What this covers
This April 2020 conversation pairs host Chris with Chris Bloomstran for a market update in the early weeks of the pandemic. It begins with macro. Bloomstran says total credit market debt will climb from about $76 trillion to over $80 trillion, taking the debt-to-GDP ratio from roughly 350% to at least 400%. He supports this with the 2000–2007 run, when about $3.50 of new debt bought each $1 of GDP growth, with falling money velocity (about 1.3), and with Japan's stagnation since 1989. He expects quantitative easing to repeat, and calls hyperinflation the eventual endgame, though only once the Fed directly monetizes debt. He also warns that shadow-banking and credit vehicles leveraged 25-to-1 or more resemble Long-Term Capital Management.
The equity discussion is where the argument gets specific. Bloomstran says S&P 500 sales have grown only about 3.5% a year, that margins peaked at 12.1% in late 2018 on the tax cut, and that a 4% forward return is therefore reasonable. He argues the five big tech companies, about 20% of the index, cannot grow past roughly 20% of sales, and he cites Google's destruction of the Yellow Pages business as proof that incumbents get disrupted. On energy, he notes US output of about 12 million barrels a day yet continued imports of about 8 million, and he expects wave after wave of bankruptcies among small producers and service firms as debt comes due through 2022.
The constructive side is a preference for essentials sellers, net-cash balance sheets, and patient waiting. He cites Dollar General, which has done better in recessions than in booms. He says cyclicals can only be bought when they look terrible, and that his firm keeps a list of wanted businesses until prices fall.
Bloomstran argues that the buildup of debt across society will push the economy into a long period of deflation, so broad market returns over the next decade will be poor, and investors should own cash-rich, pricing-power businesses at sensible prices rather than expensive mega-cap tech or cyclical energy.
- Total credit market debt near 350% of GDP is unsustainable, and additional debt now yields diminishing returns, which is deflationary
- Expensive valuations on the Big Five tech stocks make their historical growth rates mathematically impossible to sustain
- Energy businesses are capital destroyers with cyclical profits, and their dividend policies deepen the damage
Money expansion and federal rescue backstops will fail to restore growth and leave survivors more levered
- Berkshire has not done 2008-style deals because the federal money flowing to companies makes the terms of capital unknowable and reduces the attractiveness of Berkshire-style structured investments, since the crisis unfolded quickly and government funding arrived immediately.
“you've not seen the deals like they did during the crisis yet, because of the knowability of this federal money that's coming to the party.”
- Japan has had decades of stagnation since its 1989 peak despite massive money supply growth, showing that expanding the money supply does not produce inflation or growth when velocity falls and debt is already excessive.
“The problem is the same problem that the Japanese have had for the last 30 years, going back to their peak in 1989. And that's you can run up the money supply”
- Quantitative tightening and nine Fed funds rate increases failed to shrink the balance sheet as intended and weakened the economy and global growth, which contributed to the trade war and a 2019 profit slump.
“what they proved was, you can't do it. We had nine increases in the Fed funds rate, and you started to really weaken the economy, weaken the global economy.”
- Because the Fed and Treasury will not let businesses fail and will buy corporate bonds and ETFs, companies that survive will come out with more leverage than before, creating a decade of potential restructurings if deflation prevails.
“We're introducing more leverage into the capital structure of business than existed prior to 2019. And if we have deflation, then these companies are going to bleed badly.”
A deep, prolonged recession and oil price shock will drive small energy producers into bankruptcy
- Small independent oil and gas producers and service companies had been weak for two to three years and carried massive debt, so a large number of bankruptcies is expected as debt comes due in 2020 through 2022.
“there was an enormous amount of debt coming due in late '20 throughout 2021, 2022. And you're going to see an enormous number of bankruptcies.”
- The Saudi decision to flood the market with crude amid the coronavirus demand collapse was an assault on US producers that happened at the worst possible time and exacerbated the energy sector's crash.
“We really had an assault from OPEC when they said they were going to pump full out. It couldn't happen at a worst time, I think intentionally happened.”
- The speaker believes the economy is in a very deep recession that will last considerably longer than people expect when it emerges on the backside.
“I think we're in a very deep recession. My sense is the recession lasts a lot longer than people would probably think coming out the backside.”
- Airlines seeking federal aid will likely be diluted through government warrants, and demand will not return to 100% of 2019 levels, so the business will be different going forward.
“I think the airlines are going to get diluted.”
Overvalued markets will disappoint long-term returns despite good businesses and disruption risk to incumbents
- Good businesses tend to keep investors out of trouble during a crisis, but the broad stock market is still likely to deliver poor returns over the next 10 to 20 years because the starting valuation is too high.
“good businesses tend to keep you out of trouble... But I think the problem is, you're probably not going to get very good returns out of the broad stock market either.”
- Google's rise quickly eviscerated the traditional advertising business, as Southwestern Bell's Yellow Pages executives who dismissed Google as a threat within a few years saw their business disappear, which shows large incumbents can be disrupted unpredictably.
“Who would have known that a company like Google was going to come along and just eviscerate the entire traditional advertising business?”