YouTube51m· Apr 2026· cataloged

The Last Ship Out of Hormuz: Why the REAL Supply Shock Is About to Hit | Rory Johnston


What this covers

This is a conversation between host Demetri Kofinas and commodity analyst Rory Johnston, recorded as part of Hidden Forces' short series on the US and Israeli campaign against Iran. It begins with the arithmetic of the closure: roughly 20 million barrels a day normally passed through Hormuz, and after rerouting via the East-West pipeline and other offsets, Johnston puts the net loss near 13 million. He argues that the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline cannot absorb the rerouted Yanbu flows, and that the market will need prices of $200 or more to force enough demand destruction to balance a deficit of this size.

The middle of the episode covers responses and their limits. Johnston walks through the record 400 million barrel IEA stock release, which works out to about 3.3 million barrels a day if spread over 120 days, set against a gap of 10 million or more. He describes Asian governments imposing COVID-style mobility controls, such as four-day weeks and odd-even plate rules. He also explains why jet fuel and diesel are the weak point. Asian jet fuel benchmarks passed $200 a barrel in the first week. He argues the US is insulated in aggregate but not at the pump, where $5-6 gasoline is likely, and that the burden falls unevenly between oil-patch capital owners and the median household.

The later sections look at long-term consequences and geopolitics. Johnston forecasts that the shock is bullish now but bearish for oil over the next decade, as Asian importers electrify and stockpile. He also says it will favor what he calls "Fortress Americas": US shale, Guyana, Canada, Brazil and Argentina. He compares this to the 1970s and the eventual 1986 price crash. The final stretch turns contentious. He says the Trump administration has effectively buried the Carter Doctrine, and he assesses the risk that the Houthis could close Bab al-Mandeb. He then sets out two resolution scenarios, one of which has Trump talking the crisis down.

Sharpest takeaway

Johnston argues that the Strait of Hormuz closure represents an unprecedented supply shock with geographically and temporally fragmented impacts that will reshape energy markets and geopolitical alignments, with Trump's unilateral withdrawal as the most likely resolution but creating dangerous instability in the region.

  • The shock manifests unevenly across regions due to 3-6 week shipping delays, creating an 'air pocket' where some markets haven't yet felt physical impact while others face acute distillation product shortages
  • Middle distillates (diesel, jet fuel) not gasoline are the binding constraint due to refinery retirements and lack of electrification alternatives, creating cascading pressure on the real economy
  • Trump's incentive structure makes unilateral withdrawal likely, fundamentally destabilizing the region and seeding predictable future crises as Iran demands tolls and regional actors remain unsatisfied

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0.80

There is likely insufficient capacity through the Suez Canal to completely reroute Yanbu flows because normal traffic already uses Suez, large VLCCs cannot fit through Suez (hence Suezmax tankers), and Suezmax tankers cannot even transit Suez full without offloading to the SUMED pipeline which has only 4+ million barrels per day capacity.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Rory Johnston

“You can't get a VLCC, the largest tankers that are doing the majority of this journey to Asia. You can't get them through the Suez in the first place is the entire point of why you have Suezmax tankers. And Suezmax tankers can't even transit the Suez full. They have to offload some of their oil into the Sumed pipeline, which itself has a capacity of just more than 4,000,000 barrels a day.”

0.80

The oil market is bound and anchored both geographically and temporally, meaning a price of a barrel of oil or a given product is priced for a particular product in a particular place at a particular time, which is why this conflict manifests as massive dislocations both through time and space.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Rory Johnston

“the oil market is both or all commodity markets, but particularly the oil market in this case, is bound and kind of anchored both geographically and temporally. You know, a price of a barrel of oil or a given product is priced for a particular product in a particular place at a particular time. That's important for this conflict because the how acute it is and how big it is, we felt very large dislocations both through time.”

0.75

Unlike the 1970s when new production came from offshore drilling with long lead times, US shale has a much shorter investment cycle (6-9 months from capital allocation to first barrel) which allows much faster production ramp, but even shale's speed is insufficient to fill a 10+ million barrel daily supply gap quickly.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“the capital went into offshore drilling. Yeah. Which has a longer investment cycle and lead time between when the capital is allocated and when you can begin to generate profits from the production of oil. The investment cycle in shale is much shorter. So you can ramp production much faster.”

0.74

To balance the equation with a 10 million barrel daily deficit, very high prices ($200+) are necessary to force demand destruction and contraction sufficient to rebalance the market; otherwise inventories globally will be emptied.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Rory Johnston

“So I think it's just in terms of the scale of what we're talking about. That's why I think you're going to need to see those very, very high prices to force demand to be destroyed and contract in order to balance that equation. Otherwise, we basically empty your inventories globally.”

0.74

The 1970s oil shocks led to increased investment in non-OPEC supply (North Sea, UK, Norway) which eventually created so much new supply that OPEC balances became 'squishy and soft,' prices fell, and Saudi Arabia eventually unilaterally cut production to stabilize prices until the 1985 reversal when the Saudi king opened the taps, causing the 1986 price crash.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Rory Johnston

“the big explosion of non OPEC supply coming out of the seventies, like the shale of the day was the North Sea. And what's interesting about that is that, again, you had a period of high prices led to kind of the opening of a new production province in the North Sea, both Norway and The UK. And as that source of supply grew and again, coming out of the seventies, we had lackluster and often negative demand growth. So balances got really squishy and soft very quickly coming out of that crisis, and we went through a soft price period.”

0.69

Prior to the war, the Strait of Hormuz was shipping roughly 20 million barrels a day of production or supplies to the global market, which is roughly 20% give or take of global supplies.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“The Strait Of Hormuz prior to the war were shipping roughly 20,000,000 barrels a day of production or supplies to the global market. Depending on your benchmark, it's roughly 20% give or take of global supplies.”

0.69

Despite the US aggregate GDP impact being blunted by US hydrocarbon production, the distributional effects will be extremely wide, with capital owners, oil and gas companies, and people in Texas and New Mexico having a great time, while the vast majority of Americans and the median American will feel this as an unavoidable tax on consumption.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“Even with that said, though, even if the aggregate GDP impact will be blunted, the distributional effects will be extremely wide that, you know, capital owners and kind of people in the oil and gas business, people in Texas and New Mexico, for instance, are going to, you know, have a great time of this. But the vast majority of Americans, the median American is definitely a net consumer of petroleum and will feel this in the form of essentially a large unavoidable tax.”

0.69

COVID and the Ever Given Suez blockage exposed that supply chains and just-in-time trade are efficient but fragile and precarious, shifting business school focus from finance and optimization to operations and supply chain redundancy.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“COVID really expose and the Ever Given through the Suez and everything else was that supply chains and just in time kind of trade was very efficient, but very fragile and precarious. So what you saw was I remember the cliche kind of anecdote. I'm gonna call this anecdata in the context. Is that, you know, for the longest time, finance MBAs were the kind of that was the focus of business schools. It was kind of finance and optimization and efficiency. And then basically through COVID, you had this massive pivot towards operations and supply chains.”

0.69

The United States is in a privileged and strongest position of any major economic block due to large base production in the Permian Basin (Texas and New Mexico) and locked-in supply of Canadian heavy crudes from Western Canada and oil sands, reducing the risk of physical shortage versus other regions competing hand-to-hand for remaining barrels.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“While I do think that The United States is in a privileged position, arguably the strongest position, and North America more broadly, the strongest position of any major economic block in the world right now. Because while trade and the price effects will absolutely hit US consumers and already seeing, particularly along the coasts, prices are quickly kind of converging into global norms, there isn't the same risk of physical shortage in The United States given both the large base of production in Permian Basin and Texas and New Mexico, as well as the locked in supply of Canadian heavy crudes from Western Canada and the oil sands.”

0.68

Emerging Asian countries are implementing behavioral and mobility controls similar to COVID lockdown measures—mandated working from home, four-day work weeks, odd-even vehicle licensing by plate number—to explicitly manage demand because allowing prices to clear would be unaffordable for middle and low-income consumers with higher price elasticity.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“Mandated working from home for government employees, four day work weeks, you know, different rules around, you know, you can only use you can only drive certain cars with their license plates ending in an odd number into the city this day versus even numbers the next day. All of these kind of classic kind of behavioral or mobility controls that we saw during COVID are again kind of being rolled out now. And I think that that is the way that we will continue to see governments try to explicitly manage the demand impact because if not for these policies, it will be left entirely to pricing.”

0.68

Despite being a near-term bullish shock to oil markets, the Hormuz crisis will be bearish for oil in the long term because there is no scenario where petroleum product consumption, particularly in exposed importing Asian nations, does not decline over the next decade compared to pre-February 2024 baseline.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“I think while this is, for very many obvious reasons, a very you know, the ultimate bullish shock to the oil market in the near and then you've been even likely medium term. In the long term, this is bearish for oil because there is no scenario in my mind in which we do not see lower petroleum product consumption, particularly in these exposed importing Asian nations in a decade from now, then we would have in if you had asked me the same question in mid February.”

0.68

Middle distillates (diesel, jet fuel, and gasoline) have become the tight, weak link of the global petroleum sector due to refinery retirements, changes in crude slate, and because gasoline is experiencing pressure from energy transition policies and electrification of transport, whereas diesel and jet fuel are not seeing the same electrification pressures.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“Middle distillates, diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel are now the kind of the tight, the weak link of the global petroleum sector, and that's due to refinery and retirements, changes in crude slate, a whole bunch of other things, and the fact that gasoline, which is what we would have historically looked at are our main focus. You know, gasoline is the area that's feeling the most pressure from, let's say, energy transition policies and electrification of transport, whereas you don't see electrification in the same at least in the same way for industrial freight and diesel or air travel and jet fuel.”

0.68

If sustained high crude prices ($150+) persist, non-OPEC producers including Guyana, US shale, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina's Vaca Muerta will see supercharged investment activity; these four (or five with Argentina) non-OPEC producers constitute 'Fortress Americas' and will define the next quarter-century of the oil market.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“every non OPEC every non Gulf oil source is gonna see supercharged investment activity. That includes Guyana. That includes US, Canada, and Brazil. And I think those are the four non OPEC producers that you continually see cited as the kind of major source of non OPEC supply growth. If you wanna add a fifth, Argentina and the Vaca Muerta, the the dead cow resource there. And what you notice, they're they're all in The Americas. This is Fortress Americas as a non OPEC kind of offset to supply. And that I think is going to be a trend that was already gonna define the next kind of quarter century of the oil market.”

0.65

White House and some US politicians leaning on US energy dominance are correct that the US is a massive energy superpower, but they are wrong to conclude that US consumers will be spared from $5-6 average gallon prices at the pump, which is the direction prices are heading regardless of US energy status.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“White House and I think some US politicians that are leaning on this US energy dominance are getting part of this right, but they don't appreciate the fact that that doesn't mean that US consumers are gonna be spared from $56 average gallon prices across The United States at the pump. That's the direction we're going with or without the fact that The United States is a massive energy superpower now.”

0.64

Ships laden with crude and products leaving the Gulf five weeks prior to the conversation take anywhere from 3-6 weeks to reach their destinations depending on where they're traveling, meaning certain regions have not yet felt the physical impact of Hormuz supply loss; the final ships will arrive in Asia this week, Europe next week, and North America the week after that.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“because five weeks ago, we still had ships laden with crude and products leaving The Gulf, those ships will take anywhere from three to six weeks to get to where they're going depending on where they're traveling in the world. So for certain regions of the world, we still have actually felt the physical impact of the loss of Hormuz supply yet. The final ship hasn't yet arrived. That final ship will likely be arriving in Asia this week, in Europe next week, and in North America the week after that.”

0.64

In the first week of the crisis, Singaporean jet fuel benchmarks jumped above $200 per barrel due to relatively small and shallow inventories of jet fuel, with diesel and jet fuel prices in Asia now skyrocketing to those same levels.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“But because of that, in the first week of the crisis, we had Singaporean jet fuel benchmarks jump above 200 a barrel. That, and I think these are the types of prices. And now we're seeing diesel, jet fuel, etcetera, in Asia also skyrocket to those levels.”

0.64

If the US energy secretary's plan to release the US portion of the SPR over 120 days is applied to the entire 400 million barrel IEA release, that yields 3.3 million barrels per day of outflow, effectively providing 3.3 million barrels per day of temporary supply.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“If you apply that same hundred and twenty days to the entire four hundred million, you get 3,300,000 barrels a day of outflow of SPR, which is effectively 3,300,000 barrels a day of supply.”

0.63

Even after accounting for rerouting via the Saudi East-West pipeline and other offsets, the actual net supply lost is approximately 13 million barrels a day, with a 5-7 million barrel a day loss in the immediate term that will need to be absorbed by inventories.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“between the Saudi East West pipeline and some and Roddy pipeline, maybe a little of the rocky crude, etcetera, etcetera. Altogether, maybe let's say we can reduce that in an optimistic way from 20,000,000 to 13,000,000 barrels a day, which is roughly my estimate of the actual supply lost even after accounting for rerouting. Some of that will also be offset temporarily by emergency releases, SPRs, oil and water, etcetera. But at the core basis, we're still looking at, in the immediate term, a five to 7,000,000 barrel a day loss of supply that will need to be absorbed by inventories.”

0.63

The most obvious place to see accelerated production is the US shale patch due to price sensitivity, but shale producers are not meaningfully accelerating despite high prices because the market is only pricing the crisis into the immediate front of the curve and expecting Trump to resolve it in 1-2 months; shale acceleration will only occur after another month or two of sustained high prices.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“there's a lot of price sensitivity there. I think even though it was rolling over and I expected US shale production to actually decline in annual terms this year. I think that's probably going to be wrong now. But prior, because when prices were in the kind of, like, sixties, yeah, it looked like shale was tapping out at that price level. But again, the important thing is at that price level, a lot of people treated it as a geologic fate factor, and that's not true. It's a economic reality. So at a $100 crude, yeah, the shale patch is gonna print barrels. But the issue right now is that they need to see that for longer because much like the rest of the market that's only pricing this into the immediate front of the curve and saying, it's an absolute chaotic crisis in spot markets. But don't worry. Trump's gonna figure this out, and we're gonna be back to normal in a month or two. That same kind of belief is preventing shale from more meaningfully accelerating right now. But I think that, you know, give us another month or two of these prices, and, yeah, even your kind of most tight pocketed shale co is going to be drill, drill, drill, baby, drill again very soon.”

0.63

The Trump administration has effectively killed the Carter Doctrine and US defense of the Middle East for free flow of Gulf oil due to believing the US doesn't need Hormuz anymore; this belief, even if incorrect, is changing policy very quickly and will have consequences for everyone.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“The US doesn't need a need Hormuz anymore. This reality, this change in the global energy landscape has effectively seeded the ground and prompted Trump to more or less, you know, kill the Carter doctrine and The US defense of The Middle East and kind of maintenance of free flow of oil out of the Gulf. That is a massive change. And I think that even if Trump is wrong, and I do believe he's wrong about The United States not needing Hormuz, clearly the fact that he believes it is changing policy very quickly, and I think that's gonna have consequences for everyone.”

0.61

If kinetic attacks similar to 2019 Abqaiq strikes or the East-West pipeline are executed, or if Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Saudi fields are hit, the crisis shifts from unwinding in months to unwinding in years, constituting the ultimate chaos/global meltdown scenario.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“If we started seeing similar types of kinetic attacks on Abcayk, like we saw in 2019, or the East West pipeline, or any of the Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Saudi fields, this turns from something that can be unwound relatively quickly in a matter of months to something that will take years to unwind.”

0.59

While Houthis have attacked Israel and leaned into the fight, they have not yet confirmed targeting shipping in the Red Sea or confirmed targeting Yanbu port/infrastructure, though there were attacks on the refinery and port at Yanbu approximately a week and a half prior to the conversation that were ambiguously attributed (possibly Iran, possibly Houthis).

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Rory Johnston

“We have seen the Houthis attack Israel, and you have seen them kind of lean into the fight, but you haven't yet seen them target shipping, and you haven't yet seen them confirmed target Yonbu or the port or the infrastructure around that kind of termination point of the East West pipeline. There have been attacks. I wanna I'm losing track of time, but I just wanna say it was a week and a half ago. You saw attacks on the refinery and the port at Yomu, but no one confirmed who the attack was by. The loose, you know, word was that it was Iran, but that's a very far distance for Iran to attack.”

0.56

The 32 member countries of the International Energy Agency approved the largest IEA coordinated reserve release in history at roughly 400 million barrels, more than twice the size of the prior largest SPR release in 2022 of approximately 182 million barrels.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“the 32 member countries of the International Energy Agency approved the largest IEA coordinated release in history, which is roughly 400,000,000 barrels, which is, again, a shocking it's a staggering amount of industry to release. The prior largest SPR release coordinated by the IEA was in 2022, roughly the first time we met Dimitri, and that was around a hundred and eighty two billion barrels. So this is more than twice the size.”

0.56

When Israel attacked Iran's South Pars gas field two weeks prior to the conversation, Iran immediately responded by detonating the Roslofen natural gas facility in Qatar, causing a 17% reduction in Qatar's LNG export capacity potentially lasting up to five years.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“Following two weeks ago or so when Israel attacked Iran's South Pars gas field, they immediately responded by detonating and basically exploding the Roslofen natural gas facility in Qatar, which as Reuters later reported, the CEO of Qatar Energy said that that was a 17% reduction in Qatar's LNG export capacity that could last up to five years.”

0.52

Work-from-home arrangements that began as temporary COVID measures became permanent because the economy adjusted and practices were accelerated, and similarly, this crisis will accelerate long-term structural changes like broader energy source diversification and strategic stockpiling as countries recognize energy security importance that felt abstract in the pre-shock era.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“work from home during COVID is a great example of a temporary measure that became permanent for many people, not because of a government mandate, but because the economy adjusted and the pandemic accelerated, in some cases, the adoption of certain corporate practices.”

0.52

Importing nations with government control over domestic fuel prices face a trade-off: maintaining price caps blunts consumer impact but causes supply shortages by not providing incentive for balancing cargoes; removing caps shifts the burden to fiscal crisis and government bankruptcy risk if subsidies are used instead.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“If you're a country, particularly, let's say, in Asia, Emerging Asia, a lot of these countries have government controls in the price of petrol, government subsidies or price caps. If those are maintained, you could have some of the price impact and the disposable income impact blunted for obvious reasons. They people aren't paying the price. But either you get massive immediate shortfalls in supply because you can't incentivize needed balancing cargoes to your shores with those low prices. Or if they're being subsidized, this shifts from a consumer crisis to a government fiscal crisis, and then you begin to risk government bankruptcies.”

0.52

Houthis are less a proxy of Iran and more an ally with their own priorities, including maintaining money to govern Yemen, which has been increasingly supplied by Saudi Arabia; their best position is to remind Riyadh they can cause problems to extract additional financial largesse rather than fully blockading Bab al-Mandeb.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“Houthis are are less of a kind of a a Hezbollah as proxy of Iran and more like an ally. And that Houthis themselves have other priorities as well, which is, like, maintaining essentially money to govern the country of Yemen. And that right now has largely increasingly been supplied by Saudi Arabia. So Saudi Arabia is essentially paying the Houthis a lot of money. And if the Houthis get who into the war and they get too problematic and they blow up the Port Of Jambu or the refinery or the tankers, that would probably make Saudi Arabia very angry. Now so in their interest, their best position in this is to prove and remind Riad that they can do this, which might mean an attack. It might mean something else. But I think that that would be more a means of extracting yet additional kind of financial largesse from the Saudis rather than kind of fully blockading the Babylunde.”

0.51

The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump is increasingly open to ending the Iran war without the Strait of Hormuz being open, which Johnston views as consistent with his base case of unilateral Trump withdrawal while leaving Iran with quasi-control.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Rory Johnston

“We saw the Wall Street Journal, a kind of story two nights ago now that talked about how Trump is increasingly open to ending the Iran war without the strait being open, which has a lot of people scratching their heads. But, again, I think dovetails with this thesis”

0.48

The main rerouting offset of the blocked Strait of Hormuz is the Saudi East-West pipeline from the Gulf side to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, but this places the entire rerouting right next to the Houthis, the primary source of historical Red Sea closure risk, creating a critical vulnerability if the Houthis begin targeting shipping or infrastructure.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“So the main offset, the main rerouting offset of the blocked Strait Of Hormuz is the Saudi East West pipeline, which goes from the Gulf Side of Saudi Arabia all the way to the industrial port of Yonbu in the Red Sea. Now that is, again, our most important rerouting offset from the Hormuz closure. But as you note, that puts it out right next door to the Houthis, which very recently had been the main focus of the global oil market given their forced closure, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and the broader kind of traffic through the Red Sea.”

0.48

There exists a longer-lived cultural alliance between Houthis and Iranians such that if the conflict reaches existential territory for Tehran, Houthis could see something more aggressive than controlled escalation.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“if this gets to kind of existential end of Tehran kind of territory and there is the kind of longer lived cultural alliance between the Houthis and the Iranians, then I think you could see something more aggressive. But I think in the interim, it it doesn't seem like they are that interested in completely blockading the strait yet.”

0.47

Asian refineries engaged in preemptive operational run rate reductions immediately after the Hormuz closure to avoid being forced to shut down due to loss of crude feedstock, creating a simultaneous loss of crude in the Gulf and refined products in Asia at roughly the same time.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“their worst case scenario was being forced to shut down because of a loss of crude feedstock. Again, flowing systems, essentially, big chemistry sets, very complicated, very onerous to turn the thing off and turn it back on again. You don't wanna do that. Because of that, as soon as Hormuz halted, they began preemptively reducing operational run rates, which essentially meant that you had a simultaneous loss of crude in The Gulf and refined products in Asia at pretty well the same time.”

0.45

The US military buildup in the region (ships, marines, troops) observable before and during the conflict could support either scenario—Trump's unilateral withdrawal OR boots-on-the-ground escalation—because Trump has historically built military assets while negotiating and then conducting larger military operations than he initially signaled.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Rory Johnston

“And very frankly, it's not a bad argument. I think that what we have seen is time and time again, and even before the war started, Trump was basically saying we're negotiating. We're gonna figure something out. All the while building up military assets for what obviously turned into a very large military engagement.”

0.45

Even in the taco scenario, the market would face a period of months or maybe a year with forced Iranian tolling (~$2 million per VLCC or ~$1 per barrel) before the region becomes destabilized again as Gulf states remain deeply unsatisfied with Iran's quasi-control and potentially reattempt conflicts.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“So I think you'd have a period of months, maybe a year, where you have, you know, some kind of forced payment or kind of a tribute to Iran to get through the strait. The Gulf countries are deeply unsatisfied and existentially unhappy about this for obvious reasons. So not, you know, in the best case scenario, they wouldn't want this in a normal world, and they have just spent the last month getting pummeled by Iranian missiles and drones.”

0.45

If the taco scenario occurs, markets would sell off sharply on sentiment, but Johnston does not believe that scenario is bearish relative to current pricing because the cumulative physical loss continues and the market will eventually recognize it, eventually grinding back higher and ending higher than the sell-off point.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“I think if if that scenario happened, given the market sensitivity right now to Trump's comments, I think we would sell off pretty sharply on that. But I do not think that that scenario is bearish relative to current pricing. And I think that after such a price sell off on sentiment on whatever, I think the market would then grind back higher again and probably end higher than the point of the sell off because that cumulative effect of the physical loss is still happening, and the market will eventually have to recognize that.”

0.45

Trump never meant to start a full-scale Iran war; he saw it as a repetition of the 2024 nuclear facility bombing where he declared victory quickly and prices fell $15/barrel on the ceasefire announcement, and he has the rhetorical capacity to declare victory and taco because it's one of his superpowers.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“Trump never meant to start an Iran war like this. It never he never meant to get this deep. He saw this as something as the latest iteration of The US engagement in the 12 war last year where they basically bombed three nuclear facilities on a Saturday. And by the Monday, he had basically declared a ceasefire, and prices, I think, fell $15 a barrel on that day. And I remember, actually, he hedged his bets in public when the war began, not claiming credit for it, expressing some frustration with Israel, and then subsequently saying, I want credit for this. So he got very impressed and was very happy with the outcomes. Right. And I think it's he's been back and forth. Right? So I think that he has the capacity to, you know, declare victory pretty easily. It's kinda one of his superpowers.”

0.41

Johnston's base case scenario is what he calls the 'unilateral Trump taco,' in which Trump unilaterally pulls out and essentially leaves the entire rest of the world in the region holding the bag, assigned a 40% probability.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Rory Johnston

“I still think the most likely scenario here is what I call the unilateral Trump taco, which is a lot of people say, Trump can't taco. This is a war, not a tariff, not a trade policy. You know, there are other people in this conflict have a say. I'm like, sure. But none of their says matter as much as Trump, and none of them being Israel and Iran are as influenceable by external pressures by the market or by politics. It's only Trump that really is the one that has the latitude to kinda say this is over. And people are like, oh, well, no. He's constrained by alliances with the golf, or he's constrained by the Carter doctrine, or he constrained by the letter. I'm like, no. Trump is an unconstrained human being, not constrained by really any norms or precedent.”

0.41

Johnston assigns a 30% probability to a 'boots on the ground' scenario involving full US invasion aimed at securing highly enriched uranium or Kharg Island infrastructure, which would keep the strait closed for months or more and dramatically increase Iranian retaliatory capability against upstream assets.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Rory Johnston

“And I think that's I put that at kind of a 30 chance right now, which is a disconcertingly high probability of such an event happening. But I think a lot of people will say to me, like, Rory, how can you think there's a talk coming? You've said this for weeks and you've been wrong. True. And they're like, don't you see, you know, The US military assets building up the region? Don't you see the marines headed for theater? Don't you see all these troops coming in? Clearly, he's going for boots in the ground. And very frankly, it's not a bad argument. I think that what we have seen is time and time again, and even before the war started, Trump was basically saying we're negotiating. We're gonna figure something out. All the while building up military assets for what obviously turned into a very large military engagement.”

0.17

Johnston acknowledges that in a realm of improbable events (the entire episode and war situation), the 30% allocation to cockamamie scenarios is appropriate because this entire situation is outside normal precedent.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“But, again, this entire episode is unlikely. So we are in the we are in the realm of the improbable at the very least.”

0.17

Johnston never expected to see the Strait of Hormuz closed in his career; it was treated as a thought experiment and boogeyman, not something he anticipated would happen.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Rory Johnston

“I did not I never thought in my career I would see the Strait Of Hormuz closed. It's just such a big shock that I kinda it's the boogeyman. Right? It's not something that we actually thought we'd see. It was the thought experiment.”

0.15

The recorded conversation took place on April 1, with Trump scheduled to address the nation at 9 PM that evening, which Johnston notes is approximately 4:30 AM Iranian time—the moment one would choose to launch an invasion, suggesting that Trump's announcement could either be an invasion order or a unilateral withdrawal declaration

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 0/4· Rory Johnston

“Now it could be that he's doubling down and boots on the ground have already begun invading Iran. Because, again, when this thing takes when this it's at 9PM tonight, which is, like, 04:30 or kind of, you know, early early morning Iranian time, kind of the moment that you would invade, very frankly. So that could be something that happens”

0.13

Early in the conflict, Johnston expected the crisis to end within weeks and was initially wrong, with the situation lasting more than a month with no clear end in sight as of April 1.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Rory Johnston

“Yep. We're now more than a month into Epic Fury with no clear end in sight. [...] Yeah. That's a good question. And and just to kinda reiterate, I did not I never thought in my career I would see the Strait Of Hormuz closed. [...] Yeah, every week, more or less, I thought at least for the beginning, I thought this was going to be the end of it because, yeah, the consequences are already going to be and already have been quite dire. I think particularly if you're looking at some of the government announcements coming from Asian countries and even European countries around mandated rationing, kind of buckling, you know, hunkering down for the wave coming. How much longer can this go on as it currently exists? I mean, it's already gone longer than I thought it could.”