What this covers

Howard Marks, co-founder of Oaktree Capital, sits down with the hosts of My First Million to discuss his framework for thinking about investment risk and timing. The conversation covers his core thesis: that market risk originates not from companies or securities themselves, but from human behavior and crowd psychology. Marks walks through how superior returns come from clinically assessing where the market sits in its emotional cycle—carefree and overpriced, or terrified and underpriced—and acting against the prevailing mood. He draws on three decades of his own investing decisions, including Oaktree's timing of major capital deployments before the 2008 crisis and its distressed-debt strategy after Lehman's collapse.

The discussion moves across several practical territories. Marks lays out the three biggest investor mistakes: overestimating predictability of the future, assuming trends will continue unchanged, and letting emotions override discipline. He addresses the current valuation environment directly, citing S&P P/E ratios near 23–24, which historically have preceded roughly zero annualized returns over the following decade. He distinguishes between active risk-taking and what he calls "avoiding losers"—arguing that a portfolio consistently in the second quartile, year after year, compounds into top-tier long-term results. The episode also covers how to recognize overheated or depressed markets through behavioral signals (whether investing is celebrated or shunned at social gatherings), why raising capital during a crisis is nearly impossible, and why most simple investing wisdom—Buffett's included—is easy to state but hard to execute. Throughout, Marks emphasizes that investors cannot know the future, only assess where they stand in the cycle and adjust their posture accordingly.

Sharpest takeaway

Marks argues that successful investing depends on recognizing where we stand in market cycles and understanding investor behavior rather than predicting the future, and that avoiding losses through disciplined contrarian thinking compounds better than chasing winners.

  • Understanding current market conditions and cycle positioning improves odds of good outcomes better than macro forecasting
  • Investor behavior drives market extremes—when others are greedy/fearful, prices move away from value; identifying this allows contrarian positioning
  • Consistent avoidance of large losses ('fewer losers') compounds to better long-term results than occasional home runs

The claims · ranked80 claims · weighted by value

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0.93

Oaktree decided to deploy its $7B distressed fund after Lehman's bankruptcy based on pure logic rather than analysis: if you invest and the world melts down it doesn't matter what you did, but if you don't invest and the world doesn't melt down you failed your job—and historically the world usually doesn't melt down.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“If we invest it and the world melts down, it doesn't matter what we did. But if I don't invest it and the world doesn't melt down, then we didn't do our job. QED. You have to move forward.”

0.86

You cannot raise money in a crisis because the same factors that frighten the world frighten your prospective investors, who put their hands in their pockets; therefore Oaktree raised its opportunistic capital before the 2008 crisis hit, going to clients on the first day of 2007 to build the fund that would deploy when the crisis arrived.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“You can't raise money in a crisis... Because the same factors that influence the world influence the people you talk to and everybody else stick their hands in their pockets”

0.86

The three biggest mistakes investors make are: (1) believing they understand and can accurately know what the future holds; (2) assuming the world will remain as it is—that current trends continue and no new trends emerge; and (3) letting emotions rise and fall and dictate actions instead of doing what they should.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“the biggest single mistake that investors make is that they think the world will remain the way it is. That the things that are working today will continue to work... and that there won't be any new trends.”

0.86

Being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong; bubble.com succeeded because it was both right and right fast, with the tech bubble collapsing within about six months of the January 2000 memo.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong. So, the the answer is I was not too far ahead.”

0.83

A portfolio that ranks consistently in the second quartile every year (e.g., between the 27th and 47th percentile for 14 years, as General Mills' equity fund did) can finish in the top few percent for the whole period—because avoiding bad years compounds favorably—which is why pursuing consistency and avoiding self-inflicted losses beats swinging for the top.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“in 14 years the the equities General Mills equity portfolio was never above the 27th percentile or below the 47th percentile... where do you think it was for the whole period?... The answer is fourth.”

0.81

The riskiest place is where there appears to be no risk, because market risk does not come from companies, securities, or exchanges but from the behavior of people: when others are carefree their behavior raises prices and makes them precarious, and when others are terrified their behavior suppresses prices to giveaway levels.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“the riskiest thing in the world is the place that there's no risk. The risk in the markets does not come from the companies, the securities, or the institutions like the exchanges. The risk in the markets comes from the behavior of people.”

0.80

Good contrarian investing requires acting like a battlefield hero—not someone who is unafraid, but someone who does the right thing anyway despite feeling the same fear-inducing environment everyone else feels.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“a battlefield hero is not somebody who's unafraid. It's somebody who does it anyway. And that's that's the way you have to be.”

0.80

Buffett and similar investors give away their 'secrets' without fear of being caught up to, because telling people what to do is easy but doing it is hard—the things great investors must do are simple but not easy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“we can tell them all day long what what you should do but it's hard to do... I think the things we have to do are simple. They're just not easy to do.”

0.80

For someone with a surplus of money beyond what they need, the first purpose of that money should be to make them comfortable; it makes no sense to risk what you have and need to get what you don't have and don't need.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“if you have more money than you need to eat, the first purpose of your money should be to make you comfortable”

0.80

Portfolio management should not be framed as binary 'buy or sell' or 'risk on or risk off'; instead investors should think of a continuum from aggressive to defensive (like a 0-100 pedometer), identify their appropriate normal posture, and try to stay there most of the time, adjusting the mix rather than going all-or-nothing.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“the the operative continuum to think about is the continuum that runs from aggressive to defensive. And I think about it as a pedometer in the car. So, zero is no risk, 100 is max risk.”

0.80

When identifying bubble conditions, Marks observed that people were engaging in optimism not pessimism, greed not fear, credulousness not skepticism, and risk tolerance not risk aversion—these behavioral indicators were more important than any specific metric.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“We figured out that people were engaging in optimism, not pessimism, greed, not fear, uh credulousness, not skepticism, risk tolerance, not risk aversion.”

0.80

The fortunes and outlook of companies don't change much year-to-year; what changes is how people think about what's going on, creating variation in the relationship between price and value—markets go from hating stocks to loving them.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“the fortunes of companies and the outlook for companies doesn't change much. What and I'm I'm writing a memo about this that'll come out one of these days. And what changes is how people think about what's going on and think about the future. And so what changes is the relationship of price to what I'll call value.”

0.80

Prudent diversification can call for certain investment positions and composition that contradict what reality shows is happening in specific assets—you cannot ignore reality even if it contradicts your intended strategy.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Prudent diversification calls for certain investment positions and a variety of them in a certain composition. Reality says, 'I see Fenwick Chemicals burning to the ground. Get me out.' And you have you can't ignore reality.”

0.79

Although the S&P 500 has averaged about 10% per year over 100 years, the annual return is almost never between 8% and 12%; the norm is not the average, so individual years tend to be extreme rather than near the mean.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“on average, it has returned 10% a year for 100 years. But, do you know that the annual return is almost never between eight and 12?”

0.78

We never know where we're going, but we can know where we are; understanding where you stand in the market cycle determines what probably will happen and how likely it is, which improves your odds without making you a sure winner.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“we never know where we're going, but we sure as hell would have know where we are”

0.78

Companies' fortunes and outlooks don't change much; what changes is how people think about what's going on and about the future, which changes the relationship of price to value—when people love assets too much expect prices to fall (bubble), and when they hate them too much expect prices to rise (crash).

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“the fortunes of companies and the outlook for companies doesn't change much. What... changes is how people think about what's going on and think about the future. And so what changes is the relationship of price to what I'll call value.”

0.78

You can assess whether a market is overheated or too shunned by observing behavioral indicators—whether investing TV shows are popular, whether investors are mobbed or shunned at cocktail parties, and whether deals get done easily or are left begging—if you observe methodically and clinically.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Are the TV shows about investing popular or unpopular? If an investor goes to a cocktail party is he mobbed or shunned?... you can figure out from that checklist whether the market is overheated and too popular or frigid”

0.78

It is impossible to know or analyze the future because it does not yet exist; the only way to get a handle on the future is to study the past, look for the repetition of patterns, and judge whether they apply today—because human nature causes themes to rhyme from cycle to cycle.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“there is no such thing as knowing something about the future... the only thing you can do to get a handle on the future is look at the past. And uh look for the repetition of patterns, as Twain said, and try to figure out if they apply today.”

0.78

Because you cannot predict the future, active investing in the efficient-market sense doesn't reliably work; rather than trying to hit winners like an aggressive tennis player, you should try to avoid hitting losers and keep the ball in play—'fewer winners, fewer losers' rather than 'more winners.'

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“rather than try to hit winners like the tennis player, you should try to avoid hitting losers and keep the ball in play. And that has always defined my investing style.”

0.78

The same developments affecting the broader environment affect individual investors emotionally; you are subject to the same news, pessimism, and dire forecasts as everyone else, which is what makes acting against sentiment so difficult.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“the same developments in the environment that that affect everybody else will affect you. You're subject to them, you feel them, you read about them, you hear about them, everybody tells you how dire the outlook is. And you know, uh it's hard to ignore them.”

0.78

Mark Twain's saying 'history does not repeat, but it does rhyme' means that certain behavioral themes recur across generations and cycles because they are embedded in human nature, allowing pattern recognition of cycles even though the future is unknowable.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“one of the quotes I use the most now is from uh Mark Twain, who said history does not repeat, but it does rhyme. There are certain themes that rhyme from generation to generation and cycle to cycle because they are embedded in human nature, and so they recur.”

0.75

The S&P 500 has returned 10% per year on average over 100 years, but the annual return is almost never between 8% and 12%—it either kills it or dies, meaning the norm is not the average.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“on average, it has returned 10% a year for 100 years. But, do you know that the annual return is almost never between eight and 12? Yeah, like it it kills it or it dies.”

0.74

Marks' clients don't care if Oaktree is ever in the top 5% of managers and absolutely don't want to see Oaktree in the bottom 5%, so the 'fewer losers' philosophy (consistency) is the right approach for his clients, not the 'more winners' (high volatility) approach.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“my clients don't care if I'm ever in the top five and they absolutely don't want to see me in the bottom five. So, my reaction is the first guy's approach is the right one for me.”

0.74

A book by Richard Oldfield is entitled 'Simple but not easy,' capturing the essence that the things investors have to do are simple in concept but not easy to execute.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Friend of mine Richard Oldfield in London wrote a book once entitled simple but not easy. I think the things we have to do are simple. They're just not easy to do.”

0.74

It's hard to predict the end of the world, hard to assign high probability to global meltdown, and hard to know what to do if it happens; most of the time the world doesn't melt down, so betting on non-meltdown is the right probabilistic choice.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“I also wrote that it's hard to predict the end of the world. It's hard to assign a high probability to it. It's hard to know what to do if the world is going to melt down. If you do those things and the world doesn't melt down, it's probably a disaster and most of the world time the world doesn't melt down.”

0.74

The big money is made by 'catching falling knives carefully'—buying distressed assets during crises when prices are lowest, which is why you must position capital before crisis hits.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“I believe that you make the big money catching falling knives carefully.”

0.74

A great quote from a retired trader states 'when the time comes to buy, you won't want to,' because the best buying opportunities occur at points of lowest consensus, during pessimism, fear, and conservatism, which are emotionally difficult conditions.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“I came across a great quote within the last year from a guy who's a retired trader, when the time comes to buy, you won't want to. And and That and that that that encapsulated encapsulates so much wisdom because what is it that causes the great moments to buy? It's probably the point of lowest consensus.”

0.74

When investors are imprudent and carefree, prices rise unduly and become precarious; when investors are terrified, prices fall to levels where assets become bargains, creating a mandate for contrarian behavior.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“When others are imprudent, you should be prudent. When other people are carefree, you should be terrified because their behavior unduly raises prices and makes them precarious. When other people are terrified, you should be aggressive because their behavior suppresses prices to the point where everything's a giveaway.”

0.71

The Fed's actions at the start of 2009—cutting interest rates to zero for the first time in history and introducing quantitative easing—saved the economy and prevented the feared meltdown, resulting in relatively few bankruptcies outside the financial sector, which made Oaktree's crisis investments good but not a 'barn burner.'

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“the Fed mobilized uh very astutely cutting interest rates to zero for the first time in history at the beginning of '09 and introducing QE. And those two things saved the economy.”

0.70

A conservative non-active investor worried about high S&P valuations can rebalance into high-yield (low-grade credit) bonds, which currently yield 7-8% and are backed by contractual obligations enforceable through bankruptcy, giving them much less uncertainty and downside than equities though with annual taxation on the income.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“today, you can buy high-yield bonds, whether it be the US or Europe or variations on that theme, what we call low grade uh credit. And you can buy buy it to get yields of seven to eight.”

0.69

Charlie Ellis wrote an influential 1974 article 'Winning the Loser's Game' arguing that because the future cannot be predicted, active investing doesn't work and instead of trying to hit winners (like tennis), investors should focus on avoiding losers and keeping the ball in play.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“back in '74 I think Charlie Ellis wrote an article Winning the Loser's Game where he said that because you can't predict the future, active investing doesn't work. He was a believer in the efficient market. So, rather than try to hit winners like the tennis player, you should try to avoid hitting losers and keep the ball in play.”

0.69

There is a negative correlation between the S&P 500's P/E ratio at purchase and the annualized return over the following 10 years; historically, buying when the P/E was 23 produced annualized 10-year returns of between +2% and -2% in every case with no exceptions, and the S&P's P/E is currently around 23-24.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“if you bought the S&P when the P/E ratio was 23, in every case, there were no exceptions. In every case, your annualized return over the next 10 years was between two and minus two.”

0.68

Warren Buffett has always tried to educate people and share his knowledge, and when people ask if he's afraid of giving away his secrets so others will emulate and catch up, the answer is no because the core concepts are simple but difficult to execute.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Warren has always tried to just educate people and share his knowledge and and people say well why do you give away your secrets? Aren't you afraid that other people will emulate you and and and catch up with you? But I don't think so because you know we can tell them all day long what what you should do but it's hard to do.”

0.68

If you zig when others zig, you will not outperform—outperformance requires zigging when others zag, which is why contrarian positioning is the only viable path to above-market returns.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“The only thing I'm sure of is that if you zig when they zig, you're not going to outperform.”

0.68

Warren Buffett's principle 'Don't risk what you have and need to get what you don't have and don't need' means someone with surplus wealth should not expose themselves to stress-inducing investments that threaten their daily comfort.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“Buffett says, 'Don't risk what you have and need to get what you don't have and don't need.' It does makes no sense uh for somebody with a surplus of money to make their daily life less pleasant by going to investments that put them under pressure.”

0.66

The risk in markets does not come from companies, securities, or institutions, but from the behavior of people—investor emotion and herding drive market extremes that create opportunity and danger.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“The risk in the markets comes from the behavior of people. And it's that for that reason that Buffett says, 'When others are imprudent, you should be prudent. When other people are carefree, you should be terrified because their behavior unduly raises prices and makes them precarious.'”

0.63

Investor behavior has shifted such that in Marks' era there were no famous investors, but now there are celebrity investors (Buffett, others) who are philosophers and public educators, paralleling shifts in tech CEOs becoming power players and comedians becoming trusted media.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (likely host, not Marks)

“there was like no celebrity investors. There's no like famous person who was doing what you were doing and then now you have whether it's Buffett or Munger there's like the investment guys are now like the philosophers... It's like this very strange shift on all fronts where um you know influence has sort of shifted”

0.63

When the S&P 500 P/E ratio is 23, historical data shows annualized returns over the next 10 years fall between 2% and -2% in every historical case—no exceptions—indicating current valuations constrain future returns.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“it showed that historically, if you bought the S&P when the P/E ratio was 23, in every case, there were no exceptions. In every case, your annualized return over the next 10 years was between two and minus two.”

0.63

You cannot raise capital for crisis investing while a crisis is happening because the same factors that affect the world affect investors, causing people to keep their hands in their pockets rather than deploy capital during panic.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“You can't raise money in a crisis. You If you went to people you say world's melting down, we're going to buy all this stuff with it's going to be a bonanza, we're going to get rich. Nobody will give you money. Why? Because the same factors that influence the world influence the people you talk to and everybody else stick their hands in their pockets”

0.63

The Fed's rate cuts to zero and introduction of quantitative easing in early 2009 saved the economy, prevented the meltdown many feared, and resulted in few bankruptcies outside the financial sector despite crisis severity, making Oaktree's crisis fund 'very good, but not a barn burner.'

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“the Fed mobilized uh very astutely cutting interest rates to zero for the first time in history at the beginning of '09 and introducing QE. And those two things saved the economy. So, we didn't get the meltdown that everybody was afraid of and there were relatively few bankruptcies, especially outside the financial sector that result resulted from the global financial crisis.”

0.63

Bond contracts provide creditors with strong incentive for borrowers to pay, because in default/bankruptcy creditors gain control of the company through legal process, making bond defaults rare despite claiming 47 years of high-yield bond experience.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“When you buy a bond, there's a contract that says the borrower will pay you interest every 6 months and give you your money back at the end, and you can figure out the return that is implied by that contract. And if they if the borrower doesn't keep that contract, overgeneralizing, oversimplifying, the creditors get the company through the bankruptcy process. So, the borrower has a lot of incentive to pay you, and they almost always pay. I've been involved in high-yield bonds for 47 years, and I can tell you they've almost all paid.”

0.63

During the Lehman crisis, there were no past patterns to extrapolate because this was the first global financial crisis and the first meltdown of the financial sector since the Great Depression, so Marks resorted to logical reasoning rather than historical analysis.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“there had never been a global financial crisis before. The The meltdown of the financial sector had not been anticipated since the Great Depression. And there was there was there were no past patterns to extrapolate. So, you have to resort to logic.”

0.63

In the tech bubble of 2000, companies with no profits, no revenues, and sometimes no product were being highly valued solely on ideas, which is the epitome of a bubble and mirrors historical bubbles like the South Sea Bubble of 1720.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“The companies with no profits and no revenues were being highly valued. Maybe no product, just an idea. And that is the epitome of a bubble.”

0.60

In a 1990 memo, Marks documented that a General Mills pension fund client ran equities for 14 consecutive years and remained between the 27th and 47th percentile—never above 27th, never below 47th—yet when observers estimated where the 14-year average was, they guessed 37th, but it was actually 4th percentile.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“In 1990 I wrote a memo called The Root to Performance... he had run the fund for 14 years and in 14 years the the equities General Mills equity portfolio was never above the 27th percentile or below the 47th percentile. So, 14 years in a row solidly in the second quartile. Now, if you said to the normal person not in the investment business... where do you think it was for the whole period? They would say, well, let me think. Probably around 37th. The answer is fourth.”

0.59

The 'Poor Man's Guide to Market Assessment' checklist includes observable indicators like whether the market is rising or falling, whether TV shows about investing are popular, whether investors are mobbed or shunned at cocktail parties, and whether deals get done easily or with difficulty, to assess market temperature without sophisticated analysis.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“I had a thing in there called the uh Poor Man's Guide to Market Assessment. And and it says on the left a bunch of things and on the right there's a bunch of things... Is the market rising or falling? Are the TV shows about investing popular or unpopular? If an investor goes to a cocktail party is he mobbed or shunned? Uh are the deals get done easily or hard?”

0.56

Being right in identifying a bubble is valuable partly because it allows you to recognize ramifications across other parts of the world, not just in tech—when you see bubble behavior in one place, look for similar behavior elsewhere.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“things don't happen in isolation uniquely. So, when you when you see something like I describe in the tech bubble, you should realize that maybe there are ramifications in other world parts of the world.”

0.56

Paradoxically, Marks's conservatism served him well in pioneering high-yield bonds in 1978 and distressed debt in 1988 because clients were scared of the risk; his caution actually attracted risk-averse capital to those early businesses.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“the reason I was talking about the appropriateness of credit for Sam is because while the returns are a little lower, there's much less uncertainty and downside. So I I would say that if I I've been in this business 56 years, I would have spent those 56 years in less conservative asset classes, I would have made more money. Having said that, it happens that I went into things like high yield bonds in '78 and distressed debt in '88. And if I had not been a conservative person, I probably wouldn't have had any clients because they would have been scared off by the risk.”

0.56

If you manage your portfolio to be 'always good, sometimes great, never terrible' (like eating at the same excellent Italian restaurant 100% of the time) and compound that approach for 40-50 years without shooting yourself in the foot, it will compound to great results.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“eating in this restaurant is like investing at Oaktree. Always good sometimes great never terrible. Now that to me that sounds like a modest boast. But if you can do that for 40 or 50 years... if you never shoot yourself in the foot... I think it'll compound to great results”

0.56

When facing the decision to deploy capital into Fund 7 during the Lehman crisis with the world potentially melting down, Marks reasoned: if the world melts down, capital deployment doesn't matter; if the world doesn't melt down but you don't deploy, you failed your job—most of the time the world doesn't melt down, so deployment is the rational choice.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“If we invest it and the world melts down, it doesn't matter what we did. But if I don't invest it and the world doesn't melt down, then we didn't do our job. QED.”

0.56

The unsexy idea that consistency beats heroism is undervalued because people don't make motivational videos about 'never shooting yourself in the foot' or 'being consistently above average'—flashy risk-taking is culturally celebrated while quiet discipline is not.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Sam (interviewer)

“I love that because it's one of the unsexy ideas. Like I think any idea you can't, you know, make a movie about or won't make you sound really cool are generally undervalued ideas when they when they actually logically math out the way you the way that one does. And so I sort of that was one that stuck out to me is I I said nobody's going to nobody's going to give you a motivational video about being consistently above average and just never shooting yourself in the foot. Right. Uh it's all about heroic greatness and huge risks you can take and you know being willing to do it.”

0.56

Where an investor stands in a market cycle determines what will probably happen and how likely it is, and understanding cycle positioning can improve odds of success even though it cannot guarantee winning in an uncertain world.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“I believe that where we stand in the cycle determines what probably is going to happen and how likely it is. And understanding that can improve your odds. It can't make you a sure winner, but it can improve your odds, and that's the best we can do in an uncertain world beset by randomness.”

0.56

We never know where we're going, but we sure as hell can figure out where we are, meaning investors should focus on understanding current market conditions rather than attempting macro forecasts about the future.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“One of my sayings is we never know where we're going, but we sure as hell would have know where we are. And at Oaktree, uh we loudly proclaim our uh inability to make macro forecasts and our non-reliance on macro forecasts.”

0.54

In 1998, during the Russian ruble devaluation, Southeast Asian debt crisis, and Long-Term Capital Management meltdown, a young portfolio manager came to Marks expressing terrified pessimism about a global meltdown, but Marks told him to ignore that fear and do his job—a battlefield hero is not someone unafraid but someone who acts anyway.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“1998, we had uh the Russian ruble devaluation, the debt crisis in in Southeast Asia, and um the meltdown of Long-Term Capital Management. And one of our portfolio managers who who was young came to me and he said, 'I think this is it. I think we're going to melt down... I'm terribly pessimistic.' I said, 'Tell me why.' He went through his reasoning. Uh I said, 'Okay, now go back to your desk and do your job.' A a a battlefield hero... is not somebody who's unafraid. It's somebody who does it anyway.”

0.52

A competitor investment firm with strong deep value positioning happened to be overweight in banks, suffered when banks crashed during a crisis, ended up in the bottom percentile, and their president rationalized the outcome by claiming that to be in the top 5% you must be willing to be in the bottom 5% (conflating top performance with risk-taking).

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“another investment management firm had a terrible year because they were deep value investors and they were heavy in the banks and the banks suffered terribly, so they were at the bottom. So, the president comes out... He says the answer is simple. If you want to be in the top 5% of money managers, you have to be willing to be in the bottom.”

0.52

A class of investors has become folk heroes (Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger) who combine high integrity, make greatness seem achievable and relatable, write well, retain information, and make challenging things easy to understand—this is a distinct skill.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Sam (interviewer)

“There's like this um class of investor that's like kind of become like folk hero. Like you know like Warren Buffett's an obvious one where the like a folk hero sort of uh they're high integrity they make greatness seem achievable and relatable uh which is like a whole skill in itself”

0.52

Portfolio management should operate on a continuum from aggressive (100) to defensive (0), where investors should identify their appropriate normal posture and try to stay there, adjusting the mix between risk assets and defensive assets rather than making all-or-nothing bets.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“I think the way when you manage your portfolio, the the operative continuum to think about is the continuum that runs from aggressive to defensive. And I think about it as a pedometer in the car. So, zero is no risk, 100 is max risk. 100% aggressive. You should have a sense for your appropriate normal posture.”

0.48

The best book on investing for Marks was not about mathematical techniques but about investor behavior and financial history, specifically 'A Short History of Financial Euphoria' by John Kenneth Galbraith and 'Devil Take the Hindmost' on financial speculation.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“I've never read any books about how to be an investor like, you know, multiply this by that and add this and subtract that and the books I've found most interesting have always been the ones about investor behavior. And I mentioned Devil Take the Hindmost, 99. One of the greatest books I ever read was before that John Kenneth Galbraith's book called A Short History of Financial Euphoria.”

0.46

The three biggest mistakes investors make are: (1) thinking they understand what the future holds and that belief is accurate; (2) thinking the world will remain the way it is, that working things will continue to work and trends will continue; and (3) letting emotions rise and fall with market movements, causing emotionally-driven decisions.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“the biggest mistakes investors make... Number one do you think you do you think you understand what the future holds... Number two... they think the world will remain the way it is... And then number three is do your emotions uh rise and fall and get you to do what they want as opposed to what you should do.”

0.46

In 2005-2006, Marks detected that the world was behaving in a carefree manner and specific bad deals were being issued (particularly in mortgages), indicating the world was exercising inadequate prudence and pro-risk behavior, which signaled an investment opportunity.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“we detected in '05 '06 that the world was behaving in a in a carefree manner. And and I I would wear out the carpet between my office and Bruce's with the Wall Street Journal and I'd say look at this look at this piece of junk that got issued yesterday. There's something wrong. If a deal like this can get done, the world is exercising inadequate prudence.”

0.46

Marks's worst lifelong mistake was being too conservative—a result of being raised by parents traumatized as adults by the Depression—meaning he would have made more money in less conservative asset classes over 56 years, though his caution also let him pioneer high-yield bonds (1978) and distressed debt (1988) without scaring off clients.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“My worst mistake is that I have always been too conservative. My parents were traumatized by the Depression.”

0.45

For someone like Sam (conservative, has surplus capital, doesn't need the money), the appropriate normal posture on the 0-100 spectrum is around 65, or even 55 given his youth.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“Sam, you're a little conservative guy. You've made so much money you can't believe it, but you don't want to give it back. So So, I would say that you're a you're a 65. And especially given your youth, you may be a 55 for your cohort.”

0.44

Marks' worst mistake was being too conservative throughout his 56-year career, likely stemming from having parents traumatized by the Great Depression, and he likely would be wealthier today if he had been more aggressive, though not necessarily happier.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“My worst mistake is not and I know you're talking about a point in time. My worst mistake is that I have always been too conservative. My parents were traumatized by the Depression... And so you when you grow up with parents of the Depression, they say things like, 'Don't put all your eggs in one basket. Save for a rainy day.' You know, that kind of stuff. And I ended up too conservative. And if I if I wasn't as conservative, I'd be richer today.”

0.44

On January 1, 2007, Oaktree approached clients seeking $3 billion for a new distressed debt fund (compared to $2.5B in their prior 2001 fund), but received $8 billion in commitments and chose to close at $3.5 billion while creating a $7 billion standby fund for future deployment.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“on the first day of '07, we went out we said we think there's a great opportunity coming and we'd like to have 3 billion... Within a month we had eight. And said, you know, we can't do anything with 8 billion. It's it's it exceeds our ability to invest it wisely. So, we're going to take 3 and 1/2 billion and we're going to close the fund.”

0.44

By September 15, 2008 (when Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy), Oaktree's $7 billion Fund 7 was only 12% invested (~$1 billion), with the remainder held dry to deploy during the crisis.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“we started investing gradually investing 7B in June of '08. It's sitting there on the shelf. And by September 18th 15th, [33:12] it was uh no, 18th. It was uh uh 12% invested. So, just over a billion. And Lehman Brothers declares bankruptcy.”

0.43

The bubble.com memo published January 2, 2000 was Marks's first memo in 10 years (since 1990) to receive any response; success required being right fast, because being ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“I wrote bubble.com January the 2nd of 2000, and it had two virtues. It was right, and it was right fast. If you're right slow, it it doesn't look like you were right. One of the great sayings in our business is that being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong.”

0.43

Marks did not actually bet against the tech bubble by shorting stocks; instead, Oaktree preserved capital by staying out of the US stock market entirely and avoiding technology investments.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“we're basically not involved in the US stock market, and we're not involved at all in technology. So, we wouldn't have the chance to apply that.”

0.41

High-yield bonds currently yield 7-8%, which after accounting for annual income taxes yields approximately 4% after-tax, compared to the S&P 10% average which after capital gains taxation yields approximately 7% after-tax.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Howard Marks

“Today, you can buy high-yield bonds, whether it be the US or Europe or variations on that theme, what we call low grade uh credit. And you can buy buy it to get yields of seven to eight. Now, seven to eight is pretty close to 10, so that's that's a good thing. The bad thing is you have to pay tax every year on the on the income. That's a bad thing. But, for those of us who are cautious like you and me, we might say, 'I'll take, you know, eight, which in the long run will give me four after tax, as opposed to 10, which after capital gains taxation will give me seven.'”

0.34

Buffett started around 1953 but wasn't initially famous; there were a few famous people in the investment business back then, but nobody was famous in the wider world.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Howard Marks

“By the way you said there were no famous investors but I think Buffett started around '53 if I'm not mistaken. He just wasn't famous. Yeah. Uh but and and there were a few people who were famous in the investment business but I don't think anybody was in the in the wider world.”

0.30

Investing is a lot like life, and an investor's approach to investing is a way of testing whether their way of living is true.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“investing is a lot like life.”

0.29

The South Sea Company was granted a license to trade with the South Sea (Brazil, not Samoa) to help Britain pay off its national debt through license fees, and became one of the great bubbles when people speculated on its shares.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“Britain had this big national debt, and they concluded that they could uh pay it off by starting a company called the South Sea Company, uh and they granted them a license to trade with the South Sea, by which they meant not Samoa, but Brazil. And and they would charge them a a license fee, and that would pay off the debt. And it was one of the one of the great bubbles.”

0.29

The long-term investment horizon in which historical S&P returns apply is 20 years or more, not shorter periods, because short-term market volatility obscures the long-term fundamental returns of U.S. companies.

definitionestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“And I would say a 20 or more is is is the is the real long term.”

0.26

Investing is a lot like life, and Marks is working on a book exploring this connection between investment principles and life principles.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“Well investing is a lot like life... and and by the way uh I'm working on a book along those lines Sam.”

0.26

Marks' partner Bruce Karsh has been his partner successfully for 37 years and is similarly unemotional, which made management of the partnership easy—no need to restrain him or curb emotional decision-making.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“my partner Bruce Karsh, who's been my partner successfully for 37 years, he's pretty much the same. So that makes it easy. I don't have to restrain him.”

0.26

Marks was born with an unemotional temperament that came naturally, not through practice or conscious restraint, and while being unemotional is an advantage in investing, it is not an advantage in life arenas like marriage.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“No, these things are not intentional on my part. You think you're born like that? I was born unemotional... I wrote in my book that it's really important to be unemotional in investing. Not so good to be unemotional in life in in arenas like marriage... for me it came naturally.”

0.23

Marks was secure but not rich when he started running money in 1978, had good money and lived well, and his wife essentially gave him a kick to overcome his innate caution to help start Oaktree in 1985-1988, which he likely wouldn't have done without her.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“I was secure. I I wasn't rich by today's standards, and I may not have been rich by the standards at the time. But I had I had lot I had good money and I lived well. So I started running money in '78... My wife had to give me a kick in the ass, uh which she uh happily did. Um I I may not have done it without her, probably wouldn't have.”

0.22

In 1978, the head of Citibank's bond department received a call mentioning 'some guy in California named something like Milken' who invests in high-yield bonds, and asked Marks to figure out what that means—which launched Marks' 47-year involvement in high-yield bonds.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“I get a phone call from the head of the bond department saying that there's some guy in in California named something like Milken, and he he invests in something called high-yield bonds. Can you figure out what that means? And I said, 'Yes.' And I became a high-yield bond investor. And and you know what? When you buy a bond... I've been involved in high-yield bonds for 47 years”

0.22

Marks joined Citibank's investment research department in 1969 as an equity analyst, but the bank performed so badly that in 1978 he was 'banished to the bond department'—which was like being sent to Siberia, but saved his job due to lifetime employment.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“I joined Citibank in the investment research department in 1969 as an equity analyst. And the bank did so horribly that in '78, I was banished to the bond department. And the bond department was the equivalent of Siberia. The good news is that at that time, American corporations pretty much gave lifetime employment. So, I didn't get sacked.”

0.21

Howard Marks was born unemotional and did not develop his investing equanimity through any intentional mindset shift or practice; his longtime partner Bruce Karsh is similarly unemotional, making it easy.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Howard Marks

“these things are not intentional on my part... I was born unemotional.”

0.20

Marks cites John Kenneth Galbraith's 'A Short History of Financial Euphoria' (~100 pages) as one of the greatest books he ever read; its brevity appeals to him as a slow reader, and it was pivotal in his thinking.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“One of the greatest books I ever read was before that John Kenneth Galbraith's book called A Short History of Financial Euphoria. That was really pivotal for me. And since I'm a slow reader, I like the fact it was only about 100 pages.”

0.20

Marks' first book 'The Most Important Thing' contained the Poor Man's Guide framework, which has been half or more than half tongue-in-cheek but actually descriptive of practical market assessment.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Howard Marks

“In my first book The Most Important Thing I had a thing in there called the uh Poor Man's Guide to Market Assessment... and and it was half tongue-in-cheek or maybe more than half.”