
What this covers
John Nye of George Mason University joins Russ Roberts to overturn the standard nineteenth-century trade narrative. Rather than treating 1846 and the repeal of the Corn Laws as Britain's watershed moment into free trade, Nye argues the story is far messier: France actually maintained lower average tariffs than Britain for most of the century, Britain's tariff decline was gradual and predated the repeal, and a peculiar alliance between the British state and domestic brewers—forged to raise war revenue through fixed wine tariffs—fundamentally shaped both Britain's trade policy and its drinking culture. The conversation traces how these fixed tariffs, imposed after 1713, destroyed the cheap wine market and inadvertently created the conditions for a dominant beer industry, while explaining why Britain became a beer-drinking nation rather than wine-drinking like France.
The discussion moves across several interconnected territories. Nye examines the flaws in Ricardo's famous comparative-advantage example—Portuguese wine was never a natural trade good but an artifact of preferential tariffs and British control of Portuguese production zones. He argues that domestic market integration, not international free trade per se, was the primary engine of British growth, and that when Smith advocated free trade he largely meant domestic exchange as well. The broader economic forces emerge too: Nye contends that the nineteenth-century shift toward freer trade resulted not from intellectual victory but from technological change that raised the cost of protection, and that the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier Treaty triggered a cascading network of bilateral agreements across Europe rather than Britain unilaterally leading the way. A final theme resurfaces the paradox of economic interdependence: Britain and France's tightening trade ties after 1860 helped transform ancient enemies into allies, yet contemporaries believed similar interlocking would prevent World War I—it did not.
Nye argues the standard story that Britain was the great 19th-century free trader is largely false: France had lower average tariffs for three quarters of the century, Britain's tariff decline was gradual and began before the 1846 Corn Law repeal, and the persistence of fixed wine tariffs—driven by a war-born alliance between the state and domestic brewers seeking revenue—shaped both Britain's trade policy and its drinking culture.
- Average tariffs in France were lower than Britain's until roughly the mid-1870s, and both fell gradually rather than dropping at Corn Law repeal
- Fixed (volume) tariffs on French wine after 1713 destroyed the cheap wine market, protected domestic beer, and created an oligopoly that the state taxed for war revenue
- Domestic market integration and technological change, not international free trade per se, were the primary drivers of British growth
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Fixed volume tariffs (e.g., a flat $20 per bottle) destroy the cheap end of a market while leaving the luxury end relatively unaffected, because the fixed charge makes a $1 wine 21 times more expensive but a $10 wine only 50% more expensive—thus distorting consumption toward high-end wine and shifting the mass market to beer.
“what the volume tariffs do volume tariffs destroy the cheapest ones”
Portuguese wine functioned effectively as 'British wine' because British-controlled processing zones called 'factories' in Portugal—staffed by British workers and merchants, shipped on British ships, with British legal jurisdiction over crimes—produced low-grade wine exclusively for the British market to fill the gap left by the absence of French wine.
“it's sort of a processing zone it's where stuff is produced or made for re-export by Britain and it's controlled by the British often with British workers British sailors British officers”
After the wine tariffs created profitable domestic brewers and distillers, the British state taxed them heavily and formed an alliance encouraging oligopoly—reducing hundreds of small brewers to about a dozen dominant ones whose prices were state-regulated—because a concentrated, monitored industry was easier to tax, while producers accepted being monopolized in exchange for monopoly profits, with consumers (who had weak political power) bearing the burden.
“the state moves from encouraging free trade and beer... to having production in the sense that they limit entry very severely you go from having hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of small Brewers to basically having less than 20 major Brewers in fact a dozen dominant Brewers who are oligopoly”
Free trade between nations was of secondary importance compared to domestic internal trade for much of the late 18th and early 19th century; when Adam Smith advocated free trade he largely meant exchange in general including domestic trade, and the bigger problem—especially for France—was its internal patchwork of tariffs, regulations, and tax regimes that made it easier for Bordeaux to trade with London than with Strasbourg.
“the really big problem particularly for France was not its trade with other nations the really big problem was internal trade France for instance one of the problems that led to the French Revolution was the fact that France was a patchwork of different tax regimes”
Ricardo's famous comparative-advantage example of British cloth traded for Portuguese wine is a poor illustration because Portugal was an extremely inefficient wine producer whose wine was imported to Britain only as a result of the preferential Methuen Treaty tariffs of 1703-04, making it actually a case of trade created by protectionism rather than natural comparative advantage.
“the problem with that example is it's a horrible example of comparative advantage because Portugal was an extremely inefficient producer of wines Portuguese wine was imported to Britain as a result of tariffs favoring Portugal quite specifically”
Measured by average tariffs (total customs duties divided by import value), French average tariffs remained below those of Britain until about the mid-1870s, so for roughly three quarters of the 19th century—including three decades after Corn Law repeal—France had lower average tariffs than Britain.
“the French average tariffs remain Bulow's below those of Britain until about the mid 1870s so put it another way for three quarters of the nineteenth century and for something like three decades after the repeal of the Corn Laws the French had lower average tariffs than the British”
The fixed tariffs caused French wine exports to Britain to fall by 95 percent compared to pre-war levels, effectively destroying the cheap wine market and—rather than protecting a (nonexistent) British wine industry—protecting and creating the British beer industry, which explains why Britain became a beer-drinking rather than wine-drinking nation.
“as a result of the tariffs French exports to Britain fall by 95 percent compared to what they were before the war”
Alcoholic beverages were among the safest and most important drinks for the average person before the 19th century because water was polluted, milk pasteurization and fruit juice were unavailable, and the production process made alcohol relatively safe; beer was treated as a staple akin to 'daily bread', with low-alcohol beer being the largest single budget item in early-1700s Dutch orphanages.
“in many ways I would argue that alcoholic products were probably the safest drink did the average person to drink at that time that is to say water was often polluted”
Plausible stories about causation need to be shown empirically rather than merely asserted, even when they sound reasonable.
“I think plausible stories need to be shown not really asserted”
The average-tariff measure is crude because a 100% or 200% tariff on an item that is never imported registers as nothing, so one must weight by the volume of trade rather than simply averaging posted tariff rates.
“the empirical challenge is that there might be a hundred percent or two hundred percent tariff even on a particular item that's never imported correct so the fact that you wouldn't want to just go across each item take the tariffs and then average the tariffs you want to have some measure of the volume of trade as well”
The British tariffs pushed French producers to evade the fixed tariffs by producing higher and higher quality wine, since exporting higher-value goods was the only way to partially escape a per-unit tariff, making the 18th century a period of great wine research and innovation in France.
“it pushed the French to try to get around the tariff by producing higher and higher quality wine that is to sort of say that the 18th century was a period of great research and innovation in in France”
The return to technology in production is minimal without an integrated domestic market because there is no point picking cotton more quickly if you can only sell to your immediate neighbors; market unification across jurisdictions enables economies of scale, so Britain's superior domestic trade integration may have been a key driver of its Industrial Revolution innovation.
“the return to technology is really quite minimal because what's the point of picking cotton more quickly if you're only gonna sell it to your neighbors”
The major dynamic advantage of free trade is that it creates interest groups in trade-benefiting areas (such as ports) that act as a lobby in favor of future liberalization and reform, counteracting the usual tendency of lobbies to close up trade for the benefit of subgroups.
“the areas that are benefiting from trade free trade develop interest groups who can sustain future reforms and who can act as a lobby in favor of opening up instead of the usual habits which are that lobbies formed which try to close up trade”
When you plot 19th-century average tariffs for England and France without time labels, you cannot pinpoint the Corn Law repeal because there is no sudden drop—only a slow, steady fall throughout the first three quarters of the century—refuting the idea that 1846 was a decisive break.
“if you look at the data that you that you'd calculate what you see is there's ups and downs but there's a slow steady fall throughout the first three quarters of the nineteenth century in both England and France and there's no sudden drop downward”
Britain was almost certainly superior to France in encouraging a national domestic market—through improved private roads and transportation and laws breaking down local and provincial monopolies—and this open domestic market amplified the benefits of its later move toward international free trade, whereas France had to struggle (e.g., Napoleon imposing uniform rules) to integrate.
“Britain was almost certainly superior to France was that by encouraging a national market that is both through the improvement of transportation mechanisms through the rise of private roads”
The state-brewer alliance is analogous to the modern tobacco settlement, in which—in the name of children's or public health—the government created an oligopoly of a few tobacco makers, taxed them heavily for revenue, and structured the law to keep out new entrants, so that the burden ultimately falls on the consumers (smokers and beer drinkers) rather than the companies.
“it reminds me very depressingly of the tobacco settlement a situation where in the name of something really supposedly lovely children's health... the government has essentially created an oligopoly of a handful of tobacco makers who they tax heavily”
The economic interlocking of Britain and France after 1860 helped turn long-time enemies into allies through the long peaceful 19th century (1815-1914), but this is also a cautionary tale because contemporaries believed the interlocked economies of the early 20th century made something like World War I impossible—and it happened anyway.
“part of that surely has to do with the interlocking of their economies at the same time there's a cautionary story for us is that people felt that the interlocked economies at the end of the 19th early 20th century were so strong that something like World War one... could seem had never happened”
The overall 19th-century trend toward freer trade was driven not by intellectual triumph but by genuine technological transformation that diversified production and raised the cost of protectionism, plus a broad political-economy movement in which interest groups (e.g., industrialists wanting cheaper food for workers) benefited from open trade, and better-functioning capital markets made capital and labor more mobile and trade harder to shut down.
“it's combination of genuine technological transformation in the Western world that is technological transformation in the Western world is pushing countries to be more diverse and broader in their production which is also encouraging more trade”
The 1860 Cobden-Chevalier Treaty between Britain and France, a bilateral most-favored-nation agreement, triggered a cascade in which other European powers, fearing being locked out, rapidly signed interlocking MFN bilateral agreements—so European free trade arose from a network of treaties rather than Britain going it alone, which is the more important story.
“interestingly enough to bilateral trade agreement between Britain and France led to a trigger system in which most of the other European powers quickly signed most favored nation bilateral agreements”
Wine was a major export good for France, often the second or third largest cash crop for export worldwide throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, so that even though export volumes were small the high value and marginal nature of adjustments produced large effects on land prices and resource use.
“throughout the 18th and 19th century for France worldwide it was often the second or third largest cash crop for export”
The free-trade story persisted partly because the British simply told everyone they were free traders and did remove many tariffs—but on items insignificant for trade—while retaining tariffs on the products where it lacked comparative advantage, analogous to Japan removing all manufacturing tariffs while keeping a few-hundred-percent tariff on rice.
“the trivial answer I think is that it's because the British told us they were free trade”
Contrary to the received wisdom that war stimulates the economy, war is bad for the economy; the heavy tax burden of the Hanoverian fiscal state may help explain why British living standards rose little from the mid-1700s to the mid-1800s despite the Industrial Revolution—though this remains a conjecture requiring proof.
“I always like to emphasize the fact that war is bad for the economy contrary to sort of the received wisdom”
Free trade is generally a good thing and it is hard to find evidence it is generally harmful, but it is no panacea: a corrupt, inefficient nation with a poorly functioning domestic market may not be dramatically helped by opening trade, since outcomes depend on how the trade is opened up.
“as a general rule of thumb free trade is genuinely a good thing... at the same time supporters of free trade should acknowledge that it's no panacea”
The sum of all alcohol-related revenues—customs on wine, taxes on beer, distilleries, hops, and especially sugar (the largest single input to alcohol production)—could amount to as much as 20-25 percent of the British budget, and British state revenues grew roughly five times relative to GDP over the 18th century, faster than any other European country.
“if you look at the sum total of all the earnings on things related to alcohol it could be as much as 20 25 percent of the British budget”
Britain ran a trade deficit in essentially every year from 1750 to 1914 (excepting a couple of ambiguous war years) while simultaneously ruling the waves and being the dominant trader in the world, demonstrating that long-run persistent trade deficits are not necessarily unsustainable or harmful.
“there may not have been a single year except for a couple of war years which are ambiguous but there may not have been a single year in which Britain ran the trade surplus”
After the war with France ended in 1713, newly enriched domestic brewers, distillers, and British-Portuguese wine merchants lobbied the crown to impose for the first time onerously high tariffs on French wine to prevent a return to open trade, and these were levied as fixed volume tariffs rather than percentage tariffs.
“the British Portuguese wine merchants the beer makers the various Brewers the virus distillers all get together and Lobby the crown you can't do this you can't have free trade in fragile wine”
The claim by modern protectionists (e.g., Pat Buchanan) that late-19th-century US high tariffs caused its rapid growth is absurd; US manufacturing output today is many times its 1970 level despite manufacturing employment being a smaller fraction, so the sector thrives due to high productivity and returning to 19th-century protectionism would be a mistake.
“I think that's a an absurd claim... u.s. manufacturing output today is many times what it was in in 1970 despite the fact that employment is a smaller fraction”
In the 19th century, tariffs and excises were the major source of government revenue for most nations—unlike today, where income and corporate taxes dwarf tariff revenue—and for Britain especially the excises on beer and other goods were central; the income tax did not become genuinely important until the 20th century.
“in the nineteenth century for most nations that was not true that the tariffs were a major source of revenue correct the exercises and for Britain especially the excises”
Many of the most significant tariffs Adam Smith condemned in the Wealth of Nations remained in place after the repeal of the Corn Laws and the supposed removal of the bulk of British tariffs, signaling that the free-trade story is flawed.
“many not all but many of the most significant tariffs that Adam Smith condemns right there and clearly in the wealth of nations remain after repeal of the Corn Laws”
Britain's superior ability to raise tax revenue—centered on the domestic excise compromise that avoided political backlash—funded its wars and explains why the smaller Britain defeated or tied France throughout most of the 18th century, when Britain was at war somewhere in the world roughly half of all years.
“the big source of their ability to conduct those Wars and be and expand their power was their ability to raise taxes and the relative raise taxes was partially centered on this domestic compromise where they could raise excises and not get a ruckus from the major political powers”
An 1840 British parliamentary inquiry showed that lowering tariffs on French wine would actually raise customs revenues because the tariffs were so high, but Britain delayed because it feared short-run revenue disruption; only when the income tax began in the 1850s did fiscal pressure to protect wine/beer revenue diminish enough to permit liberalization.
“a parliamentary inquiry in 1840 showed that lowering tariffs on French wine would raise revenues in customs”
Calculations suggest that without the tariffs, by the 19th century Britain would have imported twenty to a hundred times as much wine as it actually did.
“many calculations would suggest that if not for the tires by the by the 19th century Britain would have been importing twenty to a hundred times as much wine from all out from all countries combined as they did in fact”
The Corn Laws repealed in the 1840s were predominantly creations of the late 18th and early 19th century, just after the publication of the Wealth of Nations, so most of them did not exist when Adam Smith was writing.
“the corn laws that were moved in 1840s were predominantly creations of the late 18th and early 19th century just after the publication of the wealthy nation”
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations argued that the true source of wealth was not silver and gold, so a nation need not obsess over running a trade surplus, which was the central error of mercantilism.
“the whole essence of the wealth of nations was trying to understand what the true source of wealth was it wasn't silver and gold and so a nation smith argue didn't have to be obsessed with running a trade surplus”
The traditional view holds that Britain decisively moved to free trade after the 1840s repeal of the Corn Laws and was the first and unique free trader in Western Europe, while France remained protectionist throughout the 19th century.
“the traditional view is that beginning in the mid 1800s the British began to move towards free trade and the decisive event was the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s”
The word 'corn' in the Corn Laws is misleading; it refers to a set of complex laws that raised the price of grain in England, and their repeal lowered grain prices and freed up both the import and export of grain (predominantly importing).
“the word corn is misleading is really a a set of somewhat complex laws that raise the price of grain correct in in england and the repeal of that lowered the price of grain”
Welcome to EconTalk, part of the Library of Economics and Liberty, hosted by Russ Roberts.
“welcome to econ talk part of the library of economics and liberty I'm your host Russ Roberts”