What this covers

This lecture, number 78 in Wheaton College's history of philosophy series, follows the shift from logical positivism to ordinary language philosophy. The lecturer begins with the ideal language philosophy of Russell and the positivists, who wanted knowledge stated in symbolic logic with terms tied to empirical reference. Against this stands the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, who treats language as social behavior and a tool with many functions. For him philosophy is therapeutic: its job is to show "the fly out of the bottle" by collecting reminders of how words are actually used. The lecture presents the whole turn as one more post-skeptical reorientation, set beside those of Plato, Augustine, Descartes and Kant.

The middle of the lecture is about the British ordinary-language figures. Gilbert Ryle maps the "logical geography" of what we already know about mind. He calls Descartes's picture a "ghost in the machine" and diagnoses it as a category mistake. The lecturer also asks whether his linguistic behaviorism leans toward epiphenomenalism, a point flagged as contested. J.L. Austin separates cognitive utterances from performative utterances and attacks Ayer's sense-datum theory in Sense and Sensibilia. The sense-data dispute is also recast as a question of which language game is being played. Wittgenstein's treatment of Moore's "Here is a hand" gets its own turn.

The lecture then turns to religion. Under the verifiability criterion, "God exists" counts as meaningless. The lecture follows the reaction through John Wisdom's "Gods," the "Theology and Falsification" debate, and Anthony Flew's invisible gardener parable. It also covers Charles Braithwaite's contested reading of creeds as moral commitments, and Paul van Buren's secular reinterpretation, which launched death-of-God theology. It closes with positivism's decline by the late 1950s and the return of respectable philosophy of religion, including William Alston, and of metaphysics and philosophy of mind.

Sharpest takeaway

Logical positivism's verifiability criterion for meaning is too reductionist; ordinary language philosophy demonstrates that language has diverse uses beyond empirical assertion, enabling religious, ethical, and metaphysical discourse to be meaningful without empirical verification.

  • The verifiability criterion excludes religious and theological language as meaningless, but the subsequent debate (Flew, Hare, Mitchell) shows such language meaningfully expresses beliefs and guides behavior
  • Wittgenstein's language games and later philosophers (Ryle, Austin) reveal language functions in multiple ways—performative, behavioral, private/public—not reducible to a single empirical standard
  • The collapse of logical positivism and return of philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and ethics demonstrates the criterion's failure and vindication of ordinary language philosophy's broader framework

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0.80

Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is therapeutic, not theoretical: philosophers should assemble reminders of how language is actually used to dissolve confusions rather than advance theses, asking 'How do we get the fly out of the bottle?' to show that most philosophical puzzles arise from misuse of language.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose. If you tried to advance philosophical theses, it would never be possible to question them because they'd have to be about words and everybody would agree. Uh so, philosophy does not develop theories of its own. It is still a therapeutic kind of activity, dissolving problems, answering the question which he puts, 'How do we get the fly out of the bottle?' You know, you've got a fly in a bottle and have to get it out. You know, how do you get the fly out of the bottle? Puzzle.”

0.80

Wittgenstein's work on Uncertainty uses G.E. Moore's statement 'Here is a hand' to show that saying 'I know' involves claiming personal assurance that rests on a coherent worldview with deep beliefs, not isolated empirical verification, demonstrating common sense realism grounded in language behavior.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“he starts by referring to G.E. Moore's famous lecture before the British Academy in which he was going to prove that two material objects exist. Remember? Here is one. Here is a hand. I know this is a hand. Now, what do we mean when we say something like that? I know this is a hand. Well, my behavior, Moore's behavior, show that they know this is a hand. And the words simply reiterate it. Well, it means uh makes no sense to doubt it. Makes no sense to doubt this is a hand. I know is sort of a guarantee I give you. My personal assurance that it's a hand... But in addition, the claim that I know is claiming that a whole picture of the world is basically correct. I know is part of a much larger coherent world view in which um um there are certain beliefs”

0.75

The debate between sense-data theorists and common-sense realists over whether we perceive material objects or only sense data depends on which language game is being played: in the language of neurophysiology, we perceive sense data, while in ordinary experience language, we perceive material objects.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 78 Ordinary Language Philosophy [XX5mZVJKE3I]

“It depends whether you're using the language of neurophysiology or ordinary experience. If you're talking of perception in terms of ordinary experience, there the language game is such that you see material objects. If you're talking of sense perception in terms of neurophysiology, there the language game is such that you see sense data.”

0.75

Paul van Buren argued in 'The Secular Meaning of the Gospel' that traditional supernaturalist and metaphysical God language is meaningless in a secular scientific age and must be reinterpreted as essentially secular humanist concerns, launching the 'death of God theology' movement.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 78 Ordinary Language Philosophy [XX5mZVJKE3I]

“Paul van Buren...published a book called The Secular Meaning of the Gospel. The Secular Meaning of the Gospel. Which launched the death of God theology, as it was called in the late '50s, early '60s. The death of God theology. His point was that um in a secular age, a secular scientific age, we have to um make new sense out of religious language...God language in its traditional supernaturalist sense, its metaphysical sense, God language is a dead language that has no meaning in a secular scientific age.”

0.74

Ryle's famous phrase 'the ghost in the machine' labels Descartes' view of mind as somehow in the body as a myth, arguing that simply because mind and body are both nouns doesn't mean there is one entity inside another entity.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“He introduces one thing that's become quite famous in the concept of a machine. He um labels Descartes' view of mind as somehow or other in the body as the myth of a ghost in a machine. Now, that phrase, The Ghost in a Machine, has become famous. And you hear it quoted in all sorts of things... What he's doing there is um simply um he's in the process of arguing that simply because words mind and body are both nouns doesn't mean there is um one entity inside another entity.”

0.74

The ideal language philosophy of Russell and logical positivists sought to couch knowledge in language free from loose connotations with symbols defined by explicit empirical reference and formal logical relationships, using symbolic logic as the ideal language form.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“the ideal for Russell and some at least of the positivists uh was to couch our knowledge in uh language that is free from all loose connotations because the uh symbols are defined with reference to explicit empirical uh points. Uh and to show the interrelationships in terms of formal logical inference. And so the use of symbolic logic was the sort of ideal. Ideal language of a formal logical sort.”

0.74

Gilbert Ryle argues that philosophical problems like realism vs idealism and freedom vs determinism are false dilemmas arising from category mistakes where words are used in two different categories, creating apparent disputes over territory that language covers.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Philosophical problems, realism versus idealism, freedom and determinism, mind and body, science and religion, which is right? And posing them as alternatives seems to put you on the horns of a dilemma. Well, um he has a whole book dealing with these dilemmas. And his point is that they are false dilemmas, pseudo problems. Uh they are disputes over the territory that language covers. They represent what he calls, and this is a notion for which Ryle is um quite famous, they represent category mistakes. Category mistakes. Where one word is used in two different categories, okay? So that you're equivocating. And there's no real dispute.”

0.74

Logical positivism, with its verifiability criterion for factual meaning, held that the proposition 'God exists' is not factually meaningful because God is not empirically verifiable as a sense object and the term 'God' is metaphysical and therefore meaningless.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“in view of the verifiability criterion for meaning, for factual meaning, uh the proposition that God exists is not factually meaningful. Because it's not empirically verifiable directly or in principle. God is not a sense object. In fact, the term God is a metaphysical term, meaningless, uh because it has no empirical reference.”

0.74

Anthony Flew's parable of the invisible gardener illustrates how theological language about God's care and love is not empirically verifiable or falsifiable, yet believers find it meaningful as explanation, showing the gap between positivist criteria and actual religious discourse.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“in order to try and make sense of the way in which a believer talks of God to a skeptic, um told a parable of an invisible gardener, an invisible garden. That is to say, some explorers uh come across an area where there is a piece of land surrounded by a wall or a fence or something like that, and is um uh plainly being cared for... they can't find anybody... they start talking to themselves about an invisible gardener... in terms of verifiability, falsifiability, what are you going to say? How could you falsify the existence of an invisible gardener with empirical data? Just not possible. Well, so it is the way in which believers talk about God's care and God's love... It's not empirically verifiable, but lo and behold, those explorers find it very, very meaningful discussion.”

0.74

Ryle's Concept of Mind initiated a philosophical debate on the philosophy of mind running from the 1950s to present, with different approaches focusing on psychological states, emotions, and dispositions versus metaphysical approaches.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“it was that book of his, The Concept of Mind, which started a debate going on the philosophy of mind, which has been going on from the 1950s to the present day. And some of you have been taking philosophy of mind courses, so you know something about it. Um Incidentally, we've had two approaches to philosophy of mind recently. Uh we've had the course that uh Roberts did, which is much more philosophy of mind in terms of psychological states. Emotions and a dispositions.”

0.74

By the late 1950s logical positivism had crested and begun declining, and philosophy of religion returned as entirely respectable, with figures like William Alston and George Mavrodes developing arguments for God's existence based on religious experience without concern for empirical verifiability.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“By the time you get to the pretty well the late '50s, um logical positivism seems to have crested, been declining, and philosophy of religion is coming back in as completely kosher... William Alston, who's now one of the leading voices in philosophy of religion in this country... I met him in the late '50s first when he was an agnostic teaching philosophy of religion at University of Michigan... he um he's one of the leading figures in philosophy of religion working on argumentation for the existence of God based on religious experience... George Mavrodes... in I would guess it was the late '50s, early '60s, uh published a little book called Belief in God... the surge in renewed surge in philosophy of religion began in the late '50s and the early '60s”

0.74

Wittgenstein's later philosophy views language as social behavior and tool with diverse functions across different life forms, not reducible to cognitive and emotive functions as positivists claimed, enabling understanding of multiple language games with different rules and meanings.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Wittgenstein uh sees language as a kind of social behavior. That is to say, language is not simply tied to two functions, cognitive and emotive, the way the positivists have said. Uh but it rather is a social phenomenon that is used in all sorts of different ways. Uh there are various forms that life takes, that human life takes. And uh language is a tool that is used, it has function in whatever kind of life form one is involved in.”

0.73

Because mind and body are both grammatically nouns, we slip into treating them as two separate things in different categories, but examining actual language behavior shows emotions and motives are private inclinations to behave, not separate mental entities.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“You notice that mind and body are both nouns. And so we slip into the habit of treating mind and body as two separate things. Mental states and physical states as two different categories of things. All that just because mind and body are both nouns. Misled by a superficial grammatical similarity rather than probing to the actual usages of the words in language behavior. You see? Uh so he um he suggests we should think rather in terms of uh mind language and body language as having to do respectively with private as distinct from public behaviors. Conscious behaviors as distinct from physical behaviors. So that emotions and motives are simply private inclinations to behave in certain ways.”

0.73

Ryle's Concept of Mind attempts to map out the 'logical geography' of our existing knowledge about mind by examining language behavior, revealing tacit knowledge embedded in centuries of linguistic development and refinement, rather than discovering new information.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“he's trying to map out the logical geography. That's a very um familiar, popular phrase. You're doing logical geography when you're trying to sort things out. And if you're doing logical geography, you're trying to do some map work. So you're trying to map out the logical geography of the knowledge we already possess about mind. Not trying to find some new information. Uh but a map out the geography of the knowledge we already possess. Already possess? Yes, in um our language behaviors. Because the way we use language has developed and been tried and refined and tested over centuries of the history of a language. And so it hides within those behaviors all sorts of tacit knowledge.”

0.69

John Wisdom's 1944 article 'Gods' proposed that discussion of God deals more with people's feelings than with facts and has no empirical reference, a view that triggered the famous 'Theology and Falsification' debate which became widely discussed in philosophy of religion.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 78 Ordinary Language Philosophy [XX5mZVJKE3I]

“it was John Wisdom's article which therefore triggered a discussion that has become quite famous. Uh I believe it was originally on BBC. Um and uh the pieces have been printed and reprinted again and again. You find them in all sorts of philosophy of religion anthologies. But um what uh was involved in this university discussion, uh or what was being discussed, was the topic theology and falsification.”

0.69

Logical positivism, which culminated the empiricist movement from the 19th century, insisted that all knowledge claims must meet the standards of empirical science, establishing the verifiability criterion for factual meaning.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 78 Ordinary Language Philosophy [XX5mZVJKE3I]

“we've been tracing the uh development from 19th into 20th century empiricism of the positivist movement uh with its insistence that all knowledge claims must meet the uh standards of what is supposedly empirical science”

0.66

J.L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words systematizes different types of language usage, distinguishing cognitive utterances (assertions and propositions) from performative utterances that do something rather than assert something.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Um his book, How to Do Things with Words, uh published in 1955, tried to systematize different types of language usage. In other words, he thinks that in all this multitude of uses that Wittgenstein has introduced, there may be certain major types of utterance. And he tries to systematize those in a way that um has been quite influential. Um he distinguishes um uh let's see. He distinguishes um cognitive utterances in the sense of assertions and propositions from performative utterances of more varied sort.”

0.66

Austin's Sense and Sensibilia attacks A.J. Ayer's phenomenalist sense datum theory, arguing that Ayer's obsession with a few particular words and half-studied facts led to oversimplification when ordinary words are much subtler in use and facts of perception are much more diverse and complicated.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“this book is an attack on the sense datum theory of A.J. Ayer... Because Ayer developed the view of phenomenalist view that all we know is sense data. Now, Austin argues in Sense and Sensibilia that this is due to his obsession with a few words and an oversimplification of their uses... 'My general opinion about this doctrine is that it's a typically scholastic view attributed first to an obsession with a few particular words and second to a an obsession with a few half-studied facts. The fact is, as I'll try to make clear, our ordinary words are much subtler in their uses and make many more distinctions than philosophers have realized.'”

0.62

Charles Braithwaite argued that religious language is about moral commitments rather than factual truth, so when someone recites the Apostles' Creed they are committing to a way of life rather than asserting propositions, reinterpreting religion in Kantian terms as symbolic expression of moral obligations.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“There was a Cambridge professor by the name of Braithwaite, who said that religious language is simply about our moral commitments... when he goes to church and recites the Apostles' Creed, I believe in God the Father Almighty, he what he what he's really doing is just committing himself to a certain way of life. Not to the truth of the propositions on which the way of life traditionally has been grounded, but simply committing himself to a certain way of life. Taking, if you like, a Kantian view of religion as being a symbolic expression of moral obligations.”

0.56

After periods of philosophical skepticism throughout history, philosophers have realized they must rearrange their theoretical positions and develop methodological changes: post-Sophist dialectic (Plato), post-Hellenistic dialectic (Augustine), post-Renaissance skepticism methods (Bacon, Descartes), post-Humean skepticism (Kant's transcendental method), and post-positivist skepticism (ordinary language philosophy).

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“after a period of philosophical skepticism in the history of thought, people realize they have to juggle their marbles into new configurations and develop changes in methodology. You see, after the Sophists, you get the dialectic, Plato. After the skepticism of the Hellenists, uh you get the kind of dialectic which Augustine used. And the introduction introduction of uh Christian perspective, another thing. The skepticism of the Renaissance produced the new methods of Bacon, Descartes. The sort of skepticism of Hume led to Kant's transcendental method. You see. Um well, similarly, um the skepticism, if you can call it that, of the positivists led to ordinary language and to the changes that have been happening since.”

0.55

Ryle's view suggests he is something of an epiphenomenalist: the reality underlying experience is brain processes, and mental phenomena are side effects of brain processes, though his position is more precisely linguistic behaviorism than metaphysical behaviorism.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Um no, he's uh you know, if you try to pin him down um on what is your view of mind, he would come out, I think, as something of an epiphenomenalist. Uh that is to say that um what uh is the reality underlying this, brain processes. And there are mental phenomena which are the side effect of brain processes... Now, sometimes called a behaviorist, but only if you have the preface linguistic behaviorism. You see, talk about mind is talk about private or public behaviors, as the case may be.”

0.48

O'Connor's philosophy of mind approach is metaphysical rather than psychological, related more to philosophy of science, showing that post-positivist metaphysics has developed alongside psychological approaches in contemporary philosophy of mind.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“On the other hand, if you've done some of the philosophy of mind stuff, which O'Connor does in contemporary metaphysics, you see, you've got a different method. But the point is that in the development of post-positivist metaphysics, the metaphysical side of philosophy of mind has developed as well as the um philosophical psychology side of philosophy of mind. So that Roberts' interest is in the philosophical psychology side, more in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle, Wittgenstein. And O'Connor's approach is much more in the metaphysical side in relationship more to philosophy of science.”

0.26

Roberts' philosophy of mind courses use ordinary language analysis technique influenced by Wittgenstein to analyze what we mean when we say things and what we have in mind, focusing on psychological states, emotions, and dispositions rather than abstract metaphysics.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Um Roberts' way of dealing it dealing with it is in terms of um an analysis of what we mean when we say what we are doing when we say, what we have in mind when You see, because his philosophical method is very much influenced by this ordinary language technique from Wittgenstein. He occasionally teaches a Wittgenstein course, which he learned in his graduate work at Yale under Paul Homer.”

0.25

Some philosophers invoked the scientific complementarity principle to suggest that different language games (science and religion, mind and body) are complementary rather than contradictory, but Ryle's work on the mind-body problem was not clearly endorsing this complementarity view.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Now, some people have picked up on that and said, 'Oh, okay, then uh two languages can be complementary.' And so they invoke the scientific complementarity principle. Remember the complementarity principle from physics, perhaps? How we How do we describe the way in which light is transmitted? Is it transmitted in waves or in particles? Well, why does it have to be either or? Complementarity suggests waveicles... could that be the same in this case? Well, in uh his Concept of Mind, he's not at all clear that it is the same”

0.19

Paul Horner, at Yale, taught a Wittgenstein course that influenced Roberts' graduate work, showing how Wittgenstein's ordinary language technique has been transmitted through university teaching and remains influential in contemporary philosophical method.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 78 Ordinary Language Philosophy [XX5mZVJKE3I]

“He occasionally teaches a Wittgenstein course, which he learned in his graduate work at Yale under Paul Homer. You see. Uh so um this is a method that he uses with a great deal of effectiveness”

0.17

Austin's 'Sense and Sensibilia' title is a joke (alluding to Jane Austen's 'Sense and Sensibility'), which is typical of Austin's humorous style, though the work itself is a serious attack on phenomenalist sense-datum theory.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — A History of Philosophy | 78 Ordinary Language Philosophy [XX5mZVJKE3I]

“Uh notice the name is Austin. Are you familiar with another Austin? Jane Austin whose book was Sense and Sensibility. That was a novel. This is J.L. Austin. Sense and Sensibilia. Not Jane, but John. Okay? Sense Sensibilia. Um just the title is a joke, and that's typical of Austin. Um I I don't I don't mean the whole book is a joke.”