
Former U.S. Navy Intelligence Chief Explains Why a U.S.-China War Is Coming
What this covers
Retired Rear Admiral Mike Studman spent decades in U.S. Navy intelligence, including a stint as intelligence director at Indo-Pacific Command and then command of the Office of Naval Intelligence. He speaks Mandarin and has long studied China. Host Dominik Presl questions him about how a Taiwan conflict could come about, how the Navy is preparing and adapting to changing warfare, and why the U.S. is losing in information warfare. Much of the answer rests on taking Xi Jinping's stated goals at face value, especially the place of Taiwan in Chinese Rejuvenation).
The middle of the conversation is concrete about China's preparations. Studman describes peacetime PLA) activity near the median line and in Taiwan's air defense zone as deliberate conditioning, meant to blunt warning signals. He treats 2027 as a "get ready by" date for military modernization, not just an anniversary, and says China is insulating its economy in the way it saw the West isolate Russia. His account of Xi is of a rational risk-taker, bolder than any leader since Mao. Xi's decision depends less on overwhelming force than on a convergence of military capability, international conditions, U.S. political will, and his own political security.
The conversation then widens. Studman reads Russia's war in Ukraine as a lesson in revanchist territorial recovery by a nuclear power, and he describes a China-Russia-Iran-North Korea condominium) reshaping the international order. He rejects the idea that the U.S. must leave Europe to focus on Asia. The most contested material concerns American leadership. He faults both recent administrations for failing to explain the China challenge to the public, and he calls for farsightedness) and discipline, themes from his book Might of the Chain.
Mike Studman argues that the risk of military conflict with China over Taiwan in this decade is substantially higher than most Western analysts and policymakers acknowledge, driven by Xi Jinping's explicit grand strategy, China's accelerating military buildup comparable to pre-WWII Japan and Germany, and the West's failure to communicate this threat or mobilize resources and leadership to deter it.
- Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that recovering Taiwan is an essential (not optional) component of his 'Chinese Rejuvenation' grand strategy to be achieved before 2049, and he is pursuing this with intentionality and resource commitment consistent with serious preparation for military action
- China's military investments and modernization timeline—with 2027 as a key 'get ready by' date for capabilities across all warfare domains—represents the fastest comparable military buildup historically, indicating genuine preparation for Taiwan contingencies rather than mere posturing
- The United States and Western democracies lack the leadership communication, boldness, discipline, and farsightedness needed to articulate the China challenge to their populations, mobilize resources in time, or shape the strategic environment—leaving them strategically vulnerable despite material advantages
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China is deliberately conditioning Taiwan to see PLA forces in proximity to the median line, in Taiwan's air defense identification zone, and on the east side through peacetime exercises and operations in order to normalize this presence and reduce the warning signal that such movements would otherwise provide.
“if you condition Taiwan to see a lot of forces around them median line in their air defense identification Zone on the east side of Taiwan Etc then you are starting to normalize close proximity operations if you're a military strategist you would do this when you have the benefit of time and peace time this is what you do to be able to lull your enemy into thinking it's just another normal day and so this is the reason why it really helps the Chinese for their Invasion planning to demonstrate more presence closer as part of a you know a daily pattern”
The more the US publicly talks about and articulates the dangers posed by China, the more informed society becomes and the more capable it becomes of addressing the threat, making transparent strategic communication about the China challenge a key leadership responsibility.
“the more we talk about it the more we articulate the dangers the more informed our society more we can do things about it and so communication that whole idea of how you do it right to be transparent to be constantly talking about the most important issues that's key that must be applied on the civilian side we do it every day in the military”
Xi Jinping is a pragmatic risk-taker who is more risk-accepting than any Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, but rational rather than emotionally driven, and seeks to achieve Taiwan's annexation at the lowest possible cost to China's other major strategic goals.
“XI Jin ping is a pragmatic risk taker he is more uh risk accepting than any other Chinese leader since M zong uh but he's also not sort of emotionally driven the way that ma uh was uh a little irrational he's very rational so he would like to be able to achieve the assimilation of Taiwan at the lowest possible cost to China's others major goals”
The United States can simultaneously manage commitments in Europe and the Indo-Pacific; it is a false and 'highly simplistic' choice to argue the U.S. must withdraw from Europe to pivot fully to Asia, and this framing appeals mainly to isolationists.
“America can walk and chew gum at the same time I mean it's a false choice to say choose Europe over Asia or Asia over Europe I mean that's that's highly simplistic uh you know thinking which you know might appeal to some isolationists out there that say hey we can only pick one thing but it's just not a reality”
China has invested vastly more resources in the Indo-Pacific than the United States, despite the U.S. pivot and rebalance rhetoric; China has concentrated more military power near its borders than the U.S. has forward deployed, giving China a major power advantage in the region.
“you know we talked about the pivot we talked about the rebalance for many years we've put you know billions of dollars into this we've gotten more recent energetic activity uh and that's all good uh but the Chinese have way more invested in this and therefore they have way more uh Power at their Disposal near to their borders than we have and that's a that's a major issue”
Farsightedness in leadership means using agency to actively shape the future in a desired direction rather than passively waiting to be swept away by forces; countries should purposefully set a destination and tack toward it, rather than being buffeted by storms and unforeseen events.
“farsightedness means that you can't always predict the future but you should be using your own agency to shape the future the way that you think it should be shaped so you can wait wait for forces to overcome you and sweep you away or you can decide that I'm going to step forward I'm going to go for that destination maybe I have to tack to get there but you're purposely moving forward in a way where you're going to actually arrive at the destination that you want to arrive at”
American political dysfunction (failure to pass timely budgets, reliance on continuing resolutions) prevents resource mobilization for Taiwan contingency preparation despite legislative recognition of China threat through passed bills and legislation.
“you can have continuing resolutions that go half the year and expect that we're going to be able to mobilize the resources and get stuff done”
Xi Jinping has outlined a grand strategy for China that includes recovering and annexing Taiwan as an essential, not optional, component of achieving 'Chinese Rejuvenation' before 2049, and he has communicated this intent repeatedly over years.
“he has outlined a grand strategy for China he's pursuing it aggressively using all means and a key component of that grand strategy to achieve the Chinese Rejuvenation or the dream as they call it is to recover Taiwan and to Annex assimilate bring it back into their Sovereign fold and that is a fundamental political uh objective for xiin Ping and he talks about it all the time and has for years”
Managing multiple simultaneous theaters creates significant executive bandwidth and prioritization challenges, but the US has done this before and can do it again without shortchanging itself by choosing one region over another.
“it's a management nightmare for us to prioritize where you know certain major pieces on the chessboard need to go in order to influence outcomes and it is true that executive bandwidth gets eaten up very quickly when you have a number of different urgent things that can maybe sometimes take away all the other energies you can spend on the more important things uh but at the same time we've done this before we can do it again you can handle multiple simultaneous when it comes to managing you know the ways that different key theaters are you know evolving”
The U.S. needs great leadership that understands grand geostrategic dynamics and can articulate them clearly, positioning China-Russia-Iran-North Korea condominium and their global south operations as the core threat, rather than treating Russia or China as separate problems or focusing on internal American issues.
“we need a great leader who understands the grand Geo uh strategic dynamics that are happening and to be able to stitch that together to say you can't just pick a Russia as your number one problem or even a China is your number one problem you have this condominium of China and Russia and Iran and North Korea with their client states that are working the global South and they are reshaping things”
Russia has incurred significant costs by becoming a pariah state and surviving only through connections to China, but if Russia ends up retaining large tracks of Ukrainian territory through a peace deal (Crimea and eastern Ukraine), Chinese leaders would view this as a worthwhile outcome that validates the cost of territorial conquest.
“I think there has been a significant cost on Russia in terms of it becoming a pariah State uh really only surviving based on its connections into China few other uh you know countries um so I think that weighs uh significantly uh on China however you know I think the ultimate lesson will be when the ultimate outcome is known will uh at the end of it all will Russia end up with large tracks of Ukrainian territory he's already got Crimea uh if he has uh the Eastern parts of uh Ukraine uh as part of a peace deal does that make it all worthwhile I think if you're Chinese you'd say I'll take that deal I'll take a few years of suffering right to be able to get back key territory”
Xi Jinping's calculus for military action against Taiwan depends not primarily on achieving overwhelming military superiority but on a convergence of factors: military capability threshold, international conditions (countries leveraged by China and unwilling to hurt China), domestic U.S. political conditions (willingness of the U.S. president to fight for Taiwan), and Xi's own political security, creating 'opportunities' that may or may not materialize.
“you'd have to look at a number of different things and it's not just correlation of military forces that's an important component as in comparing China to Taiwan China to Taiwan plus the United States China plus you know Taiwan United States and Japan those kinds of calculations are not the sole Factor right you have to take a look at what's happening internationally how many countries are more leveraged by China therefore unwilling to really hurt China uh if they go forward with Taiwan it's the domestic conditions within the United States do you have a president that's not willing to go to war over Taiwan”
U.S. senior leaders are unwilling to publicly articulate the nature and scale of the China challenge to the American people; this is true across both the previous and current administrations (previous administration was 'overheated' on China, current administration is undertreating the conversation). This failure to communicate is strategically advantageous to Beijing.
“we don't have senior leaders that are willing to articulate the nature of the China Challenge uh we assiduously avoid it uh in uh in the current administ rtion uh in the previous administration we were overheated on China uh in this Administration we continue to do some quiet work to protect America but we're undertreating this conversation with the country we're not even having it it's not in the State of the Union Address it's not a part of the presidential debates”
Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that major nuclear powers will cross borders to recover territory they believe is theirs, and this lesson should inform how the West thinks about China's stated intent to recover Taiwan, as both are driven by similar revanchist territorial claims.
“the Russian invasion of Ukraine has told us that that's actually not the case that major nuclear Powers will cross borders to recover territory they think is theirs and so we ought to factor the lesson of Russia and Ukraine when we think about you know his friend Putin's friend in Beijing who's looking over Taiwan saying I need that”
Chinese military acquisition and development timelines can be projected, and the planned acquisitions of aircraft, ships, submarines, missiles, nuclear weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, information capabilities, and satellites show China is building military capacity at an accelerated rate across all warfare domains.
“we can project out the PRC uh military acquisition and development timelines and see what they intend to put on the field in terms of aircraft and ships and submarines and missiles and things like that and look they're building like hot cakes from nuclear weapons you know all the way down to the most tactical things electronic warfare capabilities information capabilities satellites I mean the list goes on”
The year 2027 is a notable and significant date for potential Taiwan conflict not just because of the 100th anniversary of the PLA but because of strong indications that Chinese military directives set 2027 as a 'get ready by' date for achieving informatization and mechanization across all warfare areas.
“it's a notable uh date it's not just the 100 anniversary of the pla uh which uh which will be you know 19 uh 27 to 2027 that's historical important it's not just some military directives to achieve a certain amount of informationization uh as well as uh mechanization for parts of the pla uh there are very strong uh indications that these are get ready by dates in other words yes you will achieve all of these things across every Warfare area but the purpose is not just to get to a number and then just sit on your Armament the purpose is actually to be able to uh push for some final resolution and to accelerate what had been 2035 objectives now they still have 2035 objectives but the idea is that xiin ping said no I want you to do these things before 2027 in these areas right”
Discipline in government means taking necessary steps to achieve strategic objectives while staying single-mindedly focused on the mission and generating positive outcomes; government dysfunction prevents this kind of disciplined strategic execution.
“I write about self self-discipline self-discipline means that you're able to uh ensure that you take whatever steps necessary to get things done and to stay uh single-mindedly on your mission and to get it done in a way that has positive effects and good outcomes and the dysfunction in government prevents you from having the discipline to be able to get the outcomes”
The United States struggles with establishing what its destination is as a country and how to get there, limiting its ability to exercise farsightedness in response to strategic challenges.
“I still think that we have trouble with establishing what our destination is as a country and how to get there”
China-Russia-Iran-North Korea and their client states in the global south are reshaping the international system, demonstrating greater acts of coercion and aggression and physical violence than ever before.
“you have this condominium of China and Russia and Iran and North Korea with their client states that are working the global South and they are reshaping things and they see that there's an opportunity to go after their L held Ambitions and they are pursuing them with greater acts of coercion and greater tendency to use aggression and physical violence than ever before”
History is charted by surprises and unexpected fractures, not just gradual evolution, and the conventional American government position that Taiwan invasion is neither imminent nor inevitable must be understood as also meaning it is no longer inconceivable or improbable.
“history is actually charted by surprise and unexpected fractures and jumps and there weren't simply just Evolution and that's not you know a a knock on you know how people think because you go for the probabilities but uh it's interesting to hear the conversation the conversation from the American government is that an invasion is neither imminent or inevitable right but it's also no longer inconceivable or improbable”
Listeners should pay attention to what dictators explicitly say about their intentions, as they tend to reveal their game plans and strategic objectives in broad outline, and then pursue them with the intentionality of someone who feels their life is on the line.
“you ought to listen to the dictators who tend to give you the game plan in its broad outlines and then pursue it with the intentionality of somebody who feels like their life is on the line”
Mike Studman wrote his book 'Might of the Chain' to address how poor leadership at senior levels is corrosive to national capability; the book argues that leadership integrity and cohesion across organizational links is essential to bearing the weight of great challenges.
“I wrote might of the chain it subtitle is forging leaders of iron Integrity my of the chain comes from the fifth law of the Navy uh which says essentially on the strength of one Link in the cable dependeth the might of the chain which means that every link matters we have to interlock with one another and we have to uh lead well with great challenges by sticking together because that's the only way you're going to lift those heavy weights right if there's poor leadership that that will be corrosive the links will begin to crack there'll be fissures they'll break and you can't do any heavy lifting”
China is insulating its economy to a massive degree in preparation for potential conflict, mirroring the steps it observed the West taking against Russia after the Ukraine invasion, indicating China's leadership believes economic isolation is a credible threat they must prepare for.
“The Chinese are insulating their economy in a to a degree that is truly Mass massive and it's not just because we're friend Shoring and Dr risking it's just a smart economic choice right now they know what the Western Playbook looks like because we used it against Russia after they invaded Ukraine and they said oh how do I actually prepare to face that same Playbook you wouldn't have to worry about that or take steps which are multiple years of steps uh if you weren't thinking about doing something that would actually cross an International Red Line”
The China challenge is legitimate and will redefine the 21st century geopolitically; conflict over Taiwan would be disastrous for the world economy.
“because it's legit and because people are trying to think through how do we prevent this knowing that it's going to be disastrous for the world economy and uh and you're going to get into a conflict which will redefine the 21st century right”
The U.S. government takes the China-Taiwan conflict risk seriously enough that it is investing hundreds of billions of dollars in weaponry and deterrent capability across strategic to tactical levels and working with allies, which proves the government believes there is a strong, credible probability of conflict; if it thought conflict was merely a low-probability event, it would not be making such investments.
“if the US government and D didn't think that that there was a chance that this was going to happen a very strong chance they wouldn't be investing hundreds of billions of dollars in the Weaponry that would be needed to actually Forstall deter defeat attack it simply wouldn't be doing that if it thought that it was just a very very low probability those probabilities have been creeping up”
China could achieve small island seizures near instantaneously with very little warning, using them not for direct military value but for strategic messaging to deter or warn Washington, Taipei, and Tokyo, whereas a full-scale invasion would require weeks to months of visible preparation as forces move out of garrison and commercial shipping is conscripted.
“China can pull off uh small things near instantaneously I mean I think they could do a small island seizure uh not connected to a grand Invasion but these things would be uh in the kit bag for China to do if they saw reasons to scare people uh scare them away deter warn Etc that doesn't it's not the military value of taking over a small offshore island it doesn't net you much uh but taking military action and capturing one of those uh places would have a great strategic value in terms of messaging”
Taiwan can learn from Ukraine's experience that it can inflict significant damage on a larger military using distributed, lower-cost systems (small drones in Ukraine's case) against an enemy that has invested heavily in larger, more expensive platforms vulnerable to such distributed attacks.
“if you're Taiwan you take a look at it and go aha I can have a large number of small very lethal things create Havoc with a enemy that likes to invest in big platforms to do its Warf fight”
The U.S. is producing a family of drones through the Defense Innovation Unit (California-based) with near-billion-dollar funding and targeting production by 2025, designed with varying capabilities (surveillance, communications, electronic warfare, information attack, physical attack) to fill the capability gap against China in the late 2020s.
“the defense Innovation unit which is out in California has been given given a lot of money close to a billion dollars to be able to produce a high number of these drones a family of them with different kind of capabilities that are going to be produced in high numbers before 2025 and so that's their charge they're on the well on their way uh to producing these things”
Xi Jinping remains confident and has not lost confidence despite current economic headwinds; his economic troubles are structural long-term issues China has been managing for 10-20 years, and he is consciously making hard short-term economic choices to strengthen structural elements for the future, indicating his political position remains consolidated.
“there are no limits on his leadership right he is confident he takes a look people are like well clearly he's lost confidence because of his economy he hasn't lost confidence he is making struct hard structural changes that require near-term suffering for the Chinese economy to ultimately have stronger elements structural elements to it going forward right he's consciously making hard choices”
Boldness and risk-taking are leadership muscles that can be exercised and strengthened, but also overused, causing injury; the U.S. needs to decisively move forward on tough China issues, and Congress needs to make timely decisions (avoid prolonged continuing resolutions) in order to mobilize resources effectively.
“I wrote one on risk-taking where I said uh essentially that risk taking is a muscle uh that you can exercise to make stronger you can also overuse it and you can get injured if you use excessive risk but we need to be able to actually decisively uh move forward to deal with the the tough issues of our time and we need to do this with Congress that can actually make decisions in a timely matter”
China prepares its population ideologically and spiritually for great sacrifice by having Xi Jinping repeatedly communicate that people must be willing to personally commit to the motherland and nation and be ready to endure hardship ('high winds and stormy seas') in the future; the U.S. lacks any equivalent mobilization.
“China does everything in its power to prepare its people ideologically spiritually for a great sacrifice xiin ping talks all the time about having to you know personally commit to the motherland to the nation to be able to go through you know high winds and stormy seas that there's going to be you know way more that's going to be asked of them in the future none of that's occurring in America right we got the culture wars we got red versus blue States you know we have people at hom and attacks on politicians you that's consuming all our energy”
There is a high volume of expert writing and analysis on China-Taiwan contingencies in Foreign Affairs and similar outlets, reflecting genuine concern among policy intellectuals, though this remains largely invisible to the general public.
“you will see more articles on China Taiwan contingencies and everything about them uh these days than probably any other geopolitical flasho right you're dealing with a current war with Ukraine that's taken up a lot of consumption of time and energy the Gaza issues and all the rest but the same time uh I would I would commend people to take a look at how much writing is going on with China Taiwan and it's because it's legit”
China uses the metaphor of 'traveling like water down a waterfall or down a stream' to describe moving militarily when momentum and opportunity align, suggesting Beijing understands the importance of timing and environmental conditions favoring action.
“they talk about this is like well you would be like traveling uh like water down a a waterfall or down a stream right the momentum of the environment is with you therefore you should move when it doesn't look like the momentum or the opportunities there hold right”
The U.S. is investing in growing Indo-Pacific expertise, but this is being done against the backdrop of 20 years of resource depletion due to Middle East focus, so the expert base remains thin.
“so look we are investing in a lot of people trying to get more Indo Pacific experience but it's just you know 20 years of global war in Terror you know other issues here with the Middle East manh hunting against terrorist that has really taken a huge bite out of the kre”
The West broadly (including Europe) is struggling with leadership challenges similar to those Studman identifies in the U.S., particularly regarding Russia and other geopolitical challenges, making his leadership lessons widely applicable.
“and I read the book and I really liked it so I highly recommend to everyone um to get it and give it a try but I want to follow up on one of the things that you've you've mentioned...I think a lot of people would benefit from applying that here as well uh when it comes to Russia but also other other other challenges so I think a lot of people would benefit from applying that here as well”
Studman holds important views on information warfare and the U.S. falling behind China and Russia in this domain, based on an article he published in the Financial Times.
“I've read a great article of yours in in financial times when you speak about spoke about the importance of this and how the United States and the wider West is really falling behind when it comes to the war that's being waged in the information space compared with China and Russia”