#380: Four Hundred Pages of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger In Their Own Words
What this covers
This is a Founders episode in which David works through a roughly four-hundred-page collection of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger speaking in their own words. He keeps pausing to pair their remarks with founder stories: John D. Rockefeller, David Ogilvy, Issy Sharp of Four Seasons, Steven Spielberg, and John Henry Patterson of National Cash Register. Thomas Watson's remark about being smart in spots anchors the discussion of the circle of competence, including Buffett's rule that any doubt means a subject falls outside it.
The range is wide. On information advantage, David points to Coca-Cola and to PetroChina, which Buffett bought from the public annual report alone, and to Rockefeller's secret allies among rival refiners. He also covers Buffett asking coal CEOs which competitor they would back or short, and the Google opportunity Buffett and Munger passed up after seeing ads work at GEICO. On technology, he returns to the idea that it is a better way to do something, and to Buffett's 2000 recognition that near-zero incremental unit cost threatened World Book and the Buffalo News. Business-model examples include See's Candy and the brand it taught Buffett about, GEICO's rise in advertising spend, and the Royalty Model behind Jordan, Chanel, and Spielberg's cut of Universal tickets. Leon Hess and Sam Zemurray appear as men who built businesses from discarded products.
Two claims are marked contested. One is Buffett and Munger's preference for concentrating in a few best ideas over broad diversification. The other is Munger's view that no company was ruined by being over-downsized, while many were ruined by bloat. Running through both is the opportunity cost test: keep one best option and reject anything that does not beat it.
David argues that Buffett and Munger's recurring lessons, including opportunity-cost filtering, focus within a circle of competence, backing wonderful businesses and talented people, and staying in the game long enough, are reusable decision tools, and that most people miss opportunity hiding in plain sight because they fail to act on what they can already see.
- Buffett and Munger repeat the same ideas through founder and company stories, so the stories are the most transferable part of the book
- Opportunity cost, not hindsight-based 'mistakes' of commission, is the filter that governs good decisions
- Advantage comes from deep focus and self-knowledge, and large competitive edges come from seeing publicly available information others ignore
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Some of Buffett's biggest wins came from publicly available information. Coca-Cola made Berkshire roughly $3 billion pre-tax better off, yet there was nothing about the product, distribution, or finances that hundreds of thousands of people did not already know; they simply did nothing about it.
“There's nothing I know about the product, its distribution system, its finances, or anything really that hundreds of thousands or millions of people don't already know. They just didn't do anything about it.”
Investors can gain an edge by learning more about an industry than anyone else. Rockefeller built 'secret allies' by meeting every competing refiner and reviewing their books, and Buffett did similar work in coal, asking CEOs which rival company they would bet their own money on and which they would short.
“I would know more about the coal companies from an economic standpoint than any one of those managers probably would.”
David Ogilvy argued advertising is part of the product and should be treated as a production cost, so it should not be cut when times are hard. Issy Sharp of Four Seasons applied this by increasing advertising in downturns while competitors cut back, gaining market share.
“I have come to regard advertising as part of the product to be treated as a production cost, not a selling cost.”
The ideal asset is a royalty on someone else's sales, requiring no receivables, inventory, fixed assets, or further capital investment, so the owner collects a check based on volume. Michael Jordan's Jordan brand royalty, Coco Chanel's 2 percent deal, and Steven Spielberg's Universal ticket royalty illustrate how such deals create great wealth.
“The ideal asset is a royalty on somebody else's sales, where all you do is get a royalty check every month”
Owning See's Candy, bought for about $25 million, showed Buffett the power of brands and generated more than $2 billion in cash to redeploy, and Buffett said he would not have owned Coca-Cola later if he had not owned See's.
“If we had not owned See's, I would not be surprised if we would have never owned Coca-Cola later on.”
Buffett bought about $400 million of PetroChina around 2000-2003 using only the public annual report, concluding it was worth about $100 billion against a $35 billion price. He did not contact management or read brokerage reports, and the position later sold for about $3.5 billion profit.
“The PetroChina annual report came out and I read it. That's the only thing I ever did.”
Investors and operators can spot opportunities in industries adjacent to their own. Buffett and Munger missed Google because they had seen Google ads work at GEICO at $10 a click, a product with near-zero marginal cost to Google, and they failed to act on it.
“We were paying $10 a click for something that had a marginal cost to Google of exactly zero and we saw the ads were working for us.”
Investing in or partnering with talented fanatics is a durable advantage. Munger cites National Cash Register under John Henry Patterson, a fanatic who bought the patents, built the best sales force and plants, and whose 1904 annual report made the investment decision easy.
“It was created by a fanatic who bought all the patents, had the best sales force and had the best production plants.”
Buffett argues that opportunities will not be pointed out by others and must be found independently. When he first visited GEICO in 1951, leading insurance analysts told him he did not know what he was talking about, and he concludes that you must detach from the crowd and think for yourself.
“You have to think for yourself. An ability to detach yourself from the crowd is a quality that you need.”
State Farm was founded in 1922 by a man in Bloomington, Illinois with no capital and became the dominant insurer, more than twice the size of the number two player and the third-largest by net worth on the Fortune 500 list, which raises the question of how such an improbable outcome happened.
“State Farm was started in 1922 by a fellow in Bloomington, Illinois, who had no money, no capital into the business.”
All technology is a better way to do something, and it is usually better and cheaper, so the key question for any business is which current activities the new technology will make obsolete.
“all technology is a better way to do something. And usually it's better and cheaper”
Thomas Watson said he is no genius but is smart in spots and stays around those spots, which David frames as circle of competence and the multiplication of effects from extreme focus, since specialization beats generalism.
“I'm no genius. I'm just smart in spots, and I stay around those spots”
All technology is a better way to do something, usually better and cheaper. The internet made print encyclopedias and newspapers obsolete by delivering information at virtually zero incremental unit cost, which Buffett and Munger saw clearly in 2000.
“Now you have the Internet that has virtually no incremental unit cost and could deliver the information instantaneously.”
If you have doubts about something being within your circle of competence, it isn't. Investing and building in only one industry for a long time, while tracking every great company in it, is a sign of wisdom that requires discipline and self-control.
“If you have doubts about something being in your circle of competence, it isn't.”
All intelligent people should think primarily in terms of opportunity costs. Every decision should be run through one's alternatives, and wise people think in terms of personal opportunity costs, so it is your alternatives that matter. Buffett and Munger keep one best option and reject anything not better than it.
“All intelligent people should think primarily in terms of opportunity costs.”
Thomas Watson said he was smart in spots and stayed around those spots, and Buffett's rule is that if you have doubts about something being in your circle of competence, it isn't; this requires discipline and self-control over long periods.
“I'm no genius. I'm just smart in spots, and I stay around those spots.”
GEICO's advertising rose from a little over $20 million a year when Buffett bought control in 1995 to about $800 million a year, aiming to make everyone in the United States think of GEICO when they consider saving money on insurance.
“We were spending a little over 20 million a year when we bought control in 1995.”
Buffett recognized in 2000 that the Internet would hurt Berkshire's World Book encyclopedia and Buffalo News businesses, since the Internet has near-zero incremental unit cost versus paper, trucks, carriers, and printing presses.
“Now you have the Internet that has virtually no incremental unit cost and could deliver the information instantaneously”
Steven Spielberg has received about 2 percent of Universal Studios ticket sales for years, earning an estimated $30 to $70 million annually, and buying him out was estimated at $1.5 to $1.7 billion in Universal disclosures.
“Steven Spielberg for quite a while has gotten 2% on all of Universal Studios ticket sales.”
Buffett and Munger prefer to go heavily into their best ideas rather than hold small positions, since good ideas are too scarce to be parsimonious with. Munger's summary is that the whole secret of investment is to find places where it is safe and wise not to diversify.
“The whole secret of investment is to find places where it's safe and wise to not diversify.”
Munger argues that no business was ruined by being over-downsized, while many were ruined by bloat, and that it is fashionable but wrong to assume downsizing is always bad. Oil company employment relative to barrels produced has fallen dramatically over twenty years, showing efficiency gains.
“It has gotten fashionable to assume downsizing is wrong.”
Rockefeller always moved into battle backed by abundant cash, keeping plentiful reserves through downturns and booms, so he won many bidding contests because his war chest was deeper than competitors'.
“he kept plentiful reserves and won many bidding contests simply because his war chest was deeper.”
Investors should read extensively in business history and old articles, building a mosaic of historical patterns against which new information can be judged, just as one needs a baseline of baseball statistics to judge a .300 hitter.
“You have to have some kind of mosaic there that your thinking is implanted against”
Leon Hess built a business out of a refinery byproduct that others threw away, and Sam Zemurray built a banana empire by selling bananas that others could not sell within two days, showing that discarded products are often overlooked opportunities.
“Hey, that product that you as a refiner are throwing away, I'm going to make a business out of that.”
Munger argues that good businesses periodically make today's results look worse to help tomorrow, and that most businesses are poorly run, because the talent gap among American managers is enormous and the Fortune 500 CEOs are not uniformly selected like Olympians.
“The CEOs of the Fortune 500 are not selected like the members of the Olympic track and field team.”
Jay Pritzker told Sam Zell that a deal's many risk factors reduce to one key variable, and solving for that variable determines whether the deal works. Coca-Cola illustrates this: over a century, wars, pandemics, and crashes mattered less than how many servings were sold each day, which reached about one billion per day by 1998.
“There's only one variable. And if you solve for that variable, the deal will work out.”
Buffett and Munger argue that envy, not greed, drives the world, so people must cure themselves of envy and aim to deserve the success they receive, being known as having won fairly and used wisely.
“None envied this man's success. So fairly won and wisely used.”
The largest mistakes are often mistakes of omission, which do not show up in financial statements but appear in opportunity costs. Munger's example is failing to buy 1,500 more shares of Belridge Oil when offered, which he says cost him about $200 million.
“The mistakes that have been the most extreme in our history are mistakes of omission. They do not show up in our figures.”
Jeff Bezos watched Amazon's stock fall from $113 to $6 but tracked internal metrics such as customer counts and profit per unit, which were improving, and he knew that a fixed-cost business would become profitable above a certain volume. Investors and operators should base decisions on fundamentals rather than other people's opinions or prices.
“I watched the stock fall from $113 to 6. But I was also watching all of our internal business metrics”
Staying in the game long enough lets luck arrive. Someone else may invent a technology that drastically increases your market, as television and cable expanded the baseball audience and Rockefeller's oil demand grew with Henry Ford's Model T. Walt Disney blew up a partnership to keep TV rights and so could capture that expansion.
“stay in the game long enough to get lucky, someone else can invent a technology that drastically increases your market.”
A brand is a promise, and owning mindshare produces unexpected, compounding benefits over time. GEICO's advertising aims for ubiquity so people remember to check their insurance, and Costco has built such ferocious customer loyalty that members stay for decades.
“A brand is a promise. That's still the best description or the best definition of a brand I've ever come across.”
Rockefeller's observation that information quality matters more than speed still applies, and the speed of information does not matter to Buffett. What matters is processing the information and reaching good judgment, which requires good information rather than quick information.
“The speed of information really doesn't make any difference to us. It's the processing and finally coming to some judgment that has some utility.”
Munger's hiring approach for CEOs is to find someone who has already done the job well and ask them to do it for Berkshire, rather than hiring for potential or youth. Buffett's view is that outstanding managers are invaluable, and that banjo hitters who claim to be power hitters seldom transform.
“We find somebody that did a good job before and ask them to do the same job for us.”
In business, the winning system often goes ridiculously far in maximizing or minimizing one or a few variables, and for most people specialization is a sound strategy. Munger's analogy is that no one wants a doctor who is half proctologist and half dentist.
“I think it's a great strategy for the great mass of humanity, is to specialize.”
Most great fortunes were built by entrepreneurs who started businesses with concrete products rather than by investing; Nick Sleep's line is that the greatest investors are entrepreneurs who never sold, and Bloomberg built his fortune by identifying a wonderful business rather than trading.
“the greatest investors aren't investors at all. They're entrepreneurs who never sold.”
Fortunes in this country were built by people who identified a wonderful business, one resistant to effective competition, and such businesses protect wealth across generations. Coca-Cola is an example because there are not fifty Coca-Colas, and an owner who holds such a business can make a family wealthy for generations.
“There aren't 50 Coca-Colas. A really wonderful business is very well protected against the vicissitudes of the economy over time and competition.”
Berkshire keeps a deliberately understaffed headquarters with low overhead. Munger's joke that they had no staffing papers and no staff reflects a belief that bloat ruins businesses more often than downsizing does, and that businesses should question whether each process or person is needed.
“Not only did we not have any staffing papers, we didn't have any staff.”
Companies should maximize the share of management time spent on value for customers and minimize overhead and processes that don't help. Buffett estimates most public-company CEOs waste about a third of their time, and Berkshire managers can spend 100 percent focused on what counts.
“I would guess that CEOs of most public companies waste a third of their time, at least on all kinds of things that really don't add a thing to the business”
Jay Gould, while building wealth in railroads, spotted the telegraph monopoly Western Union by seeing that telegraph lines ran alongside the railroad tracks he owned, and recognized how much money the telegraph business made.
“I'd rather be the president of Western Union than the president of the United States.”
Buffett's Grinnell College endowment bought 10 percent of Intel's original private placement but sold a few years later, and Buffett bought Disney stock after meeting Walt Disney in 1966 at 31 cents per share and sold near 48 cents, showing the gap between knowing talent and acting on it.
“He paid 31 cents a share and sold when the stock went to 48 cents a share.”
Rockefeller's oil fortune benefited from Henry Ford's mass-produced automobile, which increased demand for petroleum, and Rockefeller admired Ford in his 80s.
“Henry Ford came to visit today. And I just love spending time with him”
Buffett and Munger evaluate each business against a screen of dozens of alternatives, like a baseball scout comparing players against each other with limited roster spots, so they are always prioritizing and selecting.
“But it's just like a scout in baseball thinking about one baseball player against an alternative.”
Learning is not memorizing information but changing behavior. Buffett and Munger sold winners too early, such as Intel after knowing Bob Noyce, and Disney stock after meeting Walt Disney, so they must rub their noses in their mistakes to avoid repeating them.
“One thing that Buffett and Munger taught me is that learning is not memorizing information. Learning is changing your behavior.”
The world is overwhelmingly short-term focused, so an edge comes from doing the opposite. Andy Taylor's 38-year focus at Enterprise Rent-A-Car, which grew revenue from $78 million to $24 billion, illustrates that sustained focus is rare and valuable.
“Well, if you want an edge, you just do the opposite of what the world does.”
Michael Dell designed a business that fits how he wants to spend his time, so he drew energy where others burned out. Buffett similarly argues there is more than one way to invest and that his approach would not work for Peter Lynch, nor Lynch's for him.
“I've said on investing, there's more than one way to get to heaven.”
Paying a lot for top talent is worthwhile because a truly talented person is almost impossible to overpay. Apple's roughly half-billion-dollar NeXT deal to rehire Steve Jobs is the example, but incentive design matters, since rewarding only short-term profits leads managers to cut necessary advertising.
“You don't want to award profits alone.”
When a technology threatens your business, the right response is to move into the oncoming phenomenon, as Billy Durant did when he left horse carriages for automobiles a decade and a half before Ford solved mass production. Many industries will be severely diminished by new technology.
“the proper response, in my opinion, is to be like Billy Durant.”
Jimmy Buffett, who had only two modest hits about 20 years apart, reached a multibillion-dollar net worth through licensing deals using the Buffett name and Margaritaville, earning around $70 million a year.
“The one outlier on that list is Jimmy Buffett, who had like two hits.”
Munger's method is to pick an extreme example, such as an outlier company or founder, and ask 'what the hell happened here?' to extract transferable lessons about business. Munger and Buffett use history and extreme cases to learn the general pattern.
“You pick an extreme example and ask what the hell happened here?”
Organizations should measure the share of company time spent on value-creating activity rather than overhead and processes, a tracking metric David says he has never seen used.
“It'd be very fascinating if you have a tool that can actually calculate what percent of your company's time is actually focused on making magic”
Both Buffett and Munger attribute their development to admirable role models, first inside their families, then outside them. Munger credits his grandfather Judge Munger's sound judgment and financial strength, which helped the family survive the Great Depression, as a model for his own role.
“I think we're helped because we came from families where there were some admirable people and we tended to identify other admirable people outside of the family.”
Investors who abused leverage were ruined, as with a man who had a $2.5 million house and $5 million in securities, who kept selling naked puts secured by his account to fund his lifestyle and ended up losing the house and securities and working in a restaurant.
“he kept selling naked puts secured by his account, and in due time, he didn't have the $5 million of securities and he didn't have the house”
Opportunity is hidden in plain sight. Jerry Jones was the 76th buyer to be offered the Dallas Cowboys after 75 others declined, and paid $140 million for a franchise worth roughly $10 billion decades later. Leon Hess turned a refinery's discarded product into a business that later sold for about $53 billion.
“Jerry Jones was the 76th person, right? 75 other people before buying the Dallas Cowboys said no.”
Coca-Cola benefited enormously from refrigeration, an invention by someone outside Coca-Cola, illustrating that external technology can expand a company's market.
“Coke or Coca-Cola benefited incredibly because somebody else that did not work at Coca-Cola invented refrigeration”
Munger strongly recommends Ron Chernow's Titan on Rockefeller as one of the best business biographies ever. Buffett and Munger also recommend Katharine Graham's autobiography, Larry Cunningham's Essays of Warren Buffett, and Steven Levy's In the Plex, and say history gives a mosaic against which new information can be judged.
“Another book I like very much is Titan by Ron Chernow.”
Buffett argues that if you enjoy your work you are likely to get a better result than if you go to work with your teeth clenched every morning.
“If you enjoy what you're doing, you are likely to get a better result than if you go to work with your teeth clenched every morning.”
Buffett told his partners how he liked to spend his time and be judged, and Berkshire's owned businesses are generally kept rather than sold even when they earn less, because the company's preferences are stated clearly. Being explicit about what you value makes you easier to partner with.
“I like to be judged on the scorecard at the end of the year rather than on every stroke”
Successful focused businesses resist customer requests to add more products, because each addition dilutes the core. Todd Graves refused to add dessert or spicy options, saying the menu was the same as on the day he opened.
“No, I like the menu the way it is today. That was exactly how it was the day I opened.”
The talent among Fortune 500 CEOs is not uniform, unlike Olympic teams, and includes both terrific people and a lot of mediocrity, which is why finding great managers and keeping them matters.
“The CEOs of the Fortune 500 are not selected like the members of the Olympic track and field team.”
Buffett bought Scott & Fetzer in 1986 at $60 per share after writing a letter to CEO Ralph Schey that offered the price and proposed a Chicago meeting, and Buffett's negotiation with Clayton Homes held firm at $12.50 per share, illustrating disciplined, low-ego pricing.
“Even if all the capital and stock markets shut down, you can still bank on my 12 and 50 cents price.”
Buffett's advice is to find the .400 hitters and then not tell them how to swing, so that top performers who love their work can be left alone. Berkshire employs people who would outwork 95 percent of others without financial need.
“The important thing we do with managers generally is to find the .400 hitters and then not tell them how to swing.”
David believes people who do only one thing and do it over and over have an edge, and he notes an asymmetry: a person in a narrow field would beat an outsider who tried to enter, but the reverse is not true.
“If I jumped in your game, you would kick my ass. Why do you think this?”
Good news takes care of itself, so you only need to hear bad news. Problems should be addressed immediately rather than allowed to fester, since procrastination on unpleasant problems is common when things are going well.
“You ought to jump on everything. Charlie has pushed me all my life to make sure that I attack unpleasant problems that surface.”
Buffett argues that people trading Berkshire shares hold differing opinions on valuation and that it does not matter, so one should not make decisions based on what others think.
“You really should not make decisions based on what other people think”
The host argues that people who are so good at their jobs that someone writes a book about their life form the most extreme possible subset of humanity, making biographies an ideal sample for asking what is going on.
“You can't have a more extreme subset of the human population than somebody that was so good at their job that somebody decided they had to write a book about that person's life.”
Sam Walton constantly questioned any extra layer of management or process, and when Walmart needed staff with handheld scanners to check shelf prices, he asked why the problem was not solved right the first time. The lesson is to be wary of solving problems by adding people.
“Why do we have this extra layer? Why don't we just do it right the first time?”
Naval Ravikant argues that someone not fully committed will be outperformed by someone fully committed, and in the domain of ideas, compounding and leverage amplify this gap by a large margin.
“If you're not a hundred percent into it, somebody else who is a hundred percent into it will outperform you.”
Many people have started a 'Bloomberg killer' but few have displaced the incumbent, which is still printing cash 50 years later, illustrating that wonderful businesses resist competition.
“How many people have said, 'I started a Bloomberg killer' and the guy 50 years later is just still printing cash?”
Developing a narrow view about the company's future can cause an investor to miss a great ride, if it prevents acting on the most important factor. Buffett's point is that focusing narrowly on details obscures the variable that matters.
“If you developed a view on any other subject in any other way that forestalled you on acting on that which is most important”
Buffett says he does not need precise valuations to identify a great business, since he can tell a company is financially fat in the same way one recognizes someone weighing 300 to 350 pounds without knowing their exact weight.
“That's all I'm looking for, something that is financially fat.”
Buffett said he watched Amazon from the start, that Bezos's building of an economic machine in retail and cloud from zero was close to a miracle, and that he underestimated Bezos even though Berkshire never bought a share.
“I had a very, very, very high opinion of Jeff's ability when I first met him, and I underestimated him.”
Asked for the best investment he ever made, Buffett answers that it was getting Charlie Munger as his partner, which illustrates how much the value of talent can exceed any single asset.
“The best investment was getting Charlie to be my partner.”
Todd Graves built Raising Cane's around one product, chicken fingers, and reached a valuation around $10 billion by doing that one thing better than anyone. Extreme focus compounds: small efficiencies like faster drive-thru turnover make a large difference across 600 to 800 locations.
“Todd Graves sells chicken fingers. That is all he does. He just happens to do it better than anybody else in the world.”
Buffett and Munger argue that people make their own luck through curiosity and seeking wisdom, and that intense interest in a subject is indispensable for excelling in it. Munger's example is Buffett going to Washington D.C. at 21 to knock on doors about GEICO.
“So we also made our own luck by being curious and seeking wisdom.”
Munger's observation that Costco has created ferocious customer loyalty, and that strange things happen when you do that long enough, applies to Coca-Cola, Disney, and other brands with similar loyalty.
“Costco has created ferocious customer loyalty. And of course, strange things happen when you do that long enough.”
Berkshire employees who have no financial need to work still outwork 95 percent of people because they love the work, a pattern Buffett illustrates with Novak Djokovic, who said he could carry on playing because he likes hitting the tennis ball.
“I can carry on playing at this level because I like hitting the tennis ball, it's simple.”
Steve Jobs eliminated annual reviews, arguing that feedback should be given constantly rather than once a year, and the host suggests this reflects a broader practice of questioning whether each process and person is needed.
“I'm giving you feedback constantly. Why would I wait for 12, you know, once a year to give you feedback?”
Munger's advice is not to look for other Warrens, because there are not many of them, and so one should rely on great managers without expecting to replicate exceptional investors.
“You should not be looking for other Warrens on the theory that they're under every bush”
Munger said Rockefeller was the greatest entrepreneur of all time, and the host argues Buffett and Munger think in ways similar to Rockefeller.
“he actually said that he thought Rockefeller was the greatest entrepreneur of all time.”
Buffett's coal research questions revealed honest competitive assessments.
“If they had to sell short in the equivalent amount, one coal company, which would it be and why?”
Repeats the Gould example in a shorter form; this duplicates the earlier Gould claim and adds no new content.
“Cornelius Vanderbilt, when he was the richest man in America in his 70s, said that Jay Gould, who was in his 30s at the time, was the smartest man in America.”