
The End of Risk Parity: Bonds, Stocks, and the U.S. Dollar (w/ Raoul Pal & Dan Tapiero)
What this covers
This is a 12-minute conversation between Dan Tapiero of DTAP Capital and Real Vision CEO Raoul Pal. It starts from the stock-bond relationship and what happens to it once yields reach zero. Tapiero lays out the historical case: since 1980, bonds delivered large capital gains in every serious equity downturn, which is what made the balanced portfolio work. With no yield left to fall, bonds stop acting as a portfolio hedge. He says the question for institutions over the next five years is what can replace them, and his own answer is gold.
The institutional consequences get the most attention. Pal says the pension system was built on the assumption that yields would never be zero, so its liability-matching models no longer work. He cites Japanese life insurers and pension funds buying equity ETFs) for income, and Tapiero adds the damage to European funds holding negative-yielding debt against fixed payouts. They also ask where capital could go if it leaves equities, and Tapiero doubts that commercial real estate and other illiquid alternatives have the capacity. Pal predicts that if balanced risk can't be achieved, many people will eventually leave equities altogether, and he points to Europe and Japan, where stock markets never recovered from past crashes. He also ties weak US equity returns to aging demographics.
The second half turns to the dollar, where the two men disagree. Tapiero leans toward a dollar bear market and points to the 2000–2003 selloff that helped the recovery from the NASDAQ collapse. He argues that Americans care about equity prices, not currency values, and that the next inflationary episode could lift the S&P 500 in nominal terms and ease the debt burden, as in the 1980s. Pal cites the 1920s, when major economies eventually embraced currency devaluation, but warns of a more toxic dollar rally first. In his account, foreign borrowers have no direct access to Fed facilities, so a global shortage of dollars could push the currency up despite what the Fed does.
Tapiero and Pal argue that government bonds are losing their hedging efficiency as yields approach zero, forcing portfolio managers to seek alternative risk management strategies like gold, while also debating whether currency devaluation or a deflationary solvency crisis will dominate the next economic cycle.
- Government bonds historically provided portfolio hedges through capital gains during downturns, but near-zero yields eliminate this mechanism
- Pension funds and institutional investors face an existential problem: no viable replacement asset class for bonds in traditional 70/30 portfolios
- Two competing scenarios: either dollar bear market driven by coordinated global stimulus (1920s model) or deflationary debt crisis that strengthens the dollar
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European pension funds and insurance companies have been severely damaged by zero and negative bond yields, forced to invest in negative-yielding government bonds while still obligated to meet fixed pension payouts based on historical policy commitments.
“Well, they've gotten killed. I know German insurance companies, they have to put their money into negative bunds, and they have to pay out what they have to pay out based on their policy.”
Japanese life insurance companies and pension funds are purchasing equity ETFs to prop up returns on their portfolios because bond yields provide no income, forcing them to take on equity risk despite being institutions designed for conservative investing.
“ETFs, which are basically the equity portfolios and the life insurances and the pension funds to try and prop up returns because there's no bond return.”
The entire pension system is built on the assumption that bond yields will never be zero, so the original liability and asset matching models are now broken because the promised returns are impossible to achieve with zero-yielding bonds.
“all promises the entire pension system is built on never once assume that bond yields are zero in the point that you're raising.”
The 2000-2003 period saw a massive US dollar selloff that coincided with and enabled the recovery from the NASDAQ collapse, demonstrating that dollar weakness can facilitate equity market recovery.
“Look, it went down from 2000 to '03, that was a huge run for macro guys like us, that dollar selloff. It was because of that dollar selloff that we could recover from the NASDAQ collapse, which really was a gigantic collapse.”
It is difficult to run intelligent, balanced risk management within equity portfolios for pension funds given the constraints of zero bond yields and the demographic headwinds affecting equity valuations.
“How do you run intelligent risk in an equity portfolio for a pension? Now, it's difficult.”
From 1980 to the present, every time there was a significant equity market downturn, government bonds provided massive capital gains that offset stock losses, which created the foundation of the traditional balanced portfolio strategy.
“Just think about since 1980, every time we've had the downdraft in the periods we were discussing before, there were massive gains in bonds.”
The US equity market will not recover for an extraordinary long time until demographic changes—specifically aging populations—work through the system, because demographics are part of the structural constraint on asset prices.
“Which is one of my core thesis that I don't think the US market recovers for an extraordinary time until the demographic blows through. Because they're part of this.”
Government bonds as an asset class are losing efficiency or productivity as a portfolio hedge, particularly as yields approach zero.
“there's a new narrative that maybe just developing, which is that government bonds as an asset class are losing their efficiency or productivity”
The existential crisis for institutional investors over the next five years is determining what asset class can replace government bonds as the portfolio hedge once bond yields approach zero and bonds stop providing capital gains.
“I think if there's an existential crisis, from an investor standpoint, again, putting aside the virus and the oil and all of that is that in the next five years, what can replace bonds?”
Foreign borrowers who need US dollars lack direct access to Federal Reserve facilities, so when global credit stress emerges, they face acute dollar shortage and must bid for scarce dollar liquidity, driving the dollar higher despite Fed efforts to weaken it.
“The worst is obviously abroad because they need dollars, and they don't get access to the Fed. The borrowers in the US can get access to the Fed in some way, shape or form, the foreigners don't get it. That's what drives the dollar.”
A larger solvency crisis driven by slow growth is highly probable in the current environment, creating a scenario where it becomes nearly impossible for the Federal Reserve to prevent the dollar from appreciating despite their efforts.
“I just think that the probability of a larger solvency crisis based on slow growth is pretty high. In that situation, I think it's almost impossible to stop the dollar.”
In an environment where bond yields reach zero, bonds become extremely inefficient portfolio hedges because they no longer provide capital gains to offset equity market losses, forcing institutional investors to seek alternative hedges.
“Once we get down to zero, I think it gets very hard for bonds in the portfolio to act as the hedge”
Gold should replace bonds as the primary hedge in 70/30 and 65/35 portfolios because gold has unlimited upside potential in a period of sustained stimulus by authorities, whereas bonds have zero capital appreciation potential at zero yields.
“I think there begins to be a little bit of a possible transition towards gold, which doesn't have a cap on it. It has unlimited upside in a period where the authorities are going to be adding stimulus for a long time.”
In the 1920s, the US, UK, France, and Germany resolved their post-war economic troubles through currency devaluation—initially resisting weakness due to strong currencies and gold accumulation, but eventually embracing devaluation which triggered economic recovery.
“One of my core ideas I'm floating around my head is the 1920s. We've got the US essentially and the UK and France eventually and Germany out of the troubles that they were in was currency devaluation. The US were quite late in repayment because the dollar was very strong. They kept accumulating gold reserves, gold reserves, gold reserves, and eventually, they said, listen, even though we're accumulating reserves, we have to weaken our currency. Almost the moment they weakened it, the economy turned around.”
Americans do not care about currency values and only care about equity market performance, so a 20-50% dollar depreciation over 5-6 years would have minimal political or economic impact on voter sentiment even if it occurred gradually.
“look, Americans only care really about the equity market. No one cares about the value of the currency. This is a perfect situation where if the dollar went down 20%, 30% here, wouldn't be that big a deal because especially if it happened over time? I would say most Americans wouldn't care, wouldn't know, it wouldn't matter I think over a five, six-year period, you could probably have it go down 50%.”
If institutions cannot find a way to balance intelligent risk in equity portfolios over long time horizons, and given that European and Japanese stock markets have never recovered from past crashes, most people will eventually exit equity markets entirely.
“It makes me think that most people just leave the equity market. Because if you don't have a way of taking intelligent balanced risk over a long term time horizon, and if I look at the European stock markets and the Japanese stock markets, they obviously never recovered again.”
There is potential for a larger and more toxic dollar cycle ahead of the current one, driven by the combination of weak growth, elevated corporate debt, and a global shortage of dollar liquidity that the Federal Reserve cannot directly address.
“My fear is there is still a larger potential dollar cycle that is even more toxic. Who knows?”
In the next inflationary episode, the S&P 500 may experience significant nominal price appreciation without real earnings growth, as the nominal value of equities rises through inflation while real economic output remains weak.
“It's not impossible that we have an inflationary episode where the risks of the S&P doesn't go up, the nominal value of the S&P goes up.”
There are two distinct windows in which the Fed can intervene in the dollar: an immediate window (now) where the Fed may lack sufficient policy tools to prevent the dollar from rising, and a second window (6-9 months forward) where structural problems emerge.
“I think the dollar is these two windows. One is this now period and I agree, I really don't know whether the Fed are going to do enough to stop the dollar rising. Maybe if they do, that's it squirts up again. They try and smash it back down.”
Institutional investors pulling capital from equities would need to allocate to commercial real estate or other illiquid alternatives, but these lack sufficient capacity or liquidity to absorb the capital that would exit equities.
“If you pull from the equity, are you putting it into commercial real estate and hoping that you'll make some return?”
Pension funds and endowments are facing a critical, unprecedented challenge in the next 3-5 years: finding viable replacement asset classes for government bonds given that zero yields eliminate bonds' historical hedging role.
“Well, if you're a pension fund manager, and I know you sit on an Advisory Board of endowments, or whatever it is, these are real meaningful questions now that everybody's going to have to have”
At zero bond yields, bonds function like cash—offering no return premium—which means there's no purpose to holding a bond market if yields are essentially the same as cash rates.
“All it does is act like cash. Well, fine, you'd use cash then, there's no point having a bond market.”
Despite concerns about debt accumulation, historical precedent from the mid-to-late 1980s shows that the US faced similar 'too much debt' predictions that were resolved not through default but through inflation and asset price appreciation that reflated the asset side of the national balance sheet.
“How about a different thought? How about, we always talk about all this debt, et cetera, and I remember in the mid-80s and late '80s, people talking about how Reagan had leveraged up too much, we'd had too much debt, and that the US economy, I think there was a Book Day of Reckoning or something like this, it was going to default and all of this business. What ended up happening in the '90s was that we reflated the asset side of the balance sheet, of the country's balance sheet.”
If the S&P 500 doubles over the next three years through nominal price appreciation (driven by inflation rather than earnings growth), this would dramatically reduce the pressure on the debt side of the national balance sheet by increasing the asset base denominator in debt-to-asset ratios.
“Maybe when we think about what are the models, the frameworks of the future, maybe they've gone unlimited right away. Maybe, maybe you're right, maybe the government is going to support the equity markets to a greater degree than we could ever imagine. How much pressure is the debt side of the balance sheet if let's say the S&P doubles from here?”
Inflationary episodes often follow major market panic spikes because panics force central bank authorities to add unprecedented stimulus, which leads to price inflation as the monetary base expands faster than goods can be produced.
“often you get inflationary episodes after there's a panic spike that forces the hands of authorities.”
If institutions cannot find viable alternatives to equities and bonds, the entire capital flows and allocation will eventually end up on the balance sheets of governments and central banks, whether through explicit policy or implicit default.
“Or do you get the government guarantee the pension system and you just put it into cash? It's all going to end up in the government balance sheet and the central bank balance sheet in the end, whichever way you cut it.”
The 1929 framework—where authorities fail to provide adequate stimulus and the economy contracts—is more likely to occur than the 1920s scenario if policymakers fail to 'do the right thing' by maintaining accommodative policies.
“I see you're 1920, the '29 framework where things could be-- I think that's more likely if the authorities give up and don't do the right thing.”
Euro weakness forces Europe to be more aggressive with stimulus, so if the Euro appreciates to 1.35 against the dollar, European authorities will be compelled to increase monetary and fiscal stimulus significantly.
“That's because I think that's really the only thing, also that will get Europe to be more aggressive on stimulus because if the Euro heads up to 135, they're going to have to do a lot more.”
Central banks have not yet begun wholesale easing—they have only stopped the economic deterioration temporarily, which means the full extent of stimulus is still ahead.
“they really even haven't begun a wholesale easing process, that they've stopped the rot for now”
Forcing the entire capital allocation system onto government and central bank balance sheets would effectively create a socialist economic system, representing a fundamental shift from market-based capitalism.
“That's really, you're very close to the socialist, a socialist system.”
The requirement to guarantee pension returns through government backing would require a fundamental shift in the economic system from market-based capitalism toward more government-directed capital allocation.
“You would need the government and also industry and business to say the equity markets don't work for us, we need it all guaranteed. That's really, you're very close to the socialist, a socialist system.”
In September-October (6+ months forward), even if economic growth remains weak, corporate earnings and cash flows become negative while debt levels remain elevated, triggering a debt cycle where corporations face downgrading and default.
“My fear is actually give us six months' time in September, October when economic growth hasn't really picked up, but we've got this real debt issue, so you've got negative cash flows and negative earnings out of corporations and debt. Like Ford just got downgraded to junk.”
The current dollar is late in its bull cycle and likely to begin a multi-year bear market, with 30-40% downside over the next several months to years driven by global stimulus competition and either active Fed intervention or natural currency devaluation from excess stimulus.
“I think this is an ending move, but that in-- it may be a few weeks, it may be a few months, I don't know. I think the next 30%, 40% is to the downside.”
If all major economies pursue aggressive stimulus simultaneously—through either active policy intervention or natural devaluation from excess liquidity—the world enters a 1920s-style 'rip roaring' inflationary environment with strong nominal asset appreciation.
“If everyone is being more aggressive, because we're going to either actively intervene in the dollar or naturally because of all the excess stimulus, the dollar heads into a bear market. I think you could be in a situation that's like the '20s, where it really is rip roaring.”
Government bond yields will likely compress dramatically to 10-30 basis points flat across the entire curve from short to 30-year maturities, making bonds a poor return bet for institutional investors even at current yields of 60 basis points.
“the government bond curve does come all the way down and maybe it's 20 basis points flat all the way up to 30 years, or maybe it's 10 basis points. Now, I don't think for an institution that's a great bet to buy bonds at 60 bps for a move to 30 or 20 or zero.”
China's government bond yields at 2.75-3% are too high relative to developed market rates and should be forced down to 1% or below to match global stimulus levels, otherwise China will be disadvantaged competitively.
“Also, China. China still has 3% government bond rates, or 2.75%, or whatever it is, that should be down at 1%. We have to force China also to be more aggressive.”
In early 2000, Tapiero's entire year's portfolio returns came from gains in 2-year US Treasury notes, demonstrating how bonds could be the primary return driver during equity market stress.
“I was loaded up on two years, the whole year was made on US 2-year notes”