
Ray Dalio on Career, Market Cycles, China Debt
What this covers
This is a one-hour onstage conversation at the Bloomberg Opinion Masters in Business event, in which Barry Ritholtz interviews Ray Dalio of Bridgewater Associates. It begins with Dalio's own history: clerking on the New York Stock Exchange floor during the 1971 dollar crisis, when Nixon ended the dollar's link to gold and Dalio's intuition about the market's reaction proved wrong. It then moves to his 1982 call on emerging-market bank lending. He saw the banking crisis coming but misjudged its economic consequences, and he lost money for himself and his clients. Those episodes lead into his claim that independent thinking matters because markets price in the consensus.
The middle of the conversation lays out his template for the debt cycle. Steady productivity growth sits underneath a short-term business cycle and a longer accumulation cycle. Rising asset prices feed collateral and confidence, and a shadow banking system grows outside regulation. Dalio ties the present to the early 1930s and late 1930s: zero rates, quantitative easing (QE)), polarization, populism and wealth disparity. He argues that a reserve currency invites overborrowing, and that U.S. debt-selling needs could become a problem in five to ten years. He also forecasts lower returns across all asset classes for a long time, since buybacks and cheap debt have run their course.
The geopolitical thread is the most contested. Dalio draws on Graham Allison and The Thucydides Trap, saying that 12 of 16 rising-power challenges in 500 years ended in war. He sees de-globalization as pulling the U.S. and UK one way while China, through One Belt One Road, pulls the other. On China's debt he says most of it is local-currency and internal, so he thinks productivity growth deserves more attention than default risk. The discussion closes on practical advice for ordinary investors, who he says should favor diversification and risk parity over market timing, and on his management ideas of radical transparency and idea meritocracy.
Dalio argues that debt crises follow universal mechanical cause-effect patterns across history and countries, and understanding these templates allows policymakers and investors to navigate recurring cycles more effectively; today's environment parallels the late 1930s in ways that demand attention to political polarization, reserve currency dynamics, and the rising power challenge from China.
- Debt cycles—short-term business cycles and longer-term accumulation cycles—repeat with consistent mechanics: credit extension, asset price inflation, collateral confidence, shadow banking growth, monetary tightening, and eventual contraction
- Late 1930s parallels: central banks near zero rates, limited monetary policy tools, political polarization and populism, wealth inequality, and a rising power (China) challenging existing dominance—16 historical cases of rising powers, 12 of which led to war
- Understanding cause-effect mechanics through principles, algorithms, and radically transparent idea meritocracy enables better decisions and diversified risk management than intuition or consensus-following
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Dalio was clerking on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange in 1971 between college and business school when the U.S. experienced a dollar crisis—nobody would accept dollars for goods in Europe—and on August 15, 1971, Richard Nixon severed the connection between the dollar and gold, which Dalio correctly predicted would be bullish for equities, contrary to his initial intuition.
“I remember the first time I was clerking on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange in 1971 I was just between college and doing a business school mm-hmm and the stock and we have a dollar crisis we can't pay for our goods in Europe nobody's accepting dollars and on August 15th Richard Nixon gets on the television and he basically says we're severing the connection between dollar and gold back then money was like a check and in check in a checkbook has no value it only what the money is has value and so it would get you money would get you gold and that was and it was a breakdown so it was a default and I remember thinking when I was gonna walk in on Monday morning to the New York Stock Exchange this is a big crisis and I thought the stock market would fall a lot and the stock market went through the roof”
History shows that in places where there is big disparity in conditions at the same time as an economic downturn, there is greater conflict; conversely, a poor country without much disparity or a rich country like Switzerland with low disparity would have less conflict during downturns because there is less to argue about.
“history has shown that in places where there's a big disparity in conditions at the same time as you have an economic downturn there's greater levels of conflict now you could be a poor country in which there's not much difference and you have a downturn and you have less conflict or you could be a rich country you know Switzerland is gonna have less conflict down there because they're not that same element of disparity so history has shown that when there is that and there's a downturn there's more like there's more to argue about”
In the investment business and especially for entrepreneurs, independent thinking is especially important because markets discount the consensus—whatever the consensus is becomes the price—so in order to succeed in markets you must think differently from the consensus and be right.
“in the investment business I think it's a particularly special important I think it's also an entrepreneurs it's especially important because you you have to have the independent thinking in the markets the markets discount the consensus so whatever the consensus is is in the price so in order to be successful in the market you have to think differently than from the consensus and you have to be right”
Around steady productivity growth, there are two debt cycles: a short-term debt cycle (the business cycle, where central banks adjust monetary policy and interest rates) and a longer-term debt cycle (the accumulation of short-term cycles over time).
“around that we have to debt cycles we have a short-term debt cycle which we understand because that's the business cycle you know you're in a recession central bank sees monetary policy they changed the relationship between short-term interest rate long-term interest rates asset prices put liquidity in and then you have debt growth debt credit is spending power so when you extend credit you are extending spending power”
There is always a shadow banking system—not just traditional banks but other forms of lending, capital markets, and online lending—which develops outside of regulated banking because there is pressure to develop outside the more regulated system (which doesn't make as much money) and investors want higher returns.
“there's always a shadow banking system there's a shadow banking system now in other words there's a banks and they're regulated and controlled within their parameters and then outside of those banks are other kind of new forms of lending and capital markets and and so on or it could be online given you have different forms and the there's a pressure to develop that outside of the system's shadow banking because the more regulated more control old one doesn't make as much money and so on and so by being at the periphery you can use higher amounts of leverage you can do certain things and so that grows so you develop this shadow banking system which is not regulated and also investors want to go to because they'll give you a bit higher return”
The current de-globalization appears contradictory to the pattern of how great powers became global: the Dutch and British expanded globally, but today the U.S. and UK are moving toward de-globalization, while China is expanding (One Belt One Road), carrying forward globalization in a Chinese-centric form.
“I think we're - you're talking about there are two different things in those cases there wasn't so much the globalization there was the globalization of those countries right just like the gullible ization of China we're now seeing the one belt one road we're seeing investments all around the world that's that's carrying that forward with that you will see more lending in rem MB you will see more Chinese banks in the world and so on so forth and that will expand very very analogous regarding globalization which is the idea of producing it one place and selling at someplace else in the most efficient ways that there's not much trade barriers so that you can do that or the globalization of capital markets the free flow of money into and out of countries and all of that I think that that's peaked and that we're now in an environment in which we'll go to a you know more of a D globalization kind of environment”
Ray Dalio formed Bridgewater Associates in 1975 and in 1979-80 calculated that American banks had lent way more money to emerging countries than those countries could repay—approximately 250 percent of bank capital—predicting a major banking crisis that did occur in August 1982 when Mexico defaulted, but he was wrong about the economic implications and lost money for himself and clients as a result.
“I formed Bridgewater in 75 so 18 to like 7 years later that's the reboot...I had calculated that America that American banks had went way more money to emerging countries in those countries were going to pay back and it was about 250 percent of their bank capital and so we were gonna have a big banking crisis”
When you have a reserve currency, others want to save in it rather than hold their local currency, which increases borrowing in that currency by the reserve currency country; this typically leads to overextension because the structural incentive is to borrow and leverage.
“when you have a reserve currency others want to save in it because what the choice is their local currency and so on and they they believe that that's the thing to save in and when they're saving in it that means that there's borrowing in it by that country and they usually overextend”
All assets compete with each other, and their expected returns can be understood by comparing yields: the yield on cash, yield on bonds, risk premiums on equities, and private equity/real estate returns that carry through from the same underlying interest rate and risk dynamics.
“all assets compete with each other so you could almost look at the yields of those assets what's the yield on cash the yield on cash the yield on bonds and then assets equities and so on the brisk premiums of each of those and then that carries through to private equity carries through the real estate”
Because of money printing and other reasons, there is greater political polarity today, which causes populism around the world—strong individual leaders emerging to control situations amid polarity—a dynamic that was not widely used as a term in developed countries until the 1930s and only recently became common again.
“because of the printing of money and because technologies and other reasons we have a greater amount of polarity political polarity I think this is an important important issue and that political polarity causes populism around the world in other words a strong individual to come in get control of that situation while they're having that type of polarity so the word populism for example in developed countries was not widely used until you go back to the 30s until more recently now it's course common common”
Corporate buybacks and mergers have been a major source of returns on assets, driven by low interest rates making debt cheap relative to equity returns; when rates normalize, this return driver disappears.
“one of the biggest sources of returns on assets was the fact that the interest rate was low relative to the return on equity and so there's been a lot of buybacks a lot of mergers and acquisition in other words by companies buying companies and and bidding that up and that's been a factor and that's also then you had the tax boost because if you lower to corporate tax rates companies are worth more all of those things have pushed those asset prices up”
According to Dalio's template, productivity rises over time as living standards increase because we learn how to do things better and output per unit of work increases; this moves at a fairly steady pace and is not what causes volatility in the economy.
“there's productivity over a period of time our living standards rise because we learn how to do things better and the output for man our work increases and that moves at a fairly it'll go up and down its pace but nine large it's not what causes volatility”
Credit growth is good for the economy when that credit can be paid back, pushing asset prices up while debt levels continue to increase, and this creates a self-reinforcing cycle: as asset prices go up, people have more collateral, become more confident that asset prices will continue rising, become less careful in lending, and extrapolate this trend into the future.
“when and that's good for the economy when that credit can be paid back and what it does of course is it pushes asset prices up while levels of debt continue to increase and at that part of the cycle people and everybody sort of conservative about that and it pays back but asset prices when we say pay back you mean the borrowers have the ability to service that debt even as asset prices rise that's right and everybody wins and that's good credit growth and it's a wonderful thing then as you get later in the cycle it's a very self reinforcing cycle because as asset prices go up you have more collateral people are more confident they believe asset prices will continue to rise they become a little bit less careful in terms of that kind of lending they extrapolate that into the future”
When central banks reach zero interest rates, they need to print money and buy assets (quantitative easing), which happened in 1932 (when the Fed faced zero rates from 1929-1932 and needed to buy assets) and is happening now post-2008.
“when you have and then the the you need to print money and buy assets that happened in 1932 so 29 to 32 interest rates at zero the central bank's need to buy assets they buy assets they calls that carry to 1937 very similar situation that we've been in and so will we carry that from 2008 and 9”
The Thucydides Trap is a concept describing historical tensions when a rising power challenges an existing dominant power; Graham Allison's book 'Destined for War' examines this relationship with China and the U.S., drawing from historical precedent.
“there's a concept called the Thucydides trap by the way that in an excellent book by Graham Allison called destined for wars he goes through but it you can study for war well he's dealing with China relationship”
China's debt is mostly denominated in local currency with small foreign currency denominated debt, making it an internal issue; Chinese lenders and borrowers are within their system, giving them large capacity to handle debt crises by spreading it out.
“Chinese debt is mostly in their local currency the amount of foreign currency denominated debt for China is very small okay so now you're dealing mostly with an internal issue with also the lenders to China are they within their system and the like I said the capacity to handle the debt crisis by spreading it out in one way or another is quite large”
In responding to a question about whether every great power becomes over-leveraged (citing a book by Paul Kennedy and Jackson about how every great power borrowed too much debt), Dalio reiterates that the U.S. is following this well-documented historical pattern.
“you're gonna guess the got the writers you read the book Teddy type or Candida book Jackson read that book Worf that book the message I take from that book it's that every great power it's because they're all were leverage to borrow too much debt the message wanted mass you're okay from the pockets now the u.s. really looks like you're deficits getting bigger and bigger”
There have been four cases in US history with major debt crises and defaults that were able to be managed through spreading out the debt and lowering interest rates; the 1980-1982 debt crisis Dalio was initially wrong about was an example of this managed de-leveraging.
“to do that spreading it out so I think that when you look at debt cycles on there were four cases in which I know the United States default and had major debt crisis and won't rattle them all off and that they were able to be managed that lesson I gave four sample of the 2,000 excuse me the 1980 82 debt crisis that I was so wrong about was the ability to spread that out and lower interest rates at the same time”
Average investors should not try to make tactical moves in and out of markets to produce alpha; instead, they should balance their portfolios through risk parity and diversification, unless they have specific expertise in market timing.
“as far as and how to deal with it I think most people should not be making tactical movements in and out of the markets to produce alpha I think that's difficult so I think that they have to know how to balance there are accounts that's why when I refer to what we call all-weather what's risk parity how do you balance those things back you have to have a balanced portfolio unless you're going to be able to you know concentration is a risky thing and then or you have to be able to time markets and of course that's that's a difficult thing to I saw a bunch of hands up”
Future returns across all asset classes (stocks, bonds, private equity, real estate) will be lower for a very long time because the expansion of quantitative easing and liquidity injection has largely run its course, and spreads between different asset returns have been compressed by low interest rates.
“I think we have squeezed out a lot of the US market I think we're an environment that we are going to have low returns going forward for a very very long time because if you look at returns there is the present value effect of lowering interest rates and putting liquidity into the system and that has largely run its course and all assets compete with each other”
Too much attention is focused on China's debt crisis risk when the more important factor is China's productivity growth; Chinese productivity growth (based on quality of education, infrastructure, and other metrics) continues to support high growth rates that exceed good years in the U.S.
“I'm too focused in on that and they're not focused in on their productivity growth and how they're making changes in terms of that productivity growth I think you know like a bad year of growth will be probably twice as good as a good year of growth from us in terms of that whole productivity thing and if you look at indicators of productivity over a period of time quality of education quality of infrastructure those kinds of things you know they have the reasons to continue to have high productivity”
The question of what happens to reserve currencies over the longer term is important: the U.S. will need to sell much more debt in the world due to larger budget deficits, and from a bond buyer's perspective (a promise to get currency), this creates risks that will increasingly be an issue in 5-10 years.
“which is by the way an interesting consideration if you take longer term not immediate but you think of what what does that mean longer term in terms of a reserve currency if you start to think where are we in the cycle hmm and and you start to extrapolate what you know what is going to have to be sold you know you know the United States is going to have to sell a lot more debt in the world because of the larger elements and budget deficits you would have to sell more and from a buyer of that that what it what a bond is is a promise to get a lot of currency that's what it is you get currency and so and we're in a Fiat monetary system so if you take you know let's say years in the future I think it'll increasingly be an issue you know what is the currency what is the store hold wealth we're you know those are elements that lurk in the back not immediately as as issues with the on that path of the maintaining power global economic power”
Conflict concerns—perceived risk of geopolitical conflict—reinforce de-globalization incentives: if producers worry about conflict with China, they will want to move production domestically; if investors worry about sanctions, they will withdraw from foreign markets.
“the perceived worry that you could have a conflict I think that that creates a force that reinforces the globalization because let's say if you're gonna produce something if you're producing things in China that we need in the United States by way of example there might be a concern about doing that so if you're producing PCs you might say I need pcs here there might be a pressure to go D globalization that sort of feeds on itself I think that we're seeing those kinds of pressures I think the same thing is true that that could happen with capital flows you know if Chinese investors are more concern that you could have a conflict there could be more sanctions of investments in the United States so they're less inclined to invest in the United States and so on”
In the last 500 years, there have been 16 cases where a rising great power challenged an existing power; of those 16, 12 led to actual shooting wars, establishing a strong historical precedent that rising power challenges lead to military conflict
“I made a point now to study history over the last 500 years very very carefully what you see is that in the last 500 years there have been 16 times where a great power comes to challenge and existing power a rising power so like you say in Germany in within Europe or Japan within Asia that was the nature of of that beast that means that there's certainly rivalry so with a trade war a comparable power it creates an issue so at 16 previous examples of a rising power 12 of which led to actual shooting Wars”
In Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain in the 1930s, four democracies chose to become autocracies because of chaos from economic conflict and hard times; similarly today, polarity and hard times could drive worse conflict both within countries and between countries.
“in in in Germany in Italy Japan and Spain you had four democracies that chose to be autocracies because of the would somebody get control of the situation because it was fairly the chaos of the conflict it became worse and so there was conflict within countries and there was conflict between countries”
After World War II, the United States was economically and militarily dominant (monopoly on nuclear power), which led to the establishment of international institutions like the UN, World Bank, and IMF in US cities; when a rising power challenges the incumbent, there is no global court system or rule of law to adjudicate—instead, conflict resolution becomes 'rule of power'
“after World War two the United States was powerful both economically and also it had a monopoly on nuclear power and so as a result of that power the you know the United Nations is in New York the World Bank and the IMF are in Washington DC because it determined that and in history then when you have the rising power to challenge the existing power you have elements of conflict I'm saying I don't want to overdo this but I am saying that we are entering an era in which anybody reads history and policymakers around the world and recognize this that this issue with China rising means that there are naturally going to be conflicts and how do you resolve conflicts in the world market you don't go to a court system there's not a rule of law in the world that becomes dominant so there is more of a rule of power”
The U.S. is late in the longer-term debt cycle, meaning if the economy were to turn down, the ability to deal with that by lowering interest rates is very limited and the ability to deal with that with quantitative easing is very limited for a variety of reasons.
“we amor also late in the longer term debt cycle meaning if you were to turn down if the economy was to turn down the ability to deal with that with lowering interest rates is very limited and the ability to deal with that with quantitative easing is very limited for a variety of reasons”
Lower expected returns in the future combined with unfunded pension obligations, healthcare obligations, and debt obligations will create pressure toward higher taxes on the wealthy; average investors should prepare for this structural reality
“if you take all these obligations I'm talking to some extent about the debt obligations but there are unfunded pension obligations there are also healthcare obligations there's a lot of obligations and essentially a lower real interest rate and therefore lower asset returns assets are held by those who are more rich relative to that I think all of those things are going to pull that you can expect lower returns and you can expect probably more taxes those in a longer term so that's going to be the nature of the beast”
Teaching children and in schools to value mistakes and learning from failures produces better real-world outcomes than grading systems focused on immediate correct answers; life outside school succeeds when you learn to fail and extract learning from failures.
“I think it's also how we teach kids and we teach our in our own environment that you know oh did you get the great grade in the end there and it's all kind of do you know and the life is not like this life when you leave school is not like did you get the great great life starts succeeding when you start to fail when and okay and and then it's the learning that comes from those failures that produces it”
Reserve currency status was historically achieved through technological advances that made countries competitive in world markets; the Dutch and British used global trade routes and lending to establish the guilder and pound as reserve currencies; the same mechanism enabled the US dollar post-WWII; but the cycle always leads to overextension and eventual currency decline
“there are a number of lessons one of those is and it could take the arc by the way typically is two hundred years two hundred fifty years so the arc is quite flowing and it by the way it starts off with technological advances that raises GDP and then makes them very competitive in the world markets like the Dutch was the reserve currency before the British Empire and ours and then what happens is later in the cycle there is that desire to push it and leverage usually it's a matter of they they become global they have global trade routes when they travel around they're carrying their currency then people then use that currency that's what they pay in that's what they lend in Holland essentially Amsterdam became half of world trade at that time and it became very rich because of those things and they have a world used that reserve currency so there was borrowing and lending and then the cycle goes that of course when you have a reserve currency others want to save in it because what the choice is their local currency and so on and they they believe that that's the thing to save in and when they're saving in it that means that there's borrowing in it by that country and they usually overextend and as a result of overextending they make the they get the debt problems that you're dealing with”
Without spending time understanding the mechanics and cause-effect relationships underlying a system, people merely argue about what should be done, analogous to two doctors arguing about treatment without agreeing on how the body works
“if we don't spend time understanding the mechanics and the cause-effect relationships we just argue with each other about what should be done and it's like two doctors who have not spent time understanding and agreeing on how the body works arguing about you know what should be done for the body”
Dalio wants an idea meritocracy where the best ideas win regardless of where they come from, not where ideas must come from him, combined with meaningful work, meaningful relationships, radical truthfulness, and radical transparency to build trust and cut through politics and bureaucracy.
“I want an idea meritocracy in other words I want the best ideas to win as opposed to where it comes from right I don't have to be that it doesn't have to come from me I just want the best decisions to be made and I want to what I want is to have meaningful work and meaningful relationships a meaningful work meaning you're on a mission together and those relationships are deep and meaningful and they're high-quality they're all reward in and of themselves and they make an organization more effective”
After losing money in 1982, Dalio borrowed $4,000 from his father because he did not have enough money to take care of his family, and this painful experience became the most valuable thing that happened to him because it changed his entire approach to thinking about decision-making and risk.
“I had to let them all go and I lost money for me I lost money for clients I had to I borrow $4,000 from my dad because I didn't have really enough money even to take care of my family at that point I was very painful but it was the most valuable thing probably that happened in my life certainly one of those because it changed my approach to thinking”
People are looking for principles, and Dalio believes everyone would benefit enormously by being crystal clear about their own principles rather than merely adopting his.
“I think people are now looking for principles and I want to emphasize forget my principles they don't have to be my principles but I do think that everybody would benefit enormously by being crystal clear about their principles”
By being able to write principles down clearly enough that they could be expressed as equations (now algorithms), Dalio was able to make decisions in a very powerful way.
“I learned also that by being able to write them down clearly enough that they could be expressed in what were then called equations are now algorithms that allowed me to make decisions and us to make decisions in a very powerful way”
When independent thinkers have differences and work through them via thoughtful disagreement, they raise their probabilities of getting at the best answer and build trust and better relationships.
“when you have those differences in independent thinkers if you can work that through through thoughtful disagreement you have the art of thoughtful disagreement if you work that through you raise your probabilities of getting at the best answer and and that's been a very very powerful thing and it also builds trust and it builds better relationships”
For millennials interested in finance careers, the most important thing is to realize that success comes from knowing how to deal with not knowing, more than from anything you already know; one should be humble, open-minded, and learn to deal with not knowing.
“I think the the most important thing is as you're young is to realize that your success comes from knowing how to deal with your not knowing more than it comes from anything you know so how to be open mind how to take in the best of the around there don't think that your be humble take in the best know how to deal with not knowing and then you'll be more successful”
Bridgewater has capped its alpha (investment outperformance) returns and only offers two accounts: beta (strategic asset allocation) which has significant liquidity and capacity, and alpha which is capped and not accepting new money.
“we're we're there's alpha there's alpha and there's beta so this is going to probably be a little bit of a technical answered your question first but an beta which is what is your strategic asset allocation mix through timeless and universal there's a lot of liquidity a lot of capacity and so those are the only two accounts we've taken alpha we have capped our alpha we I don't think you know what we just don't take in new money that is capped”
Dalio learned from a book by Joseph Campbell called 'Hero with a Thousand Faces' that describes how crashing and metamorphosis occur, reinforcing his belief that learning from painful mistakes and writing principles down as recipes for dealing with circumstances is the universal approach to growth.
“there was a book that my son gave me in 2014 Joseph Campbell here over Thousand Faces and he describes about how that crashing occurs and that changes do you have a metamorphosis so the whole approach to learning from mistakes and painful mistakes and making the most out of them and writing principles down in other words recipes for how do you deal with the circumstances learn the lesson write those principles down this is the thing that I would recommend to you know everybody write them down”
Dalio recommends 'Lessons from History' by Will and Ariel Durant (104 pages) as an essential read that distills 5,000 years of history, and also recommends 'Hero with a Thousand Faces' by Joseph Campbell and Paul Kennedy's 'The Rise and Decline of Great Powers' as masterpieces.
“I would I would say lessons from history it's 104 pages will Durant the Durant's wrote that who are the probably the greatest historians broke 5,000 years of five they distilled it down into hundred four pages fabulous I would say here of a thousand faces the life cycles which is great and I was particularly Joseph Campbell and then I would particularly say that now they should read which i think is a masterpiece Paul Kennedy's the rise and decline of great powers”
Understanding the mechanics of how past currency breakdowns worked allowed Dalio to realize that currency devaluation is bullish for equities, which he did not understand intuitively until he studied historical precedent.
“I said well did you have currency breakdowns before and then I was I studied currency breakdowns had happen in this system and I realized why when you devalue the currency it's bullish and how that whole thing works that I didn't understand”
Dalio's perspective on mechanics and understanding cause-effect relationships is essential: once you understand the mechanics, you can agree on them, and then you know how to deal with them, which is why he emphasizes the importance of understanding timeless and universal mechanics of how systems work.
“it's that perspective about mechanics do we understand can we agree on the mechanics of how it works because once you can do that then you know how to deal with it”
Dalio's philanthropic focus is ocean exploration and microfinance; he believes fundamentals of blessing (family, education, initial capital for decisions) are often difficult; he supports Grameen America because for every $1 given, there's $12 in lending that gets paid back and keeps growing, becoming self-financing.
“for me personally it's two things ocean exploration and particularly microfinance microfinance interesting microfinance and ocean exploration because I basically believe I believe this issue is a big issue and I think that you know the fundamentals are can-can blessings that I've had can I have a family that's a good family take care of me that that's a very important thing and sometimes that's difficult education I was able to go to a good public school you know can you have good public education and then a few bucks to get you going in terms of being able to make decisions I seen on microfinance I'm a supporter of Grameen America from from the beginning for every dollar that I give to that there's $12 in lending that gets paid back in the in the first ten years and it just keeps going round and round and it becomes self financing”
Unlike reactive debt crisis management (like the 2008 financial crisis where crisis forced reactive response), China is doing proactive debt restructuring and organization before a crisis actually occurs.
“they're doing it on a proactive basis before the cycle has actually caused a crisis in in most of the other cases like in our financial 2008 financial crisis we had the crisis and then you have reactive they're doing proactive”
Trust in organizations without radical transparency comes from behind-the-scenes politics and people giving high-fives while talking behind each other's backs, whereas radical transparency and truthfulness build genuine trust.
“Trust comes from you know or upping an operating in organizations who have this politics it's all behind the scenes everybody gives them high-fives and they're all happy and so on and they talk behind each other's backs”
Dalio helped engineer Chicken McNuggets for McDonald's by working with a chicken processing producer to lock in feed prices using futures contracts, allowing McDonald's to obtain a stable menu price and the producer to secure a major contract despite volatile commodity prices.
“I traded commodities then back then I mean that was my big thing and I really learned you know how to make chicken and how much feed what what a chick cost how soybeans were grown how they competed with cotton and corn and that home mechanics I like that whole mechanical thing and at the time that and chicken McDonald's was a client of mine at the time and they wanted to come out with this Chicken McNuggets but it was very volatile prices were volatile at the time and they were worried about whether they can get stable menu prices or that it would have the volatility and that be disruptive and I had a chicken processing producer was I think at the largest at the time and a client and I could engineer the ability to lock in the feed prices because basically the cost of a check is not much relative to the cost of the feed and you have futures contracts on that and I was able to work a deal so that that chicken producer could get the McDonald's contract and McDonald's could get a stable price by engineering how they could do the hedge to be able to do that”
To transform people who are resistant to admitting they don't know, one should explain the intellectual appeal (you can know your weaknesses, develop strengths, have honest relationships, know better answers) and then help them through the emotional barriers (ego and blindness) by creating an environment of transparency and trust where they can see things for themselves.
“you would be able to tell me what you think do you want to have disagreement when we're disagreement do you want to have thoughtful disagreement because if there's disagreement there is some chance it may be you that's wrong rather than the other person intellectually you can get people they're not all people but intellectually you can by and large say you're struggling with yourself really because there's this intellectual self that said yeah I'd like to know my weaknesses I know everybody has strengths and weaknesses I can develop I'd like to have that honest relationship and then you will once you intellectually get that you want it then you're going to encounter your emotional barriers to it and emotional barriers are either your ego barrier that you know that you're gonna have to get over or your blind spot barrier”
Every time you encounter a situation or right after, you should write down the criteria for making your decisions, which allows you to communicate with others, clarify your decision-making, and take in from others the best criteria for dealing with those circumstances in the future.
“if every time you're encountering your situation at that moment or right after you right down the court the criteria for making your decisions inwards and that allows you to communicate with others allows you to clarify your decision-making and you could take in from others what the best criteria is for those circumstances in the future that is invaluable because in all your relationships with people no people will know what your principles are how you will interact with them and why and then you can go even beyond that to convert those into a Asians and help them make the decision again I think that's a powerful thing in the future”
The most recent period analogous to today is the late 1930s (particularly 1937); Dalio currently sees the U.S. well along in the business cycle (short-term debt cycle), in the seventh or eighth inning, with central banks tightening monetary policy.
“the most the most recent period that's analogous of this is is the late 30s let's say if you take 1937 so why do I say that I'd say we're well along in the business cycle the short term debt cycle we're in the seventh or eighth inning of that central banks are tightening monetary policy that's where we are in that cycle similar to then”
Dalio is uncertain about whether the U.S. and China will get into shooting conflict; how conflict is handled (with thoughtful disagreement and negotiation vs. escalation) will determine outcomes, and how we deal with polarity issues in the U.S. is the real question.
“what our circumstances lead to has a lot to do with how we deal with each other given those circumstances in other words you mean us individually you do you mean between President Xi and President Trump maybe between let's history shown that how conflict is handled is that is the big thing so there's a tendency of polarity to cause greater conflict and then hard times to cause even worse conflict”
Dalio is not worried about a debt crisis in China and believes it will be a very good place for long-term investing; China has to be an important part of everybody's portfolio because it's opening up to foreign investors and represents a different kind of opportunity.
“so I'm very I'm not worried about the debt crisis in in China or the debt situation in China and I'm you know I believe that it's gonna be a very good place for long-term investing I think it has to be a important part of everybody's portfolio it's just opening up to foreign investors it's a different kind of place so you have to get to know it but uh you know I'm basically bullish on it”
Capitalism is not working effectively for everybody; issues around education, equal opportunity, and inequality have become fundamental and are big challenges that capitalism must address.
“there are issues in terms of how effectively capitalism is working for everybody mm-hmm it's it's working I think less affecting I'm a capitalist I'm professional capitalist I believe in the system but as it how do you deal with all of those those are education equal education these types of things have become fundamental and they're there they're big challenges”
Dalio wishes he knew 40+ years ago how to deal with not knowing, how to bring in the best thinking, how to engage in thoughtful disagreement, and how to raise confidence and diversify bets effectively by understanding that he could improve returns through the art of thoughtful disagreement and place bets with both aggressiveness and humility.
“I guess it would be the same thing which is I wish I knew how to deal with my not knowing how to how to bring in the best how to deal with that thoughtful disagreement to be radically open-minded to be audacious and going after my goals to try to do great things but to know that I could change my risk-return ratio by being able to raise my confidence by the art of thoughtful disagreement and to diversify effectively my bets so that I could not have anyone that dominates my returns and you know to place those bets with both aggressiveness and humility”
Bridgewater Associates has made more money for clients than any other hedge fund in history, managing over $160 billion in assets for institutional clients
“the world's largest hedge fund managing over 160 billion dollars in assets for institutional clients according to Forbes Bridgewater has made more money for their clients than any other funds in history”
Dalio's new book 'Navigating Big Debt Crises' came out as a New York Times bestseller; he was asked by Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, and others to write it; the book is structured in three parts: a template for what big debt cycles look like, three detailed case studies (Great Financial Crisis, Great Depression, Weimar Republic), and 48 case studies from the past century.
“you mentioned you decided to write that cuz a couple of folks asked you to put it together Ben Bernanke Tim Geithner other people I really like the way the book is assembled it's broken into three parts the template for what the big debt cycles look like then you use three detailed cases the great financial crisis the Great Depression in the Weimar Republic and then you you put together 48 case studies from the past century”
Dalio is in a transition phase from his second life stage (working, others dependent on him, striving for success) to his third stage (joy comes from passing along what he's learned to help others be successful and seeing other people succeed).
“I'm gonna phase of life which is a transition from my second phase to my third phase and so the way I look at it is in the first phase of life one is dependent on others one is learning one's basically a student in second phase of life one is working others are dependent on them and one is trying to be successful as you get to my stage in life which is a transition from the second to third stage right the way I think it is the joy is no longer as much to be successful as to pass along what you've learned that has helped you be successful the joys and seeing other people be successful”
Dalio is working on three books in a series: the first about life and work principles (already published), the second was 'sort of an accident' (referring to Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order or similar), and the third will be about economic and investment principles.
“there are two things so I did the life of work principles and now I'm working on economic and investment principles that'll be the third third book in the series yeah so middle one was sort of an accident well we'll get to the middle one in a moment before we leave principles”
Dalio found that speaking to people about his book 'Principles' was a pleasurable, joyful experience with meaningful interactions with the public, contrary to his expectation that it would be uncomfortable and that communications would be bad.
“I thought that was going to be a very uncomfortable experience I thought even the communications would be bad and I have found such a joy in the interactions that I've had with people in the in the public and so on so it's been a really pleasurable good experience a sense of relationships”
The most important thing people don't know about Dalio is that he has a great wife of 40+ years who is a force of nature and that he is crazy about her, and she is doing amazing things in her own world.
“most important that I have a great wife for 40-plus years who is a there's a force of nature that I'm crazy about and that is also doing amazing things in her world”
In the audience Q&A about whether Bridgewater would invest more in China given current stimulus, Dalio did not provide specifics about particular investments he would make, wanting to avoid conflicts of interest or specific investment recommendations.
“I won't get into the particulars of what particular investments I would make there though”
Dalio watched three episodes of the TV show 'Billions' out of curiosity but didn't pursue it further and has no strong opinion on whether the character Bobby Axelrod was based on him.
“I I have no speak to those guys I have no idea whether it's true I I watched three episodes out of curiosity I thought it was entertaining and then I general just didn't have the chance to pursue it so I don't have much day”
Dalio was told by the show host that he was 'cheating a little bit' by bringing Ray Dalio as the guest to 'Masters in Business Live,' but Dalio doesn't do a lot of media historically, though he's beginning to do more now that he's an author.
“I I have to admit to cheating a little bit when when we first proposed the idea of masters in business live Alan Dave were very supportive and I said I'm gonna bring in a ringer with Ray Dalio so I really don't have a whole lot of work to do I assume most of the viewing and audience present knows who read al you is”