What this covers

John Cochrane of the University of Chicago discusses the origins and nature of the 2008 financial crisis with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. Rather than characterizing the crisis as a failure of free markets, Cochrane traces it to three distinct failures: investors who chased above-market returns without scrutinizing the instruments they held, regulatory structures that created perverse incentives to misrate assets and evade prudential rules, and the reliance of financial institutions on short-term funding that proved vulnerable to runs. The conversation covers the mechanics of how firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers collapsed despite their historical prominence, the role of leverage in amplifying small losses into insolvency, and why the policy responses—TARP, bank recapitalization, and fiscal stimulus—targeted the wrong problem.

The range of ground covered is substantial. Cochrane defends mortgage-backed securities as a sound mechanism for distributing risk across investors, arguing the instruments themselves were not the problem; instead, he points to regulatory rules requiring triple-A holdings, which created incentives to fraudulently brand risky assets as safe. He disputes the diagnosis that bank capital shortages caused the crisis, contending instead that the breakdown of credit intermediation—the system by which savings are converted to loans—is what froze lending. On policy responses, he argues that TARP's structure was mathematically incoherent, that government recapitalization entangled banks in political uncertainty rather than allowing clean failures, and that stimulus spending rests on flawed assumptions about how households respond to temporary income shocks. He also defends mark-to-market accounting against its critics, advocates for letting financial institutions fail rather than fearing their collapse, and suggests that reduced lending following excessive borrowing is a necessary correction, not a symptom requiring intervention.

Sharpest takeaway

Cochrane argues the 2008 financial crisis was not a failure of free markets but largely a product of investors not scrutinizing risk, regulatory distortions that encouraged gaming triple-A ratings, and excessive short-term leverage — and that the policy responses (TARP, bank recapitalization, fiscal stimulus) misdiagnosed the real problem, which is a broken credit-intermediation system rather than a bank capital shortage.

  • The core failure was investors chasing above-market returns without reading the fine print, not the instruments themselves, which spread risk usefully in principle
  • Regulations requiring triple-A securities created incentives to fraudulently brand risky assets as safe and to write insurance to evade bank rules
  • The real economic damage came from the breakdown of the credit-intermediation 'refinery,' not from bank capital constraints, so capital injections and stimulus address the wrong problem

The claims · ranked45 claims · weighted by value

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0.86

Investment banks were vulnerable because they borrowed enormous sums overnight, having to roll over their funding every day; lenders believed they were safe because they could simply refuse to renew an overnight loan at the first sign of trouble, but this is a recipe for a run, since when everyone simultaneously refuses to renew, the institution wakes up unable to borrow new money — exactly what happened to Bear Stearns.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“they were borrowing not just borrowing a lot of money but they were borrowing it overnight so every day they had to go in and borrow new money to pay off the old money”

0.86

You cannot eliminate risk by planning to sell on the way down or placing a stop-loss order; the belief that you can avoid risk by exiting before losses accumulate is one of the great fallacies of finance, because everyone trying to exit simultaneously is precisely what creates the crisis.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“you can't put in a stoploss order and stop and and not have risk you can't plan to sell on the way down and therefore not have risks”

0.80

Mortgage-backed securities are a fundamentally good idea because they spread mortgage risk around the world: instead of a Kansas bank failing and devastating the local economy when Kansas mortgages sour, a diversified holder like a German hedge fund absorbs a small hit as part of a larger portfolio, which is how free markets ideally distribute risk.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“when a bunch of mortgages in Kansas turned sour in the 1930s that meant that a bank in Kansas would go under and and devastate the low economy now a bunch of mortgages in Kansas go sour and a hedge fund in Germany takes the losses that's that's wonderful”

0.80

You only earn extra return in financial markets by taking on some form of systemic risk; buying a pool of mortgage-backed securities was effectively a bet on house prices, so when house prices fell investors were always going to lose money.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“you only earn extra return in this life for taking on some form of systemic risk so if you bought a pool of mortgage-backed securities the risky we're taking you were taking a bet on house prices”

0.80

A credit rating cannot deliver what investors expected of it; if an instrument pays 5% more than Treasuries there is necessarily risk in it regardless of its rating, and expecting a rating agency to certify that you can earn extra interest without bearing risk is asking for the tooth fairy, not a rating.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“if this thing is paying 5% extra interest rating or no rating that means there's some risk in here and it's your job to look”

0.80

Firms like Bear Stearns, Lehman, and Merrill Lynch were destroyed rather than merely having a bad year because they combined very risky positions with heavy leverage; with little equity and large borrowings, even a small loss can render a company unable to repay its debts and push it into bankruptcy, just as a gambler who has borrowed most of his stake goes bust on the first loss.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“if you have not very little equity stock outstanding and you have borrowed a lot of money in order to make your investments if you make a little bit of loss then the whole company can go bankrupt because you can't pay your debts”

0.79

We should not fear bank failure nearly as much as we do, because a modern bank failure does not destroy the economically important operations: when a bank fails, within days the people, computers, and loan-making business resume under another name, depositors are uninterrupted, and the failed bank may even reopen better capitalized — as when Washington Mutual failed and was taken over by JP Morgan and was back in business the next morning.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“when a modern bank fails what happens is within a matter of days the people computers the business part that knows how to make loans is back in business with somebody else's name on it”

0.79

Banks were surprisingly devastated because they had retained far more of the riskiest equity tranches than anyone realized; by keeping these first-loss tranches and writing credit guarantees, banks were effectively writing insurance rather than just originating and selling loans, and this insurance-writing was treated more leniently by regulation than borrowing and lending, so banks used it to evade bank regulation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“the banks seem to have kept many more of those riskiest parts than anybody thought so what the banks ended up doing was essentially writing insurance as opposed to borrowing and lending”

0.79

Banks recapitalized by the government did not resume lending because modern banks operate on a 'lend to sell' model rather than 'lend to hold'; as a bank executive put it, they could not sell loans anymore, and since most US credit (student loans, credit cards, most debt) is originated by banks but then packaged and sold through credit markets, the breakdown of those markets — not a bank capital shortage — is the real problem.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“she looked at me like I was a sort of intellectually challenged two-year-old and said that's not what we do we don't lend to hold we lend to sell and we can't sell loans anymore”

0.78

The modern system created a risk-free haven (savings and checking accounts) where depositors are told not to worry, but investors who hold a bank's bonds or stock are supposed to monitor its health and bear risk; you cannot allow bondholders and shareholders to be free of risk via guarantees without disaster, so the systemically important operations (deposits, brokerage, ATMs) can be preserved through a quick failure while bond and stock holders are wiped out.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“we've created in the modern world a risk free Haven called savings account or a checking account ... but if you invest in a bank as a holder of their bonds or as a holder of their stock we expect you to keep an eye on it”

0.78

If you believe the market price of an asset gives a misleadingly low signal, the right response is not to suppress the information by abandoning mark-to-market (shooting the messenger) but to change the rule about what you do with that information — e.g., adjust capital requirements rather than force a bank to close based on a marked-down value while the underlying loan is still being repaid.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“if you think that's the problem you don't have to change the books you can change the rule about what you do with the piece of information so if you think that you know the market is sending a wrong signal okay listen to that signal and then change what you do”

0.77

The fundamental current problem is a collapse of confidence — people are scared, lack confidence in the future and in others' ability to pay back debt, so innovation, entrepreneurship, and risk-taking are slowing; but economics has no model for how to create confidence, so when economists prescribe actions to 'instill confidence' they are offering personal opinion, not professional expertise, and should defer to psychiatrists or priests.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“the fundamental problem we have now it's making it hard for the economy to function well is that people are scared there's a lack of confidence in the future”

0.73

The only sustainable way out of the credit crisis is for the private intermediation system to rebuild — for example hedge funds raising money to buy good mortgage-backed securities, student debt, and auto loan pools ('building new refineries') — rather than the government nationalizing the credit system, which is a serious danger because once the government is in and finds it enjoyable, its incentives to exit are weak.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“hedge funds are being started and they say look there's all these enormous opportunities in buying good mortgage-backed securities ... they're building new refineries and that's that is the only way we're going to get out of this”

0.73

Junk debt originated in the 1980s as a regulatory workaround: because banks weren't allowed to hold stock, people invented an instrument that could be classified as debt for regulatory purposes but was economically really equity-like stock, which then blew up.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“this is in some sense how our junk debt started in the 1980s banks weren't allowed to hold stock so people invented a kind of thing that could be called debt for regulatory purposes but was really stock and you can see where that blew up”

0.73

The deepest reason fiscal-stimulus ideas are wrong is that people make spending decisions today by looking to the future; for instance, if no taxes were collected this year people would anticipate doubled taxes next year and save much of any rebate rather than spend it, so demand-side stimulus relies on fooling people, which is an unsound basis for government policy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“the central reason why they're completely wrong is because people when they're deciding what to do today they think about the future”

0.73

The financial crisis is wrongly characterized as a free-market failure because the US never had a free financial market; it was a heavily regulated market in which the government pushed people to invest in houses rather than stocks and bonds, and many of those regulations had downsides that contributed to the crisis.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“this is often characterized as Oh free markets failed we don't have anything like a free financial market we have a very regulated market with the government trying very hard to have people invest in houses rather than stocks and bonds”

0.73

Regulations requiring institutions to hold only triple-A securities are misconceived because safety comes from a diversified portfolio of individually risky assets, not from each security being triple-A; this regulatory structure created an incentive to brand assets triple-A that really weren't, and was a major source of the problem rather than the triple-A rating itself.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“the way you get a safe portfolio is you take a diversified portfolio of things that aren't safe and you make them safe it doesn't help to just hold triple-a securities each one what you want is a portfolio that's safe”

0.73

Mark-to-market accounting—writing assets at their market price rather than historical cost or a made-up number—is fundamentally sensible, and the complaint against it is incoherent: critics simultaneously argue that mark-to-market is causing all the problems and that banks are secretly holding assets carried far above true value, but you cannot have it both ways, since either the market price is known and low (a real problem to address) or assets are secretly overvalued, not both.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“half of the time they tell us oh it's mark to market accounting that's causing all the problems and the other half of the time they tell us the problem is the banks is they have all these assets on their books that we don't know how to value and are secretly worth a lot less ... and never both”

0.73

A decline in lending is not necessarily a sign of a problem; because the economy got into trouble through too much borrowing, we should expect and even welcome reduced lending and tightened standards as the economy moves toward being more savings-oriented and demanding more transparency — analogous to lower gas sales during a recession being normal rather than a sign the oil industry is broken.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“the fact that lending has gone down is not necessarily a sign of problems it's I think I think we are moving to a much more savings oriented economy and an economy that demands a lot more transparency of its financial system and that's all a good and great thing”

0.73

The credit problem resembles refineries blowing up rather than reduced demand: there is plenty of 'crude oil' (savers, currently parked in Treasury bills) and there are good loans that should be made, but the middleman intermediation system is broken so it is hard to turn savings into credit; the sign of this is that even very creditworthy borrowers must pay interest rates far above Treasuries, which is hard to explain purely by risk aversion.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“the middlemen system is kind of blown up there's plenty of crude oil there's lots of people who want to save they're saving in the form of Treasury bills right now there's some good loans that should be made but it's getting it's hard to turn oil into gasoline right now”

0.73

Once the government becomes a shareholder in a bank, the bank's prospects become dominated by what the government will do rather than its business operations, making it hard for the bank to raise new capital, merge, fail, or be closed down when it gets into further trouble — entangling resolution and creating a persistent problem rather than allowing quick economic-bankruptcy-style resolution.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“if you're thinking about what's gonna happen a Bank of America and you're an investor and Bank of America it's all about what the government is going to do with Bank of America yeah I agree it's not about the business operations anymore”

0.73

Buying troubled assets from banks faces a dilemma: if the government buys them at true market value (e.g., 30 cents when carried at 60), banks must mark them down and go out of business, so no favor is done; if it buys them at the inflated book value, that is a transparent subsidy of hundreds of billions to bank shareholders and debt holders — which is why the plan shifted to buying bank stock to recapitalize them instead.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“if you buy those assets from the bank at 30 you haven't done anyone a favor because now the banks have to mark those down to market and boom go out of business ... if you're gonna just buy them at 60 well then that's a transparent subsidy of hundreds of billions of dollars to the bank shareholders and debt holders”

0.73

The original TARP proposal—having the government buy a few hundred billion of mortgage-backed securities on the open market to raise the value of all ~13 trillion of such securities—rested on the economically false premise of a nearly vertical demand curve, that removing a small amount of supply would raise the whole market's value; you cannot make 13 trillion dollars of assets worth more by buying a few hundred billion of them.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“there's about 13 trillion of open of securities sitting out there on the market and the idea was that buying up just a few hundred million hundred billion of them you would increase liquidity”

0.73

Policy uncertainty itself depresses the economy: people are scared because they don't know what huge programs, tax systems, or interventions are coming — for example, an auto bailout loan in which the government wiped away senior creditors' rights signals that such expropriation could happen at any moment, making it foolish to invest.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“one of the reasons people are scared is because you don't know what huge program is coming down the line ... what is a tax system gonna look like a year from now you'd be a fool to invest”

0.72

Calls for regulation rest on a fallacy that regulation can magically let investors keep earning great returns without doing any work or place a guardian on everyone's shoulder to prevent future mistakes; the free-market claim was never that markets are perfect, only that the alternative of government running things is worse.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“regulation is magically going to let you keep on earning great returns and not have to do any work in order to do it or plant some fairy on everyone's shoulder who's going to keep them from doing something stupid in the future”

0.69

Commercial paper markets did not uniformly freeze; bank-issued commercial paper effectively shut down because investors demanded higher rates than banks would pay (banks could borrow from the Fed instead), while big triple-A non-financial companies like Kraft borrowed enormous amounts at very low rates, and only lower-rated non-financial borrowers faced very high rates — reflecting a general flight from risk rather than a wholesale market collapse.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· John Cochrane

“big triple-a rated non financial companies have had a field day because since people aren't lending money to banks they still got the money to lend and they ended up lending it in the commercial paper market at very low interest rates to big non-financial companies”

0.69

The bank-recapitalization theory was effectively tested and failed: the premise was that banks weren't lending only because they lacked capital ('electricity to the pumps'), but when the government supplied the capital, banks still didn't lend because the real reasons were that they couldn't sell loans, demand had fallen in the recession, and everyone had learned that making shaky loans is a bad idea.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· John Cochrane

“we just ran an experiment on this view of banks don't have enough capital and we discovered that it's not that banks desperately want to make loans but sorry we just don't have the capital ... they got the capital and all of a sudden ... they don't want to make loans anymore because nobody wants to make loans anymore they can't sell them”

0.69

Big commercial banks ended up in deep trouble because, contrary to the originate-and-service model in which they were supposed to sell off the risk via mortgage-backed securities, the trancing system and credit guarantees meant they actually retained far more mortgage risk than anyone thought while appearing to sell the mortgages off; typical local neighborhood banks that simply originated or held-and-serviced mortgages are doing fine.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· John Cochrane

“it turned out that by the credit guarantees in the trancing system the banks had managed to keep all the risks well not all but had keep kept a lot more risk than anybody thought while well putting well selling all these mortgages”

0.69

The central current problem is not the banks but that many credit markets have stopped working; in many cases a 'version 1.0' design flaw in the market structure caused it to blow up, and a 'version 2.0' regulatory fix is clearly possible — illustrated by the municipal bond market freezing because funds required municipal bonds to carry triple-A-rated insurance, so when insurers were downgraded from triple-A to double-A, funds were forced to dump bonds onto a market unable to absorb them.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· John Cochrane

“a lot of the credit markets are not working and in many cases if you look at each one in detail you can see sort of the version 1.0 of the software had a bug in it and that caused it to blow up”

0.69

Fiscal stimulus had effectively vanished from professional economics by around 1960: it is not in the professional journals and not taught in graduate programs, and even Keynesian undergraduate courses (e.g., from Bob Solow) taught that fiscal stimulus wasn't going to work — so reviving it is like abandoning modern medicine to apply leeches.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· John Cochrane

“for the last 50 years fiscal stimulus has vanished it's not in any of the professional journals it's not taught anywhere in any graduate program ... I took a Keynesian undergraduate course from Bob Solow and it said right there fiscal stimulus isn't gonna work”

0.69

The label 'stimulus' is the real objection: government spending on genuinely good projects like roads can be a fine idea on standard cost-benefit grounds, but calling it stimulus falsely implies it raises the overall level of the economy, when it actually just moves money from what private actors would have done to what the government does.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Cochrane

“My oral is just with the idea of calling this stimulus that it's going to raise the overall level of the economy no it's going to take money for me that I might have done something else with it and built the road”

0.68

The bottom-line problem with stimulus is the financing crowding-out question: the money spent must be borrowed, and the person who lent it would otherwise have done something with it, so the demand the government creates is demand that lender can no longer exercise — a fact Keynes ignored.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“where's the money gonna come from well it has to be borrowed okay the guy who you borrowed it from what was he gonna do with it instead aha now we're stuck because he was obviously going to do with it something instead and whatever demand you just created his demand that he isn't going to be able to do”

0.68

Banks can and do raise new equity after experiencing losses, contradicting the common story that they cannot, so writing down loan values does not necessitate destructive deleveraging.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“banks can and do issue capital all the time when bank when banks write down the value of loans they can sell new equity and there's lots of stories that say oh they can't they won't but you look at the numbers and banks do issue new equity”

0.68

The primary blame for the crisis belongs to investors who put their money at risk without reading the fine print or thinking twice when offered high returns supposedly without risk; it is the investor's responsibility to scrutinize such offers, and government should not bail them out because allowing people to suffer the consequences of stupid decisions is the only way they learn to make better ones.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“it's on people who invested their money without reading the fine print or even the fine front without even thinking twice about it when someone comes and says I have a gold mine here you're gonna earn lots of more money without taking risk”

0.68

If a credit-market problem is like busted refineries, paying people to drive around (stimulating demand) won't bring back gas sales; when the location of the problem is known, the right response is to fix that specific problem rather than to stimulate aggregate demand — and modern economics gives no reason to think stimulus would raise demand anyway.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“if the refineries were busted paying people to drive around is not gonna bring back gas sales right right so if we know where the problem is let's fix the problem not stimulate demand”

0.68

The stimulus debate is fundamentally about whether the US should be more like Europe (public activity taking a bigger share of GDP) or less; and Europe's underlying problem—a low-growth precipice invisible to tourists, where friends live in small apartments far from city centers—is a cumulative low-growth cost that should make Americans wary of moving in that direction.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“what this is a debate is really about is whether we should be more like Europe or less like Europe if you think we should be more like Europe that public activity should be taking a bigger chunk of GDP then let's spend more money”

0.68

Modern macroeconomics over the last 50 years understood why fiscal-stimulus ideas were wrong, with monetarism gaining ground after the 1962/1963 Monetary History and the rational-expectations business cycle models of Lucas, Prescott, and Sargent incorporating people's forward-looking behavior and undermining the intellectual basis for Keynesian stimulus.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“post 1962 with the publication of the monetary history the United States monetarism started to have a serious comeback at versus Keynesianism and then with the business cycle models of Lucas Prescott Sargent and others”

0.66

Keynes held positions modern economics rejects, including dismissing investment as a bad idea unnecessary for prosperity and emphasizing consumption today, whereas we now understand investment creates the capital stock crucial to growth — a key element Keynes's framework missed.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“he said investment was a bad idea you know we don't need it the idea that investment creates capital stock which is crucial to growth that's not in Keynes we missed that”

0.66

Much of what economists believe in the stimulus debate may reflect their philosophical priors and ideological commitments rather than science, evidenced by the fact that no market-oriented economist favored large government spending increases and no market-skeptic opposed them — suggesting the divide is mainly philosophy, not science.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“in this current debate there is not a single market oriented economist who has been in favor of large increases of government spending and there's not been a single skeptic about markets who hasn't thought it's a great idea ... so it makes you think that ... it's mainly philosophy”

0.64

The extraordinarily high interest rates on safe credit such as municipal and corporate bonds (e.g., University of Chicago selling muni bonds at 6%, implying an unbelievable ~50% default probability over 20 years) are either a sign of massively excessive risk aversion or of a market that is not functioning, since such default fears are not credible for solid issuers with buildings and endowments.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 1/4· John Cochrane

“we sold them at 6% which if you do the math implies over 20 years a belief that there's a half a chance that will default on the bonds and that's just unconceivable a 50% probability of us defaulting”

0.64

Whether fiscal stimulus works depends entirely on how it is financed: printing a trillion dollars and dropping it from helicopters would give a small temporary output boost followed by Latin-American-scale inflation, whereas borrowing our own money that we intend to repay has no support in the last 50 years of economics for stimulating the economy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“if we print up a trillion dollars of money and drop it from helicopters we know what that'll do you'll get a little boost in output for a while ... and then you'll get an inflation of Latin American proportions”

0.40

Greg Mankiw is an example of a free-market economist who is fairly Keynesian in outlook yet opposes the stimulus because he looked at the evidence rather than retreating to old beliefs, demonstrating that the stimulus divide is not purely ideological.

factualcontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· John Cochrane

“Greg Mankiw is you know he's the public and free marketer but he's been he's fairly Keynesian he's against the stimulus but he's fairly Keynesian in outlook”

0.37

There should be much more competition among credit rating agencies, and the practice of enshrining their ratings into regulation is itself part of the problem because it gives ratings a regulatory force they cannot economically justify.

normativecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Cochrane

“the rating agencies are enshrined into regulation I'd like to see a lot more competition in rating agencies that would help a lot”

0.31

When a person is paid to rate something, the rating is probably not the most objective, so most people understood that triple-A ratings had to be taken with a grain of salt rather than treated as a guarantee of no risk.

factualcontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· John Cochrane

“most people know that when a person's being paid to rate something it's probably not the most objective rating in the world”

0.18

The University of Chicago floating a tax-free municipal bond is itself bizarre and arguably it shouldn't be floating bonds at all.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Russ Roberts

“maybe you shouldn't be floating bonds anyway and it's bizarre that you're floating a tax-free bond”