What this covers

Eric Balchunas walks host Zack Fuss through Vanguard's origins, starting with Jack Bogle at Wellington in the 1960s. A failed tie-up with Thorndike led to a boardroom fight, Bogle's firing, and a compromise that left him running a back-office company that became mutually owned. His founding deal barred him from running money, but after Paul Samuelson publicly proposed an index fund, Bogle reasoned that an unmanaged fund didn't count. That loophole produced the first index fund in 1976. Balchunas notes that the firm did little for its first 25 years, that about 97% of its assets arrived after Bogle stepped down as CEO, and that Bogle feuded with management for roughly 25 years, partly over his refusal to launch ETFs.

The middle of the conversation covers the machinery around that story. It traces the shift from commission-paid brokers, compensated through loads, to fee-based RIAs, who have reason to favor cheaper products. It also compares ETFs with mutual funds, covering the share class system, capital-gains treatment, and why Balchunas holds mutual funds in his own 401(k). Scale figures recur: Vanguard holds 27 to 28 percent of U.S. fund assets but earns only 5 to 6 percent of industry revenue, and it took in $2.3 trillion over ten years, gaining most in down markets.

The contentious turns come late. Balchunas expects steady passive flows to mute reactions to news, thin trading, and raise volatility in ways that favor active managers, and he argues the mutual structure mattered more than indexing itself. He also calls the 80-year-old 10 percent ownership rule outdated, and places Cathie Wood as a small satellite in a Core-Satellite Portfolio.

Sharpest takeaway

Balchunas argues that Vanguard's mutual ownership structure and its sub-10-basis-point fee strategy, not indexing alone, drove the shift to passive investing, and that competitors now match those fees, so the next phase is consolidation and a fight over the advisory and alternatives business.

  • Vanguard's mutual structure lets investor-owned funds vote to cut fees as profits grow, a structure no rival has copied
  • Fee cuts below 10 basis points triggered mass inflows, and rivals were forced to match them
  • Passive share gains come from net flows, and Vanguard captures most flows in down markets

The argument · threads7 threads · 80 claims
0.71

Industry-wide fee pressure, shown by Vanguard's asset-revenue gap, is commoditizing asset management and driving consolidation.

19 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Vanguard takes in the majority of industry flows, especially in down markets, and because flows are what drive market share, its share gains should accelerate in bear markets; Balchunas believes only regulation, not market forces, can stop its growth.

    “flows are all you can have to gain market share. And so it's these bare markets where Vanguard is going to emerge as even a bigger leader. Personally, I think the only thing that can stop their growth at this point is regulation.”

  • Vanguard holds 27 to 28 percent of all U.S. fund assets, double the previous high-water mark set by Fidelity in the 1990s, yet it earns only 5 to 6 percent of the industry's revenue.

    “they have a 27%, 28% market share of all U.S. fund assets. That's double the old high-watermark set in the '90s by Fidelity”

  • Vanguard manages roughly $7.6 trillion, making it the second-largest asset manager behind BlackRock at about $9 trillion, and because Vanguard keeps gaining on BlackRock each year, Vanguard is expected to surpass BlackRock in overall assets by 2028 or 2029.

    “we think by 2028, 2029, Vanguard will be bigger in overall assets”

  • The gap between Vanguard's roughly 27 percent asset share and its 5 to 6 percent revenue share is a warning for Wall Street, because if the industry converged on Vanguard-level fees, industry revenue would fall from about $140 billion to $20 billion a year; Balchunas thinks a decline of about 50 percent is more likely than the full 80 percent.

    “The industry would go from making $140 billion a year to $20 billion a year. So that would be like an 80% decline in assets. I don't think it'll get that bad, but I do think we're looking at maybe 50%.”

  • Vanguard controls only about 50 percent of total passive assets, with the remainder held by BlackRock, Fidelity, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Schwab, and others, which shows that the passive trend has spread beyond Vanguard.

    “if you take all the passive assets out there, Vanguard only controls 50%. The other 50% are from a host of other issuers”

  • Fidelity's index mutual fund business has grown to about $1 trillion, and its 2 basis point index mutual funds give it a profitable niche even though the broader mutual fund category is shrinking.

    “Fidelity's index mutual fund business is big. It's $1 trillion. So even though we focus on the ETFs, Fidelity is carving out a nice little niche”

  • As fees converge toward zero, the asset management industry will consolidate in a March Madness-style bracket over the next 20 to 30 years, with three or four managers controlling about 70 percent of assets, similar to airlines and banking, and niche players serving smaller parts of portfolios.

    “over the next 20 to 30 years, there's going to be this NC March Madness bracket look, where it's going to go from like 64 to like 5. And there'll be like maybe 3 or 4 asset managers controlling 70% of the assets”

  • Firms such as BlackRock often cut fees before they are forced to, even on industry-leading funds, by roughly half when they sense competition from Vanguard, a self-cannibalization move that ends up helping them.

    “They might even have an industry-leading fund but because they smell competition from Vanguard, they'll just cut their fee by like half”

  • Fidelity's S&P 500 index fund has grown to about $320 billion, roughly three times the size of its next largest fund, the Contrafund at about $90 billion, showing that Fidelity has successfully swallowed its pride and embraced low-cost indexing.

    “Fidelity's S&P 500 Index Fund is now their biggest fund 3 times over. The next biggest one is the famous Contrafund at $90 billion. The index fund I just mentioned is like $320 billion.”

  • Based on flows, most portfolios are about 60 to 80 percent cheap beta in equities and bonds, usually under 10 basis points, with a roughly 15 percent satellite allocated to alternatives and speculative assets, and this core-satellite structure will shape the industry's future.

    “Most portfolios today, and we know this based on the flows are 60% to 80% cheap beta, maybe equity, bonds, maybe a little international, all probably under 10 basis points. But then they have this 15% bucket for alts”

  • BlackRock's 2008 purchase of iShares and its embrace of low-cost products was smart, and without it Vanguard's share gains would likely have been worse, though industry shareholders make it hard for firms to cut fees.

    “Larry Fink buying iShares in 2008 and like really embracing the low-cost thing was also smart.”

  • ETFs are essentially mutual funds with benefits: they carry the same exposure but generally lower fees, and they democratize investing by making institutional-class pricing available to everyone regardless of account size.

    “ETFs basically give the institutional class for everybody. And in many cases, they're even cheaper than that. So whether you're a Bridgewater or my mom, you're going to pay the same fee”

  • State Street fell from the big three ETF issuers because it did not pivot to low-cost products 10 to 15 years ago, believing its liquidity would carry the day, while BlackRock launched Vanguard-like core series that satisfied advisers.

    “They thought their liquidity would carry the day, but BlackRock pivoted to core series, which were very Vanguardian and they were low cost”

  • Balchunas uses mutual funds in his 401(k) because workplace plans give access to institutional-class fees, and tax efficiency is irrelevant in tax-deferred accounts, so ETFs lose their main advantages there while still dominating taxable accounts.

    “ETFs lose all those superpowers when they go into the 401(k) world, but they crush outside of that world in taxable accounts.”

  • Vanguard's S&P 500 ETF VOO charges 3 basis points, BlackRock's IVV also charges 3, and SPY charges 9, so an investor is better off using VOO or IVV, and the choice between those two is nearly indifferent.

    “VOO is their S&P 500 ETF. It's 3 basis points. BlackRock has one that's 3 basis points IVV, and then SPY is 9.”

  • Vanguard moved to commission-free ETF trading one to two years before Schwab did, and Balchunas argues it effectively sparked the industry-wide commission-free trading trend.

    “they went first to commission-free ETFs about a year or 2 before Schwab did. In a way, I think they actually sparked the whole commission-free trading thing.”

  • Index fund fees across providers now sit at about 5 basis points or lower, so beta exposure to almost any asset class costs under 5 basis points, if not 10, from any provider, which turns cheap indexing into a commodity baseline.

    “You can now get basically beta or index exposure to almost any asset class for under 5 basis points, if not 10, from any provider at this point.”

  • Balchunas argues that companies should self-cannibalize, as Apple did with the iPod, because if you do not cannibalize yourself, someone else will, and Vanguard's willingness to cut its own fees is the same logic applied to asset management.

    “we have an example called the Steve Jobs Rule, which is if you don't cannibalize yourself, someone else will.”

  • About 75 percent of intermediaries are paid a percentage of assets, and many charge around 1 percent, so while clients benefit from cheap funds, advisers have not lowered their fees, causing dollar fees to balloon as assets double or triple.

    “the amount that is now fee-based where gets a percentage is like 75%... A lot of them charge 1%.”

0.63

Vanguard's mutual ownership structure is the root driver of its permanent cost-cutting.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Because Vanguard's profits flow to fund investors rather than owners, no individual gets enormously wealthy from the company, unlike Fidelity's Johnson family, which Balchunas estimates has about $20 billion in net worth, and Bogle himself ended with about $80 million.

    “There's no owner that's getting filthy rich like in the Fidelity case last I looked -- I may be way off here. But I think the Johnson family might have like $20 billion in net worth.”

  • Despite the structure's success, no other asset manager has adopted a mutual ownership model, which Balchunas finds puzzling and which made the Vanguard story attractive as a research question.

    “It's yet to be copied today, which, again, attracted me to the project”

  • Vanguard's mutual ownership structure means the funds own the company and investors own the funds, so when profits grow the investors who control the vote choose to lower fees in their own funds, which gives Vanguard a permanent incentive to cut costs.

    “the people who are voting on what to do with those are the investors essentially. And so they just vote to lower the fees in their own funds, right, because that's their interest.”

  • Balchunas argues that the mutual ownership structure, not indexing itself, is the number one catalyst of the passive shift, because indexing only became transformative once fees fell below about 10 basis points, something only Vanguard's structure would deliver.

    “this structure, in my opinion, is the #1 catalyst of this whole change we've seen towards passive and indexing. I make the case in the book that indexing got way too much credit for the index fund revolution”

  • Because any competitor's index fund can now charge under 5 to 10 basis points, the market effectively has Vanguard-style pricing everywhere, so rivals do not need Vanguard's mutual structure; the effect of the Bogle legacy is larger than Vanguard itself.

    “nobody has to copy Vanguard's mutual ownership structure because they already are. They already are offering low-cost funds as if they had that structure.”

0.35

Vanguard's scale and head start leave rivals contesting a limited share of new growth.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Balchunas expects the industry to be defined by four firms: Vanguard in nearly everything, BlackRock competing with Vanguard in ETFs, Fidelity in index mutual funds, and Capital Group in active mutual funds, with these rivals together keeping Vanguard from growing faster.

    “if you could imagine Vanguard in the middle, BlackRock is fighting them in ETFs, Capital Group with active mutual funds and Fidelity with index mutual funds”

  • BlackRock and Vanguard together capture about two-thirds of new ETF cash, leaving the remaining third, roughly $300 to $400 billion, to be contested by 150 to 200 other issuers.

    “BlackRock and Vanguard, for example, they're going to take in about 2/3 of all the new cash going into ETFs, but there's 150 or 200 issuers who are fighting over the 1/3”

  • Vanguard's dominance rests on trust and goodwill built over decades, and because most rivals launched low-cost index funds only 10 to 15 years ago, Vanguard had roughly a 30-year head start in branding as the low-cost champion.

    “So Vanguard had a 30-year head start as being branded as the low-cost champion of the small guy index fund company.”

  • The rule that a fund cannot own more than 10 percent of a company's stock dates back nearly 80 years to when fund companies were single funds, and because fund complexes like Vanguard can own far more across funds, the rule has become outdated.

    “The rule on the books is that a fund cannot own more than 10% of the stock... this rule was made, I don't know, nearly 80 years ago when fund companies were really 1 or 2 funds.”

  • Vanguard owns about 8.5 percent of any given stock and BlackRock about 7 percent, and Balchunas estimates Vanguard could reach 15 to 20 percent and BlackRock 10 to 12 percent before hitting real market limits.

    “Vanguard owns pretty much about 8.5% of any given stock. BlackRock owns another like 7%... they could conceivably go to like 15% or 20% for Vanguard”

0.34

Fee-based advisers and internet performance comparison drove passive adoption as fees fell.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The move from commission-paid brokers, who received loads for placing clients in funds, to fee-based registered investment advisers was a major driver of passive adoption, because advisers paid a percentage of client assets have an incentive to choose cheaper products; advisers now manage about $26 trillion.

    “Once you get paid as a percentage of your clients' fees, now your money is their money, and you are going to probably go for the cheaper products.”

  • Index fund inflows surged once Vanguard's expense ratios fell below about 20 basis points, and adoption swept the country once they fell below 10 basis points, because economies of scale were passed to investors.

    “when the fund expense ratio for their index funds got below like 20 basis points, they started to see a good surge of assets. Then when it got below 10, it started to sweep the country”

  • Internet household usage and passive asset growth are about 98 percent correlated since the 2000s, which Balchunas says reflects some causation because the internet let investors compare active and passive performance through SPIVA reports, blogs, and journals.

    “If you graph the growth of Internet household usage and passive assets, they're like 98% correlated. That's also no accident, probably some causation, maybe not totally”

  • Decades of investors buying funds that topped the rankings one year and lagged the next taught them that outperforming the market for more than a year or two is very difficult, which pushed many toward low-cost index funds.

    “buying a fund that was like on top of its game 1 year and then realizing that it actually underperformed the year after”

0.33

Bogle's founding history, populist credibility, and modest conduct shaped Vanguard's mission and lasting trust.

12 pointscentrality 2/5
  • After Bogle's death Vanguard let index fund holders move into ETF share classes, which Balchunas believes Bogle would have disliked, and removed the ship logo tied to Bogle's sailing metaphors, signaling a desire to forge its own identity.

    “They also killed the ship logo. There used to be a ship logo for Vanguard.”

  • Bogle joined Wellington, a conservative balanced fund firm losing assets in the 1960s, and when he tried to offset outflows by partnering with the growth-oriented Thorndike, a boardroom fight led to his firing, a compromise that made him run back-office operations, and ultimately the mutual company Vanguard, which launched the first index fund in 1976.

    “he felt like everybody was selling tasty donuts across the street, and they were selling nutritious bagels. And he figured he'd have to start selling donuts to succeed.”

  • Bogle stepped down as CEO partly due to a heart issue, then was pushed off Vanguard's board, reportedly because his public ranting and raving had grown tiresome, using an age limit as the formal reason.

    “they use this age limit thing, even though I think they just wanted him to leave.”

  • Vanguard's founding deal barred Bogle from running money, so after Paul Samuelson publicly suggested an actual index fund, Bogle reasoned that an unmanaged index fund would not violate the rule, which created the loophole that let Vanguard launch its first index fund in 1976.

    “part of the deal when setting up Vanguard was he could not run money. So he thought, well, I won't be running money if I launched an index fund because it doesn't have to be managed.”

  • In 1991 Jack Bogle said he would know his mission to create a better world for investors was succeeding when Vanguard's market share began to erode, a stance Balchunas says has no precedent among CEOs.

    “I'll know that our mission to create a better world for investors is beginning to happen when our market share begins to erode.”

  • Bogle refused to launch ETFs in 1989 and 1990 because he hated trading, and about ten years later under CEO John Brennan, Vanguard launched ETFs, one of many disagreements that fueled a 25-year public feud between Bogle and management.

    “Bogle had the opportunity to launch ETFs in '89, '90 and said no way. I would never want a fund to trade because he hates trading. Then 10 years later, when Brennan is CEO, they launched ETFs.”

  • Balchunas compares Bogle to a blend of Steve Jobs and Martin Luther, because Bogle built practical products that revolutionized the industry and also created what amounts to a religion, Bogle-ism, that other firms such as Fidelity and Schwab practice without using Vanguard.

    “I sort of compare him as a combination of Steve Jobs and Martin Luther, the protestant guy because on one hand, he made the practical products that revolutionized the industry. But in the other, he created what's essentially a religion”

  • For about 25 years after leaving, Bogle publicly attacked ETFs, international funds, and smart beta, yet Vanguard kept taking in money in those very products, leading Balchunas to call the firm Bogle-proof.

    “Vanguard is so in the zone, they're Bogle proof because they were still taking money into stuff he trashed.”

  • If a company sells itself as a populist revolutionary, its leaders must avoid getting filthy rich, because hypocrisy about wealth will be obvious to customers, and Bogle's modest personal outcome is part of why his populism was credible.

    “If you're trying to sell yourself as a revolutionary populist, I think you got to be careful not to become filthy rich and lose your way a little, that hypocrisy will be very apparent to people.”

  • Balchunas believes crypto, which sells itself as populist but has produced billionaires and celebrity commercials, could learn from Vanguard's approach to populism, since the gap between messaging and conduct erodes trust.

    “I also think for crypto. Crypto is a world that sells itself is populous, but there's so many people in crypto who becoming billionaires”

  • BlackRock draws protests because Larry Fink publicly pushed climate agendas, angering both right and left, while Vanguard, headquartered quietly in Malvern, Pennsylvania, stays out of the news even though it is the larger owner of most stocks.

    “Vanguard is a bigger owner of most stocks than BlackRock, but BlackRock has become the focal point for many of these groups.”

  • Bogle's early choices to defer short-term asset gains, lowering fees and building trust before growth arrived, paid large dividends later, illustrating that taking the longer, harder road usually pays off more in the end.

    “I find this to be a good book about taking the longer, harder road that usually pays off way bigger in the end.”

0.22

ETFs' trading and tax features draw speculation and macro bets as mutual funds shrink.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Because ETFs trade throughout the day, they attract trading and speculative behavior, and they let a news-reading investor express a macro view, such as bullishness on Brazil's election, without picking individual stocks.

    “let's say Brazil elects a new leader and you're bullish on this person, you don't need to know which stock to pick. You just buy a Brazil ETF”

  • Cathie Wood fits the modern portfolio as the wild satellite around a boring vanilla beta core, and because nobody puts college funds in her funds, she faces little pressure and can persist for a long time while remaining small.

    “People who have boring vanilla beta in the core, they want wild and crazy to decorate it with.”

  • ARK Invest's ARKK fund holds only about $13 billion, a sum Vanguard and BlackRock would take in within about 1.5 weeks, so its media coverage vastly exceeds its asset base.

    “right now, ARKK has $13 billion. Vanguard and BlackRock will take that in, in like 1.5 weeks. It's not that big.”

  • Investors pulled roughly $800 billion out of mutual funds this year, which could reach $1 trillion for the first time, indicating that the mutual fund world is dying while ETFs gained about $500 billion.

    “This year, $800 billion are flown out of mutual funds, could reach $1 trillion for the first time ever.”

  • ETFs generally avoid regular capital gains distributions because creation and redemption of shares washes out gains, so investors in ETFs pay tax only when they sell, while mutual fund holders can owe tax caused by other investors' redemptions.

    “If you're in a mutual fund, you may get hit with that tax and you did nothing. That tax is just a consequence of what other people have funded.”

0.22

Vanguard's service, advisory, voting, and private-equity moves create openings for rival firms.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Vanguard's advisory business charges between 5 and 30 basis points depending on account size, and asset managers such as Goldman Sachs acquiring advisory firms lets clients flow directly into the parent's funds, which lowers advisory fees and pressures independent advisers.

    “advisers are actually going to like team up with asset managers because all the money is already there. So like Goldman bought a big advisory service.”

  • Vanguard is piloting a program letting its roughly 30 million retail investors choose how their shares are voted, including delegating to Vanguard or a third party, which Balchunas thinks could ward off regulation by diffusing centralized voting power, similar to Schwab's polling approach.

    “Vanguard piloting a program where they're going to allow their 30 million retail investors to have an option on how their shares are voted.”

  • With fewer U.S. public companies, private equity is growing, and Vanguard has partnered with a private equity manager, which Balchunas sees as a potential avenue for disruption, though a Bloomberg Intelligence analyst says private equity investors are much less fee sensitive.

    “Although the private equity analyst in Bloomberg Intelligence says that, no, they're way less fee sensitive. It's not going to be, Vanguard.”

  • Vanguard's customer service is its Achilles heel, and if Balchunas ran it he would stop cutting fees and redirect the money to service, which he thinks clients would vote for, opening room for rivals like Fidelity and BlackRock to compete on service.

    “If I was Vanguard, I would say stop lowering fees, they're low enough, put all the extra money in customer service.”

  • Vanguard's vanilla index fund flows keep rising through bear markets as if no one cares, and Balchunas expects this passive behavior to dampen reaction to news while thinning trading and raising stock volatility, which would benefit active managers.

    “as passive gets bigger and bigger, it's probably going to create a little more volatility in the stocks because there's going to be less people actually trading them.”