What this covers
Shippo CEO Laura Behrens Wu talks with Patrick about how the company found its footing. The first MVP was a wrapper around existing shipping APIs, sold to ecommerce merchants. Mid-size and larger merchants asked how many packages ran through it, and the answer was zero, so the pitch failed. Small merchants felt the pain sharply enough not to mind a months-old company, but they had no idea what an API was, so Shippo built an easy interface on top. Early customers came by piggybacking on Shopify, WooCommerce and BigCommerce.
The business model gets the most attention. Shippo holds a master account with each carrier and resells discounted rates, a setup that was not a known practice in the industry. Pooled volume later won over the larger customers who had turned it down. Laura notes that most competitors earn mainly from rate arbitrage, while Shippo wants standalone software revenue, as Stripe and Twilio built. She also covers the best investor question, which was whether the biggest customers will leave once they have their own warehouses or 3PLs. She explains why Amazon and Walmart can run their own shipping while roughly 50,000 scattered small merchants cannot. She also speculates that Shippo could help carriers match package volume to capacity, since they charge the same price regardless.
The rest covers operations and founder advice. Customers blamed Shippo for carrier API outages, so it had to guarantee uptime itself. Laura describes Shopify's merit-based app store and the wider platform ecosystem logic. She urges founders to start building rather than overthink, and to schedule strategy time once survival is no longer the issue.
Shippo's CEO argues shipping is hard because it is where the online and physical worlds meet, and that the winning strategy is to aggregate small merchants' volume into carrier leverage and abstract away carrier complexity behind a platform.
- Shipping sits at the convergence of online and offline, so software must map messy real-world events back to the internet
- Aggregating SMB shipping volume gives access to carrier discounts and account setup that individual merchants cannot get
- Carriers are poor at developer-friendly technology, so a software layer that absorbs API changes and outages creates the value
Shippo absorbs fragile, changing carrier integrations so merchants never have to handle them directly.
- Storing customer shipping rates on Shippo's own servers rather than calling carrier APIs in real time was a necessary infrastructure investment before selling to larger customers.
“storing our shipping rates, our customer shipping rates on our own servers instead of calling upstream APIs. Again, harder than you'd think”
- Customers held Shippo accountable for carrier API outages even though they knew the carrier was responsible, so Shippo had to guarantee uptime itself, including returning rates and labels when carrier APIs were down.
“they held us accountable when the FedEx API was down or the UPS or the USPS API”
- Some carriers embraced the aggregated account setup while others remain resistant, though the arrangement is a win-win because carriers avoid account management and support costs and gain an easy customer acquisition channel.
“There is a big argument to be made that this is a win-win for both Shippo customers and shipping providers”
- Shippo is the buffer between merchants and carriers, so the value it sells is that merchants never have to handle endpoint changes and certification one by one.
“Not every ecommerce business should have to go through the challenge of figuring out API end point changes one by one. But we're the buffer in between.”
- Maintaining carrier integrations earns no extra credit from customers, who expect shipping to work and punish failures, so the work consumes engineering teams that could build new features.
“They're not going to give you extra points for this kind of work. But they'll be really pissed off if it doesn't work”
- Carrier APIs such as FedEx, UPS and USPS are clunky and poorly documented because these companies excel at logistics but are not tech companies, which is the gap Shippo exploits.
“they're not tech companies. They're really good at doing the complex logistics of shipping”
- Shippo holds one master account with each carrier and lets merchants ship through it without signing up individually, a setup that was not a known practice in the industry and became a core part of the business model.
“When you sign up on Shippo, you shouldn't have to get your own FedEx or your own UPS or USPS account. In this industry, it was not a known way to do business”
- Shippo is built on top of many carrier APIs it does not control, which keep changing endpoints without notice and require annual compliance recertification, creating a large ongoing engineering burden.
“we're built on top of a bunch of other APIs that we don't really control”
Aggregating shipping volume earns carrier discounts and leverage, and data advantages small merchants lack.
- The best investor question was whether Shippo will lose its largest customers when they grow large enough to have 3PLs or their own warehouses and no longer need Shippo's shipping discounts relative to its technology.
“How do we make sure that we don't have the leaky bucket with our best customers?”
- Shippo admits it was bad at pricing early on, treated it as non-scientific, and still prioritizes growth over margin, pricing software to attribute value without being so high that merchants refuse to try it.
“We're really bad at pricing. We didn't really treat it as a science”
- Shippo's pricing is built on software fees plus reselling discounted shipping rates negotiated with carriers, so the aggregation model, not just subscription revenue, drives the business.
“the other part is really our ability to resell discounted shipping rates, so it's this aggregation model”
- Shippo's early plan was to build a wrapper around existing carrier APIs to sell to merchants, and this was replaced by customer-driven pivots toward a dashboard and aggregation model.
“The MVP was to build a wrapper around existing APIs trying to sell that to a few ecommerce merchants.”
- The primary flywheel is shipping volume: more packages strengthen leverage with carriers, which yields better shipping options that attract more customers and more volume, a loop Shippo says five years of data confirm.
“The more packages we ship, the better our shipping rates/our leverage becomes with carriers”
- Aggregated shipping data lets Shippo recommend carriers, share industry benchmarks and detect route-level delays, and scale makes carriers take the company more seriously than before.
“we can start making recommendations to our customers around which shipping provider to choose”
- Amazon and Walmart can run their own shipping infrastructure because their pickup locations are predictable, whereas Shippo's roughly 50,000 SMB customers are spread across the US, making carrier outsourcing more cost-effective.
“We can't pick up from 50,000 different locations. So, it's actually more cost-effective to have other carriers do this”
- Shipping carriers charge the same price per package regardless of capacity, unlike airlines' dynamic pricing, so a shipping platform could help carriers balance package volume against capacity.
“On the shipping provider side, there's no dynamic pricing. Everyone is always paying the same for the same package”
- Amazon and Walmart ship better than SMBs because they have large engineering teams and far more shipping data, while most SMBs have too little data for meaningful optimization.
“they have a much bigger engineering team. And then on the other hand, they just have access to a lot more shipping data”
A simple two-click interface serves non-technical small merchants better than an API.
- Mom-and-pop merchants were eager for help with shipping but had no idea what an API was, so offering an API to them was the wrong product, and the company had to build an easy user interface on top of its API.
“they had no idea what an API was. When you approach them with the wrong offering”
- Traditional shipping counters such as USPS and FedEx stores have short hours during normal working time and unhelpful staff, making in-person shipping a waste of merchant time.
“These locations are only open between 10:00 and 16:00, so these are normal working hours.”
- Shippo pulls orders automatically from platforms like Shopify, computes shipment rates, recommends the cheapest or fastest option, and lets merchants print labels and schedule pickup in about two clicks, replacing manual carrier-counter trips.
“with one click, they either print all the labels or label at a time and another click, the postman comes to pick it up”
- Merchants accept that Shippo's software is not free, so pricing aims to attribute value without being high enough to deter trial, and Shippo's public pricing targets SMBs because most of its business is SMB-focused.
“Our merchants understand that our software is not free. We're not trying to price it too high for merchants to not want to give this a try”
Serving API developers and non-technical dashboard merchants at once creates a focus trade-off.
- Shippo can bring enterprise-grade shipping best practices to small merchants by doing the analysis for them, requiring minimal cognitive overhead so merchants do not have to think about shipping strategy.
“bring those shipping best practices to the masses and make sure that everyone has access to them with just minimal cognitive overhead”
- Stripe sells only to people who understand APIs, whereas Square serves SMBs and mom-and-pop businesses that need an interface, and Shippo tries to serve both at once.
“Stripe, as an example, they're only selling to people who know what an API is. And then you've got a different company like Square”
- API users are typically tech startups with developer resources that scale quickly, and once they integrate a shipping API they rarely rip it out, while non-technical merchants need a dashboard interface.
“once you've integrated a shipping API, unless we really screw up, they're not going to rip it out again”
- Shippo runs both an API and a dashboard product without duplicating effort because the dashboard is built as a client of the same API rather than as a separate product.
“our dashboard is built on top of the API - basically as a client of the API. So, these are not two different products”
- About 80 percent of Shippo's customers use the dashboard and ship only 20 percent of volume, while 20 percent use the API and ship 80 percent of volume, creating a hard focus trade-off.
“roughly 80% of our customers, just the amount of our customers, they use the dashboard. Together, they're only shipping 20% of our shipping volume”
- Mid-size and large ecommerce merchants will not adopt an unproven shipping startup without existing package volume, so early traction must come from smaller customers.
“The founder... at the beginning, there were no packages going through our API. We failed that.”
Targeting small merchants first was a necessity after larger merchants rejected the initial pitch.
- Shippo's shift to focusing on small merchants was driven by necessity after large merchants rejected it, not a deliberate strategic choice.
“it came out of necessity not necessarily a calculated decision”
- Shippo's first MVP was a wrapper around existing shipping APIs sold to ecommerce merchants, but mid-size and larger merchants immediately asked how many packages went through the API, and Shippo had zero, so the pitch failed.
“how many packages are going through your API today?” At the beginning, there were no packages going through our API. We failed that.”
- Large companies already had shipping options and were not in enough pain to risk an unproven startup, whereas mom-and-pop businesses had such a giant pain point that they did not care the company was only a few months old.
“they were not in such a big pain that they were willing to take a risk to try an unproven start-up”
- A second challenge for small merchants is that they are too small to qualify for shipping discounts and face difficult carrier account setup and rate comparison, which Shippo could solve through economies of scale.
“they are too small to get access to any kind of shipping discounts or shipping rates”
- By aggregating large numbers of SMB merchants onto one platform, Shippo built enough package volume to then win larger customers who had initially rejected it.
“Started aggregating volume by aggregating a ton of SMBs and in the meantime, with that aggregated volume, we've been able to go after larger and larger customers”
Shipping is a messy, expanding opportunity where real-world events meet software.
- Everything in ecommerce happens online until a package needs to ship, and shipping is the convergence of online and offline where software must make real-world workflows and physical events fit the digital system.
“shipping is the convergence of online and offline where these two worlds meet and you have to find a way to make them fit”
- Once a package is in transit, real-world events such as delays caused by a driver hitting a deer must be captured and translated into messages that merchants and consumers can understand, which is where shipping software gets messy.
“There can be an error message that there's a delay because the driver ran over a deer”
- A great market is one that is giant and continuously expanding; shipping qualifies because ecommerce is still early, so the pie keeps growing rather than shrinking.
“giant markets are awesome, but it's even better if this giant market is continuously expanding”
- Founders found shipping far more exciting than expected because it had many low-hanging inefficiencies in an old industry whose tech lagged far behind ecommerce, creating a large gap between the two.
“ecommerce has advanced at such a rapid pace that the discrepancy between these two industries is giant”
Founders should lead high-level vision and hire executors for execution as the company scales.
- Strategic planning is not urgent day to day, so it does not appear on a founder's calendar unless deliberately carved out, which makes it easy to neglect even when it matters more as the company grows.
“Not a lot of time comes up for this kind of work because, day-to-day, it's not pressing”
- A YC founder met at a Zurich conference forwarded Laura's resume to a YC mailing list, which produced about 27 responses and led to her LendUp internship, illustrating how open Silicon Valley networks are compared with tighter European ones.
“he offered to forward my resume to the YC mailing list. He didn't know me. We only just met”
- Laura knows her weaknesses, is strongest at high-level vision rather than detail, and hires executors to turn her ideas into execution at the company's current scale.
“I know more about what my weaknesses are and that I have to hire for those weakness”
- Once a startup is out of survival mode, the founder must deliberately schedule time for long-term strategy because the company can die slowly when a competitor develops a better strategy, rather than from running out of money.
“It used to be running out of money. It's like a slow death when someone else comes up and it has a better strategy”
- Persistence is an underrated founder trait because startups require repeated grinding until early proof points and investor belief arrive, and Laura values it in team members too.
“I think in terms of character, persistence is an underrated superpower”
- A high-level founder should acknowledge weaknesses and hire people who can turn ideas into execution, since at scale there are better executors than the founder.
“I know more about what my weaknesses are and that I have to hire for those weakness.”
Ecosystems and word of mouth, not executive relationships, drive Shippo's distribution.
- Shopify's app store was merit-based early on: anyone could submit an app, and positive reviews led to algorithmic placement, so word of mouth compounds without needing executive relationships.
“Anyone can submit an app, you have to go through their approval process”
- Once early customers are happy, merchants recommend tools in forums and social groups, so word of mouth became a major growth channel for Shippo, though organic growth eventually hits a ceiling.
“Online merchants, they have forums that they participate in, or through Facebook or other channels, where they recommend what they're already using”
- Small merchants are hard to locate and contract values are too small to justify one-by-one sales, so scalable demand generation through content, SEO and paid channels is necessary once organic growth plateaus.
“the contract values are just not big enough to make it worth your time”
- Shippo's early customer acquisition relied on piggybacking on large SMB aggregators such as Shopify, WooCommerce and BigCommerce, where it could reach merchants through their ecosystems and referrals.
“we at the beginning really nicely piggy-backed on a bunch of super obvious SMB aggregators”
- Large platforms realize customers want many features they cannot build themselves and enable third-party developers to fill the gaps, creating mutually beneficial ecosystems such as Shopify's and Salesforce's app stores.
“they can't keep up building all these features themselves. Plus, it's not the core of their business”
Shippo should build multiple standalone products on its API, as Stripe and Twilio did.
- Most shipping software competitors earn revenue mainly from shipping-rate arbitrage, and Shippo aims to build more software revenue and standalone high-margin products on top of that arbitrage foundation, as Stripe and Twilio did.
“the majority of our competitors, all of our competitors, they're making revenue by mostly this arbitrage model of the shipping discounts”
- Laura is puzzled why no other shipping software company has built multiple standalone product lines as Stripe and Twilio did, suspecting there is a hidden obstacle she does not yet understand.
“why no other shipping software company before us has been able to make that step? So maybe there's something that I don't know yet”
- Once a shipping API establishes customers, SaaS companies typically expand the platform with adjacent products, and Shippo is now doing this by adding features that save money or help merchants grow.
“You start by just selling something very simple, a shipping interface, a shipping API, or payments API”
- The worst question an investor can ask is what happens if Amazon does this, because it applies to any company and does not engage its specific strategy.
“The worst question is always, What if Amazon does this? It's the worst question because you can ask this to any company”
- SaaS companies commonly start by selling one simple API or interface, then expand into adjacent products by identifying other pain points their customers have.
“That is a fairly common evolution in SaaS companies.”
Shipping expectations make platforms reputationally responsible for carriers they don't control.
- Customers trust a shipping platform's interface and blame it when any underlying carrier fails, so intermediary platforms carry reputational responsibility for providers they do not control.
“By using the Shippo interface, they trusted our technology and were pissed off if something else wasn't working”
- Shipping is part of the purchase decision itself because consumers check shipping costs and free-shipping thresholds before buying, so merchants must show shipping options on product pages and at checkout.
“consumers might not even buy with you unless they see the right shipping options at check-out or on the website”
- Amazon Prime has trained customers to expect fast, cheap or free shipping, and that expectation now shapes merchants' decisions before purchase.
“this is something that's taught to us by Amazon and Amazon Prime, those kinds of skyrocketing customer expectation”
- A notable trend is farmers selling directly to consumers online, bypassing grocers, which can deliver higher quality produce to the door sometimes at lower cost than supermarkets.
“farmers moving online becoming direct-to-consumer model”
Founders should start building early and pivot rather than overthink, accepting uncertainty.
- Diversifying revenue sources is a luxury problem that only arises after a startup is no longer at risk of dying for lack of revenue.
“it's a luxury problem to have. You're no longer in the bucket of, There's not enough revenue”
- Co-founder Simon asked whether shipping was something Laura would be excited to get out of bed for over the next 10 to 15 years, and neither was sure, but they chose to build an MVP and test with customers rather than stall.
“Is shipping something you'd be excited to get out of bed for, for the next 10, 15 years?”
- Founders who overthink what to build should start building, because ideas evolve through customer conversations and pivoting is acceptable, as Shippo itself is nothing like its original idea.
“I think there is a lot to be said about just getting into action, starting to build something and then you'll figure it out as you go”
- Running a side ecommerce business called Popout, Laura found Shopify and Stripe easy to assemble but shipping hard, and reasoned that if it was hard for her it was probably hard for many merchants.
“all of the different ecommerce building blocks were really easy and intuitive to use, to put together”