scarcity in places like the Permian basin.

    “Classic capital cycle... From 2012, '13, '14, Exxon and Chevron were spending on the order of $40 billion and they overbuilt productive capacity... We have created some scarcities.”