
2020 Setting the Stage: The Next Decade for Geopolitics and Markets (w/ Mike Green & Marko Papic)
What this covers
This is a July 2020 interview in which Mike Green questions Marco Papic of Clocktower Group about the coming decade. The conversation starts with fiscal policy and widens to geopolitics. Papic's framing device is the move from the Washington Consensus, which he describes as central bank independence, fiscal prudence, supply-side economics, free trade and privatization, to the Buenos Aires Consensus. He argues the earlier framework made elections nearly irrelevant to investors because left and right parties adopted it alike. The 2020 response, with wartime-scale spending and no war, shows how quickly that has changed.
The fiscal discussion is concrete. Papic contrasts 2008's $850 billion stimulus, which he calls "comically small" in hindsight and which was followed by Tea Party austerity, with 2020, and he says government's contribution to GDP matters more to macro investors than the Fed's balance sheet. He credits Nancy Pelosi with a political trap that makes further stimulus likely whoever wins in November, and he links this to the median voter now being a millennial. Green adds that unemployment-insurance spending, aimed at income-constrained households, probably has a large multiplier. They also dispute how the Great Depression and 2008 compare, and why annualized GDP figures mislead.
The second half turns to geopolitics. Papic argues the bipolar context of the Cold War fits poorly, because in a multipolar world even close allies such as Australia keep trading with China and decline to join an anti-China coalition. He describes how China sees itself as a returning power rather than a rising one. He forecasts a surprisingly muted China and a European Union strengthened by deglobalization, partly through Trump's antagonism. He is most contentious on risk: he puts the odds of a Taiwan or South China Sea conflict at 10-20 percent and says passive investing keeps markets from pricing it.
Papic argues that global macro investment requires understanding the shift from Washington Consensus (technocratic, supply-side focused, fiscally prudent) to Buenos Aires Consensus (populist, demand-focused, fiscally expansionary), which fundamentally changes how policy responds to crises and what assets will outperform.
- The 2020 COVID response demonstrated wartime-level fiscal spending (15-20% of GDP) with no offsetting austerity, unlike the 2008 crisis response which was followed by Tea Party-driven fiscal retrenchment
- Median voters—now including millennials and Gen Z—demand short-term gain over long-term pain, making fiscal stimulus politically inevitable regardless of which party is in power
- The policy framework shift has profound implications: gold and cyclical equities benefit; passive indexing breaks proper risk discounting; geopolitical risks (Taiwan conflict at 10-20% probability) are no longer priced into markets
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The 2008 stimulus (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) was $850 billion passed 5 months after the crisis with only 3 Republican votes, appearing 'comically small' in retrospect, and was followed within 18 months by the 2010 Tea Party revolution that imposed austerity.
“the american recovery and reinvestment act aura was passed to the tune of 850 billion dollars basically five months after the crisis began and it was passed completely along party lines...only two republicans voted for this”
We are experiencing an extraordinary transition from the Washington Consensus (40-year macro context) to the Buenos Aires Consensus, marked by wartime-level government spending with no war—a shift that happened far faster in 2020 than most investors anticipated.
“the most important thing to really focus on is this transition that we're experiencing right now from the last 40 years of a context a macro context that was defined by the washington consensus...and we're transitioning to something new and the speed with which we've done that this year has been extraordinary”
The geopolitical context has shifted from bipolar (post-WWII) to multipolar (today)—in a bipolar world, trade bifurcates into two sealed camps, but in a multipolar world, allies can pursue independent economic interests and will trade with rivals, making it impossible for the US to contain China through alliance management.
“today we don't live in that world we live in a very messy world it's a world where united states is clearly still the strongest country in the world geopolitically china is clearly the second but then you have a mess”
China views itself not as a rising power but as one of the global powers that took a 150-200 year 'timeout' from its historical role (during Western colonialism and internal conflict)—this fundamentally shapes Chinese geopolitical behavior and aspirations, and makes it see America as the 'challenger power' that must be contained.
“china clearly sees itself as a not a revoncious power it doesn't see itself as a rising power china sees itself as one of the global powers that took 150 200 year kind of timeout from its you know traditional role and so it sees america as as the challenger power”
The longest and deepest self-imposed period of austerity in the United States occurred from 2010 to 2016, when government contribution to GDP turned negative—this was not a natural consequence of the crisis but a policy choice driven by the Washington Consensus obsession with fiscal prudence.
“we had the longest and deepest self-imposed period of austerity in the united states but really globally too...the longest and deepest period of self-imposed austerity...the government was not contributing to gdp growth”
The Washington Consensus, which defined the last 40 years, was characterized by central bank independence, fiscal prudence, supply-side economics (Reagan/Thatcher model), free trade, deregulation, and privatization—policies that made election outcomes largely irrelevant to investors because both left and right parties adopted the same framework.
“those policies were really about central bank independence fiscal prudence fiscal policy uh became apolitical it was almost like you know counter-cyclical levers get pulled when needed uh free trade deregulation privatization”
Domestic political pressure (from constrained, insecure populations in a slow-growth environment) creates incentives for nations to externalize risks and threats (scapegoating)—both the US is doing this with China and other countries likely doing this internally, which is a natural byproduct of demand constraint.
“the natural byproduct of that is to try to externalize the risks and threats right so it's very natural that the us is now very aggressively saying well china is the problem right because it allows us to distract”
The European Union is a protectionist economic bloc designed for a multipolar deglobalized world and will actually strengthen under deglobalization, not weaken—Trump, by antagonizing Europe, is inadvertently strengthening European integration and deserves a Charlemagne Prize for unifying the EU.
“european union was almost designed for it it's actually in many ways a very protectionist economic bloc that has a geopolitical logic and that logic is strengthening it's not weakening”
The US desire to decouple from China is 'very hard' because of entangled US corporate sector investments in China, complex supply chain dependencies, and the practical difficulty of disaggregating the 'tangled knots' connecting the two economies—this slows supply chain rewiring.
“the us wants to pull away from china but that's very hard right disaggregate separating then you know the uh the tangled knots that combine u.s corporate sector investments in china uh the supply chain components associated with china that's harder than simply saying we're no longer going to do this”
Putin and China both interpreted the last decade (2008-2018) as evidence of American decline, leading Russia to invade Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) and China to become more assertive, but this interpretation proved strategically incorrect as it provoked containment.
“remember 2009 2010 there's a lot of talk of the beijing consensus and i think um you know i mean putin kind of made the same move as well i mean he did invade georgia in august of 2008 he you know intervened in ukraine in 2014 so a lot of countries took the last decade to be the decade of like american decline”
The 2020 COVID stimulus was targeted at the bottom of the income distribution through supplementary unemployment insurance, reaching those most income-constrained, whereas tax credits or cuts accrue to less constrained populations—this targeting means the spending multiplier is likely 'huge' because recipients will spend rather than save.
“stimulus for the first time was really targeted at the lower end right in particular those who had lost their jobs with supplementary unemployment insurance right so money made its way into the hands of those who were most income constrained as compared to a tax credit or a tax cut which tends to accrue to those who are much less income constrained by definition right so the spending impact of this has likely been huge”
Australia rejected Pompeo's alliance of democracies against China (July 28, 2020) despite being the most natural US ally due to its proximity to China and dependence on US defense—this demonstrates that even frontline allies will not join a US coalition against China because trading with China is economically essential.
“pompeo made what many think is a fundamental historical speech he called for an alliance of democracies in the nixon library against china...the australians said sorry you know sorry mate we're gonna we're gonna keep trading with china”
The Great Depression and the 2008 financial crisis had fundamentally different characters—the Great Depression was driven by deflationary policy (Mellon liquidationism) and austerity, while 2008 was more similar to the 1920s because debt levels never fell dramatically, defaults remained limited, and the financial system was not restructured.
“what we saw looked much more like the 1920s...we didn't see debt levels fall dramatically we didn't see extraordinary levels of defaults or restructuring”
Europe is uniting not out of arrogance or strength but out of fear and weakness—it requires a federal union because individual countries like Germany, Italy, and Spain are geopolitically irrelevant in a world of great powers (Russia, China, India, Iran, USA), and need scale to maintain sovereignty.
“the reality is that europe is not uniting out of some sort of arrogance or strength european countries are uniting or passing sovereignty to a supernatural level out of fear and out of weakness”
The 19th century was characterized by extraordinary internal turmoil driven by emigration flows (populations leaving Europe for America), which forced systems to restructure because traditional family support networks (children caring for parents) no longer functioned—this is similar to today's demographic constraints.
“it also was a period of significant internal turmoil right many of the actions that we're describing that were taken in the 19th century were a byproduct of the extraordinary emigration that occurred where populations were flowing to the new world and systems had to be restructured”
The most important indicator for macro investors is government's contribution to GDP (the purple line), not Federal Reserve balance sheet expansion, because fiscal stimulus is what actually drives demand in the current economic cycle.
“the purple line is government's contribution to gdp you know and the funny thing about that is that the reason most investors didn't like pay attention to that is because the last 10 years it didn't really matter...the federal reserve and expansion of its balance sheet is not what's really relevant right now i mean obviously it's important because they're essentially monetizing debt and they're essentially you know ensuring that the physical side can work but the fiscal is really the important part”
In 2020, for the first time in U.S. history, a millennial became the median voter, and millennials and Gen Z have been disproportionately harmed by inequality and the Great Recession, making them strongly prefer left-leaning economic policies (fiscal stimulus, redistribution) regardless of whether they are socially conservative.
“for the first time in u.s history that a millennial is now the median voter so when you put all that together i think it doesn't matter whether nancy pelosi is rich or whether this or that i think politicians of both parties are simply going to respond to the preferences policy preferences of the median voter”
Scale matters less in a globalized world where small countries like Slovenia can export freely, but scale becomes critical in a deglobalizing world where market access depends on trade agreements requiring sovereignty cession.
“scale doesn't matter in a globalized world...a country of 1.2 million people nestled next to the alps makes absolutely no sense other than in a globalized world where slovenian manufacturers export or service companies can access markets without any friction...but in a world of large you know states that protect their markets suddenly that scale really does matter”
The comparison between a 40% annualized GDP decline and an 8% actual decline illustrates the misleading nature of annualized statistics—when the 2020 COVID collapse is quoted as a 40% annualized decline, it actually represents only an 8% real cumulative decline in output.
“you know when you're quoting that just to be clear that's like you know on a compounding basis that's the equivalent of like an eight percent declining gdp”
From the late 19th century through World War I, the UK traded with Germany extensively despite knowing war was coming and despite being allied with France and Russia against Germany—allies prioritized commercial interests over alliance solidarity.
“i brought you two charts one is from the late 19th century the other one is from the 30s uh the one from the 19th century shows that the united kingdom uh traded with germany right up until the start of world war one and i could have also shown you french trade with germany russian trade with germany these were three countries the triple antons they were basically allied defensively against germany and they all expected for 20 years before world war one everybody knew there would be a war like everybody was planning for this and yet they traded with germany why because if the uk didn't protect its commercial interests its ally france would have just picked up that revenue um that uk left on the table”
In a bipolar (Cold War) context, research in political science using game theory shows that trade and investment between enemies is essentially eliminated—the two camps are hermetically sealed with clean bifurcation.
“there's a lot of research in political science where they gamed out the implications for trade and investment using game theory it's very boring stuff if anybody wants to you know read this stuff i can send it to you but bottom line here is that a bipolar context produces these very clean camps you know very segregated uh bifurcated outcomes no trade no investment uh and it's a world where the soviet union and the united states can keep their allies in check with small you know deviations here and there like france pulling out of nato troops and so on but for the most part these two camps are bulletproof they're hermetically sealed”
Central banks will not raise interest rates at the first sign of inflation because politicians will pressure them not to, and the fiscal stimulus will persist much longer than conventional wisdom expects.
“i don't think central banks are going to raise interest rates at the first sign of inflation i think we're going to play this out much longer and that's where the inflation to go back to your original question that's where i think the inflationary pressures are going to build up”
Nancy Pelosi demonstrated sophisticated political strategy by driving fiscal stimulus to the median voter (not to hedge fund managers), forcing Trump to match her proposals or lose the election to campaign ads portraying Republicans as cutting unemployment benefits—this established the political trap that guarantees continued fiscal stimulus regardless of which party wins.
“nancy pelosi is one of the most vicious and skilled politicians in the united states and what she's done is she sniffed out where the median voter is in this country...she just plowed right to the median voter and the median voter is not a hedge fund manager”
Papic estimates the probability of military conflict or a miscalculation in the South China Sea or over Taiwan at 10-20 percent, which is extraordinarily high in geopolitical terms and should result in much higher discount rates for companies with Taiwan operations, but markets are not pricing this because passive investing breaks proper risk discounting mechanisms.
“i would say that the probability of a military conflict uh in south china sea or or over taiwan is is actually quite high the prob i would say between 10 and 20”
China is currently opening its economy and inviting foreign investment to professionalize its capital markets, and is deliberately taking a step back from aggressive foreign policy to focus on domestic reforms—this represents a reversal of the aggressive 2010s posture and suggests China will be surprisingly 'muted' geopolitically over the next decade.
“i mean china is clearly trying to like what the chinese are actually doing right now is they're opening up their economy uh they're trying to you know invite more investment in their capital markets”
Green notes that people are actually experiencing desensitization to macro volatility and social media narrative swings, not escalating reactions, because of growing awareness that they operate in filter bubbles where they receive confirmation rather than new information.
“i would actually argue that what you're seeing on social media is more of a desensitization right...people are increasingly aware that they're operating in a social media bubble right that the information that they're receiving tends to be confirmation as compared to new information”
The original 13 American colonies might not have formed a federal union and would have settled for a confederacy without the imminent threat of invasion by the United Kingdom, demonstrating that geopolitical threat drives integration.
“the reason that switzerland exists as a country even the original 13 colonies of the united states i'm not sure they would have necessarily formed a federal union maybe confederacy would have been sufficient had there not been that imminent threat of an invasion by the united kingdom to repossess its colonies right”
Income inequality and social mobility have skewed relative to other developed nations in the US, exacerbated by the 2008 recession, and the median US household income is at 50% of population but the income distribution is much more unequal than peer nations.
“the us has on a lot of measures of income inequality social mobility blah blah relative to its peers in the developed world you know really skewed to one way and the great recession in 2008 has exacerbated some of those inequalities...the oecd did that shows that the u.s has a very high median income but middle income as share of total population it's pretty low it's at basically 50 percent”
The rapid fiscal response to COVID was driven by the plunge in risk asset prices creating a compelling framework for immediate action, and austerity language is already returning as asset prices recover, suggesting political commitment to stimulus is contingent on market stress.
“the speed of the response was in large part driven by the speed of the movement in asset prices right so as risk assets plunge that creates a very compelling framework for uh a fiscal response right we have to do something because clearly the expectations channel even though they don't use that language as incorporated in risk assets as plunging we're already starting to see austerity language return”
Papic expects a dollar bear market (not a sign of American decline, but a normal cyclical phenomenon) to accompany the Buenos Aires Consensus and would be 'biased against the dollar and towards gold' as asset positioning.
“we're probably entering a um you know dollar bear market which is fine like it happens often doesn't mean the end of america if if american assets underperformed for a decade it has happened before”
Whether China's early actions were forced by demographics or a misunderstanding of its geopolitical positioning, China has called itself out to the world, and the rest of the world has woken up aggressively to this reality.
“whether they were forced because of demographics or whether they really misunderstood their geopolitical positioning it feels like they made a move that called them out to the world and the rest of the world has woken up pretty aggressively to this”
European voters increasingly support the euro and monetary union, and have declining confidence that individual countries can prosper outside the EU—with the exception of Italy, which periodically has populist bouts, but ultimately Italians understand they cannot succeed outside the EU, so they renegotiate rather than leave.
“if you look at the polling in europe since the euro area crisis there's been a steady increase in support for for example the monetary union...on the other hand you've got this steady decline in confidence that these countries could actually exist outside of the eu and prosper”
The last time supply chains were rewired (2001-2008, when China entered the WTO) was hugely beneficial for Europe, emerging markets, cyclical stocks, and commodities—similarly, rewiring away from China will benefit these same categories, whereas S&P 500 companies with entrenched supply chains will suffer margin compression.
“the last time we did it from 2001 to 2008 when china entered the wto that was hugely beneficial for europe emerging markets and other cyclicals and commodities the industrialization of china...was very uh beneficial for sort of cyclicals commodities and so on rewiring away from china could again be as beneficial”
Investors should not bet against the S&P 500 based on geopolitical risks like China conflict, but should maintain hedges (gold, defense stocks, semiconductor capex plays) within their portfolio to account for the 10-20% probability of a Taiwan conflict that would require rapid fab rebuilding.
“investors you know so many investors want to not buy the s p 500 because of china us and i'm saying that's that's that's nuts...the high probability of an accident or a miscalculation or a conflict means that you have to position your portfolio to have some hedges”
Sophisticated investors must understand geopolitics not just as bilateral conflict (U.S.-China rivalry) but as a system (bipolarity vs multipolarity, Washington vs Buenos Aires consensus), because macro geopolitical context shapes whether outcomes bifurcate cleanly or remain messy.
“i i brought you two charts one is from the late 19th century the other one is from the 30s uh the one from the 19th century shows that the united kingdom uh traded with germany right up until the start of world war one and i could have also shown you french trade with germany russian trade with germany these were three countries the triple antons they were basically allied defensively against germany and they all expected for 20 years before world war one everybody knew there would be a war like everybody was planning for this and yet they traded with germany why because if the uk didn't protect its commercial interests its ally france would have just picked up that revenue um that uk left on the table um similarly i think it's going to be very difficult for the us to disentangle for china because it can't control its allies the way it did in a bipolar context and this is something that i think we need to do as investors we need to have a very sophisticated view of geopolitics not just in understanding like china u.s don't like each other the acidity strap and all this stuff but understanding that the macro geopolitical context influences outcomes whether we're in a bipolar world or a multipolar world will influence the you know how these things play out whether we're in the washington consensus or buenos aires consensus will influence how policy makers react these these big picture macro contexts matter just like they matter in economics they also matter in geopolitics”
The US and UK were the earliest adopters of the supply-side economics revolution in the 1980s (Reagan/Thatcher), but over the past decade have moved steadily away from those policies, with France's Mitterrand as the historical cautionary tale of early fiscal expansion.
“supply-side economics reagan and thatcher won francois mitterrand failed he lost uh his policies were disastrous those of reagan attached were extremely beneficial so across the world a set of policies was adopted”
Russia under Putin has been 'geopolitically genius' and played the great power game better than anyone else, possibly using diplomatic channels to encourage China to move against the US earlier than China would have chosen, thereby exposing China to Western countermeasures.
“russia played this role previously effectively putin geopolitical genius i mean playing the game better than anyone else in my opinion”
European equity valuations (S&P, Daimler) may not benefit from European integration or even government stimulus if those equities remain dependent on globalization and access to growing Chinese markets, making the distinction between policy support and fundamental demand crucial.
“my pushback would be that makes a ton of sense if you're talking italian bonds right i'm not quite sure that that means that you should go out and buy sap all right or that you should go out and buy daimler chrysler or daimler chrysler or daimler right yeah like i i wonder how much europe is the equity component of europe relies on globalization in particular access to a growing chinese market and if that's a very different statement than the growth of government spending as a percentage of gdp effectively the idea that europe needs to provide an internal source of demand for the products that it's scaled up to produce on a global basis how would you react to the that distinction”
The median voter is the price maker in the political marketplace and the politician is the price taker—understanding median voter preferences is the key to predicting which consensus you're in and what policies will follow.
“the median voter which is of course a theoretical concept is the price maker in the political marketplace this is really important for for my way of thinking the median voter is the price maker the politician is the price taker”
Political opposition to fiscal stimulus from Republicans (like Mitch McConnell and Rand Paul) will ultimately fail because the Buenos Aires consensus is now dominant and politicians across parties will respond to median voter preferences for fiscal stimulus, not ideological fiscal conservatism.
“there will be a campaign against this republican uh basically package but here's where i would kind of disagree with you you know my framework for thinking about politics is um that policymakers um just try to win...if you have that framework it means that the median voter which is of course a theoretical concept is the price maker in the political marketplace this is really important for for my way of thinking the median voter is the price maker the politician is the price taker”
Most investors (approximately 90%) missed the importance of the purple line on the government contribution to GDP chart because the last 10 years fiscal policy appeared irrelevant due to austerity, making them unprepared for the 2020 regime shift where fiscal became dominant.
“the purple line is government's contribution to gdp you know and the funny thing about that is that the reason most investors didn't like pay attention to that is because the last 10 years it didn't really matter”
The market is addicted to fiscal stimulus and is ignoring regulatory and tax headwinds from a potential Biden/Democratic presidency because the market is pricing in the certainty that fiscal stimulus will continue under any Democratic administration.
“the market has completely ignored the massive increase in probability of such an outcome why because the market's addicted to fiscal policy and i think the market is looking through all the regulatory and tax challenges of abiding presidency and the market is saying like you know what it's cool it's cool with me a biden presidency combined with democrats taking the senate ensures that this fiscal tap continues”
The shift from Washington to Buenos Aires Consensus means markets will become 'addicted to fiscal policy,' with the probability of a 'fiscal cliff recession' becoming the central focus for both investors and policymakers, replacing deficit obsession.
“markets driven by fiscal the stimulus and so i would say that the pushback right now...that's going to be something that i think the market's gonna start obsessing over”
The most important macro investment question is identifying which chart will drive markets over the next 10 years and determining that chart's directionality, not getting caught in short-term noise.
“macro investing is about that it really comes down to figuring out what is the most important chart of the year and what is the directionality of that chart”
Green was 'Biden Island biased' from early 2019 (betting on Biden's nomination victory), and found it striking that institutional investors seemed completely confident Biden could not win based on Twitter sentiment—this exemplifies how social media distorts sophisticated investor perception of fundamental political realities.
“i was uh one of the early i i never sold my condo on biden island ever...i kept my condo on biden island uh from early 2019. i thought he was going to win the nomination”
Social media has corrupted sophisticated investors by making them believe 'Twitter is real life,' leading them to overweight narrative volatility while remaining desensitized to actual macro risks like Taiwan conflict—the result is that market moves become more violent when risks actually materialize.
“i think social media has corrupted like too many people and including extremely sophisticated investors um so basically people have come to this um conclusion i think they wouldn't admit it but they have that twitter is real life”
The Washington Consensus was fundamentally non-democratic—it was about 'short-term pain for long-term gain' by institutionalizing technocratic protocols (like central bank independence) that voters would not choose if asked directly, because most voters prefer short-term gain and defer long-term pain decisions.
“washington consensus is about short-term pain for long-term gain washington consensus in some way is almost about a lack of democracy it's non-democratic it's about instituting these protocols that if you really ask people they wouldn't want like independent central banking”
Mike Green suggested that 20th century politics was about the politics of scarcity (growing population, expanding productive capacity), while mid-1970s onward represented a shift to supply-side focus (integrated global markets, China manufacturing), and now we're transitioning to demand management (universal basic income, fiscal stimulus) as a response to demand constraint from demographics.
“much of the 20th century was all about the politics of scarcity right you effectively needed to figure out how to address an exploding population growth and a continuous outward shift...the growth of the government”
If the US does not stand as a champion of laissez-faire and the Washington Consensus, policymakers in Germany, Japan, and China will see that and abandon their own austerity, adopting fiscal stimulus globally, spreading the Buenos Aires consensus worldwide.
“if the u.s doesn't stand as a bulwark bulwark as a champion of laissez-faire and the washington consensus policymakers in germany or japan or china or everywhere else you're going to look around and see like well hell if the country of ronald reagan is you know just spending like crazy we're going to do some of that too”
Green questions whether the Macron-Merkel EU recovery fund is actually a game-changer, noting that many institutional investors believed European breakup was likely and only changed their view after this plan—the optics (new borrowing facility, security integration) matter more for investor psychology than the economics.
“i was somewhat skeptical of this latest macron merkel plan you know okay i never thought it was that big of a deal because i don't think they actually need to do this to continue to integrate um but okay fine yeah i mean it's marginally positive”
The current macro environment is extraordinarily tense and interesting (not boring), driven by fundamental contradictions: fiscal stimulus transfers to private sector balance sheets, but discount rates are not adjusting because passive investing breaks pricing mechanisms, creating tail risks in geopolitical domains.
“i look at it and i'm just like oh my god how could like you know how could this be more crazy um i can only think of a few ways most of which involve various planes flying over taiwan”
The Tea Party moment of 2010 (18 months post-crisis) will not be repeated in the current cycle; investors expecting a similar austerity backlash are likely to be surprised by continued fiscal expansion because the median voter has shifted.
“i don't think that we're really going to have the moment that we had last cycle last cycle the tea party moment came as i said 18 months into the recession there was a revolt against profligacy basically by middle of 2010. i think this time around you're not going to see it you're not going to see it in the u.s”
The inception of Papic's Buenos Aires Consensus view was a 2020 recession forecast, but the view was designed to predict the policy response to recession rather than the recession itself—COVID accelerated the recession component unexpectedly but confirmed the Buenos Aires Consensus response pattern.
“the inception of the view was that we would have a recession in 2020 obviously i didn't expect a biblical downturn because of a you know plague um but we did get a recession”
Universal basic income is essentially demand management by another name—providing income-constrained populations with purchasing power to smooth and recover their demand function.
“universal basic income which we have a variant of today it's it's just another way of saying demand management right you're going to provide people with the tools that are required to smooth their demand function and recover their demand function”
Active investing is a great opportunity in today's environment precisely because of the structural break (passive dominance) and narrative volatility (social media) that prevent proper risk pricing—macro investors who understand the consensus framework will outperform passive strategies.
“i think oddly people are increasingly aware that they're operating in a social media bubble...if anything people are reacting less as compared to reacting more”
Papic is bullish on European assets over the next 12-36 months because: 1) global reflation is underway (China stimulating), 2) Europe is a high-beta play on global macro, 3) European companies will benefit from rewiring supply chains away from China, and 4) the euro could increase from 20% to 25-30% of reserve currency share.
“i think at this particular moment the answer is yes i think we have global reflation china is stimulating europe is a high kind of beta play it's a price taker from a global macro perspective and i think it's going to do well over the next 12 uh to 36 months”
If Republicans block unemployment benefits in stimulus negotiations, Trump will lose by 20 percentage points instead of 10, and Biden will then ensure no fiscal cliff recession occurs in his first year by continuing stimulus, establishing a pattern of perpetual fiscal expansion.
“if mitch mcconnell screws this up over the next three months you're gonna hear nothing but campaign ads that republicans try to cut your unemployment benefits and then trump's not going to lose by 10 he's going to lose by 20 and then next year joe biden is not going to allow a 10 12 fiscal cliff to happen of course not i mean he just beat trump based on fiscal policy”
In 1945, after World War II, the Soviet Union and United States were the only two remaining great powers; Europe and Japan were devastated, making a bipolar context natural and inevitable.
“after world war ii you know europe was completely decimated japan had two nuclear bombs thrown at it china was uh exiting like two decades of vicious warfare whether versus japan or internal health yeah right yeah so the only two powers in 1945 were the soviet union in the united states the context was bipolar”
Papek works at Clock Tower Group as a macro strategist and does not use social media for information or publishing, preferring to work directly with institutional investors.
“at clock tower my job is to really work very closely with our investors so that's where most of the research goes to but the book will be available in october and next time i come on we can talk about it”
The US hit a China trade deal around the time of the previous Real Vision interview, with much having changed since then, particularly regarding domestic political focus and policy responses to slow growth and pandemic.
“you were right that the u.s hit a china trade deal when you and i were discussing it but so much has changed now”
Green's general view on gold is that it will be 'what is next'—a hedge that performs well coming out of crisis, but the real question is about equity market positioning given the simultaneous occurrence of government spending and potential discount rate compression from passive investing.
“my general view on gold has been it would be what is next right as you're coming out the other side of it”
The book 'Geopolitical Alpha' will be available in October and can be pre-ordered on Amazon—it will serve as the basis for future discussions with Papic about geopolitical investing frameworks.
“the book will be available in october and next time i come on we can talk about it it's called geopolitical alpha and you can actually pre-order it on amazon's there's a little plug there”