What this covers
A March 2020 conversation in which Patrick questions Brent Beshore, who runs a small-business private equity firm, about what the shutdowns are doing to the companies he buys and owns. Brent starts with the arithmetic of Leverage Multiple of EBITDA: a ratio that looked moderate in 2019 spikes when earnings fall, so heavily levered buyers face wipeouts. He also stresses that Co-mingled Personal and Business Finances make a company's losses the owner's own. He notes that his firm carries no debt, and that no business plan anticipates a government-ordered shutdown.
The middle of the episode is operational and policy-minded. Brent describes the problems of mothballing a business and restarting it: lost suppliers, lost expertise, and the capital needed to rebuild receivables and cash flow. He expects owners in denial to burn through equity before recovery arrives. His case for simple, fast programs includes a criticism of the FMLA expansion, which pays through tax credits that cash-starved firms cannot use. He also proposes adding banks and fintech lenders to SBA lending, covering 80 percent of payroll rather than 100, and setting terms for a long-dated small business bond.
The more contested turns concern fairness and incentives. Brent argues against bailing out every equity holder, defending Skin in the Game, and asks for a roughly two-year moratorium on bank lending standards. He also discusses distressed investing as a line between Loan Shark vs White Knight, including converting unpaid bridge debt into 80 percent ownership. He closes with a forecast that deal activity will stall for years, as it did after 2008.
Beshore argues COVID-era shutdowns create a liquidity and solvency crisis for small businesses that conventional relief misses, and that a bundle of payroll subsidies, payroll tax suspension, long-amortizing small business bonds, and looser bank lending can bridge the gap.
- Small business finances are co-mingled with owners' personal finances, so business losses are personal losses that can force owners to close.
- Interest-free loans do not help a business with no revenue, so solvency, not just liquidity, must be addressed.
- Simple, fast-to-use programs get used; complex programs such as tax-credit-based relief do little for cash-starved owners.
Shutdowns cause owner losses, costly restarts, and pauses that push businesses toward closure or delayed exits.
- Businesses with short feedback loops, such as daily retail sales, see an unmistakable and dramatic revenue drop during the shutdown, while businesses with long B2B sales cycles see KPIs fall off a cliff before revenue does.
“if you're selling stuff daily and you can sort of see the feedback what's coming, I mean, there's been a dramatic drop in revenue”
- Owners can only endure so much financial pain and loss before pulling the plug becomes the only responsible decision, and that decision is terrible but often forced.
“there's only so much financial pain and loss the owner can endure before, really the only responsible decision is to pull the plug”
- For many small businesses, owner and business finances are co-mingled, so a business loss is a direct personal loss rather than something the owner absorbs while keeping a salary.
“So a business loss is a direct personal loss”
- Mothballing a business during a shutdown and restarting it has never been done at scale, so operators are improvising and restart requires substantial capital to rebuild machinery, receivables, and cash flow.
“Can you mothball a business? I mean, maybe the closest proxy is like prohibition”
- A restaurant with no operating debt and no mortgage on its building could survive roughly four to six months of a shutdown, while restaurants carrying typical debt face a much shorter runway and personal savings are consumed by the burn rate.
“I think you can probably maybe four or five months, six months at most”
- Restarting a shut-down business is not like flipping a light switch: employees take other jobs or relocate, customers' needs shift, and sales cycles may require about six more months before revenue returns.
“It's not like you flip the light switch back on.”
- No business can withstand a 80 to 100 percent drop in revenue, even for a short period, and almost no business plan accounts for a government-mandated shutdown.
“no business can withstand a 80 to 90 to 100% drop in revenue, even for a short period of time”
- When a business is mothballed, the loss of suppliers and of the expertise held by servicing companies can degrade quality on restart, so supply chain fragility is a key restart consideration.
“What if that expertise goes away, now your quality drops.”
- Many small business owners in denial will burn all their equity trying to keep the business alive, and when recovery comes later than hoped they have no capital left to restart, so the business is lost.
“if you torch all your equity trying to keep the business alive, hoping that it will come back sooner and it doesn't, you have no capital to restart these businesses back up”
- Within about two weeks, business owners who had said everything was fine began pausing their sale processes, showing that the shock had moved from denial to reset and that investing activity will slow.
“everyone now is hitting reset and saying, hey, we're stopping our processes”
- Many older owners who lived through 2008 threw in the towel rather than rebuild again, and a similar wave of exits is likely this time, which is tragic.
“A lot of people in 2008 that were older just threw in the towel.”
- Owners who see revenue down will wait out the downturn and sell later, as in the 2008-2010 cycle when lower-end M&A did not really recover until around 2011, so deal activity will be delayed for years.
“it wasn't really until 2011 ish when business sales and sort of the M and A process on the lower end really started picking back up again”
- Small business owners put heart and soul into their companies and care for employees, so the least kind thing an owner can do is fail to keep a business available for employees to return to.
“the least kind thing you can do is not have a business for them to come back to”
- Most successful smaller entrepreneurs have income but are not wealthy in the traditional sense outside their business equity, and that equity has become much harder to monetize and may be permanently impaired by the shutdown.
“I'd say the majority of even successful smaller entrepreneurs, business owners, they have income, but they're not wealthy in the traditional sense outside of their equity in their business”
Relief must be fast, simple, targeted, and designed with owners, with government sharing the shutdown burden.
- Government should co-pay 80 percent of small business payroll for salaries up to about 100,000 dollars for three months, with a qualifying window requiring employees on payroll by March 1 and rehired by April 15, so that the subsidy keeps only employees the business truly needs.
“government could co-pay, let's call it 80% of small business payroll expenses for salaries up to a certain amount, I said a hundred thousand dollars, for the next three months”
- Covering 80 percent rather than 100 percent of payroll preserves employer incentive to keep only workers needed for restart, though some employers will try to cheat the system.
“the danger here is that, well, if the government's paying for it, everyone stays on payroll, right? Who cares?”
- Relief should not make all equity holders whole; owners should share the pain through a future tax on their earnings, since skin in the game keeps them motivated to stay in business, and bailing out every business as France's president reportedly pledged is a mistake.
“I'm not in the mindset that we should just try to make all equity holders of all businesses whole.”
- If a program offers a few clear options, immediate action, and an approved vendor list, the usage rate could exceed 90 percent, since desperation drives owners to act.
“I think that you would see a usage rate that probably exceeded 90%.”
- Temporarily suspending the payroll tax, up to the same roughly 100,000 dollar income threshold, would give owners and employees more take-home pay and liquidity.
“Pretty easy one will be temporarily suspending the payroll tax.”
- Policymakers with good intentions need to talk directly to small business owners to understand how their programs create practical burdens, since well-meant relief can backfire in practice.
“having policymakers really talk to small businesses and understand what stresses the maybe good intentions that they have are putting on the business in practicality”
- Bank regulation and loan examiners discourage banks from creative lending, so a temporary moratorium on bank lending standards for about two years would let banks lend in ways they otherwise would not, despite perverse incentives.
“a moratorium on sort of bank lending standards and said that, Hey, for the next two years, we're just going to give you a free pass.”
- Fraud will inevitably occur under emergency programs, but the opportunity cost of slow, complex design outweighs that risk.
“Of course, there's going to be fraud. Of course there's going to be fraud. There's the opportunity cost to everything”
- SBA loans normally take 60 to 90 days, and surge demand could create six to eight months of backlog, so banks, fintech firms like Square, and lenders without SBA practices should be added as lenders.
“they could be looking at six, seven, eight months of backlog to even get a loan done”
- Because government-mandated shutdowns helped create the crisis, government should help businesses through it, so the burden of social distancing is shared rather than placed solely on owners.
“we helped to get you into this mess, we're going to try to help get you out and all be in this thing together”
- Relief programs must be simple and fast, because complexity and paperwork cause owners to miss relief; the expanded FMLA paid leave delivered through tax credits does little good for cash-starved businesses that have no taxes to pay.
“they're compensating people through tax credits and no business owner right now is worried about paying your taxes.”
- Complicated relief programs fail because owners lack time and capacity for paperwork; a program delivered as a simple, straightforward, easy-to-understand option set with approved vendors could achieve over 90% usage.
“I think that you would see a usage rate that probably exceeded 90%.”
- Policies should be rolled out with five clear options, immediate actions, clear instructions, and approved vendor lists, since paperwork and complexity reduce usage far more than fraud does.
“Hey, here are your five options. Here's immediately what we're doing. This is how you do it.”
- The crisis requires diversifying lenders beyond the SBA to include fintech platforms like Square and banks without SBA practices, which could be partners in emergency lending.
“they could be looking at six, seven, eight months of backlog to even get a loan done”
Debt and leverage erode owners' savings and equity as earnings fall, so avoiding debt is prudent.
- If a borrower cannot repay bridge debt, the lender can convert the debt into equity and take 80 percent ownership, leaving the owner 20 percent, which is still better than owning no business.
“Maybe instead of you owning a hundred percent, you now own 80% and we take over the 80% of the equity and convert over that debt product into equity”
- Beshore's firm carries no debt, closed its first fund's five companies with zero senior debt, and holds strong balance sheets, so it is in the best relative position despite feeling tough in absolute terms.
“We carry no debt. We have one business that has some debt on it, moderate amount, but the first fund that we raised, we closed five companies, zero senior debt.”
- Leverage is not irresponsible when outcomes are favorable, but because the world is imperfect, avoiding debt is prudent, so criticism of Beshore for not using leverage was misplaced.
“if everything goes to the moon and we never hit any problems or speed bumps, I think it would be irresponsible. The issue is that we don't live in a perfect world.”
- Two times EBITDA leverage that looked moderate in 2019 becomes dangerous in 2020 because EBITDA will drop sharply, with roughly 95 percent of businesses less profitable than in 2019, so leverage ratios shoot up.
“95% of businesses are going to be less profitable this year than they were in 2019”
- Many highly levered private equity portfolio companies will not survive without massive equity infusions, which will reduce investor returns across the industry.
“how those businesses are going to survive without a massive infusion of equity”
- Owner-manager and private equity relationships become more fraught in a crisis because owners who are asked to restructure may feel resentment, so firms must try to structure deals as long-term win-win.
“there's always going to be resentment that's built up”
- Because businesses keep little cash equity, owners fund losses from personal savings, and the higher the burn rate, the faster those savings are depleted.
“it's just going to be eating through personal savings the higher your burn is.”
- Using leverage looked responsible-seeming in good times, but in a shock to EBITDA, the leverage ratio of two times EBITDA spikes sharply, so heavily levered private equity firms face wipeouts and need large equity infusions.
“I cannot imagine right now if I had two times leverage... EBITDA's going to drop precipitously across virtually every business.”
- Compensating employers through tax credits, as in the recently passed FMLA expansion, does little for businesses with no tax liability, because they have no taxes to pay and need immediate cash, so the credit actually worsens short-term burn.
“they're compensating people through tax credits and no business owner right now is worried about paying your taxes. There is going to be no taxes to pay.”
- Even though the bond is debt and burns equity to fund losses, a long enough amortization period means the repayment will not impede future growth once the business restarts.
“if you have a long enough amortization period, you can make, even though it is debt, and even though it's a liability”
- Interest-only abatement, which is a six-month relief from principal and interest, can allow owners to keep businesses alive but still burns equity and leaves less capital for restart.
“Some people are able to get some abatement from lenders and say again, can we stop all pick the interest and no principal payments for six months”
Owners struggling under government-mandated shutdowns are blameless, which justifies public support for their businesses.
- Brent fully supports social distancing and shutdowns because they save lives, and argues government helped create the problem by mandating closures, so it should help businesses get out.
“we helped to get you into this mess, we're going to try to help get you out and all be in this thing together”
- No business playbook accounts for a government-mandated shutdown, so owners who struggle did not make bad choices, and this justifies public support.
“it's not these businesses that made bad choices. No one's planning for a government mandated shutdown of your business.”
- A restaurant chain owned by a friend of Brent laid off over 150 people in a single week, and these workers had no savings and nowhere to go.
“they've had to lay off over 150 people in the last week.”
Brent's firm's patient balance-sheet and equity products are an emergency response, not core lending.
- Some lenders are willing to grant interest-only or payment-abatement periods of about six months, and the longer the shutdown lasts the more lenders will be open to this, because lenders gain by keeping borrowers alive.
“Some people are able to get some abatement from lenders”
- A proposed small business bond would be a 10-year or longer loan, with no principal or interest for the first year, interest at 3 percent or less, personal guarantees by the borrower, and a cap around 5 million dollars, so long amortization keeps the debt from impeding future growth.
“it would have sort of a 10 year loan term or longer, no principal interest payments for the first year, 3% or less interest. But it's personally guaranteed by the borrower”
- Distressed investing sits on a thin line between being a loan shark and being a white knight, and buying from a distressed seller is especially hard, so the firm wants long-term win-win relationships rather than high-yield junk-style lending.
“this thin line between being a loan shark and a white knight, because I think it is pretty darn thin”
- Balance sheet products, meaning bridge loans, receivable factoring, or inventory-based credit lines at higher rates and without personal guarantees, are not core to private equity but are a necessary product to keep businesses and jobs alive.
“A balance sheet item would be more like providing a short term loan or some sort of bridge financing”
- A balance sheet product is a short-term loan or bridge financing, such as factoring receivables or inventory-based credit lines, which Brent's firm is considering as a substitute for its normal equity purchases, which typically buy 70-80% of a company.
“A balance sheet item would be more like providing a short term loan or some sort of bridge financing”
- If investors exploit owners in a crisis, resentment builds and undermines the later relationship, so buyers should leave more value on the table to show good faith.
“no one stressed our relationship in dire circumstances and then try to make it work later and then there's always going to be resentment that's built up”
- Brent's firm normally exchanges cash for equity by buying a majority of 70 to 80 percent of a business, sometimes 100 percent, and then works with sellers on a long-term exit.
“most often we're buying 70 to 80% of the equity of the business”
- Brent's firm is not a lender and does not want to become one, so its balance sheet products are an emergency response rather than its core business, which is difficult to execute right now.
“But we're not lenders and we don't want to be lenders.”
- Few owners will want to sell a large equity stake in their business during the current crisis, since selling now would feel like a retirement decision at the wrong time.
“I just don't know how many people right now are going to be like, now's the right time”
Private equity will cull portfolio companies, producing a large washout with layoffs.
- Restaurants across the country, not just New York City, are in the same situation, with sales sharply down and staff laid off, as illustrated by a restaurant chain that cut over 150 people in a week.
“I would say restaurants across the country are in the same situation. It's not just New York City.”
- Over the next couple of years, there will likely be a shift and reduction in many types of consumer purchases, though demand could recover to or exceed prior levels in about 20 years absent another catastrophe.
“in the next couple of years, I think there's going to be a shift and just a reduction in many of the types of things that people were used to buying”
- Many private equity firms are deciding which portfolio companies to save and which to abandon, and a large washout with layoffs is coming, made worse by situations that did not have to be that way.
“many private equity firms right now are going through the calculus of which of their portfolio companies to save and which ones not to save”
Personal asides and peripheral reflections on the crisis's duration and broader social implications.
- The term social isolation is a misnomer: people should physically isolate while over-communicating and engaging socially, and relationships are what matter most in this crisis.
“I think that socially isolating is kind of a, maybe a misnomer. We should be physically isolating. We should be socially over-communicating and engaging.”
- Brent and his family want to serve their community but self-isolation feels like the opposite of that, so he wondered aloud whether it would be acceptable to deliberately catch the virus to gain immunity and help.
“can we go ahead and just get the virus, if we get immunity, can we just get it, get it over with so we can go and serve”
- Brent warned early about the coronavirus and found it difficult to convince older relatives that this crisis is different from past panics, which he regards as a reason to be glad he raised the alarm early.
“trying to get them to understand that this really is different, has been hard at times”
- Cabin fever is setting in after a week at home, and school teachers should be paid about a million dollars a year given the difficulty of their work.
“that I think school teachers should be paid about a million dollars a year”
- The closest historical proxy for mothballing a business is Prohibition for alcohol businesses, though even that is an imperfect analogy.
“maybe the closest proxy is like prohibition, if you were in the alcohol business.”
- Everyone is still in shock from this crisis, and while many owners today see no difference in their businesses because of longer sales cycles, the downturn will take a long time to wash through.
“I think that everyone's still in shock would be my guess.”
- Brent hopes the pandemic will bring the country and world together, overcoming borders and trade wars.
“my prayer every day right now is that somehow this brings us together as a country and as a world.”
- Teachers should be paid around a million dollars a year given the work they do, and spouses doing childcare under isolation have harder jobs than the speaker.
“I think school teachers should be paid about a million dollars a year.”