
Get Long China? | Michael Howell and Jimmy Connor
What this covers
This is a 43-minute interview in which host Jimmy Connor questions Michael Howell, founder of CrossBorder Capital, about China's September 2024 stimulus and what it means now that both the US and China have cut rates. Howell sets the rate cuts aside as largely symbolic. He describes China as a state credit-allocation system, comparable to Japan's 1980s "window guidance," in which central bank liquidity flows through money markets, state banks and so-called shadow banks, which he says are ordinary High Street banks lending off-balance-sheet. He calls the recent measures (a roughly 20 basis point cut, $113 billion of equity support, lower reserve requirements) directionally right but too small.
The wider range moves from China to the plumbing of the global financial system. Howell distinguishes monetary inflation from consumer-price inflation, and says cheap Chinese exports, technology and lower oil prices have kept the CPI) quiet while gold and Bitcoin price in the debasement. He argues that bank purchases of short-dated government bills amount to monetization. He also holds that markets now exist mainly to roll over debt rather than raise new capital. In his account, every crisis of the past few decades was a debt refinancing crisis, and a maturity wall around 2026–2027 is the next test. He also describes the Fed's August stress-test change and Treasury's shorter issuance as responses to that problem.
The more contested material concerns currency. Howell says China's real exchange rate is too high, so it must either deflate or devalue, and he compares the situation to Japan in the late 1980s. He sees US-China-Japan coordination resembling the Plaza Accord and its liquidity-driven bubble, which ended in the 1987 crash. He argues Japan cannot raise rates meaningfully because of its debt load. The most fringe claim is that the 2022 yen collapse was deliberately timed to pressure the yuan.
Global liquidity cycles, not interest rates, drive financial market dynamics and economic outcomes; policy coordination between the US, China, and Japan suggests a currency realignment similar to the 1985 Plaza Accord, positioning markets for further gains through late 2025 before a likely liquidity crunch and debt refinancing crisis emerges.
- Chinese monetary policy operates through credit allocation and liquidity injection, not interest rate transmission, making rate cuts largely symbolic
- The US and China have implicitly coordinated currency stabilization and easing in late 2024, mirroring the Plaza Accord structure and timeline
- A $350 trillion global debt pile with exponential growth and a 5-year average maturity creates a cyclical liquidity-to-debt mismatch; the 2026-2027 maturity wall will demand massive refinancing capacity just as liquidity cycles peak and begin contracting
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Shadow banks in China are not shadow banks in the Western sense; they are traditional High Street banks operating off-balance-sheet through PBoC liquidity pools, allowing them to expand lending while bypassing formal regulatory constraints.
“Shadow banks are not quite like what we understand in the west Shadow banks are actually uh the traditional High Street banks in in China but there operating uh off balance sheet in many cases they will get extra funding uh from that pool and they will lend”
The Federal Reserve and US Treasury are aware of the debt refinancing problem and have made policy adjustments: the Fed modified bank stress test rules in August to release Reserve holdings (possibly ~$500 billion) into the system, and Treasury has shifted toward short-end bond issuance by reducing average tenor by 1.2 years.
“one of the things that got very little commentary uh was the change made I think it was August 13th uh by the Federal Reserve on bank stress test rules now that may be getting into the weeds of this whole thing but it's very important because basically the banks uh have been building up huge Reserves at the treasury sorry at the in the Federal Reserve basically to protect themselves because they need to satisfy stress tests their regulator uh every month and basically this money held at the FED is a pretty decent liquid asset Reserve they can they can post uh the Federal Reserve said that actually in future going forward uh they can actually use uh prospective discount window borrowing um also borrowings from federal home loan Banks or the standing repo facility uh as uh as part of their stress test which means that those Reserves reses or a large part of those reserves maybe uh we think maybe as much as half a trillion uh can find their way back into other instruments”
If the PBoC significantly increases liquidity to specific industries, Chinese business activity will rise, spilling over into positive effects on world commodity prices given China's vast industrial footprint and role in global production.
“if the People's Bank decides to Goose the economy by increasing liquidity significantly to certain industries uh then you will get uh a rise in Chinese business activity that will spill over given the huge size of the Chinese economy uh in terms of the world economy uh China's footprint we know industrial footprint is is vast and that will have a very positive effect on world commodity prices”
The Chinese financial system operates as a state allocation of credit system similar to Japan's 1980s 'window guidance' model; liquidity injections flow through the PBoC to money markets, shadow banks (traditional High Street banks operating off-balance sheet), and state-owned banks, which then lend according to central directives.
“what you've got is effectively a state allocation of credit system rather like Japan in the 1980s which was then called window guidance uh China is following a very similar remit and what's happening is that the pboc injects liquidity into the money markets uh the shadow banking system uh which you know Shadow banks are not quite like what we understand in the west Shadow banks are actually uh the traditional High Street banks in in China but there operating uh off balance sheet”
Banks are the primary buyers of short-term government bills because they match bank balance sheets fueled by government spending; if long-term funds bought government debt, it would represent pure funding from savings, but bank purchases constitute monetization—monetary inflation.
“if you are funding at the short end of the market in other words funding through 2E 3E 5ye bonds uh no longer 10 or 20 or 30 year um you are principally selling bonds to credit providers because they like that sort of stuff and it's a wonderful match for uh their balance sheets which are basically getting uh fueled or pumped up by more and more government spending so they tend to be the buyers of these bills and these short-dated bonds not the long-term fund funds if the long-term funds bought government debt that would be pure funding it would come out of savings if the banks buy the debt which is what they've been doing what you're getting is monetization and monetization is dangerous because it's monetary inflation”
Three factors have suppressed High Street inflation despite decades of monetary inflation: cheap Chinese goods dumped in the West, technology gains reducing prices, and substantially lower oil prices than in 2008.
“why hasn't that monetary inflation spilled over into the High Street basically because of two or three things one is cheap Chinese Goods which have been dumped in the west secondly because of techn Technology gains which have reduced prices and thirdly because oil prices are substantially lower than they were in 2008 and all these things all these ingredients have come through to keep High Street prices down”
Liquidity cycles are independent of and typically move in advance of interest rate cycles; investors should not wait for monetary tightening to begin before reducing risk exposure, as liquidity cycles can contract well before rate reversals.
“it may be that the liquidity cycle turns down before interest rates go up so uh we you know we shouldn't be waiting for a tight monetary policy or a tightening monetary policy to you know spook us out of markets I think one's got to be cognizant of the fact that liquidity is an independent cycle to a large extent and it tends to move in advance of interest rates”
China's recent stimulus measures—interest rate cuts of ~20 basis points, equity market support of $113 billion, and required reserve ratio reductions—are directionally correct but lack sufficient magnitude to solve the structural economic problem; sizable amounts of liquidity injection are needed.
“by you know shifting interest rates down of you a few tens of basis points that ain't going to do it”
China's real exchange rate is way too high, similar to Japan's problem in the late 1980s and many Asian economies in the late 1990s; this imbalance must resolve either through massive domestic deflation or currency devaluation.
“if you look at the Chinese economy and financial system fundamentally the problem is that the real exchange rate in other words the exchange rate adjusted for inflation is way way too high it was exactly the same problem that Japan had at the end of the 80s it was the problem a lot of the Asian economies had uh back in the late 1990s”
China using the Yuan as a marker of soft power and refusing to devalue it, combined with overproduction of goods, forces deflation of asset prices and consumer prices, which imposes a crushing burden on the domestic populace, particularly the poor with falling incomes.
“at the moment CH is using uh the Yuan the Chinese currency as a marker of soft power and it doesn't want to lose face by allowing the Yuan to devalue but at the end of the day they either stop producing mass or massively overproducing Goods or they let their currency drop”
Interest rates do not drive financial system outcomes in China or globally; instead, the volumes of liquidity and policy decisions about allocating credit to specific industries determine economic and market behavior.
“Financial systems uh well particularly in China but even globally now don't really operate around interest rates they operate around the volumes of liquidity and that's really the main thing to watch”
Corporations extended debt maturity aggressively when interest rates were very low, pushing repayment dates out to 2026-2027; a massive maturity wall of debt will hit the system around late 2025, requiring substantial refinancing capacity and liquidity.
“corporations when interest rates were very low did a lot of their refinancing and they basically pushed debt out into 2026 or 2027 and that's when the bulk of it will start to to mature and they've got to face the problem of having not to had to refinance very much over the last two years there's a huge amount of debt that needs to be refinanced basically two years out”
Financial markets have fundamentally shifted from mechanisms for raising new capital to mechanisms for debt refinancing; with $150 trillion in debt worldwide averaging 5-year maturity, approximately $30 trillion per year must be refinanced on average, creating massive liquidity demands.
“the whole nature of financial markets has changed in the last few decades no longer are financial markets uh uh mechanisms for raising New Capital uh for new uh for new investment in plant and equipment or whatever uh the sort of textbook model that drives the uh the business cycle as uh you know as academics tell us uh and it's not interest rates that attenuates that particular process we're in a world where there's a huge amount of debt and capital markets play the role of debt refinancing mechanisms not new capital racing mechanisms”
In 1985, the Plaza Accord saw the US dollar depreciate significantly because of strong US fiscal policy combined with tight monetary policy; the US agreed with G5 allies to ease monetary policy, allowing other countries to ease as well, resulting in a major liquidity injection that created asset bubbles through 1986-1987 and ended in the October 1987 crash.
“what America agreed alongside its other allies in in the uh then um G5 countries was to basically allow the dollar to devalue by the US easing monetary policy significantly and that meant that the other countries ultimately could ease their monetary policies in time and that's exactly what happened and that big liquidity injection LED onto uh an asset bubble that blew up through 1986 and 1987 and ultimately ended in tears uh in the October crash of '87”
Every financial crisis in the last 2-3 decades has been a debt refinancing crisis; examples include the Asian crisis (1997), the 2008 financial crisis, and the 2019 US repo crisis.
“every financial crisis in the last two or three decades has first and foremost been a debt refinancing crisis think of the Asian crisis in 97 think of 2008 think of the US repo crisis in 2019 all these were instances of debt refinancing and rollover problems”
Monetary inflation (devaluation of the paper dollar) is not the same as High Street inflation (CPI measured in Consumer Price Indexes), though the former can spill over into the latter; monetary inflation has persisted for 10-20 years despite suppressed CPI inflation.
“liquidity is going up what does this mean for inflation well I think that um let me say first of all that liquidity is going up which is a monetary inflation um High Street inflation as people understand it which is basically you know measured by CPI Consumer Price indexes uh isn't necessarily going up at the same Pace”
The Yen collapse in 2022 coincided with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and was deliberately timed to pressure China's Yuan, force it to devalue, and corner China into tightening monetary policy to wreck its economy.
“it happened to coincide with the uh Russian invasion of Ukraine um so maybe there was something there to try and U you know associate that with what was happening in Japan and China and I think the fall in the uh Yen was all about putting a lot more pressure on the Chinese Yuan trying to force it to devalue and actually putting the CH painting the Chinese into a corner and trying to make them tighten monetary policy and ultimately wreck their economy so I think it was all deliberate”
To address excessive global debt, liquidity conditions must remain elevated in the medium term; this is why 'everybody's got more gold' as a hedge against monetary inflation.
“that's why liquidity conditions basically will have to go up in the medium term and that's why everybody's got more more gold it's as simple as that so liquidity is going up”
Japan cannot meaningfully raise interest rates because of its huge government debt burden; raising rates would compound the interest burden on Japanese government debt, making rate hikes politically and economically impossible.
“all this talk about Japan tightening is completely Pie in the Sky the Japanese can't tighten I mean let's be realistic they've got a huge huge debt problem if they start to raise interest rates they start to compound the interest bill on Japanese government debt so uh dream on they're not going to Titan”
The long-term structural problem in the world economy is excessive debt, which creates instability and frequent financial crises; debt continues to grow because governments run fiscal deficits and pile up larger debt loads.
“in the medium term we've still got this long-term bogey of too much debt in the world economy and that is the problem that is creating instability or fragility in the world financial system and it's why we're sort of riddled with frequent crises and Cycles uh it's all about this huge huge and uh too big debt load and the problem is that debt load is getting bigger not smaller because governments uh are now spending a lot of money they're getting into bigger and bigger fiscal deficit and they're piling up an even bigger uh you know mountain of debt”
The People's Bank of China has starved the Chinese financial system of liquidity for the last two to three years, largely forcing China to maintain tight monetary policy to protect a weak Yuan currency.
“the system has been starved of liquidity uh pretty much for the last two to three years which is largely why the Chinese economy has never managed to escape from the covid lockdowns they've been forced to run a tight monetary policy to protect what has been a weak Yuan currency”
Debt is never paid back; it is rolled over and piles up, creating perpetual refinancing needs estimated at $30-110 trillion annually depending on the year, reflecting uneven debt maturity schedules.
“spoiler alert debt is never paid back it's just built up it piles up and so you've got a refinance debt uh basically of a huge amount uh annually now that um 70 trillion is clearly not evenly distributed some years you might get 30 some years you might might get 70 some years you might get $110 trillion of refinancing”
Bitcoin and gold are both pricing in inflation; the gold market and Bitcoin market are signals that investors perceive monetary inflation risk even if official CPI statistics do not reflect it.
“it's not being recorded uh and that's really the question to pose the gold market thinks we're getting inflation for sure Bitcoin thinks we're getting inflation”
US federal debt has increased eightfold since 2000, a remarkable growth rate; few assets have increased eightfold in that period, with gold being a notable exception, suggesting gold is tracking fiscal laxity.
“if you come back to your metric on on US debt US debt has increased by Eightfold in size since year 2000 I mean that's an astonishing uh growth rate for debt public debt okay there's there are very few assets that have gone up eight times since 2000 one of those is the price of gold so gold is matching pretty much exactly the uh sort of fiscal laxity of the American economy”
Good quality equities will perform well in a moderate inflation environment; however, both deflation and very high inflation regimes wreck equity markets.
“stick with equities uh good quality equities will do well in a moderate inflation what tends to wreck the equity Market is either a deflation or a very high inflationary period And I don't really uh Envision either of those two in the near future”
China's historically traditional lending channels (shadow banks to local authorities and real estate) have been frowned upon in recent years, creating uncertainty about where new credit will flow in response to PBoC liquidity injections.
“they will lend and traditionally they've lent on a real estate particularly to the local authorities now that has been looked down badly upon in the last few years and it's a you know it's a question about what they'll do in the future”
All financial disasters result from the inability to refinance debt; financial crises are not random but are structural consequences of liquidity-debt mismatches.
“all financial disasters are brought on by the inability to refinance debt”
Liquidity conditions in the global economy are likely to move higher over the next 6 to 12 months due to policy coordination and debt refinancing needs.
“so what you've got is the prospect of liquidity conditions in the global economy uh moving up still further higher over the next 6 to 12 months”
Given the convergence of debt growth (exponential) and liquidity cycles (cyclical), another financial crisis is certain to occur, likely within 12-18 months.
“debt tends to grow exponentially but liquidity is cyclical and you can see from that uh you know from that Confluence of different factors that that's why you get financial crises every financial crisis in the last two or three decades has first and foremost been a debt refinancing crisis... and we'll get another one sure as eggs or eggs but it may uh you know 12 18 months away”
34% of China's top 50 property developers have defaulted on their debts in 2024, and major developers like Evergrande have gone bankrupt, significantly impacting the wealth effect and domestic populace.
“34 of China's top 50 property developers have defaulted on their debts in 2024 and many of China's largest property developers have gone bankrupt in recent years one of the big ones this year was ever Grand group one of the largest developers in the world”
Bill finance has increased to 22% of total US debt outstanding, a significant shift indicating the Treasury is funding through short-term bills rather than long-term bonds.
“what's more Bill Finance uh has increased to 22% of total debt outstanding now these are these are big big numbers”
The Federal Reserve's official inflation statistics significantly understate actual inflation; Michael's personal inflation rate is approximately double the stated official figure.
“my personal inflation rate and about yours is a lot higher than 2% so you know they're they're fiddling the figure somewhere”
Every financial crisis that Michael recalls has been a debt refinancing crisis; the cycle has not been cured, so another crisis is inevitable.
“if you look back from experience uh every financial crisis that I can recall has been a debt refinancing crisis and um you know we we haven't we haven't cured the cycle yet there called there's still a cycle”
The West's financial economy vastly exceeds its industrial economy; a financial crash in the West is more likely than in China because of this structural imbalance.
“in the case of the West it's kind of the other way around is that the financial economy is is vastly greater than the industrial economy and if you look at the financial economy in the west the real question to ask is will there be another crash uh like 20089 or um U maybe even like the Asian crisis in 2000 sorry 199 uh 6 97 those crises will recur because they're debt refinancing crisis”
Current policy dynamics parallel the 1985 Plaza Accord structure: the US is easing monetary policy, Asian currencies are now more stable against the dollar, and China is signaling intent to ease; this suggests a similar trajectory toward liquidity expansion followed by asset bubbles and potential crisis.
“I think there's been a currency deal done I think Asian currencies now a lot more stable against the US dollar what we've seen is a US easing and we've seen uh the Chinese come in and basically suggest that they're going to start easing as well over coming months and a bigger size so I think this lines up as an equivalent type of deal”
The US deliberately devalued the Yen against the US dollar approximately two years ago (circa 2022) at a speed and magnitude never seen for a major currency in 30 years of observation; only governments can move major currencies at that velocity.
“if you look back to when the Yen collapsed about two years ago uh the speed or the alacrity with which the Yen fell against the US dollar was something I've never seen from a major currency uh you know in 30 years of being in financial markets uh markets don't do this to Major currencies only governments do so in my view that Yen uh collapse was a deliberate move”
A sudden jump in the Japanese Yen value in August 2024 suggests a tacit agreement between the US, China, and Japan to realign Asian currencies at a new, more stable trading range, similar to the 1985 Plaza Accord.
“go back to August of this year and then you see a sudden jump uh in the Japanese yen in value now that was quite a substantial move it came out of well pretty much out of the blue and I suspect what was hen what happened then was there was some tacid agreement between the US China and Japan to basically uh realign Asian currencies at a new trading range”
If monetary inflation persists at 8-10% per annum while cost-suppression mechanisms (cheap Chinese goods, tech gains, low oil) continue, High Street inflation will accelerate significantly beyond current levels to approximately 4% CPI or higher, not the 2% claimed by the Federal Reserve.
“if if you've got monetary inflation compounding at a rate of maybe 8 to 10% per anom which I think is realistic um you will get much faster High Street inflation unless you get costs uh capped in some way and you know I I'm not that optimistic we will I don't think we're necessarily going to see 8 to 10% High Street inflation but I do believe we're going to see sub substantially more than we've recently had so my figure would be you know start thinking of near a 4% uh CPI inflation not the 2% that the Federal Reserve claims uh they've hit in the US”
The key metrics to monitor for genuine PBoC easing are whether the central bank injects sizable liquidity into money markets and whether state-owned banks substantially increase lending; interest rate movements alone are not reliable gauges of PBoC policy intent.
“but what we got to do is to keep monitoring the money markets to see whether the People's Bank of China is injecting sizable amounts of liquidity into the system and we've got to monitor the state owned Banks to see if their lending starts to increase sizeably and those are really the the key gauges to watch it's not about looking at short-term interest rates”
Prime residential real estate is an excellent inflation hedge; Australian residential property is experiencing significant price appreciation as investors sense monetary inflation.
“Prime residential real estate is always a good uh asset to own uh you know I did a call on a an Australian program uh today uh about these very same things and the commentator made the point that actually in Australia uh Prime residential real estate is absolutely going through the roof because people are sensing there's monetary inflation there”
If US debt grows at 8-10% per annum, it will double within 10 years, suggesting gold prices will also double as the primary long-term monetary inflation hedge.
“you've got this debt burden growing as I said at a rate of amount maybe 8 to 10% per anom which basically would suggest to me that it's going to double uh certainly within every 10 years I mean that's what the math says so if you've got a doubling of that debt uh of that debt pile uh in the next 10 years you can be pretty sure that the gold price will double uh because goal is is the most wonderful long-term U monetary hedge”
Risk asset gains over the past two years have been substantial; further gains are possible but will be harder to achieve, creating a case for portfolio diversification into non-correlated assets like gold, commodities, and commodity-linked equities by end of 2025.
“we've already had two years of pretty decent gains in Risk assets uh we've got maybe another 12 months to go but it's going to be harder to make money out of financial assets through that period let's be clear you need to diversify and you need to think about other things maybe gold or maybe Commodities or maybe commodity related equities or this sort of thing”
Markets operate in cycles; the current downward rate cycle (from 2022 onwards) will eventually reverse, likely 12-18 months from now, as the 'super tanker' shifts direction toward rate increases.
“markets mve in Cycles uh we're now in a situation where rates are coming down the super tanker is Shifting Direction but you know we know as sure as eggs or eggs the super tanker will if I'm not mixing my metaphors shift direction again and um that is probably an event which May will occur let's say 12 to 18 months hence”
In the short term (6-12 months), rising liquidity and coordinated easing by the US and China will likely bode well for the global economy and financial markets.
“so are you suggesting that this is going to bode well for the global economy yeah in the short term I think unquestionably yeah”
Milton Friedman would observe that approximately 3/4 of the increase in US M2 money supply this year has come through monetization of the federal deficit—'crazy numbers' that are bound to end in higher inflation.
“Milton Friedman for example you know the sort of DNE of monetarism uh sadly not around anymore but he'd be telling you is grave looking at these numbers something like three4 of the increase in US M2 money supply this year has come through monetization of the federal deficit that mean this these are crazy numbers it's bound to end badly with higher inflation”
The liquidity cycle is predicted to peak in late 2025 because of three converging factors: (1) higher interest rates from central banks, (2) a strengthening real economy crowding out financial markets, and (3) a massive maturity wall of debt requiring refinancing.
“there are broadly speaking uh you know two or three reasons why that may be the case uh one of course may be higher interest rates from central banks but uh it's the other two which are more important one of those is a strengthening real economy so if the world economy picks up uh we've got to realize that money can't be in two places at once if it's in the real economy in fueling spending and increased production it is not U moving around in financial markets”
The liquidity cycle is predicted to peak in late 2025 and then contract; it has been the main driver of the bull market in risk assets since October 2022.
“I would suspect that the liquidity cycle is likely to Peak in late 2025 and come down and I would argue uh in a moment why that is but that liquidity cycle has been basically moving up since October of 2022 and that has really been the main stay of the bull market in Risk assets”
Chinese policymakers will likely increase credit injection to address the cyclical business cycle problem despite knowing it compounds China's long-term debt problem, because political pressure for immediate economic revival leaves few alternatives.
“you will argue against me and say well okay isn't that creating more debt and it's compounding the problems and I'll come quietly and say well yes probably it is uh but you try telling politicians that because they've got the immediacy of trying to revive the Chinese economy and there isn't there aren't many other ways to do it”
Bitcoin has outperformed gold significantly in recent years, with historical data showing a 10% increase in global liquidity translating to ~45% increase in Bitcoin price versus ~15% for gold, though this higher multiplier may reflect a takeup effect and may normalize over time.
“for every 10% increase in global liquidity you tend to find a 15% increase in the price of gold bullion um historically I'm saying in the Last 5 Years uh Bitcoin has actually produced a multiply about 4.5 times in other words a 10% increase in liquidity means a 45% increase in the price of Bitcoin”
Global debt stands at approximately $350 trillion; US federal debt is $35 trillion and growing at approximately $1 trillion every 100 days, with interest expenses reaching $1 trillion annually.
“I'm sorry what was the global debt levels uh 350 trillion 350 trillion so that's government debt that's corporate debt that's everything correct okay and so just to bring this closer to home now the federal debt let's look at the US okay its debt now stands at 35 trillion dollar it's growing by1 trillion dollar every 100 days the interest expense is a trillion dollars”
The S&P 500 can continue rising absent major geopolitical shocks; if central banks and Treasury continue liquidity expansion, markets have sufficient fuel (analogous to a full gas tank) to drive higher.
“there's there's no case for saying the market could come back significantly and me barwing shocks uh those could be geopolitical shocks or whatever I mean who knows what happens ahead of the election who knows what happens in Ukraine or Israel I mean these are clearly issues which may spook the market near term but I think in the longer term one's got to say that you know it's a bit like driving you know driving a car if you got a lot of gas in the tank you can keep driving and that gas is liquidity”
China's announced stimulus measures are not sufficient to cure the country's structural problems; the scale of measures indicates bureaucratic tinkering with several knobs rather than a comprehensive resolution attempt.
“they haven't you know they're not throwing the kitchen sink at the problem that that's for sure I think what they're trying to do is in sort of typical bureaucrat fashion they're sort of fiddling at several knobs uh without sort of realizing maybe this the the magnitude of what they're they're trying to address”
Bitcoin has likely not achieved plateau adoption; further gains are expected if institutions increase Bitcoin allocations as an inflation hedge, similar to how institutional gold allocations have historically varied from 1-2% (current) to 10-15% (1970s).
“if you go back to the 1970s which I just just about remember uh in the 1970s portfolios were vested probably um 10% sometimes 15% in Gold so it was much much bigger amounts so I think that what you've got here is uh uh the the ability for both in Bitcoin the Intensive margin to increase and in the case of gold and Bitcoin the exensive margin to increase as inflation wires start to pick up”
China is not currently imploding; the Chinese financial system is basic and straightforward rather than complex, making financial unraveling less likely in China than in the West.
“I don't think China's imploding but I I mean you know the the sort of reality is that you know the Chinese Financial system is pretty basic and and very straightforward it's nothing like as complex as the Western Financial system so I think if you're looking at a financial unraveling it's more likely to come in the from the West rather than in China”
China's problems are industrial (oversupply, structural overcapacity) rather than financial; the real challenge is getting off the dollar hook and developing a functional financial system.
“China's problems are much more industrial and they're much more about you know developing the financial system more and actually getting off the dollar hook that's what they need to do”
Risk assets have already generated two years of substantial gains since October 2022; future returns will be harder to achieve, though another ~12 months of gains are likely before liquidity conditions turn.
“we've already had two years of pretty decent gains in Risk assets uh we've got maybe another 12 months to go but it's going to be harder to make money out of financial assets through that period”
The lag time between global liquidity changes and Bitcoin price response has shortened to approximately 6 weeks, reflecting Bitcoin's heightened sensitivity to monetary conditions; traditional fixed income markets typically respond to liquidity changes after 6 months.
“it's sort of concertina shorter and shorter all the time and the latest calculations or our calculations would say about 6 weeks now that's in normal uh asset Market reactions actually remarkably short time uh the fixed income markets normally respond to liquidity after about 6 months I mean that's been our our normal Benchmark but in actual fact Bitcoin seems to be a lot lot more sensitive”
Stanley Druckenmiller noted that the statistical patterns of US fiscal metrics resemble those of Argentina, not a developed economy; the US is following Argentina's path of monetary excess.
“I think it was Stanley drer Miller uh many months ago which said who said uh you know very perceptively a lot of these figures are not the statistics you would expect coming out of the US they're the statistics you would expect coming out of Argentina well actually no Argentina is doing a pretty good job at controlling its monetary excesses and the US is actually going down the old Argentinian path”
Michael suspects China will inject substantial liquidity as a 'hunch' but is not convinced without evidence; this evidence may take several months to materialize.
“I would suspect it probably will that's my hunch but I'm not convinced because I haven't seen the evidence in front of me yet and that may take some months to come out”