
What this covers
This is a single-voice, fifteen-minute retrospective built on Refinitiv data, with an unnamed speaker looking back at a decade dominated by monetary policy and forward at what might replace it. The account begins with the roughly $13 trillion that the Bank of Japan, the People's Bank of China, the ECB and the Fed added to their balance sheets after 2008. The speaker treats quantitative easing (QE)) as a contested case: bond yields fell while central banks were buying, but money-printing lowered inflation expectations rather than raising them, and the velocity of money collapsed in a deflationary feedback loop.
The middle of the talk catalogues the distortions the speaker attributes to cheap credit. Central bank liquidity fed share buyback programmes instead of investment, kept zombie companies alive, and let unicorn firms like WeWork raise private capital without profit. It also produced about $17 trillion of negative-yielding debt in 2019, including hundred-year Austrian and Argentinian bonds. Equity prices outran profits while passive investing weakened the usual valuation correction. Investors now buy bonds for capital gains and equities for income, the reverse of the historical pattern. The speaker also flags record triple-B issuance and compressed spreads, which tend to show up late in a credit cycle. They add that falling profit growth) could push leveraged borrowers into default.
The forward-looking section is the most contentious. The speaker expects governments to turn to fiscal policy, coordinated with central bank accommodation, and argues that its faster transmission could swing the economy from low inflation toward much higher inflation. Gold's inverse relationship with real yields is offered as one consequence. Against this, the speaker cites Japan, where extreme policy still failed to lift growth against demographic and debt headwinds. They also invoke Kenneth Rogoff's warning that assuming the next crisis will resemble the last is dangerous. The unresolved question is whether higher yields would collapse debt service and force a return to deflation and more QE.
The speaker argues that the 2010s were defined by central bank monetary policy that failed to generate real economic growth despite massive balance sheet expansion, and the 2020s will shift to fiscal policy attempts to break deflationary expectations, but this risks triggering inflation or debt crises that could destabilize markets.
- Central banks added $13 trillion to balance sheets since 2008 yet failed to raise inflation or growth; money flowed into asset prices and buybacks rather than productive investment
- The next decade will pivot to fiscal stimulus coordinated with monetary accommodation, but this carries risks of either runaway inflation forcing rate hikes and debt defaults, or persistent deflation despite efforts
- Credit spreads are at historic lows, passive investing dominates, and profit growth has turned negative—structural vulnerabilities that could trigger a severe downturn when central banks lose control
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The stock of triple-B rated corporate credit has grown to record levels, accounting for approximately half of US investment grade debt, with one or two large corporates representing a significant portion; spreads between high-yield and investment grade have compressed, a pattern that tends to occur toward the end of credit cycles.
“there are overall profits that we've seen earlier that have gone nowhere and this has also led therefore to this ever burgeoning stock of triple B and and high-yield corporate credit I think triple B accounts for about half of US investment grade debt with one or two large corporates accounting for a significant portion of the total and overall the spreads of high-yield versus investment grade have compressed as have triple versus BB and this compression could be a negative sign for the future as it tends to occur towards the end of the credit cycle”
If inflation does pick up and outpaces bond yields (nominal yields rise slower than inflation), real yields will fall, which is a key argument for holding gold, as gold has historically moved inversely to the direction of real yields.
“if inflation does pick up inflation is likely to outperform bond yields I it'll got faster than yields this will mean real yields will fall and this is one of the key arguments for holding gold gold has been moving inversely to the direction of real yields and real yields that's nominal yields minus inflation when really ODEs fall gold has tended to go up”
Japan's experience with extreme monetary and fiscal policy shows that it did not have significant impact on Japan's GDP growth because of headwinds from demographics and debt, headwinds that are present in many parts of Europe and Asia today, creating uncertainty about whether fiscal stimulus will actually generate inflation.
“others will rightly point to Japan which has been experimenting with extreme forms of both monetary and fiscal policy and point out that it didn't really have a significant impact on Japan's GDP growth because of the headwinds of demographics and debt and those headwinds can be seen in many parts of Europe and Asia today as well”
For equities, the relationship between the week selling differential (describing whether profit growth is increasing or decreasing) and the S&P 500 since 2002 shows a close correlation, and the last 10 years have been like a supercharged version of 2003-2008, meaning if the rate of profit growth turns negative, it increases the risk of highly leveraged assets moving into a default cycle.
“Capital Advisory shows the relationship between the week selling differential and the S&P 500 since 2002 now they were selling differential it describes whether the rate of profit growth is increasing or decreasing and unsurprisingly it's closely related to equity market performance and the experience the last 10 years has been like supercharged version of 2003 to 2008 and if the economy and profits are turning that it increases the risks the lots of highly levered acids could move into a default cycle”
The system was broken in 2008 and cheap central bank credit was not the fix; instead, velocity of money collapsed in a self-fulfilling prophecy where falling yields discouraged investment, lowering long-term growth expectations further.
“the system was broken and this repeat of free cash was not the fix but as Banshees rose velocity of money collapsed in a self-fulfilling prophecy yields fell discouraging investment and lowering long term expectations further”
Central banks (Bank of Japan, People's Bank of China, European Central Bank, US Federal Reserve) added approximately $13 trillion to their combined balance sheets since 2008.
“central bank balance sheets expanded dramatically with the combined efforts of the the Bank of Japan the People's Bank of China the European Central Bank the US Federal Reserve adding around 13 trillion an unimaginable number a few years ago to the balance sheets since 2008”
With falling bond yields making equities look relatively more attractive, investors are now buying bonds for capital gains and equities for income, which is the wrong way around historically but may become normal for the next decade.
“falling bond yields make equities look relatively more attractive and appealing even though an absolute in historical terms they are pretty much expensive and into this bizarre world we now have investors buying bonds for capital gains and equities for income which really is the wrong way around but maybe that's going to be normality for the next ten years”
We have been in a four-decade bull market in bonds that has helped support equity prices; the key question is whether bond yields will break higher and decisively move out of the trend channel that has dominated the last 30 years, particularly in the US.
“within all of this therefore what will happen to bonds we've been in this four decade bull market which has helped support equity prices but will bond yield start to break higher and decisively move out of this trend channel that's dominated the last 30 years particularly in the US”
One of the great areas of debate is whether central banks can continue to levitate markets even if the underlying economy deteriorates; historical perspective is not encouraging, as equity market collapses between 2000-2010 materialized despite central bank efforts, though in 2015-16 central banks did settle markets with renewed liquidity.
“one of the great areas of debate is whether the actions of central banks could continue to levitate markets even if the underlying economy has deteriorated now the historical perspective is not good with both of the equity market collapses between 2000 and 2010 materializing despite the best efforts of central banks but as we saw in 2015-16 when the markets were on the edge after a bout of u.s. dollar strength and a mini devaluation in China the central bank stepped in to settle markets with a renewed of liquidity and that kick-started the current leg of the bull market”
If the rate of profit growth turns negative, there could be trouble ahead as leveraged assets move into default cycles, which is the type of event more likely to trigger an economic downturn.
“it's an event like this that's more likely to trigger an economic downturn so if we look at the rate of profit growth and it looks like it's turned then there could be trouble ahead”
Central bank money-printing, rather than creating inflation as expected in 2009, ended up lowering inflation expectations, which in turn guided bond yields to even lower levels through a deflationary feedback loop.
“rampant money-printing which rather than creating inflation which was the initial expectation of pretty much everyone in the market in 2009 it's had she ended up lowering inflation expectations and these lower expectations have helped guide bond yields to even lower levels”
If higher bond yields increase the risk of a collapse in debt service ability and equity prices, then any bout of inflation will be very short-lived and the system will quickly move back into deflationary bust, meaning central banks will have to continue with QE and try to let inflation run hot while holding bond yields down.
“if higher bond yields increase the risk of a collapse in the ability to service debt and a collapse in equity prices then any bouts of inflation would be very short-lived and we will quickly move back into a deflationary bust and that's not this inflation that would be deflation and that's why central banks will continue with the monetary policy such as QE and they're going to that inflation run hot whilst holding bond yields down”
Central banks have been targeting a low volatility regime, or more accurately a stable volatility regime, and they cannot afford to see disruptive events occur in bond, credit, equity, or FX markets.
“central banks have been targeting a low volatility regime or perhaps it may be more accurate to say a stable volatility regime but they cannot afford to see disruptive events occur in bond credit equity or FX markets”
Bond yields fell during periods when central banks were actively buying bonds (QE), yet they rose or flattened during periods when central banks were less active, which appears counterintuitive and reflects the broken state of the global economy in 2008.
“yields were rising and bonds were falling when the central banks were buying bonds now on the face of it that would seem to be the wrong way round and I think what it does is it reflects just how broken the global economy was in 2008 where without the central bank juice yields and economic growth could potentially sunk into depression type levels”
The fear is that given debt levels, demographics, pension shortfalls, and the extremes in asset valuations across the world, the very thing central banks want (inflation and growth) could be the trigger that brings the edifice crashing back down.
“the fear however given debt demographics pension shortfalls and the extremes in assets across the world is that the one thing that central bank's want could be the very thing that brings the edifice crashing back down”
Central bank credit found its way into corporate buybacks rather than productive investment, providing a wealth effect for the wealthiest but little genuine economic value, despite the US experiencing its longest expansion which was not powerful.
“capital effectively transferred from central banks and found its way into things like corporate buybacks with very little economic value outside of the wealth effect for the wealthiest and yet the US has experienced its longest expansion but it's just not been a very powerful one”
If the last decade was defined by central bank monetary policy, the next decade is expected to be defined by fiscal policy, with governments around the world contemplating or already engaging in spending sprees coordinated with central bank accommodation to support those expenditures.
“if the last decade was unquestionably the decade of central banks and monetary policy the next ten years are expected to be the decade of fiscal policy leaning on the monetary efforts of the central banks to help follow that funds spending sprees or keeping markets in check and government's the world over are either contemplating this direction or have already engaged in it”
Unicorn companies (tech-oriented stocks like WeWork) attracted sky-high private valuations without ever showing profit because cheap capital was always available, but this may now have come to an end.
“unicorns which are generally tech oriented stocks or like we work stocks that wanted to sound like they were technology stocks they managed to attract sky-high private valuations without ever a profit because cheap capital was always available to support them well that may now have come to an end”
There is a strong case that future inflation risks under a concerted fiscal regime will swing from persistently low inflation and low growth toward significantly higher inflation, because fiscal policy has higher velocity of money transmission than monetary policy/QE, which mainly flowed into asset prices rather than economic growth.
“there's a strong case to say that future inflation risks under a concerted fiscal regime will swing the risks from persistently low inflation and low growth to significantly higher inflation because the fiscal policy will have a higher velocity than monetary policy and QE which basically mainly found its way into asset prices rather than economic growth”
Equity prices outperformed equity profits over the decade, and the usual valuation correction mechanism has been distorted by the rise of passive investing at the expense of active investing, which is one of the most monumental structural changes over the last decade.
“equity prices have outperformed equity profits whilst the usual balancing mechanism of valuation has been distorted by the rise and rise of passive investing at the expense of active investing for investors this has been one of the most monumental changes over the last decade the shift out of active mandates into passive mandates”
At one point in 2019, there was approximately $17 trillion of negatively-yielding debt globally, and investors purchased hundred-year Austrian and Argentinian bonds at prices that implied zero default risk, representing absurdities driven by rampant money-printing rather than fundamental analysis.
“at one point we had 17 trillion of negative yielding debt globally in 2019 we had the hundred-year Austrian bond doubling in value over 12 months and people believing that the Argentinian hundred year bond wouldn't default”
Central bankers and policymakers have taken the view that they can spend and spend and spend because interest rates are so low, a dangerous supposition that Kenneth Rogoff, author of 'This Time Is Different,' noted assumes the next crisis will be like the last, which is unlikely.
“central bankers and policy makers have taken the view that they can spend and spend and spend because interest rates are so low and this is something that Kenneth Rogoff who wrote the book this time is different has noted is a very very dangerous supposition in fact in an op-ed he wrote in December 2019 he argued to the notion that almost every advanced economy can allow their debt to drift up towards Japanese levels without any great concern about long-term consequences is very flawed for a large number of reasons not least because it largely assumes that the next crisis will be like the last which is very unlikely”
Zombie companies with terrible growth prospects and companies in desperate need of capex have been kept alive via central bank credit, able to raise capital in credit markets to fund share buybacks that juice their share price higher, effectively transferring wealth from taxpayers to shareholders and from workers to shareholders.
“zombie companies are companies with terrible growth prospects and often these are our old world models in desperate need of capex and they were and are still able to raise capital in the credit markets in order to fund a gluttony of share buybacks which juices their share price higher so companies that probably should have failed by now have been plugged into the life-support machine of endless central bank credit”
The current market is being driven less and less by fundamentals and more and more by passive flows, which are themselves a direct result of the framework created by relentless central bank liquidity distortion.
“this is also a market that's being driven less and less by fundamentals and more and more by passive flows which are themselves a direct result of that framework which had been created by that relentless distortion of central bank liquidity”
Share buybacks have been one of the dominant forces of the last decade in the equity market, particularly in the US, while overall profits from these buybacks have gone nowhere and equity valuations have become stretched.
“the share buyback is clearly one of the dominant forces of the last ten years in the equity market particularly the u.s. but effective that's a transfer from taxpayers to shareholders and also from workers to shareholders because wages were getting squeezed and that was in order to maintain margins there were overall profits that we've seen earlier that have gone nowhere”
The ECB will 'do whatever it takes' (as Draghi stated), meaning central banks will prioritize keeping markets stable and doing whatever it takes to prevent collapse over inflation targeting, though the inflation debate is controversial.
“as we know from what Draghi said the ECB will do whatever it takes and the big question on the back of the fiscal impulses will this changed inflation risks from deflation or disinflation to inflation the inflation debate is always racked with controversy”
The outlook for equities remains incredibly uncertain; the current expansion is very long in the tooth and the equity market is stretched and extreme, particularly in the US, creating doubt about whether the combination of monetary and fiscal policy can keep the overall framework intact.
“the outlook for equities remains incredibly uncertain this current expansion particularly the US is very very long in the tooth and the equity market is stretched and extreme again particularly in the US but can that combination of monetary and fiscal policy keep that overall framework intact”
Mario Draghi, as outgoing ECB president, made unlimited bond buying his parting shot; while the ECB is limited by capital keys to buying roughly 30% of any one country's debt, if governments increase debt issuance to fund spending, the ECB's potential debt purchases becomes unlimited until the 2% inflation target is reached—which cynics think could be never.
“Mario Draghi who was the outgoing ECB president his parting shot was a return to unlimited bond buying and many have pointed out that the ECB will be limited in its efforts because of the capital keys which will prevent the ECB from buying more than I think it's roughly 30% of any one country's debt and yes that's true but if each government now increases the amount of debt in circulation in order to fund a spending binge then the potential for debt purchases is indeed unlimited at least until the ECB's 2% inflation target is reached which many cynics think could be never”
It will be better to be long gold rather than short bonds if inflation runs hot while bond yields are suppressed, and the relative performance of commodities should improve versus equities as fiscal spending should increase demand for commodities.
“so it's going to be better to be long gold rather than short bonds if this type of scenario plays out the relative performance of commodities should improve versus equities as well now the ratio of the sp500 versus the broad commodity index has been close to the all-time wides or lows depending which way you look at it physical expenditure should increase demand for commodities”
Given the current starting point (high valuations, late-cycle profit growth, compressed spreads, high leverage), the next few years should be an exhilarating rollercoaster ride for global investors with significant volatility and regime change risk.
“and given our starting point the next few years should turn out to be an exhilarating rollercoaster ride for all global investors”
One of the key questions with fiscal policy is how long it will take to shift from low inflation to high, dangerous inflation, or whether we will get a period of grace where inflation is in a growth sweet spot that would imply higher equity prices before risks emerge.
“one of the key questions with fiscal policy is how long if at all but how long will it take to shift from low inflation to high in dangerous inflation will we get a period of grace where inflation is a growth sweet spot which will imply higher equity prices yet again”
In summary: the last ten years were about monetary policy and its failure to create economic growth; the next ten years will be about fiscal policy and a renewed attempt to break the deadlock between lower inflation expectations to keep the profit cycle on an upward trajectory.
“in summary the last ten years we're all about monetary policy and its failure to create economic growth the next ten years will be about fiscal policy and a renewed attempt to break the deadlock between lower inflation expectations in order to keep the profit cycle on an upward trajectory”
Do not expect the commodity outperformance of the 2020s to be like China's experience in the naughties—no one will be doing fiscal expenditure on that scale, so the magnitude of commodity appreciation will be smaller.
“similarly don't expect this to be like the China experience of the naughties no one will be doing for fiscal expenditure on that sort of scale”