What this covers

Economist Douglas Irwin speaks with Russ Roberts about how the gold standard transmitted the Great Depression across countries, and argues for a reassessment of who bears responsibility. The conventional account, established by Friedman and Schwartz, fixes blame on the Federal Reserve's contractionary policies starting in 1928. Irwin challenges this by showing that France's accumulation of gold reserves—rising from 7 percent of the world total in 1927 to 27 percent by 1932—imposed equally severe deflation on the global economy. When France sterilized those inflows by refusing to print money in proportion to its gold gains, it broke the self-correcting mechanism of the gold standard and forced other countries into a deflationary spiral they could not escape while remaining on gold.

The conversation traces how the gold standard functioned as a transmission mechanism for monetary shocks. Under fixed exchange rates, a country accumulating gold without expanding its money supply drains gold from trading partners, tightening their money supplies and forcing down their prices. Irwin illustrates this with the time sequence of countries leaving gold—from Australia and Argentina in late 1929 through Britain in September 1931 to the US in 1933—showing that recovery accelerated once countries left the standard and regained monetary independence. The discussion also touches on deeper mechanisms: Irving Fisher's debt-deflation theory explaining how falling prices trap firms with rigid wages, the role of nominal wage rigidities in amplifying output losses, and why large unanticipated deflation differs from the mild, anticipated deflation of the 19th century. Irwin acknowledges open questions—why a 30 percent price decline produced output falls of similar magnitude remains partially unexplained—and addresses tangential debates, including whether the Smoot-Hawley Tariff or a liquidity trap played material roles.

Sharpest takeaway

Irwin argues that France's accumulation and sterilization of gold reserves in the late 1920s and early 1930s imposed a deflationary shock on the world economy at least as large as the Federal Reserve's, making France a co-equal (and underappreciated) cause of the Great Depression alongside the United States.

  • France raised its share of world gold reserves from 7% in 1927 to 27% by 1932 while refusing to inflate (sterilizing the inflows)
  • Under the gold standard's price-specie-flow mechanism, sterilization breaks the self-correcting adjustment and forces deflation onto other countries
  • Countries off the gold standard (China, Spain) avoided the depression, and countries recovered only after leaving gold

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0.93

France raised its share of world gold reserves from 7% in 1927 to 27% by 1932, and its cover ratio (gold reserves per central bank liability) rose from about 35% in 1928 to nearly 80% within three or four years, demonstrating it was literally pulling gold out of the rest of the world and holding far more than needed.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“in 1927, they only had 7% of the world's gold reserves... By 1932, just five years later, they had 27% of the world's gold reserves. So, they really were truly and literally pulling gold out from from the rest of the world.”

0.86

Because the nominal price of gold is fixed under the standard, an abundance of gold cannot lower gold's price directly; instead the relative price of gold falls by raising the prices of all other goods (inflation), as the excess gold flows into central bank reserves when people exchange it for transaction-usable paper currency.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“when the nominal price of gold is fixed, it can't go down. The prices of all other goods adjust. And the way that you get a fall in the relative price of gold is the price of other goods has to go up, and that's inflation.”

0.86

The gold standard's fixed exchange rate regime transmitted financial disturbances across countries and prevented the use of monetary policy to address the economic crisis, which is supported by the observations that countries not on the gold standard avoided the Great Depression and gold-standard countries only recovered after leaving it.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“The gold standard's fixed fixed exchange rate regime transmitted financial disturbances across countries and prevented the use of monetary policy to address the economic crisis. This conclusion is supported by two compelling observations. Countries not on the gold standard managed to avoid the Great Depression almost entirely, while countries on the gold standard did not begin to recover until after they left it.”

0.86

Countries left the gold standard at different times (Australia/Argentina late 1929, Britain September 1931 pulling ~18 others, the US April 1933, Belgium 1935, France and the gold bloc late 1936), and this time variation provides a way to identify the economic impact of leaving gold, since leaving allowed reflationary policies, bank stabilization, and recovery as prices rose.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“Britain pulled off in September of 1931 and pulled about 18 other countries along with it... Then the US left in April of 1933... and then France and the remainder of what was known as the gold block... they left in late 1936. And what's nice is this time variation gives us sort of a way of identifying, you know, what was the impact of going off the depression going off the gold standard.”

0.86

Gustav Cassel argued world gold production needed to grow about 3% a year to ensure price stability, matching average global output growth from productivity and labor supply; growth below that produces deflationary pressure, while growth above it (as in the 1890s Australian discoveries) produces mild inflation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“we really needed world gold production to grow at about 3% a year or so to ensure price stability... that's sort of the average rate of growth of output around the world in terms of productivity and and labor supply expansion... if you had growth rates in the supply of gold less than that, then you're not keeping up with sort of the transactions demand for gold. And that will put downward pressure on prices.”

0.86

France, after worse post-war inflation, chose to re-peg at a deliberately undervalued franc rather than deflate, making French goods highly competitive and imports expensive, which let France run a persistent trade surplus and attract gold from trading partners like Britain.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“we're also going to not just adjust the exchange rate to the extent to which our prices have changed, but will make it a do a little bit more. In other words, we're going to undervalue the French franc, which will make French goods very price competitive on world markets, make imports seem much more expensive to French consumers, and we'll be able to run a trade surplus in that way.”

0.86

Sterilization—when a central bank gains gold reserves but declines to print more money—violates the implicit rules of the gold standard and removes the self-correcting mechanism, and it played a major part in the Great Depression in both the United States and France.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“what happens if a central bank gets more gold, but decides not to print more money? Well, then you're really not playing by the rules of the gold standard game... That's known as sterilization... And actually, that plays a big part of the in terms of the story of the Great Depression both in the United States and France”

0.86

Irving Fisher's debt-deflation theory holds that nominal debts (mortgages, bank loans) become harder to service as prices and wages fall, producing defaults that stress banks into raising reserves, cutting lending, and tightening standards, which reinforces the initial downturn into a self-reinforcing financial contraction.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“Irving Fisher, the great Yale economist of this time, had the debt deflation theory of the of the depression... if your uh prices of your output go down, if your wages go down, that maintaining, you know, paying that that debt off becomes much more difficult... You get defaults... that puts pressure on the banks... they want to cut back in lending... you sort of begin to get this tightness in the financial system that sort of reinforces the initial downward turn.”

0.86

A little anticipated deflation is not harmful (the 19th century saw deflation with rising output and low unemployment), but large unanticipated deflation (~10%/year) is destructive when combined with nominal rigidities: firms facing falling output prices that cannot cut wages proportionally must shed workers and contract.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“Nothing's wrong with a little deflation, particularly if it's anticipated... when prices fall 10% a year and no one expects them to and you introduce some nominal rigidities or nominal debt burdens, back and lead to problems.”

0.83

France's accumulation of gold without inflating its money supply (sterilization) disabled the self-correction of the price-specie-flow mechanism, so instead of France inflating to offset others' deflation, France drained gold from the rest of the world and forced other countries into a worldwide deflationary spiral.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“France began accumulating gold, but not inflating its money supply. And what that means is that there's no natural self-correction... France was draining gold from the rest of the world and not inflating, but forcing other countries to deflate... then you get sort of this worldwide deflationary spiral.”

0.83

Friedman and Schwartz (Monetary History, 1963) correctly identified contractionary US monetary policy beginning in 1928 and subsequent failure to respond to deflation, but they downplayed France's contribution; Irwin calculates that France's deflationary impact on the world economy matched, if not exceeded, that of the United States.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“I was the reason I wrote this paper is I always scratched my head, well, how could the US single-handedly cause this worldwide economic disaster... What I sort of was able to calculate is that the deflationary impact on the world economy coming from France matched, if not exceeded that of the United States.”

0.80

The gold standard underpinned the late-Victorian era of globalization with high labor and capital mobility and abundant trade, because fixed exchange rates removed uncertainty about future rates and provided price stability, allowing the world economy to function smoothly.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“that's one reason why sort of the world economy you know did pretty well in the late 19th century sort of the late Victorian period. That was a big era of globalization... Capital was mobile because of the gold standard the fixed exchange rate it facilitated trade flows... because there was very little uncertainty about what exchange rates were going to be”

0.80

Because each currency is pegged to a fixed quantity of gold, triangular arbitrage fixes all bilateral exchange rates between gold-standard currencies; maintaining that peg requires adjusting domestic monetary policy, so a country cannot run an independent monetary policy without violating the standard or triggering gold flows.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“if each currency is is pegged to a certain amount of gold then the sort of by sort of triangular arbitrage it implies something about the the price of pounds in terms of the price of dollars... that implies that all those bilateral exchange rates are going to be fixed unless countries change sort of their gold parity.”

0.80

If one country prints more money than gold rules permit, inflation prices out its exports and cheapens imports, creating a trade deficit that (absent capital flows) must be financed by gold outflows, which then forces the central bank to slow money growth and raise rates—David Hume's price-specie-flow mechanism returning the system to equilibrium.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“prices are going to rise in that country because of inflation. That will begin to price out its exports... the country will begin to run a trade deficit... Then the only way the country can finance that in the absence of capital flows is by gold flows. So... the gold will begin to leave that country and that puts sort of the... reins the central bank in”

0.80

The gold standard functioned as a self-imposed discipline device on central banks and politicians: it prevented running the printing presses because excess paper relative to gold stocks would raise the risk of a speculative run, and this credibility was reinforced by gold's independent uses and the impossibility of inflating its supply.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“So gold standard is a discipline that the central bank imposed on itself... the reason you couldn't run the printing presses is if you did people would start to get worried that there was too much too many pieces of paper out there for how much gold you were holding.”

0.80

Britain (under Churchill as Chancellor) chose to deflate prices and return to gold at the pre-war parity in the mid-1920s, but since prices had not fully fallen, British goods were overpriced internationally, forcing further painful deflation—a decision Keynes attacked in 'The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill.'

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“Britain decided to deflate prices and get them back down to... where they were before the war and then go back on the gold standard at pre-war rate... when they went got back on the gold standard, the price of British goods relative to goods in the rest of the world was a bit too high, which meant they'd have to suffer some more deflation... John Maynard Keynes wrote a pamphlet The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill where he excoriated that decision”

0.80

The chief drawback of the gold standard is the loss of independent monetary policy: a country ties the short-term fate of its economy to the world gold supply, so it cannot use monetary policy to cushion shocks like crop failures and must instead endure tight money, high rates, and gold loss—making its fate hostage to events in gold producers like South Africa and Russia.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“The main policy challenge is that by losing an independent monetary policy, you're sort of tying the short-term fate of your economy to the amount of gold in the world... if people are thinking about, well, maybe we need a gold standard today, well, what that's saying is that we're going to tie our monetary policy to events in Russia and South Africa, the two major gold producers.”

0.80

World prices fell about 30% within two or three years of their 1929 peak, and the deflation was synchronized across Britain, France, and the US starting in mid-1929—a monetary shock consistent with Friedman's dictum that inflation (and its converse, deflation) is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“deflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomena, and world prices fell 30% within just two or three years of their peak in 1929.”

0.78

France's deflationary impact in 1927-28 was masked because the US was simultaneously shedding gold and lending abroad, offsetting France; but when the US began tightening in 1928, it reinforced France's effect, and the combined gold flows drove world prices down starting mid-1929.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“the United States was sort of doing the opposite. The US was shedding gold in those two years... we were sort of offsetting the French action... the US began to tighten monetary policy in 1928... and that sort of began to reinforce what France was doing.”

0.78

The link from deflation to output collapse remains an open puzzle: while prices fell ~30%, why output fell 20-30% is not fully established, though the contrast with Spain (no big deflation, flat or rising industrial production) shows a clear link, with candidate mechanisms being nominal rigidities and credit-system disintermediation (per Bernanke's work).

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“just because prices fell by 30%, why does output fall by 20 or 30%? And that's still sort of I'm not sure it's an open question, but I think still there's fruitful work to be done in sort of establishing that link.”

0.78

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff was only slightly deflationary (by attracting gold to the US) but its effect was too small to cause the 30% world price implosion, because the trade imbalance at the time was relatively small; the deflation must be traced primarily to gold-standard central bank policies.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“Smoot-Hawley Tariff in particular was slightly deflationary in the sense that it was attracting gold to the United States... but when you look at the magnitudes of that effect, it's really pretty small... the impact on trade was just not enough to sort of cause a 30% implosion in world prices.”

0.78

There was probably no liquidity trap in the 1930s: when Congress forced the Fed into open market operations in early 1932 despite low rates, the monetary base and money supply rose with signs of recovery, but the Fed aborted the effort by summer 1932 and the economy slipped back—a natural experiment showing monetary expansion can help even amid deep deflation and slack.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“Congress essentially forced Fed start undertaking open up market operations in early 1932. Even though interest rates were were very low low and behold they were able to increase the money supply... But they aborted this effort to expand the money supply in the summer of 1932... and then the economy began to slip back.”

0.77

Milton Friedman himself, after reading the memoirs of the French central bank governor in the early 1990s, wrote that had he been fully aware of what France was doing, his Monetary History would have laid equal blame on France rather than putting the burden on the Federal Reserve.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“Milton Friedman himself in the early 1990s, I believe, read the memoirs of the Central Bank governor of France during this period and he actually wrote in a forward to a reissue of that those memoirs that if he had been sort of fully focused and fully aware of what France was doing, his monetary history would have been a little bit different. They would have laid equal blame on France”

0.75

In the present crisis the US has done reasonably well compared to the Great Depression because it avoided a huge deflation; big deflations are just as disruptive as big inflations, so the goal should be monetary stability avoiding both extremes (per Friedman, Cassel and others).

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Douglas Irwin

“I think we have done reasonably well through this crisis as opposed to the Great Depression because we've managed to avoid a huge deflation... big deflations are just as disruptive, just as nasty as as big inflations. Obviously you want to avoid the the wide swings and avoid the extremes”

0.74

Being on the gold standard means a country's monetary base and policy stance are dictated by central bank gold reserves: rising reserves permit expanding the money supply, while falling reserves force higher interest rates and contractionary policy to stop gold outflow.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“What essentially means is that your monetary base and the stance of your monetary policy is dictated by how much how many gold reserves are held by the central bank. So if the central bank's gold reserves are increasing... it can issue more currency... If the country is losing gold reserves, then it has to sort of raise interest rates, tighten monetary policy to prevent that gold outflow”

0.73

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff may have exacerbated the monetary crisis through a credit channel (per Rustici and Meltzer): farmers unable to export couldn't repay equipment loans, stressing agricultural-state banks into insolvency and worsening the monetary contraction, though a severe 1930 drought confounds this and cotton data show export shares actually rose as domestic demand fell more.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Douglas Irwin

“farmers suddenly couldn't export goods, then they couldn't repay their loans... which meant that banks in agricultural states... struggled to stay solvent... In fact, Allan Meltzer sort of proposed that too... but there's also a severe drought during that year... cotton production fell presumably because of the drought, but domestic demand fell a lot more because of the recession”

0.73

French central bankers and politicians were traumatized by the 1924-25 inflation (stabilized only in 1926), giving them an extreme anti-inflation stance; combined with legal restrictions on open market operations and a refusal to monetize government debt, this made them unwilling to monetize their gold inflows even as prices fell sharply in the early 1930s.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Douglas Irwin

“French politicians, French central bankers had been traumatized by the inflation that they endured in 1924, '25 until they stabilized things in 1926... they want to absolutely make sure that they didn't repeat that... they were very cautious about how they treated their gold reserves. And they were stricted the ability of the central bank to undertake open market operations”

0.73

The single most important thing FDR did was to take the US off the gold standard in April 1933, which marks the trough of the Depression with industrial production and wholesale prices bouncing back in a sharp V; the New Deal's other policies (e.g., the NRA) were largely secondary, if not counterproductive.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Douglas Irwin

“Certainly the the best thing they did was to try to change the stance of monetary policy, get off the gold standard. All the other stuff I suspect was largely secondary, if not counterproductive.”

0.73

Central bank inaction in both the 1930s and today stems from the same two rationales: fear of inflation (the Bank of France's worry) and a belief in central bank impotence/lack of credit demand (the Fed's real bills doctrine, per Meltzer), which together served as an excuse for failing to pursue expansionary policy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Douglas Irwin

“The answer of the Bank of France was well we're worried about inflation. And the answer of the Federal Reserve was well there's sort of no demand for credit. The Fed as Allan Meltzer shows... was adhering to a real bills doctrine... between the fear of inflation and the and the the idea that their sort of monetary policy authorities are impotent that was an excuse for inaction. And and that's sort of what... is... recurring to some extent today.”

0.73

China (on a silver standard) and Spain (on a fiat money standard) were not on the gold standard during this period and, while they suffered recessions because trading partners went into depression, they did not experience the great deflation, the great rise in unemployment, or the great reduction in output that gold-standard countries did.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Douglas Irwin

“those two countries are China, which was on a silver standard, and Spain, which I believe was on a fiat money standard... And both those countries, you know, did reasonably well through the early 1930s as other countries were imploding.”

0.72

Had the price of gold been raised in the late 1920s, or had major central banks pursued price stability instead of adhering to the gold standard, there would have been no Great Depression, no Nazi revolution, and no World War II (quoting Robert Mundell).

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Douglas Irwin

“Had the price of gold been raised in the late 1920s, or alternatively had the major central banks pursued policies of of price stability instead of adhering to the gold standard, there would have been no Great Depression, no Nazi revolution, and no World War”

0.69

The standard transmission mechanism from monetary expansion to stimulus is in question because banks are holding the injected reserves as excess reserves rather than lending them, so the enormous reserve injections have not produced expected inflation—calling into doubt the Fed's ability to offset business-cycle swings.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“there's no doubt that banks are not lending the money that... the Fed has injected into their system. They're holding excess reserves. And so that's why we're not getting the inflation we would normally expect from enormous injections of reserves... but it calls into question the very mechanism that economists particularly monetary economists argue is the way that the Fed can offset the business cycle swings”

0.68

Discretionary monetary policy with 'open hands' has been an abject failure in many countries (e.g., Zimbabwe's hyperinflation) and even in the US has been indicted for the low rates of 2002-2004 precipitating the current crisis, so choosing between gold and discretion is a genuine trade-off rather than a clear win for either.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“Monetary policy uh with with open hands has been a abject failure in many many countries where where the discipline has totally failed. Zimbabwe being an obvious example... a lot of people have indicted monetary policy between say '02 and '04 for precipitating the current mess we're in. So uh I there is a trade-off.”

0.64

Monetary policy today (circa 2010) is likely too tight (per Scott Sumner): consumer price inflation has been roughly zero over nine months and ~1% year-over-year and falling, and low nominal interest rates indicate tight money rather than easy money, so the Fed has scope to do more.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 1/4· Douglas Irwin

“I tend to lean towards Scott Sumner's view that I think things are too tight. We've got consumer price inflation that is basically zero over the past 9 months... And as Sumner points out low nominal interest rates don't indicate monetary ease they indicate sort of very tight money.”

0.45

After the 1929 stock market crash, Christina Romer has shown consumers got spooked and held back consumption of durable goods, an effect independent of monetary policy, but it is doubtful such non-monetary effects are large enough to explain the size of the observed fluctuations.

causalestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Douglas Irwin

“when the stock market crashed in 1929... Christina Romer has shown that... consumers got a little bit spooked and they held back on their consumption of durable consumer goods. And so, that's sort of independent of monetary policy, but but the question is how big is that really”

0.43

Developing countries today peg their currencies to the dollar rather than gold, and when they fail to adhere to the required discipline they are forced to devalue or face speculative attacks, as happened to Mexico in 1994 and Asian countries in the late 1990s.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Douglas Irwin

“when we look at developing countries today and they try to keep their exchange rates fixed... they'll peg their currency say to the dollar... sometimes they don't adhere to that strict discipline and then they're forced to devalue or there's a speculative attack on their currency such as happened to Mexico in 1995 or 90 94”

0.38

The Roaring Twenties featured a large expansion in debt and stock market investment, with people living beyond their means expecting to manage it—paralleling the recent housing crisis where high mortgages became unaffordable as prices fell and incomes stagnated, though the 1930s problem was more widespread than a single sector.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Douglas Irwin

“We have a big expansion in debt. We have a big um increase in stock market investment... a lot of people are living beyond their means because they figure, well we'll we'll be able to handle it... there are parallels with the housing crisis because... people had... pretty large high mortgages.”

0.12

The gold standard was suspended during World War I and restored for most countries by 1928-1929, with the business cycle peak for most countries in mid-1929.

factual· Douglas Irwin

“most countries were on the gold standard by 1928-1929, and then they began to peel off at various times... the business cycle peak for most countries was in mid-1929”