Cultivating a Disaster Resistant, Compound Interest Machine
What this covers
Patrick interviews Brent Beshore, who runs a firm that buys small private companies and holds them. The conversation follows the work in sequence, from sourcing and screening to what happens after closing. Beshore says the firm reviewed about 2000 companies last year to complete three deals. It defaults to rejecting anything that lands in the Too Hard Pile, and he treats businesses listed on small-business sale sites as unlikely to be good, since their sellers usually have no other options. He separates EBITDA from owner earnings, giving an example of $6 million of EBITDA of which owners could keep about $2 million. He also explains why the firm uses only modest debt, and puts the odds of an experienced executive finding and closing a profitable deal within two years at 15 to 20 percent.
The middle of the discussion is operational. Beshore frames marketing as a value funnel, explains why content marketing rarely converts, and argues that direct mail is neglected because most companies abandoned it. One portfolio company moved its media spending onto credit cards and gained about $500,000 in cash flow. He also describes hidden liabilities, using the buried suit problem and what he calls culture debt. He notes that many owners don't know how much money they make, and that long-tenured owners stop questioning their own costs.
Some claims are more contested. Beshore says public markets offer little alpha, citing Ray Dalio, and that traditional private equity is now moving below $5 million of EBITDA. He recounts passing on an ad-tech business on Ben Graham-style price discipline, only to see it sell for $35 to 40 million. He closes on not squeezing sellers, on self-deception as the easiest way to lose money, and on valuing process over outcomes.
Beshore argues that the lower end of the lower middle market is the most inefficient place to invest, and that high returns come from buying boring, owner-dependent businesses at low multiples and then improving them through disciplined systems, marketing, and patient, trust-based relationships.
- Owner-dependent small businesses are mispriced and sellers often lack realistic valuations, so buyers can acquire cash-generative companies at about 4x owner earnings
- Value creation comes from fixing what the business shouldn't be doing, adding marketing, technology, and data systems, and removing hidden 'debt' like culture and systems problems
- Most deals fail to close and most small businesses are not worth buying, so disciplined rejection and long-term relationships are the core edge
Smaller private businesses offer greater opportunity than shrinking, highly efficient public markets.
- Patrick notes that a steady-state 10 percent free cash flow yield in public markets is impressive, and that starting at roughly two and a half times that yield in a less efficient private market shows the advantage of small scale.
“in public markets, you see a 10% free cash flow yield, and that's pretty impressive as a steady-state. And to talk about two and a half times that as your kind of starting point shows the power”
- Psychology is amplified in smaller private businesses compared with large public markets, because the investor's and owner's judgment and relationships have a bigger effect on outcomes.
“how the importance of psychology, if anything, is amplified in the market that you're operating in with smaller businesses”
- Public markets have shrunk through buybacks, reduced float, companies going private, and fewer listed stocks, leaving a large universe of private businesses as potential investment targets.
“there's been so much about the shrinking of public markets, both through buybacks, so less float, but also through companies going private”
Captive, owner-controlled capital and hands-on investor involvement enable better long-term outcomes than outside investors.
- Patrick argues that captive capital, meaning company-owned money without outside investors, lets managers execute long-term plans, while outside investors hire and fire capital at the wrong times.
“this is entirely captive capital, that it's the company's money, there aren't outside investors, and that allows you to have what everyone says, they have a long-term vision”
- Patrick notes that Andreessen Horowitz's venture model treats investment as more than a check and provides connections, efficiencies, and expertise, a strategy the firm reportedly borrowed from the entertainment industry.
“the venture model, but Andreessen Horowitz regardless of their returns... it's not just a check it's a whole bunch of connections, efficiencies, services”
Headline earnings measures and chasing outsized returns are misleading guides to investing.
- Patrick notes that direct response advertising books like Robert Collier's Letter Book and Scientific Advertising teach writing focused on the reader, removing flaws and focusing on 'you' rather than the seller.
“Robert Collier's letter book or scientific advertising... they're great. Like writing tutorials about removing flaws, focusing on you not on them”
- Earnings measures like EBITDA can be misleading, a point Munger famously called bullshit earnings, which Beshore agreed with as near and dear to his heart.
“Bullshit earning as Munger says.”
- Chasing 25% cash-on-cash returns is almost certain to produce inferior returns in most situations, because such outsized returns are rarely sustainable and value stocks as a category have performed poorly.
“chasing after 25% returns is almost going to certainly result in inferior returns in most situations.”