What this covers

Patrick interviews Brent Beshore, who buys small private businesses, and the conversation runs from the bottom of the private market to the largest buyout firms. Beshore describes the lowest tier, companies with three to 700,000 dollars of pretax earnings, which typically sell for two to three times owner earnings, and fewer than 30 percent ever transact. He explains why a 7x multiple's 14 percent starting return looks good from the thirty-thousand-foot view but rarely survives on the ground. He also says he discards the projections in sellers' deal books and looks only at history.

The middle of the conversation is about how capital gets deployed. At the top, KKR and Carlyle have no proprietary deal flow, since bankers run multibillion-dollar sales, yet Beshore credits them with beating public markets through a difficulty premium. He is more skeptical of five-year hold periods, fee structures that reward doing deals, and aggressive cost cutting. He is openly unsure whether 3G's approach builds lasting value. Venture gets a similar look: a power law in fund returns, a report in which only about 20 of 100 investments cleared a public-market equivalent, and founder dilution of 15 to 40 percent at seed.

The last stretch turns to brand and psychology. Beshore defines brand as a distribution of outcomes and offers a test for whether a moat outlives its founder. Patrick brings in dopamine, anticipation, and the "most advanced yet acceptable" idea, using Netflix and Apple as contrasting cases. Beshore also discusses the Austrian premise that people act rationally given what they know, and Charlie Munger's advice to disguise one's judgment.

Sharpest takeaway

Beshore argues that small private businesses and the private equity and venture markets that buy them earn returns through operational skill, relationships, and aligned incentives rather than structural premiums, and that durable moats and personal brands must rest on substance rather than marketing.

  • Small private companies have no proprietary deal flow edge at the top end, but at the small end, relationships, skill, and illiquidity create returns that public investing cannot replicate
  • Short hold periods and fee structures that reward deal activity push managers toward value-destroying decisions
  • Brand is durable only when the substance behind it exists first; marketing that precedes value erodes

The argument · threads13 threads · 95 claims
0.69

Private market prices, deal flow, and buyer dynamics differ sharply from public markets.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The number of U.S. private companies large enough to be investible (roughly $5M+ revenue, around 30+ employees) is about 500,000 to 800,000, out of roughly low-20 million total companies and 33 million business tax returns.

    “you're talking about somewhere between 500,000 and 800,000 entities that are out there that contain transferable assets”

  • The largest private equity firms such as KKR and Carlyle generate better returns than public markets across almost every horizon because a difficulty premium exists on both buying and selling private businesses that does not exist in public markets.

    “they're generating better returns than the public markets in almost every time horizon. They're doing it because there is a difficulty premium in both the buy and the sell”

  • Smaller companies with concentrated shareholder bases have few buyers and sellers, so their prices swing far more than the prices of heavily traded public stocks, where infinite actors average out variance; this is the Mr. Market problem in private markets.

    “as you start moving down into more concentrated shareholder bases and you start moving into smaller companies, there are less buyers. So there's less competition.”

  • At the largest private equity firms, no one has proprietary deal flow, because multibillion-dollar sellers hire investment bankers, so all the top firms look at the same deals and differ mainly by dry powder and public comparables.

    “There just isn't proprietary deal flow. Everyone knows that if you have a giant company that's going to be bought for multi-billion dollars, you don't meet a guy at the country club and sell them your business.”

  • Owners of small businesses are far less price-sensitive than owners of multibillion-dollar companies, because the large company's price is anchored to public comparables, and this price rigidity explains why the top of the market repriced less in 2008-2010 than the lower end.

    “the price is adjusted much more on the top end of the private equity in 2008, '09, '10, then they did lower in private equity”

  • Beshore discards the industry research and projections in sell-side deal books (CIMs) and looks only at historical performance, because sellers with aligned incentives rarely raise growth merely by transferring ownership to a less experienced buyer.

    “I typically rip out all of the industry research and I rip out all the projections out of any deal book that I get”

0.64

Venture and private equity growth pressure and dilution often harm founders and the companies they fund.

10 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Early in fundraising, the identity of investors matters a great deal because an investor who meddles is worse than divorce to remove, and seed dilution often runs 15 percent minimum and sometimes 30 to 40 percent, so the math works only if the capital dramatically enlarges the pie.

    “typically in the seed rounds, I'd say at a minimum, it's going to be 15% dilution. I'd say you see closer to 30 or even 40% sometimes dilution in the seed round.”

  • Taking venture capital puts a company on a track where it must either go big or go home, and the capital acts like a steroid injection that drives hiring and burn rates that often produce forced train wrecks.

    “once you go down the path of taking the venture capital needle, right, it's like the steroid injection. You're going to get big period.”

  • Venture capital is one of the hardest businesses to make money in, despite its glamour, with VCs flying around meeting heads of state and courted by everyone, and the media circus around entrepreneurship distorts the reality for young founders.

    “As a business model, I think it's probably the hardest money in the world to make is getting into venture capital.”

  • Traditional private equity's playbook is simple: it looks for 'synergies', which in practice means eliminating people whose salaries can be cut without losing much output, and cutting for reasons other than misconduct creates long-term dynamics that harm the company.

    “what synergies mean is who can we get rid of and not lose as much as their salary, right?”

  • For early-stage companies the choice of investor matters a great deal, because a bad investor on the cap table is very hard to remove, while later-stage money is more of a commodity.

    “trying to get rid of an investor is worse than getting divorced”

  • Seed rounds typically dilute founders by at least 15 percent and often 30 to 40 percent, Series A by 20 to 30 percent, and each later round dilutes the already diluted stake.

    “at a minimum, it's going to be 15% dilution. I'd say you see closer to 30 or even 40% sometimes dilution in the seed round”

  • A business with a good model and a trustworthy, competent operator should be able to raise venture money in almost any macro environment, because macro conditions matter mainly when fear of missing out takes over.

    “you should be able to find money in almost any situation”

  • During hot funding cycles founders attach trendy technology like AI or machine learning to unrelated businesses, such as dog-walking or underwear delivery, and still raise venture money.

    “let's attach machine learning and AI to everything that we do”

  • Many businesses that take venture capital could have succeeded without it, while very few businesses that should have taken it failed to do so.

    “I rarely see businesses that should have taken venture capital that didn't”

  • It is unclear whether angel and early-stage investing always follows a power law, although the professional VC asset class does.

    “is early-stage investing angel investing? Does it always follow a power law?”

0.57

Small private businesses are overpriced, hard to acquire, and offer no easy arbitrage for impatient buyers.

13 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Adventur.es typically pays three to five times earnings for businesses of about $2.5 million pretax earnings, will stretch to six for exceptional businesses, and has a rule not to buy below three times because such businesses should not be bought.

    “we kind of have a rule if we're going to buy a business for less than a three-times multiple, probably shouldn't be bought.”

  • Rising multiples in small private businesses, paired with better earnings and balance sheets, make the price paid look cheaper than it is because the earnings are near cyclical peak; buyers should not pay healthy multiples on peak earnings.

    “You don't want to pay a good, healthy, multiple on the peak of their earnings”

  • The lowest tier of small private businesses, with three to 700,000 dollars of pretax earnings, typically sell for two to three times owner earnings, and fewer than 30 percent of them ever transact, because the business is hard to buy, sell, and run.

    “my best guess is in that three to 700,000 of pre-tax earnings, less than 30% gets sold on average.”

  • Private equity firms moving down-market and fundless sponsors who are ex-corporate executives both overpay for small businesses, sandwiching Beshore's firm; the sponsors lack framing for valuation, and their numbers are often unsupported by financing or post-close plans.

    “you're playing with sticks of dynamite and it can occasionally work out, you can toss the stick of dynamite back and forth a few times and not have a blow-up. It's going to eventually blow up.”

  • Small private businesses face mostly micro volatility, including personnel changes, local competition, regulation, and macro shocks, which together make steady-state return assumptions unreliable.

    “you've got macro volatility, but mostly you got micro volatility. You've got volatility within the personnel of the business”

  • A 7x owner-earnings multiple implies a 14 percent starting return that looks attractive from 30,000 feet, but on the ground, most private businesses cannot be sustained at that return, and buying and holding steady-state earnings would lose principal within a few years.

    “Like everything looks so calm and peaceful at 30,000 feet. Wow. You can buy a business at a seven times multiple, get a 14% return? Sign me up.”

  • Below about five million dollars of pre-tax earnings, almost no businesses sell at a seven-times multiple or higher, so a buyer can acquire nearly any business in that range at a lower price.

    “under $5 million pre-tax earnings, almost nothing goes to seven times multiple or higher”

  • Low-end multiples in small businesses are not an arbitrage opportunity because buying, selling, and running them is brutally hard and risky, so the price reflects that difficulty; a hypothetical 10-deal portfolio at that level might earn about 20 percent, roughly matching public markets for the effort.

    “The reason why the prices are there is because of the difficulty of doing them and the risk involved”

  • Bidders who offer high prices without financing details often drag sellers through extended lockups and exclusivity extensions before failing, and the firm positions itself as the backup buyer.

    “they're going to get you into a three, six-month due diligence lock up”

  • Ten private investments at seven times earnings in Brent's size range would likely lose about half of the original principal because of micro volatility, competition, personnel issues, and regulation.

    “if you made 10 of those investments in my size range, you would lose 50% of your original principle”

  • Fundless sponsors, often former corporate executives, overpay because they lack a framework for valuing businesses and compare purchase yields to their public portfolio returns, which makes them like people playing with dynamite.

    “you're playing with sticks of dynamite and it can occasionally work out, you can toss the stick of dynamite back and forth a few times and not have a blow-up. It's going to eventually blow up.”

  • Brent says his firm rarely encounters female-owned businesses in its deal flow, and he cannot explain why.

    “we rarely come across a female-owned business, which is a totally, I can't quite figure out why it's so dramatic”

  • Brent prefers to make money along the way through compounding or dividends rather than relying on an external buyer to write a large check, because it avoids depending on exit events.

    “I'd much prefer to just make the money along the way and either compounded or dividend it out”

0.53

Patient, disciplined investing resists fee and holding-period pressure to act.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Aggressive cost cutting produces attractive returns for investors who plan to own a company only briefly, but if the owner plans to hold for a long period and act in the company's interest, deep cuts create dangerous long-term dynamics.

    “if you plan on owning the company for a very short period of time, by all means, I mean, I think that's a really good way of generating returns”

  • Knowing when to take your foot off the gas is as important as knowing when to accelerate; Beshore's firm chose not to push growth to its limit, judging that pushing harder would raise risk against long-term company health, and expects this year's result to be higher because of it.

    “knowing when to take your foot off the gas pedals is as important as knowing when to put it on the gas pedal”

  • Traditional private equity funds find five years the longest healthy holding period, so managers have only about five years to find, improve, and exit a company, which creates a pressure cooker that pushes decisions away from long-term optimum.

    “the longest that it's healthy for a traditional private equity fund to hold a company is five years.”

  • Beshore's firm would rather wait for the right deal than act to show activity, and it prefers to be the backup bidder who gets the first call when a sale with a bad counterparty collapses.

    “we are happy as I said in my letter to be the backup to the prompt. We tell people all the time hey, if you can get that from them, just want you to know”

  • Managers paid fees to hold and deploy capital face a pressure to do deals rather than wait; combined with the need to show LP activity and the seduction of closing deals, fee structures make disciplined inaction hard to sustain.

    “when you combine that seduction with any fee structure that encourages you to do deals, I mean, that's where I'm ... I don't think I have the fortitude to hold up to it.”

0.50

Win-win relationships and avoiding losses matter more than extracting value quickly.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Beshore and Patrick jokingly invoke the Buffett rule that the first rule is not to lose money, and Beshore's firm frames its discipline around avoiding losses as a core principle.

    “Don't lose money, that's rule number two, remember rule number one.”

  • Long-term sustainable win-win relationships are the basis of Beshore's firm's approach, and most business people shortsightedly try to extract as much as they can as quickly as possible, which is less effective over time.

    “we're all about creating long-term, sustainable, win-win relationships, which is probably unusual”

  • Peter Kaufman's principle that one should examine the outermost circle of one's life implies that who you are in business is who you are at home, so compartmentalizing business and personal conduct is not viable.

    “Who you are in your business life is who you are in your home life.”

  • Beshore relies on peer mentorship rather than traditional mentors: he surrounds himself with people who tell him the truth and have unusual, life-altering perspectives, collects them, and learns how to adjust his thinking from them.

    “What I have is a lot of peer mentoring. ... I try to surround myself with people who will tell me the real truth”

0.44

Scaling depends on scarce, less-messy managers and different talent, which forces capital upmarket.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Organizations scale by layering less messy people over more messy people, so growing wide versus up depends on finding leaders who are less messy; Beshore has not solved how to find enough of them for a scaled hierarchy, and Berkshire found top talent by acquiring companies.

    “that's the nut I haven't cracked”

  • Beshore argues that scaling large capital almost forces firms to move upmarket, because big sums cannot be deployed widely; he cannot recall a conglomerate that grew wide rather than up, and his firm will likely go up eventually.

    “when you start getting into really big sums of capital, it is extremely challenging to do anything but go up.”

  • A 200 million dollar PE fund cannot profitably deploy into 10 million dollar checks, so large funds build divisions to chase smaller companies and push returns, a shift whose outcome is still unknown.

    “if you're raising a $200 million private equity fund, which is a pretty low amount of money in private equity world”

  • A company with 2 to 3 million dollars of pre-tax earnings needs different talent, systems, patience, and expectations than a 20 to 30 million business, and the smaller company often has much higher growth potential, so it cannot be run by simply dumbing down big-company methods.

    “the right two to $3 million company has much higher growth, potential, explosive, upside growth, potential than the right $30 million pretax earning business”

  • Organizations scale only as well as the least messy people can manage others, and the hard unsolved problem is finding less-messy managers for smaller companies, since most of them are already leading a single firm.

    “when you go wide, you got this issue of, how do you find these less messy people? And that's the nut I haven't cracked.”

  • The thrill of closing deals and fee structures that reward activity tempt managers into bad purchases, and more capital makes it more likely to waste it, which Brent calls the bladder problem.

    “The more money that you have, the more likely you're going to piss it away.”

  • In traditional private equity fund returns are hard to see until around year seven, which weakens the feedback that would otherwise discipline managers.

    “you have no idea what the returns of the fund are going to be until year 'seven-ish'”

0.39

Moats and personal brand reduce failure risk and narrow the dispersion of outcomes.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • A moat is a structural feature that lets a business sustain elevated returns on invested capital over time; in regional businesses it is often geographic dominance or high capital intensity that deters entrants.

    “So moat being able to sustain elevated returns on invested capital over time.”

  • Building a personal brand has become a hedge against failure in entrepreneurship and venture, because a well-known person with many relationships can land softly after a failure.

    “a big hedge against failure in the entrepreneurship space has become building your personal brand”

  • A positive personal brand is valuable only when the person is well known to the right people at the right time, and fame sought for ego or power without substance erodes and is largely wasted time.

    “you better make sure you have the go first before you have the show”

  • Strong VC investors like Brad Feld have a personal moat that narrows outcome dispersion for their funds, whereas a manager without that brand would face much wider Monte Carlo-style outcomes.

    “if you're him, of course, if you're in his funds, you're going to do well because he's a great guy with a great reputation”

  • Patrick notes that many commonly cited moat types such as network effects and intellectual property are rarely found in small businesses, and Brent confirms he sees none of the platform-style moats.

    “I don't see any of those.”

0.37

Sustainable growth comes from aligned incentives, focused operators, and continuous experimentation.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Growth in small private companies comes from helping talented operators stay focused on the right things through a continuous experimentation process, running tests, doing more of what works, and doing less of what doesn't, rather than from any hidden secret.

    “the biggest secret is there is no secret, you just got to test a whole bunch of stuff and try it and see what works”

  • Business growth comes from properly aligning incentives, keeping focus on the right things, and avoiding outright stupidity, with most failures stemming from groupthink or a single person blazing an unwise path, so big decisions need careful process.

    “I think it's combination of hopefully properly or more properly aligning incentives, keeping focused on the right things, and trying to avoid just outright stupidity”

  • Running a business is brutally hard because it involves constant battles with illness, legal trouble, misconduct, unfair customers, and suppliers pressing for better terms, so investors who have never operated a company underestimate the daily difficulty.

    “operating a company is in many ways like a knife fight”

  • Beshore's firm aims to provide an environment where people can flourish by offering autonomy, mastery, and purpose, and believes that allowing people the opportunity for happiness drives long-term returns, though it is not the company's job to make them happy.

    “that allowing people the opportunity for happiness is a considerable amount of how we generate our long-term returns”

0.37

Moats are rare, constantly shifting, and usually tied to the founder rather than transferable.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • A moat is not a static attribute; it is constantly being pushed out or pushed in, so a business can feel strongly protected on some days and flimsy on others, and moats are only clearly identifiable in hindsight.

    “developing the moat, it's not a static thing, you're constantly either pushing out the moat or having the moat getting pushed in on you”

  • The businesses that reach Beshore's deal flow are selected in a way that means the absence of growth often signals the absence of a moat, so the phrase 'small businesses don't say small on purpose' captures that a moat has not been expressed to its fullest.

    “Small businesses don't say small on purpose”

  • Almost none of the businesses Beshore's firm examines have a sustainable moat, so finding one is like searching for a needle in the biggest haystack, and even a large business with a 30-to-50-year owner team often lacks a transferable moat.

    “almost none of the businesses we look at have what I would call a sustainable moat, which means we're looking for the needle and the biggest of haystacks”

  • A business has a durable moat only if its advantage is not tied to the founder or CEO's personality; most owner-operated businesses with high returns have moats that are non-transferable and vanish when the owner leaves.

    “the owner, the founder, is the one who is the moat, and that's just non-transferable”

0.30

Brand is the distribution of expected outcomes, built on real substance rather than marketing.

7 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Brand is best understood as the distribution of likely outcomes one can expect from a company or person; a strong brand has a high peak of expectations and a narrow distribution, like Amazon, while a weak brand has a wide distribution with a lower peak.

    “brand is the distribution of likely outcomes that you can expect from any company or person”

  • Personal brand has always existed, but it has become prominent recently because everyone is now a media outlet and distribution is less centrally controlled, so personal brand will matter more as media becomes more tied to personalities.

    “the reason why it's caught fire over the last 10 years is everyone is now a media outlet”

  • In smaller private companies with fewer buyers, reputation and personality fit matter more than at the top, because sellers at the top all know what they will get from the top ten firms and there is less competition overall.

    “what you can do in the smaller private companies is reputation can matter, I think, more than it matters at the top”

  • Personal brand is worthless without substance behind it, so brand should be built second, after the real value is created, because marketing-first approaches are hollow and erode over time.

    “you better make sure you have the go first before you have the show, or the show is not going to matter over a durable period of time”

  • Warren Buffett did not pursue fame early; he became known only after his performance spoke loudly, and his later aw-shucks persona was an intentional branding technique built on top of real results, illustrating a 20-years-to-overnight-sensation pattern.

    “only after he sort of was discovered ... did he really start ramping up his personal branding efforts”

  • Brand trust is better understood as the alignment of expectations, so consumers do not trust Coca-Cola but know what to expect from it, with consistency over time being the key attribute.

    “I think it's the alignment of expectations, right? So you don't trust the Coca Cola brand. You know what to expect.”

  • Consumers grant grace for occasional extreme positives and negatives, but where a product's failure carries high risk, such as LASIK surgery, the dispersion should be narrow and the company should stay consistent rather than surprising.

    “Sort of as you raise the risk of the product's failure and what the impact of that failure is, I think that's where it doesn't matter how the ... You want the dispersion narrower.”

0.25

Most startups fail, and venture returns follow a hidden power law.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Most startups fail, and entrepreneurs underestimate this because everyone believes they are above average, so investors in early-stage companies are effectively funding the default outcome of death.

    “The norm, the default, is death in the startup realm. And as an investor, you're funding default of death, which means death to your money.”

  • Venture-backed companies with around $10 million in revenue often burn between eight and 25 million dollars annually, with burn rates of one to two times revenue now common.

    “it doesn't surprise me anymore to see burn rates of two times revenue or at least one times revenue”

  • Almost no entrepreneurs actually believe they can build a gigantic business, and a sustainable model that is not mismanaged should compound through reinvestment at high rates of return, so most moats are stumbled into rather than designed.

    “I think very few entrepreneurs, despite what they may say, actually believe they can build a gigantic business”

  • Failing venture firms fade quietly, with VCs burying their dead quietly, and LPs do the same, so poor results are seldom publicized and the asset class's failures remain hidden.

    “I think LPs bury their dead quietly as well. I think maybe VCs learned it from the LPs.”

  • As a profession, venture capital inescapably follows a power law, where access to top-brand funds drives returns, and most funds get middling results or lose money, with a few outliers such as Andreessen Horowitz driving the aggregate.

    “I think that it's inescapable that, as a profession, it follows a power law.”

0.07

Understanding others' behavior requires reconstructing their reasons rather than judging them.

3 pointscentrality 1/5
  • The core Austrian economics premise, that everyone acts rationally given their information, desires, and preferences in the moment, changes how one views others' behavior, reducing judgment and increasing empathy even for seemingly irrational actions.

    “in the moment, everyone is acting rationally based on the information and desires and preferences that they have in that moment. Okay. You take that to heart and that totally changes your life.”

  • Charlie Munger advised that the need to show others you are right and smarter, and that they are doing something stupid, has hurt people's success, and he said one should disguise one's judgment; Beshore sees himself in this struggle.

    “his need to show people that he was right and that he was smarter than them ... he said, disguise your judgment.”

  • When someone acts in a way one considers abnormal, the productive response is to look through their eyes, examine the cards they were dealt, and reconstruct the reasons behind their behavior, as one might with Sherlock Holmes-style reasoning, rather than judging them.

    “you really need to try to look through their eyes, be in their shoes, whatever analogy you want to use, right? Look at their cards they're dealt”

0.05

Personal renewal and kindness-based success shape Brent's outlook on business.

2 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Brent describes a roughly six-month molting cycle in which he sheds old habits and beliefs, and he believes he keeps more of his old skin each time.

    “I think about every six months it feels like I go through a molting period, right?”

  • Buffett and Munger demonstrate that one can be kind and caring and still succeed in business, a lesson people do not believe because they chase the biggest slice.

    “you can treat people well, and you can be a kind caring person and still do well in this world”