APi Group: Safety Services at Scale
What this covers
The conversation among Adam, Chadd and Zack splits into two halves: Chadd mostly explains how APi operates, and Adam mostly covers deal history and the investment setup. The operating story starts with how fragmented fire-protection firms work. They win a handful of $150,000 to $1 million projects a year and leave the mandated $1,000-$2,000 inspections to someone else. APi reverses that order. Its working belief is that each inspection dollar leads to $3 to $4 of high-margin repair work, the Inspection-to-Repair Funnel. A Boston acquisition is the example: revenue rose from roughly $15 million to $20 million and margins from 7% to 14%. They also cover what it takes to convert a project business, including seller commitment before closing, new inspectors and a new sales team.
The history comes next. Revenue growth of 15% to 18% in 2020 to 2022 came largely from inflation pass-through, which made management doubt the quality of that revenue. A planned sale that would have sent Life Safety to Blackstone collapsed when Lee Anderson and Ross Becker objected, and Martin Franklin then offered a simple whole-company deal. The Chubb purchase is treated as an orphaned asset bought at roughly 7.5 times post-synergy EBITDA, and the apparent weak free cash flow after closing is explained as a working-capital artifact. Tuck-in M&A is priced at 5 to 7 times EBITDA.
The last stretch is the contested investor view. It covers how Franklin's promote on 140 million founder shares dilutes by design, why buying below the sponsor's high-water mark helps, and why a roughly $10 billion company may never reach private-market multiples. Adam names buybacks, a sale and the question of board alignment as the ways value gets unlocked once the promote rolls off.
APi Group's value rests on converting fragmented, project-based construction and life-safety work into a recurring, inspection-led service model, backed by an under-levered balance sheet and a sponsor incentive structure. The speaker argues the public market still undervalues it because of a weak specialty segment, low organic growth, and a shrinking investor base for $10 billion companies.
- Inspection-first selling turns small statutory inspections into higher-margin repair work, shifting the mix toward recurring revenue (55%+ today, targeting 60%+).
- Chubb was bought at a high reported multiple but, after synergies, the speakers estimate a much lower effective multiple and a large platform.
- The stock trades under 11x EBITDA versus higher-multiple peers, and the speakers expect the gap to narrow as organic growth and cash conversion improve and the promote incentive matures.
Value unlocks through buybacks, a sale, or buyers if the gap persists.
- A key question for any investment is whether management and the board will act to extract value through buybacks or a sale if the multiple gap never closes, since a cheap stock with a misaligned board can destroy the investor's return.
“is the management team and board aligned with you in terms of doing everything in their power to extract the value?”
- When investing in rollups with promotes, it is wise to buy when the stock is below the sponsor's high-water mark, because the sponsor then has an incentive to recover the mark and the investor is aligned with the sponsor's push to deploy capital at lower prices.
“when you're investing in rollups and companies with promotes, I think it's really good to buy them when they're below the high-water mark”
- The addressable universe of investors for a roughly $10 billion company has shrunk dramatically, so a company may never re-rate to private-market multiples, and value must be unlocked through buybacks, a sale, or acquisition by a strategic or private equity buyer after the promote rolls off in 2026 or 2027.
“it just shows how there just isn't a ton of demand for companies of this size.”
- If APi continues to trade below private market value, it could be acquired by a strategic buyer or a consortium of private equity firms, and the company will be open for business on January 1, 2027, when the promote rolls off.
“On January 1, 2027, I'd say, yeah, open for business.”
- Adam says APi will buy back stock if it trades cheaply and could sell the company if there is no M&A to do, since it is unlevered and generates cash.
“The company generates cash, they'll buy back stock if the stock trades cheaply, it's not leveraged.”
Chubb can reach 20% margins through route density and repricing fixes.
- Chubb is a route-based alarm and monitoring business with much unprofitable work, which management planned to fix by re-pricing, firing unprofitable customers, and improving route density before using it as a platform for tuck-in M&A in Europe and Asia.
“we'll basically get the pricing right, we'll fire some customers, we'll get the route density right, and then once that gets where it needs to be, we can start doing tuck-in M&A”
- Management said at its analyst day that Chubb would reach 15% or more EBITDA margin, and Adam believes it could reach about 20%, although it will grow more slowly than core Life Safety because European installed-base growth is weaker.
“what they said publicly at the analyst day is that Chubb would be 15-plus percent”
- Chubb's alarm and monitoring business can reach around 60% gross margin, giving Chubb higher gross margins than APi's core Life Safety business, so profit improvement depends mostly on utilization and G&A savings.
“The alarm business, I think, can get 60% gross margin. It's crazy. So they have higher gross margins.”
- Chubb is a route-based business, with a technician checking many sites on a route, and Europe has less competition for assets and heavier regulation, so APi can run its US tuck-in playbook there, including in Asia.
“it's more of a route-based business. So you put a guy in a van and he checks all these different things.”
- The underwriting case for Chubb assumed it would reach about $3 to $3.5 billion in revenue with 15% or higher EBITDA margins, yielding roughly $450 to $600 million of EBITDA, and Adam believes it can reach 20% margins.
“what they said publicly at the analyst day is that Chubb would be 15-plus percent”
- Adam sees little risk of APi failing to execute because a blown-up Chubb would have shown up by 2022, and he sees the Chubb downside as slower growth, perhaps 2% rather than 3-4%, rather than a failed deal.
“I don't actually think that there's a risk of them not being able to execute on the plan. If Chubb were blown up, it would have happened already.”
- Chubb's main downside is slower growth, for example 2% instead of 3-4%, because Europe grows more slowly and has aging, rusty assets, but Adam does not see that as a major threat.
“Does it grow 2% instead of growing 3% or 4%? It's entirely possible, but I don't see that as a big issue.”
Franklin's diluting promote and simple buyout align him with per-share value.
- A prior sale process that would have sold Life Safety to Blackstone and let Carlyle recapitalize the industrial businesses collapsed because Lee Anderson and Ross Becker objected to the breakup, and Martin Franklin then offered a simple deal with no earnouts, no rollover equity, and modest leverage to buy the whole company.
“I think Martin came to the table and was like, look, no earnouts, no rollover equity, no carve-out, no this, no that. We're going to take over your company with modest leverage”
- Martin Franklin's incentive is a 20% promote on the 140 million founder shares, so the promote is paid only on that base, and as the company issues more shares for acquisitions and financings, his effective share of the upside shrinks by design.
“So by design, as the company gets larger, the dilution gets smaller. There were 140 million shares when it started.”
- From memory, Adam estimates that Martin Franklin, together with Jim and Ian in what he calls the Mariposa team, owns close to 30 million shares across all holdings.
“my guess is he's probably got ownership across everything of probably close to 30 million shares. I bucket Martin, Jim, and Ian all together.”
- Lee Anderson had been ill twice with no real succession plan, and he was worried his wife would be left with dealing with his ownership, so he needed a capital allocator steward for the business.
“there wasn't really a succession plan for him. And I think he was very worried that his wife would be stuck dealing with this and his ownership in it.”
- The promote structure is only active through 2025 and 2026, after which the incentive and carry emphasis should fall, which Adam expects will reduce the discount institutions apply to Mariposa dilution.
“remember that incentive structure is only on for 25 and 26.”
- Martin Franklin's incentive emphasis will fall after the 2025-2026 window, and he is expected to be more incentivized to increase value per share afterward, so the multiple should converge.
“Martin Franklin will likely do things to increase value per share and be even more incentivized to do that after 2026.”
Chubb was an orphaned asset bought cheaply below APi's own multiple.
- After the September 2019 listing, APi made tuck-in deals, bought SK in Europe in 2020, and at the end of 2021 acquired Chubb Fire and Security from Carrier, funded with substantial debt at low rates and common equity.
“At the end of '21, they acquired Chubb Fire and Security, a carve-out from Carrier. They took on a bunch of debt at low interest rates and raised some common equity.”
- Chubb Fire and Security was neglected inside United Technologies and then Carrier because it did not fit Otis, Raytheon, or other units, making it an orphaned asset that APi could buy cheaply and fix.
“Chubb was a very neglected asset inside of Carrier because it really was part of United Technologies and sort of very neglected inside of United Technologies.”
- Chubb cost roughly $2.7 to $2.8 billion plus working capital and restructuring spend on a business with about €200 million of COVID-era EBITDA, and if it reaches about $450 million of EBITDA, the effective multiple is about 7.5 times, below APi's own trading multiple at the time.
“even if they got the low end of my EBITDA expectations, I still think they paid about seven and a half times for a large amount of EBITDA.”
- Acquiring Chubb is like buying an unoccupied building: if you stabilize it you can get a 12 or 15 percent yield on cost, but it requires significant operational work, and the buyer is paying a high reported price because of the savings and systems it brings.
“it's like buying an unoccupied building.”
- Even at the low end of Adam's EBITDA expectations, the Chubb purchase works out to roughly 7.5 times post-synergy EBITDA, well below APi's own trading multiple at the time, which was around 10 to 12 times, so the company bought a platform equal to or larger than its own business.
“even if they got the low end of my EBITDA expectations, I still think they paid about seven and a half times for a large amount of EBITDA.”
Low-capital recurring mix supports an 8% free cash flow yield and durability.
- Adam estimates APi will generate roughly $1,100 million of EBITDA in the current year, about $1,050 million or more of EBIT after roughly $65 million of net CapEx, about $800 million of free cash flow, and an 8% free cash flow yield on a roughly $10 billion market cap.
“the business this year will probably make about $1,100 million of EBITDA, maybe a little bit more. The CapEx is funny because they buy and sell trucks and equipment, but we think that net CapEx is about $65 million on a net basis”
- Adam does not believe AI will disintermediate the fire, life-safety, and inspection business, because the work requires physical in-building inspection and the market size and pricing data support the thesis.
“I do not think FIRE is getting disintermediated by AI.”
- As APi divested and closed capital-intensive business lines and fire safety grew as a share of the company, capital intensity came down materially, and management will keep emphasizing low-capital, high-recurring businesses.
“as they've continued to divest and close the more capital-intensive business lines and fire safety has become a larger percentage of the business, the capital intensity has come down materially.”
- At the current market cap, APi trades at about an 8% free cash flow yield, and Adam expects it to grow organically in the mid-to-high single digits and to keep buying smaller businesses at 5-7x EBITDA.
“the business this year will probably make about $1,100 million of EBITDA, maybe a little bit more. The CapEx is funny because they buy and sell trucks and equipment, but we think that net CapEx is about $65 million on a net basis”
- Net capex is about $65 million, which implies roughly $1,050 million or more of EBIT and about $800 million of free cash flow; EBIT is about 90 percent Life Safety and 10 percent Specialty in 2025, and the mix is shifting toward low capital intensity.
“So you should think about it as $1,050 million plus of EBIT and about $800 million of free cash flow”
Under-leverage and cheap tuck-in multiples give APi an acquisition advantage.
- As the business becomes more recurring and less project-oriented, it could run with higher leverage, perhaps around three times debt-to-EBITDA, which would support roughly $500 million of medium-sized acquisitions.
“As the businesses become more recurring revenue and less project-oriented, the argument would be that they can run it with higher leverage, probably more three times.”
- APi buys small and mid-sized businesses at roughly 5 to 7 times EBITDA in tuck-ins, and medium-sized fire alarm, security monitoring, and elevator platforms at 10 to 12 times EBITDA, and deployed about $300 million into tuck-in M&A in 2024.
“should be able to continue to acquire small mom-and-pop or even medium-sized businesses in that five to seven times EBITDA”
- In 2024 APi cleaned up its capital structure by retiring the Blackstone preferred, raising common equity to buy Elevate, and accelerating tuck-in M&A, leaving the company with debt under two times EBITDA and arguably under-levered for 2025.
“nicely, squarely under two times debt-to-EBITDA, and they're going to generate about... pick a number, they're going to generate about $800 million of free cash.”
- APi financed Chubb with preferred equity from Blackstone and Viking at a low coupon, a term loan, and an interest rate swap, so rising rates produced mark-to-market losses rather than real financial distress.
“because they financed the deal intelligently with the pref equity and the term loan with the swap, it was just a mark-to-market pain, not an actual financial pain.”
- Private equity portfolios carry heavy leverage and interest rate exposure, which should reduce competition for deals and lower purchase multiples, giving APi, which is under-levered, an advantage in acquisitions.
“the private equity guys are swimming in their adjustable-rate mortgages, so to speak, and API's got a nice balance sheet and good access to capital”
- APi paid about 13 times EBITDA for Elevate, an elevator service business expected to generate roughly $50 to $60 million of EBITDA in 2024, which Adam views as a high price that still gives the company a platform for tuck-ins.
“they paid 14 times or whatever it was for elevated— it was 13 times.”
The multiple discount reflects track record and the weak Specialty segment.
- In 2025 the Life Safety segment, covering fire alarm and security monitoring, is expected to contribute roughly 90% of EBIT, while the more capital-intensive Specialty Services segment, which includes telecom pipeline integrity testing, contributes about 10%.
“I think on an EBIT basis, I think it's probably like a 90/10 contribution between plus or minus in 2025 between the Life Safety segment”
- APi trades under 11 times EBITDA, including fourth-quarter cash flow, a discount to higher-multiple peers such as FirstService, Otis, and Cintas, which the speakers attribute partly to track record and partly to the weak Specialty segment.
“Par APi Group is trading under 11 times EBITDA. So the point you're trying to make is the point that Chadd and I joke around with”
- Although Specialty is only about 10% of EBIT, its unpredictable 2024 performance has weighed on the stock because investors focus on the weakest part of public companies.
“the specialty business has been unpredictable in 2024. So I would say that specialty is weighed on investors even though, as a percentage of EBIT, as I said, it's really only 10%.”
- Part of APi's multiple discount versus peers such as Otis and Cintas reflects its track record, and management's continued capital deployment should narrow the gap over time.
“I think, look, a couple of that is just track record.”
Pruning past project work should normalize reported organic growth to trend.
- Past pruning of the business mix and of project resources is largely behind the company, so unless there is another large inflation or deflation shock, reported organic revenue growth should return to more normal trends.
“I think that's largely behind us. Unless you have another huge spike of inflation or deflation, we should return to more normal reported organic revenue trends.”
- In 2020 to 2022 APi's revenue growth was high (in the 15% to 18% range) because project contracts allowed material cost pass-through during inflation, but this lifted revenue without matching margin contribution, leading management to question whether that revenue was real.
“what you saw is very high rates of revenue growth, but not the same margin contribution. So you saw these 15s and 18s.”
- Reported organic growth is distorted by inflation and deflation because project contracts pass through material cost increases, so headline growth can overstate or understate the underlying business.
“it allows for material cost pass-through.”
- Because technicians overlap between project and service work, devoting resources to large projects diverts them from higher-margin inspection-led service, so the company has focused branches on inspection-first selling and pruned project work, which should normalize reported organic revenue.
“because there is overlap in terms of the technicians between project and service. So when you devote too much resource to a project, those are resources that can't be used elsewhere.”
Ownership culture and cross-division mobility shape APi's operating model.
- An early ESOP created by Lee Anderson gave employees a stake in growth, and APi lets leaders who sell businesses join corporate leadership and move across divisions, producing an ownership and entrepreneurial culture that predates the public listing.
“very early on, Lee Anderson created an ESOP. So the employees participated in the growth of the business.”
- APi's National Services Group tracks customers across states and matches them with local branches, so that a relationship with one customer, such as a data center operator, can produce cross-sell of alarm or suppression systems across divisions while branches keep their own P&L responsibility.
“They try and match the customer relationships with the business branches, and that's how the mothership helps to do the cross-sell.”
- When founders sell their businesses to APi, they have the chance to join corporate leadership if they can compete and deliver, as with Paul Grunau, whose family HVAC business was sold in the mid-2000s and who is now Chief Learning Officer.
“Paul is now the Chief Learning Officer. So what I think is super unique about this business is that when someone sells their business to APi Group, they have the opportunity to join the corporate leadership team”
- APi moves successful leaders across divisions rather than waiting for a direct promotion, as when controller Mark Polowitz moved to run a business unit instead of becoming CFO, a practice Adam says few companies have.
“a leader can go from one division to the next. And I think there are very few companies that I've ever encountered”
- Cross-functional leadership development, such as a controller moving to run a business unit because no CFO path was open, is rare, and it combines ownership culture with mobility to keep high performers moving.
“And I think there are very few companies that I've ever encountered in my life where a leader can go from one division to the next.”
Opening remarks thank colleagues and introduce speakers and their firms.
- Speakers thank each other and introduce themselves and their firms.
“Thank you, Zack, for having us on.”