
Viktor Shvets The Twilight before the storm
What this covers
Viktor Schvetz conducts a long-arc diagnosis of contemporary economic and political order through the lens of two simultaneous revolutions: an information/AI wave he characterizes as roughly 3,000 times more impactful than the Industrial Revolution, and five decades of financialization that has generated what he calls "abundant capital"—5 to 10 times more than the economy needs. The conversation, held with an unnamed host, spans economics, finance, politics, and technology to argue that these forces are collapsing the neoliberal consensus and driving all major societies toward greater state direction of capital, differing mainly in degree and nationalist flavor. The core question Schvetz poses is whether societies will reconcile to this new reality before or after a destabilizing "world on fire."
The material covers several distinct areas. On technology, Schvetz argues that AI need not reach artificial general intelligence to be transformative—cost efficiency and scalability are already collapsing hiring across sectors, and robotics and biotech will soon reshape the physical economy wholesale. On finance and valuation, he contends that abundant capital has destroyed traditional signals: risk premia, cost of capital, and mean reversion have lost their meaning, making central banks backward-looking and unable to locate a neutral rate. On demography and values, he traces a generational shift, claiming younger cohorts born from the early 1990s onward resemble Depression-era survivors more than baby boomers—prioritizing community and state support over individual freedom—and will become electoral majorities around 2025–2032. On geopolitics, he forecasts a hardening split into illiberal Eurasia and the Anglosphere, with capital and labor flowing increasingly within blocks rather than between them. The analysis turns contentious on whether such disruption is avoidable and whether productivity gains justify America's divergent social outcomes—mortality and incarceration rates far worse than peer democracies.
Victor Schvitz argues that the next 1-2 decades will be the most transformative period since the agricultural revolution, driven by converging technological disruption (AI, robotics, automation) and financial excess, which will inevitably lead to geopolitical conflict, social polarization, and economic instability unless societies fundamentally restructure their political-economic systems around productivity gains, redistribution, and government-directed capital allocation.
- General-purpose technologies (AI, robotics) have a U-curve productivity pattern: initial decline as society adjusts, followed by explosive gains, but we're currently in the painful trough where displacement accelerates before benefits arrive
- Abundant capital (5-10x what's needed) created by 50 years of financialization and neoliberal policy has eliminated traditional valuation anchors (yield curves, spreads, mean reversion), leaving only military spending and asset-price support as outlets—a fundamentally unstable equilibrium
- Generational shift: younger cohorts (post-1990) reject neoliberal freedom-focused values and demand community, redistribution, and state involvement, guaranteeing political realignment and geopolitical bloc formation that risks escalation from cold war to hot war unless productivity and redistribution policies materialize
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Technology-driven labor displacement causes social polarization because people's sense of self-worth is based on how others perceive their usefulness; as workers become redundant, their marginal utility and cost decline, lowering both individual and aggregate value, creating a recipe for social dislocation and unhappiness.
“because at the end of the day, um, our perception of ourselves is based on how other people perceive us. If other people know that we're no longer as valuable or no longer as useful, we don't feel very good and gradually we'll feel less good as time progresses. So the longer you sit in those chairs, the lower marginal utility of you uh both marginal utility which you derive uh as well as marginal cost will decline. As marginal cost and utility declines, average declines inevitably over time. And so that's a recipe for polarization. That's a recipe for social dislocation, unhappiness.”
College enrollment surveys (1965-1987) show a dramatic reversal: mid-1960s, students came to college to improve the world and help people (with 30%+ in arts/humanities); by late 1980s, 27% majored in business/finance and the primary reason was to be better off financially. This reflects the boomer transition to neoliberalism. Now, starting around 2000, a new shift is occurring: younger students are enrolling more in science and humanities, with more citing desire to help the environment and communities.
“one of the surveys I really like and inevitably it's a US it's a surveys that [49:05] ask uh uh freshmen who go into the first year of college uh the same class 18 19 year old uh they've been doing it since 1965 they're doing it every year what do you Why do you why did you come to college? Uh why do you want to embark on this process of uh education? What do you want to achieve for yourself? And so if you go back to mid 1960s, it all about improving the world u helping people uh redefining [49:36] philosophy of life. Uh making money was not a big part of it. uh and in fact in US colleges 30% plus of students were enrolled in arts uh and humanities and things like that. Uh by early 1970s when baby boomers really become powerful it all started to change and so by the time we get to late 80s 27% of all the graduates were business and finance. Uh there was a collapse of enrollment in arts and humanities. [50:07] number one choice for coming to college was to be better off financially rather than anything else...starting from around 2000 [50:38] there was shift occurring in the surveys now the newer generation they're [clears throat] not going back to their great-grandparents they actually don't they actually do believe money is important they don't think money is unimportant uh but on the other hand more and more they want to enroll because they want to help the environment um help communities uh a lot of them are much harder science driven which is part of the II and information age whether it's biology mathematics uh computer science business [51:09] degrees are down uh on average there is more going into arts and humanities so it's not a complete replica but it's [clears throat] it's it gets close to what to what those generations uh used to do”
Europe's high regulation and bureaucracy, while economically sluggish, is actually an advantage in uncertain times because it creates resilience and prevents rapid system collapse; this inverts the common critique that deregulation/efficiency is always superior.
“Europe on the other hand uh have too many rules. at least European Union have too many rules. Uh [clears throat] those rules makes you lethargic, less entrepreneurial but in the bad times it's much harder to smash and that's why extreme right in Europe is very different to extreme right in US. They hate foreigners absolutely they're more conservative culturally. Yes. Uh but otherwise they don't want to have a dodge. They don't want to dismantle the government. They want [clears throat] to use it uh for various purposes. So it's very different. So you look at it and you say okay what usually is regarded as a negative which is Europeans are sluggish too many rules too bureaucratic does that become a positive uh in a more uncertain world because it's harder system to smash”
When a major stock market correction occurs (equivalent to dotcom bust, ~$15-20 trillion destroyed), the policy response will necessarily be to 'privatize profits and socialize losses'—asset prices will be supported through intervention while the burden of loss falls on broader economy; this cycle will repeat because the system cannot tolerate large corrections.
“by destroying a little bit you're creating major havoc. So you can't afford it. So what it basically means if there is anything that is coming through that is meaningful uh let's say equivalent to com which will [clears throat] eliminate maybe 1520 trillion uh in the US you will have a direct line into not just investment that is going to happen later on afterwards but also consumption uh at the same time so you guarantee that there will be a strong policy response uh in other words we're going to privatize the profit and socialize the losses”
Financialization—excess capital creation—is the accelerant for technological propagation; it functions like 'pouring kerosene on a bonfire of information age' by making capital cheap and abundant, forcing faster technology adoption and innovation than would occur under capital scarcity.
“if you think of uh financialization it's like pouring a kerosene on a bonfire of information age. uh inventiveness is um a human spirit that what makes us human... the speed however with which technologies progress depends on availability and the cost of capital the more available the capital is the lower effective cost the faster it propagates”
Government is the only institution with sufficient strength and monopoly power to rebalance the relationship between capital and labor that technology and finance have disrupted; the private sector system will never self-rebalance, making state intervention not ideologically bad but economically necessary.
“Only the government has the strengths and a monopoly power to be the guardrail. Nobody else system by itself is never going to rebalance as much as as much as Scott Basson and Donald Trump think it would. It will never will uh rebalance. Only the government uh can do that. Uh and so it's not necessarily a bad thing.”
The US has a structural constraint: Americans want three incompatible things (freedom, government services, low taxes); you can have two but not all three; this trichotomy explains why the US oscillates between periods of freedom-maximization (Reagan, Trump) and service-expansion (FDR, LBJ), unable to stabilize.
“Remember after uh 1999 that most of the guardrails all the way to 2008 were dismembered... Americans want freedom and no taxes. But I want a government. Well, you can't have all three. And so what regularly happens you come up with things like California. But the amazing thing of course California is still uh the richest of the second richest state in the union on a per capita basis”
The next decade or two could be the most transformative that the human race has experienced since arguably the agricultural revolution, because we are changing pretty much everything—not just one or two sets of relationships, but all relationships—across industries, sectors, and personal/social relationships.
“I do think that the next decade, possibly two decades, probably could be the most transformative that the human race have experienced since arguably agricultural revolution. Uh I know it's a big claim to make considering we had mercantile revolutions, we had industrial revolutions, there were many other revolutions. Uh but this time around we're not just changing one set of relationships or two sets of relationships. We're changing pretty much uh everything as we go forward.”
Climate change and population growth in Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia will create migration pressure of 1.5+ billion people; migration at this scale would rival Mongol and Turkish invasions (12th-14th century) and barbarian migrations (4th-5th century); preventing this requires either an 'enlightened Marshall Plan' to raise productivity in these regions or accepting demographic and ethnic change in destination countries.
“Uh and that is combination of climate and a massive increase in population in Africa, Middle East and Central Asia. Uh so very soon we will have three billion people residing in those areas which is a whole population of the world only in 1960. Uh one and a half to billion or more will be younger people, working age people. if just a fraction of them decide to move uh you're going to have a bigger movements than uh you know Mongols and Turks in the 12th 14th century or barbarians back in the fourth and fifth century”
Electoral cycles in first-past-the-post systems allow rapid shifts (2-3% vote change can swing an election dramatically), making them vulnerable to demagogue capture and populist movements; proportional representation systems have more friction and stabilize politics more but are slower to respond.
“you have democracies that has first pass the post electoral systems uh that you can have just on two or 3% have a massive shift from one side to the other very quickly...It's a little bit harder to do in countries with proportionate representation system and a ranking choice systems because you can't just flip on the two or 3% that easily”
Baby boomers and the next generation (born 1946-late 1970s) broadly agreed with neoliberal views: government is inefficient and unjust, private sector generates better signals and results, therefore government should be minimized. This consensus lasted from ~1980-2010, where both democrats and republicans sang from the same hymbook.
“I've just told you how baby boomers and next generation anybody born between 1946 and [clears throat] say late 1970s they essentially agreed with a sort of neoliberal view. Uh give me freedom. The government inherently inefficient quite often unjust. uh what they do. Private sector generates has a benefit of signals from the marketplace and therefore generally can can uh achieve a better results...Clearly the model of neoliberals are gone. Nobody believes in that. [clears throat] Even Republicans don't because they're really socialist in the way they behave. Uh so um at some point in time we always agree like it did between 1946 47 and 1970. people agreed uh just like it was between 1980 and say 2010 every that didn't matter whether you're democrat republican labor conservative they all sang from the same hbook uh now they don't”
The first wave of information technology was the computer revolution (1980s), which eliminated the need for middle-class information-processing workers (vice presidents, analysts) by enabling rapid accumulation and distribution of information within firms, reducing decision-making time from a week to a day to immediate access.
“Computer revolution enabled all of that to be speed one massively. You could know everything within a day. Initially it was three days and it was one day and then you can have your new fingertips completely. So you started with computer revolution uh that emptied a lot of middle class vice presidents and other people who was there in order to accumulate information to make sure that whatever CEO decided actually gets implemented the way CEO wanted to be implemented.”
The second wave of information technology was massive telecom investment from 1993-2002 (coaxial cable, broadband, wireless, Wi-Fi), which led to the dotcom crisis but also spawned social networks, Facebook, and Google, eventually enabling disintermediation of entertainment, news, and financial trading.
“we've gone into the next stage which is massive telecom investment from 9394 all the way to 2002. This is your cooxial cable. This is your broadband. This is wireless. This is Wi-Fi. that in turn led to the dotcom crisis but also spawned new life uh your social networks, your Facebooks, your Googles.”
US exceptionalism has created specific pathologies: (1) belief that inequality is individual fault, not systemic, (2) weak social safety nets (pension, healthcare, education compared to other developed nations), (3) 5-7 year lower life expectancy, 2-3x higher infant mortality, 6-8x higher maternal mortality than developed countries, (4) incarceration rate equal to Turkmenistan and Cuba, (5) repeated political violence (1820s, 1860s, 1930s, 1960s-70s), (6) these are the price of American 'freedom'.
“Do we need to have the most productive and forward-looking economy that citizens live 5 to seven years less than an average developed country? Do we need to have the most productive economy if our infant mortality is two or three times uh the developed countries? Do we need to have that uh and have our um female uh mortality during child birth about 6 to eight times higher than what you find in a in a normal in the western countries? Do we have to have that and do and incarcerate people at a rate that 50 times more? We have the same incarceration rate as Turkmanistan and Cuba and Nicaragua.”
Universal basic income is not a giveaway or a laziness subsidy—it is 'compensation for irrelevance,' compensation for being no longer economically valuable. Tech billionaires like Elon Musk and Sergey Brin support UBI because they need customers and aggregate demand, not out of charity.
“It's not surprising that people people like Alan Musk uh and Sergey Breen are great supporters of universal basic income. They need customers. They need they need aggregate demand. And universal basic income in various forms is not uh it's not um it's not a giveaway. It's not something you give to make people lazy. It's a compensation for irrelevance. You're no longer relevant. So that's your compensation for being irrelevant.”
Historical periods with major technological and financial disruption occur when multiple variables converge—technology, finance, climate, pandemics, and demographics—within a short timeframe. These periods are incredibly disruptive. The 1920s-1930s had all these variables present like today, whereas late 1960s to early 1980s had disruption but not all variables were present.
“In other words, technology changes how capital and labor function uh what the relationship of capital and labor is uh and therefore disintermediates in some form or changes how people feel about their life, about their future, about their countries. At the same time, finance almost always is present. First of all, no generalpurpose technology that changes the world ever progresses without a bubble. That never happens. You need a bubble for them to progress forward and to transform the world. So financialization in various forms or financial crisises in various forms are present. But sometimes there are other issues. Sometimes there is climate, sometimes there are pandemics, sometimes there are demographics. But when you have all of those things coming together in a relatively short period of time, uh those periods are incredibly disruptive. So if you think of uh late 1960s to early 1980s, a disruptive period, but not all of those variables were there. If you think of 1920s and 1930s, everything was there pretty much as what we have today.”
A 1937 book (not republished since) compiled ideas from Mussolini's economic minister, Nazi Germany, Stalin, anthropologists, and New Deal economists. All agreed that free market ideology was theology not science, had caused catastrophic consequences, and that the real question wasn't whether to plan economies but how to plan. Each proposed different solutions (communist technocracy, fascist dirigisme, American mixed economy) but all agreed government must become more involved.
“one of the things I've been quoting a book uh that was published in 19 uh 37. It hasn't been republished since. Uh but but essentially that book was a compilation of ideas from various people. Uh there was from Bonita Mussolini and his economic minister. There was from Nazi Germany. That was [52:42] from [clears throat] Joseph Stalin, his economic minister as well. Uh there were ideas from anthropologists in the in the west, New Deal economists from the United States. And what they were discussing is that clearly free market ideas were just theology, not science. They led to catastrophic consequences. Remember, we're talking of 1937 to catastrophic consequences. And therefore the question they raised is that uh it's not that we uh that that instead of asking should we plan our economies and [53:13] our societies but how should we plan not whether how and so if you read through you could see that communists were answering absolutely we always said contradictions of capitalism is going to bury capitalism”
The neoliberal consensus rests on faulty assumptions: it assumes free markets exist (they don't), assumes prices exist (they often don't), and assumes people behave rationally (they don't). Alan Greenspan finally admitted this in 2008 when asked if he found a flaw in the system, saying 'yes, the system doesn't work the way I expected to because human societies don't work that way.'
“one of the problems was and one of the impact of neoliberalism was that it assumes that uh there are free markets which there aren't. It assumes there are prices quite often there aren't. It assumes that people behave certain way most of the time they don't. Uh and so you find the underlying underpinnings of van hike underlying underpinnings of Freriedman uh are faulty. That's not the way human societies work. And Alan Greenspin finally had to admit that in 2008 when he was uh when he was asked by the by the Congress whether he found a flaw in the system and he said yes, the system doesn't work the way I expected to because human societies don't work that way.”
Abundant capital means spreads and yield curves no longer send meaningful signals. Liquidity must constantly rise because any compression triggers asset price setbacks that flow into economic fundamentals. Risk has been expelled from capital markets and migrated to geopolitics, polarization, electoral outcomes, climate, and healthcare—areas portfolio managers and central banks cannot assess.
“it's no longer has value anything that is abundant has no value it's like having too many [32:31] oranges uh that also creates a faulty signals that's why spreads or yield curves don't work anymore or at least they don't send the same signals as they used to in the past...there is no way of going back you have to continue generating liquidity and so when people say oh my god there is a compression of liquidity I don't it. Yes, there were QT but QT is largely quantitative tightening sorry quantitative tightening is largely a signal by itself. There were other forms [34:04] of liquidity that actually were rising uh all the way through QT...Now if you combined uh the sort of technology and how disrupting uh economic cycles, business cycles, employment, if you combine that with finance which is creating access capital that you have problem measuring or allocating in a meaningful way, uh then you're basically saying I've expelled [34:35] all the risk outside the system. We no longer have economic cycles. We no longer really have capital market cycles the way we understood them...Where are they? Well, the consequences of what we've done. So if you subject economic cycles to so much pressure, capital market cycles to so much pressure, if you created access [35:06] capital, if you disintermediating various pieces, um you're creating polarization...So where's the risk? Polarization, electoral outcome, geopolitics, climate, healthcare. This is where the risk lie. But the chances of you as a portfolio manager assessing those factors or even estimating what the likely impact will be is zero.”
AI is not yet AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) and probably won't be for at least 20 years, but AI doesn't need to be AGI to be transformative. AI is 'good enough'—flexible, cost-efficient, and capable of scalability and spillover effects—to replace much human labor across industries without reaching general intelligence.
“This is not an AGI. This is not a general intelligence but it is good enough to actually do a lot of things...The whole advantage of AI, it is flexible, it is costefficient, and at the same time, uh, it actually generates you, uh, scalability and spillover effect that you would like to have, uh, in your business model. You don't need to be as good. you just need to be good enough. Uh and that's exactly what AI is becoming...without actually reaching the stage of general intelligence, which probably at least 20 years away in my view. So it's not going to happen as quickly as some people suggest. Some suggest as quickly as 2029. I don't believe that's likely.”
General-purpose technologies follow a U-shaped productivity curve: when they arrive, productivity initially declines because massive investments are made while societies haven't yet adapted to use them, creating a period where aggregate multifactor productivity falls. This trough can last years or even generations depending on the technology, but eventually productivity suddenly mushrooms once adoption catches up.
“one of the lessons from all technological revolutions is that they have a U curve to begin with when general purpose technology arrives in any form whether it's electricity whether it's steel whether it's combustion engine whether it's internet productivity declines...So in other words, uh when the GPT general purpose technology arrives, people don't know what to do with it. Businesses don't know what to do with it. Societies have not adjusted yet. And so the result is productivity arises rapidly in a select few niches, but the rest of the economy dies one cut at a time and therefore aggregate productivity actually goes down, not up. Now that could last years uh depending on the technology could be looking uh a generation or two but these days we're a little bit faster but still you're looking at years. Then finally the pluses and minuses of technology balance...And then you get to the other side of the year curve and this is when...Productivity suddenly mushrooms.”
Younger generations (born from early 1990s onward) are much closer to their great-grandparents (who survived the Great Depression and WWII) than to their boomer parents. Surveys consistently show they want community and support, are willing to sacrifice rights that boomers would never sacrifice, and are not convinced democracy is the right path forward.
“the younger generation are coming through particularly those born so say from early 1990s onwards they have not seen the good things that baby boomers have seen in 50s and 60s even into 70s. Uh they saw a declining [47:00] usage for them professional paths which are getting narrower. They've seen wars rather than peace dividends...it's clear from all surveys that they are far closer to their greatgrandparents. [snorts] Those supposed to survive the uh the Great Depression and the World War II uh than to the baby boomer. So age gener in [47:30] other words much closer to their great-grandparents and to their parents and all the survey one by one uh across the world highlight that they want community uh they want support they don't like this idea give me the rope and I and I'm going to either succeed or hang myself with they don't like that uh it also highlight that they're willing to sacrifice certain rights whereas baby boomers would never sacrifice anything certainly not their rights. Uh they're [48:02] willing to do that. They are not as convinced that democracy is the right way forward uh by any stretch of imagination.”
Baby boomers who rejected their parents' focus on safety, security, and government guardrails decided they wanted freedom—to marry/divorce whom they wanted, change jobs and countries, and have personal/economic/market freedom. This philosophy was reflected in 1960s flower culture and became dominant policy under Reagan and Thatcher. But this freedom-based philosophy morphed into a 'Frankenstein monster' completely dependent on government to maintain constant liquidity and asset prices.
“baby boomers decided that this preoccupation with safety, security, government role that their parents and grandparents had...baby boomers didn't see any of that. They saw rising productivity, rising middle class, educational healthcare opportunities through 50s and 60s. And so what they decided is that we don't want to have those constraints. I should be allowed to marry anybody I want. I should be allowed to divorce anytime I want...Uh but baby boomers didn't see any of that. They saw rising productivity, rising middle class, educational healthcare opportunities through 50s and 60s. And so what they decided is that we don't want to have those constraints...And so you could say that there is a direct line from uh flower culture and uh and hippies and yippies on the one side and investment bankers of 1980s. They're the same people...Now the choice however has a price and the final price of baby boomer's choices arrived around the global financial crisis uh 2008 2009 10...And so baby boomer revolution yeah liberal revolution died. Uh but the younger generation are coming through...they saw a declining usage for them professional paths which are getting narrower. They've seen wars rather than peace dividends.”
Paul Volcker initiated the modern financial system. While known for fighting inflation, his greater legacy is creating the modern financial world. Financial instruments per dollar of GDP have grown from ~1-1.5x (Volcker era) to 2:1 (Greenspan post-1987), to 3:1 (Bernanke), to 5:1 (Yellen), to 6:1 today (per FSB for 30 countries as of 2023). But this 6:1 figure is 'grossly understated' because it ignores unfunded liabilities and private capital.
“if you go to Paul Walker's day, who by the way initiated all of that, Paul Walker is known for squashing inflation, but his far greater legacy is creating our modern financial world. And so if you go to Paul Walker days, the amount of financial instruments per dollar GDP was around 1 1.5 and was relatively flat...Now what started to happen is that we started to multiply the money. Money started to grow faster than GDP. Now by the time we get to Greenspin uh put which was black Monday of 1987 and and Greenspin put as you know basically said that we are unable to tolerate volatility of asset prices anymore by the time you get to Greenspin put uh that was around 2:1 uh by the time we get to Bernaki that was 3:1 by the time we get to Yelen that was 5:1 today there are various estimates financial stability board [clears throat] tries to do it but it's It's a big exercise. They're only doing it for 30 countries. They're usually 18 months out of so today you can only get 2023 figures uh not even 2024 figures but their number is about 6 to1.”
Central banks must be backward-looking ('data-dependent') because they cannot look forward. Neutral rates and risk premiums are being 'bombarded outside the system' by the same factors that create unpredictable geopolitical and polarization risk. Even current debates about whether the neutral real rate should be 0% vs 2% show this uncertainty is unresolvable.
“my argument for the last 10 years was that central banks will have to be backward-looking because they can't look forward. Why can't they look forward? Because neutral rates as well as risk premium is being bombarded outside the system. And so you're not sure exactly where neutral rate is anymore. And you're not even sure what is going up or coming down. That's a debate between Steven Moran uh new new governor at Federal Reserve and some other [clears throat] people in Federal [36:08] Reserve. Uh should should neutral rates real rate in the United States now after Trump policy be zero or should it be one and a half or 2%. Real. So should inflation break even rates how do you estimate them? should be at 2% or 3%. Which means policy rates can be anywhere from 2 and a half to 4 1/2% and you can justify both of those answers very well. And so if you as a central bank don't know then you have to be backward-looking or they call it data dependent.”
Without a stable risk-free rate and risk premium, weighted average cost of capital (WACC) doesn't exist, PE multiples don't exist, and mean reversion doesn't exist. When business cycle positions are unknowable, you can't tell if a stock is early-cyclical or late-cyclical, making traditional analytical frameworks useless for valuation.
“if you don't have risk free rate and risk premier you have no weighted average cost of capital. That means you don't have a PE. It doesn't exist anymore. And you don't have mean reversion. Like when I was growing up, when I was a younger analyst, it was all about identifying where in a cycle are you? Are you early cyclical, late cyclical, mid defensive? Where are you? And also working together with the capital markets in a sense uh is a stock too over penalize it is trading two standard deviation below the mean. I've just described you the world has no mean. So you don't know whether you're two standard deviation below or two standard deviation above because there is no mean. So that that means no mean reversion because mean reversion depends on availability and predictability of economic cycle and a capital market cycle.”
Baby boomers' desire for constant growth and rising asset prices, combined with limited political will to fund this through productivity gains, forced central banks and government to rely increasingly on asset price appreciation and borrowing (bringing future consumption to present) rather than income generation, creating massive financialization.
“there was increasing desire to generate consistently faster growth rates, consistently higher prices. Uh, and how do you accommodate that? So... the central banks malfunctioned... I disagree with that. I said if you've won a guilty party look yourself in the mirror. It's you. You wanted it and politics delivered exactly what you wanted. And the only way they could do that is by relying far more on asset prices, far more on borrowing, bringing future consumption to the present uh rather than your income uh that you were generating.”
Macro analysis has become so complicated that it is nearly impossible to use for practical decision-making; however, it still must be used as a 'roof' to build over one's investments, tested regularly, but with low confidence in forward prediction, while fixed income managers have lost all moorings (yield curves, spreads, cycles) and equity managers retain some leverage through fundamental analysis.
“my view for the last 10 years was that if you that the macro analysis is going to become so complicated that it will be impossible to use. So in other words macro permeates everything but the more important it becomes the less useful it is... Do you really need to bother a lot with macro? Well, the answer is yes and no. Uh yes, you need to put you need to build a roof over your head.”
Neoliberalism has died and discredited itself; everyone is now 'socialist' in the sense of supporting state direction of capital and economy, but the debate is over degree: nationalist/exclusive socialism (right) vs. internationalist/inclusive socialism (left); this shift has already occurred in China and Russia (post-2008) and is now occurring globally.
“neoliberalism died and I'm sorry for that because actually much freer but it has died and has discredited itself and so as a government becomes more and more involved uh the question I keep highlighting uh what is the difference with China uh and the answer there are still very significant differences but those differences are getting smaller and smaller... now we're seeing in the US, US cannot make up its mind... everyone um the only difference right is more nationalistic and exclusive uh left is less nationalistic and exclusive but they all socialist uh in various forms”
Business cycles are accelerating: companies can now reach $500M revenue in 1-2 years that previously took 10+ years; this means bubbles are being created and destroyed faster, allowing new bubbles to form immediately; the constant creation of new bubbles prevents the same degree of aggregate economic correction that would occur if the system allowed a bubble to fully deflate.
“cycles are getting uh shorter and shorter. So if you're corporate we can now create a very large companies very quickly a year or two and they [clears throat] have $500 million of revenue... whereas in the past it could have taken you 10 years or [longer]... So in other words, even if we fall another one, we can create bubbles quickly. In the past, like do it, it took you 3 or 4 years to create a new bubble... Now we might need to wait from Thursday to Monday. We've got a new one.”
China faces a 'liquidity trap' (or 'overproduction' in Japanese terminology) caused by excessive national saving rates maintained for too long; without increasing consumption, China is forced into an 'invest and export' model where it floods global markets with 5-10x the demand capacity, creating disinflationary pressures globally.
“The problem China has. And that problem is not about over production itself. Over production is a consequence. The problem is very high national saving rates maintained for far too long... rather than reducing saving rate by higher consumption. And if you reach that stage the only answer for you is invest and export. And so they become a squirrel in a wheel investing and exporting no other way.”
Three critical geopolitical variables determine whether the world avoids 'hot war': (1) whether China successfully exits its liquidity trap or accelerates/decelerates in ways that create instability, (2) whether Russia's empire implodes (worst possible outcome) or maintains cohesion, (3) whether the US performs well or poorly against China.
“whether it's China uh you know deacelerating too fast having too many problems or accelerating too fast uh having too many good things whether it's Russia disintegrating in some form whether it's United States either doing very very well against China or very very poorly all of that creates pos or hunger games all of that creates uh creates uh an opportunities for much greater volatility and therefore potential wars uh to occur.”
US corporate sector is structurally sound and competitive, equity markets are fundamentally strong, but US society and politics are dysfunctional; this disconnect explains why US equity valuations remain high (investors price in corporate strength, not political dysfunction) while political instability increases.
“what you have in the US is structurally sound economy, competitive economy, structurally sound corporate sector, but dysfunctional society and politics that constantly meanders... You assign a very low-risk premier to us because you reward structural strengths against the weaknesses that I've just described.”
Competence in governance is less important than systemic fit: both Alabama (low-tax, low-service) and California (high-tax, high-service) can be well-managed or poorly managed within their models; the question is not competence but whether the model aligns with citizens' preferences and provides baseline security.
“It's not um it's not incompetent or competent because if you think of places like Alabama, uh attracting a lot of investments, growing, whatever, do you want to live in Alabama? Uh and if you think of average lifespan, they live much less... It's a far more brutal uh society uh than California would be. Uh and [clears throat] so the question is that was my answer was Detroit versus Melbourne. Uh it's not competent or incompetent. Everybody works within a system they have and how they can manage the system”
China has not invented anything in the last 40 years—it is incredibly innovative (adapting existing science to new products) but has not invented (discovering new ground). The question is whether China can ever invent under its system of unappealable authority, and the historical answer over 500 years was no. However, if AI and quantum computing eliminate the need for human inventiveness, this constraint becomes irrelevant.
“China is counting that the combination of AI as well as quantum computing will eliminate the need for even inventiveness because one area where you could argue that China has been failing is the fact that they haven't invented anything in the last 40 years. The incredibly innovative nation, incredibly innovative, the most innovative nation in the world, but they have not invented anything. Invention is essentially breaking a new ground. Uh finding something that people didn't know before. Innovation is basically taking whatever proven to be true in science and adapting it in various forms to products that ultimately they're going to sell to you...But if it's not human anymore, does it matter? Does it matter if you're free? Uh it's really quite quite quite irrelevant.”
The world is splintering into two blocs (or more finely, multiple blocs): a 'liberal Eurasian' bloc (China, Russia, Iran, Central Asia, parts of SE Asia and Africa) and an 'Anglosphere' bloc (US, Canada, Mexico, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, EU), with capital, resources, goods, labor, and ideas increasingly flowing within blocs rather than between them.
“we could see a liberal Eurasia emerging which is China and its dependency in North Korea, Russia, Central Asia um you [clears throat] know Iran, Pakistan, parts of Southeast Asia, parts of Africa uh those countries basically belong to the same church they sing from the same hymbook. uh whether it's the role of the state versus individual, the roles of private versus public, the role of information and information flow, independence of institutions of state or judiciary, they all saying roughly from the same book... it was clear that you sort of a liberal uratia is being formed. The other side of the coin to me was what I call anglophere which is US, Mexico, Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and European Union.”
The transition from cold war (1-2 casualties per 100,000 population, 5-6% defense spending) to hot war (20+ casualties per 100,000, 20-50% defense spending) represents a completely different economic and social organization; a cold war is inevitable; the question is how to avoid escalation to hot war.
“there's a major difference. In a cold war, the casualties are usually one or two per 100,000. Uh defense spending very seldom goes above five or 6% of GDP. In a hot war, the casualties are usually 20 or more per 100,000. Uh military spending usually 20 40 sometimes 50% of GDP. It's a completely different economies uh and societies. So I think you have to accept cold war is a reality. Um that there is no way of bypassing that.”
Australia avoided polarization (lowest in Western world) because it implemented: (1) compulsory superannuation (9% pension savings per income), creating a couple trillion in retirement assets, (2) Medicare single-payer system with private options, (3) government-funded education with loan forgiveness, (4) vocational training (40% of population participate); these policies maintained broad-based prosperity and reduced class resentment.
“Australia made certain right decisions... They introduce superenuation... everybody must contribute 9% of their income every months and [clears throat] today it's couple of trillion dollars it's the only overprovided pension system you amongst major economies on a global scale um secondly what they did what Australia did is that they changed the medical through Medicare through one single payer system introducing also the uh introducing also private options along the way. The third is education... if you take care of pension if you take care of medical if you take care of education if you take care of trading uh then people not as angry and they find other ways of finding their ways through the system.”
Solutions to current crises are known and theoretically available (productivity improvements, redistribution policies, corporate taxes, wealth taxes, socialized healthcare, UBI) but are politically difficult in the US due to ideological opposition from both elites and affected populations who don't believe they would benefit from redistribution.
“there are solutions, there are answers... you could have redistribution policies. You can have this, you can have the other. So all I'm saying is that there are solutions... when I discussed in this book 1930s and all the bad choices I made says why don't we make better choices than what these guys have made but uh at this stage it doesn't look like that's uh uh that's uh that's likely”
Wealth concentration in the US is extreme (top 0.1% controls majority of wealth, approximately 135,000 households); this differs from the Gilded Age in magnitude and mechanism but represents a similar wealth inequality problem.
“it's a guilded age. Uh in fact, it's not 1%, it's.1%. it's really 135,000 households that [clears throat] controls most of that.”
Returns are now highly concentrated—winners keep winning, losers get nothing—not because the winners are fixed (e.g., Magnificent 7) but because there's no mean reversion. This concentration applies broadly because 'everything is technology' now; there are no traditional vs technology companies anymore.
“the world I've just described has no mean reversion. That means the [clears throat] returns are highly concentrated. [39:45] So in other words, all the winners winnings go to the winners. Losers get nothing. But the winners are not the same people. So it's not just Magnificent 7 or Fangs or any of those names. Don't get ups too obsessed with that. It's not even technology as such because what is technology this day? Everything is technology and every company is technology in various forms.”
If you want to reconstitute sound money, prepare for house prices to be worth a fraction of what you paid, pension funds to be worthless, and 401ks to vanish. This is too late to do—the debate should have happened in the 1980s. We have created 'abundant capital' (5-10x more than needed), which cannot be eliminated without catastrophic consequences, so the system must continue generating liquidity indefinitely.
“if you ever want to re reconstitute sound money again, be prepared that your house might be worth a fraction what you paid for it. And by the way, there is no pension. You thought your fund managers were making money, but they were really riding riding the wave. And so [clears throat] there is no money. And [31:30] so so you have to be careful when people discuss things like return to solid money. To me, that's too late. We should have had this debate in 1980s...The result is we've created what I call abundant capital. We have five 10 times more capital than we need. It's not evenly distributed. It's not fairly distributed by any stretch, [32:01] but it's there...it's no longer has value anything that is abundant has no value...And as I said, there is no way of eliminating it. There is no way of going back and reconstituting sound money. If you want to do that, that's a recipe for World War II.”
The US Constitution (18th century) is structurally unfit for modern governance: it separates legislative and executive branches without clear boundaries; creates ambiguity between state and federal power; uses 18th-century mechanical checks (electoral college, Senate representation) that fail under modern pressure; most modern democracies have moved to proportional representation to prevent bipolar oscillation.
“US is suffering under creaking 18th century constitution where founding fathers uh got to a stage that they didn't know what they want did they want democracy monarchy... They were very suspicious of people. So they've created a lot of checks and balances... they didn't know federal government will be anything other than jumping on a horse to defend good Americans against invaders. But beyond that they didn't think federal government will be there. But he's entrusted with all executive power... where does a state power begins and ends and where does federal government begins and end? Not clear.”
Younger generations will become electoral majorities between roughly 2025-2032 (depending on the country). Once they do, they will get what they want—just as boomers got their neoliberal consensus by the 1980s. The question is not whether values will change, but when, because humans always eventually agree on a new consensus, though usually after disasters rather than before.
“they will soon become a majority. uh depending on the country you can actually plot it out uh because uh as I said baby boomers uh and uh gradually dying away uh they're becoming larger and larger apart depending on the western country somewhere between 2025 [48:32] 28 and 2032 uh they will be absolute adult and electoral majorities and so what do they want they're going to get just like baby boomers ultimately from Woodstock in 1969 finally got it all done by 1979 uh when they become a majority these people will get what they want...Humans always do agree. It's just the question is do you agree before disasters or after disasters? Almost inevitably we agree afterwards.”
In the near term (next 10 years), technology adoption will be predominantly about efficiency and replacement of human labor, not augmentation of humans; optimistic narratives about technology amplifying human capability are unrealistic because most people cannot 'fly' regardless of technological improvements.
“the reality is at least initial stages over the next 10 years it's all going to be about replacement and efficiency. You can discuss wonderful things how I'm going to augment and make you fly. uh but uh that's not going to be uh real primarily because 90% of people can't fly. They don't have the wings anyway. So even if you try it's not going to work.”
Military spending globally will rise from $2.6-2.7 trillion today to $3.5-4 trillion by early 2030s as geopolitical tensions increase and countries seek to appear strong domestically; this spending is 'guaranteed' and represents opportunity for defense contractors.
“military spending will go up. Now today we're already spending more on military than on R&D on a global basis. Um and ultimately over the next 5 years 2.6 2.7 trillion today will be at least three and a half 4 trillion by the time we get to early 2000s.”
Electoral cycles are the only remaining guardrail preventing dysfunction in the US system; while judicial, legislative, state vs. federal, and corporate checks have failed, the threat of electoral loss forces periodic course correction.
“the only guardrail you have I've concluded It's not judicial. It's not legislative. It's not state versus non-state. It's not it's not federal. It's not even corporate. It's electoral cycles. That's the only guardrail you have.”
The younger generation born from roughly the early 1990s onward are far closer in values to their great-grandparents (Depression/WWII survivors) than to baby boomers—wanting community and support, willing to sacrifice rights, skeptical of democracy—and will become electoral majorities around 2025-2032, at which point they will get the policies they want, as boomers eventually did.
“they are far closer to their greatgrandparents... than to the baby boomer... they want community uh they want support they don't like this idea give me the rope”
Because human self-worth is based on how others perceive our value, and technology is steadily reducing the marginal utility and marginal cost of human labor, this drives a long-term decline in average human economic value that is a recipe for polarization, social dislocation and unhappiness within and between countries.
“that's a recipe for polarization. That's a recipe for social dislocation, unhappiness.”
Rodrik's globalization trilemma holds that you cannot simultaneously have nation states, full free markets/free trade, and local democracy—only two of the three; since we won't abolish nation states and global governance is nearly impossible, globalization must partly reverse because the winners of globalization never compensate the losers within an acceptable timeframe.
“you cannot combine uh nation states um with free markets and a free trade and some form of local politics... You can only combine two out of three”
California has successfully balanced high taxes, high regulation, and substantial spending on homelessness/social programs with economic growth and wealth creation; it remains one of the richest states per capita despite or because of these policies, contradicting the narrative that state intervention destroys prosperity.
“California is still uh the richest of the second richest state in the union on a per capita basis uh because of network effects.”
Universal basic income, supported by figures like Musk and Sergey Brin, is not a giveaway to make people lazy but a 'compensation for irrelevance'—a necessary mechanism to maintain aggregate demand and customers once technology has displaced human labor.
“universal basic income in various forms is not uh it's not um it's not a giveaway... It's a compensation for irrelevance. You're no longer relevant. So that's your compensation for being irrelevant.”
A 1937 compilation of ideas from Mussolini's, Stalin's and New Deal economists shows that across communism, fascism and the New Deal the consensus had shifted from 'whether to plan' to 'how to plan'—and the same is true today: regardless of label, all systems now agree government must become far more involved.
“the question they raised is that uh it's not that we uh that that instead of asking should we plan our economies and our societies but how should we plan not whether how”
Historically, the most disruptive 'world on fire' periods occur when technology and finance change simultaneously alongside other stressors (climate, pandemics, demographics); when all these forces converge in a short period—as in the 1920s-30s and today—the disruption becomes nearly unavoidable.
“when you have all of those things coming together in a relatively short period of time, uh those periods are incredibly disruptive”
Technological revolutions follow a U-shaped multifactor-productivity curve: when a general-purpose technology arrives, productivity rises in a few niches but the rest of the economy 'dies one cut at a time,' so aggregate productivity falls; only after businesses and society adjust does productivity eventually mushroom across the economy.
“productivity arises rapidly in a select few niches, but the rest of the economy dies one cut at a time and therefore aggregate productivity actually goes down, not up”
Baby boomers' demand for total personal, economic and market freedom (the through-line from 1960s hippies to 1980s investment bankers) brought in Reagan, Thatcher, monetarism and Friedmanite neoliberalism, whose underpinnings are faulty because free markets, true prices and rational behavior mostly don't exist—as Greenspan effectively admitted in 2008.
“there is a direct line from uh flower culture and uh and hippies and yippies on the one side and investment bankers of 1980s. They're the same people. It's they they both wanted freedom.”
The world is splintering into geopolitical blocks, with China's mind-change away from liberalization datable to the 2008-09 GFC (state control of national assets rising from then, five years before Xi)—producing an 'illiberal Eurasia' (China, Russia, Iran, etc.) versus an 'Anglosphere' (US, Canada, UK, Australia, Japan, EU), so capital, goods, labor and ideas will increasingly flow within blocks rather than between them.
“the dividing line to me is around 2008 2009 global financial crisis. This is the time when China concluded liberal way is not the way forward”
The combination of climate stress and a population surge in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia (heading to ~3 billion, with 1.5-2 billion of working age) means even a fraction migrating would dwarf historical movements like the Mongols or barbarians, so the only humane solution is an 'enlightened Marshall Plan' (~10-15% of GDP, $5tn+) to raise local productivity and prevent mass migration, pandemics and war.
“very soon we will have three billion people residing in those areas which is a whole population of the world only in 1960... if just a fraction of them decide to move uh you're going to have a bigger movements than... Mongols and Turks”
Eras of stability arise when generations agree on a shared socioeconomic model (e.g., 1946-1970, 1980-2010); the present disorder will end only when society agrees on a new model—and humans almost always reach such agreement only after disasters rather than before.
“it will end when we agree what's a new social economic model. Clearly the model of neoliberals are gone.”
Schvitz uses the 'Fujiwara effect' metaphor—when hurricanes form within a thousand miles of each other, they combine into a much larger hurricane—to describe how converging technological and financial disruptions amplify each other into catastrophic change.
“In my first book, and I continued in my second book, I discussed it as a Fujiwari effect, which is what I've just said a second ago, fusion of several hurricanes. Sometimes hurricanes come too close together. Usually, they have to be within a thousand miles from each other. And what they do, they actually combine into much larger hurricane that can either divert in a completely different direction or can become much much stronger on the landfall. And so to me the key as I said a second ago is technology and finance.”
Computers and finance were both born in the 1970s because prior to that there were capital controls preventing capital flows. They didn't meet each other until late 1990s, but when information revolution and finance met, they 'got married' and produced children like ETFs and other financial instruments born from the combination of computer and finance revolution.
“that um that computers and finance uh they um both of them were born in 1970s because remember prior to 1970s capital there were capital controls so it was really no capital flows. So both of them were born roughly at the same time but they didn't meet each other until late 1990s and when information revolution and finance met each other they got married and now there are beautiful children ETFs other things that the combination of finance and computer revolution generated”
Risk has not disappeared but migrated outside the economic and capital-market system into polarization, electoral outcomes, geopolitics, climate and healthcare—domains that portfolio managers and central banks have zero ability to assess, forcing central banks to be backward-looking ('data dependent') because they cannot locate the neutral rate or risk premium.
“the risks are gone. They're not. They just migrated out of a system... Polarization, electoral outcome, geopolitics, climate, healthcare. This is where the risk lie.”
Humans are social and competitive animals; absent work-culture-based competition (which is disappearing), they will still compete on other domains (religion, sports, entertainment); but literature on post-work competition structures remains speculative and uncertain.
“humans are social animals and a competitive animals. And so we'll have to compete on other things...there is a vibrant literature right now as to what we're going to compete against ourselves when it is not rooted in a work culture...we can debate whether it's going to be religion, whether it's going to be sports, entertainment, whatever it's going to be, it's not going to be what we have experienced uh before.”
Neoliberalism has died and discredited itself, and as government becomes more involved in directing capital, the differences between Western economies and China are shrinking; the modern political spectrum is no longer freedom vs slavery but how much freedom to sacrifice—so in effect 'we are all socialist now,' the right merely more nationalistic and exclusive than the left.
“we all socialist now everyone um the only difference right is more nationalistic and exclusive uh left is less nationalistic and exclusive but they all socialist”
The difference between deindustrialized Detroit (now one of the poorest US cities) and deindustrialized Melbourne (now rivaling Sydney in wealth) is not race but policy: Australia introduced compulsory superannuation, single-payer Medicare with private options, government-funded forgivable education and TAFE vocational training—so caring for pensions, health, education and trades keeps people less angry and avoids polarization.
“if you take care of pension if you take care of medical if you take care of education if you take care of trading uh then people not as angry and they find other ways of finding their ways through the system”
No general-purpose technology that transforms the world ever progresses without a financial bubble; bubbles are a necessary condition for such technologies to scale and reshape the world.
“no generalpurpose technology that changes the world ever progresses without a bubble. That never happens. You need a bubble for them to progress forward”
The boomers' insistence on perpetual growth and wealth creation regardless of productivity could only be accommodated by relying on asset prices and borrowing—pulling future consumption to the present—so blaming central banks for post-2008 distortions is misplaced: the public demanded it and politics delivered it.
“if you've won a guilty party look yourself in the mirror. It's you. You wanted it and politics delivered exactly what you wanted.”
China's core problem is not overproduction itself but very high national savings rates maintained too long; this forces it to invest and export (a 'squirrel in a wheel' investing ~$9-10 trillion/year, double Japan's GDP), creating excess capacity that pops up everywhere ('whack-a-mole') and exports global disinflation, with the only alternative—domestic dumping—deepening disinflation against 4x debt-to-GDP.
“The problem is very high national saving rates maintained for far too long... the only answer for you is invest and export. And so they become a squirrel in a wheel”
The US labors under a creaking 18th-century constitution full of unresolved ambiguities (state vs federal power, judiciary making policy rather than arbitrating, first-past-the-post enabling big swings on small vote shifts, unaddressed 'rotten boroughs' and gerrymandering); a more rational system is designable but almost impossible to enact, while Europe's overly bureaucratic rules paradoxically make it 'harder to smash' in bad times.
“US is suffering under creaking 18th century constitution where founding fathers uh got to a stage that they didn't know what they want”
We have created 'abundant capital'—5-10x more than the economy needs—and because anything abundant has no value, this generates faulty signals so that spreads and yield curves no longer convey the information they once did; this cannot be unwound because reconstituting sound money would crash house prices and pensions and risk world war.
“we've created what I call abundant capital. We have five 10 times more capital than we need.”
US college-freshman surveys since 1965 show a generational value shift: in the mid-1960s ~30%+ of students enrolled in arts/humanities and prioritized improving the world, but by the late 1980s 27% were in business/finance with 'being better off financially' the top reason for college—reflecting the boomer 'me generation' ethos—now partly reversing among younger students.
“by the time we get to late 80s 27% of all the graduates were business and finance... number one choice for coming to college was to be better off financially rather than anything else.”
AI does not need to reach AGI (which is at least 20 years away, not 2029) to be transformative; its value lies in being flexible, cost-efficient, scalable and 'good enough,' which is already collapsing hiring—e.g., a bank that hired 500 graduates to end with 20-30 will progressively hire 100 to get 10, then 50 to get 2.
“You don't need to be as good. you just need to be good enough. Uh and that's exactly what AI is becoming.”
AI as a general-purpose technology will move beyond manipulating data to transforming the physical world via robotics, automation, 3D printing and biotech—e.g., printed houses in 24 hours for $10-20k displacing 5-10% of the construction labor force, printed aircraft parts replacing 'one factory of the world' (China) with 30,000 distributed factories at very low marginal cost.
“can we, for example, print a house now in 24 hours in the cost of 10 or $20,000? Yes, we can... That means 5 to 10% of the labor force in every country that construction workers will no longer be required.”
The industrial revolution needed humans as its brains, but the information revolution no longer does; China is betting that AI plus quantum computing will eliminate even the need for human inventiveness, which would render moot the historical rule that genuine invention is impossible under a system of unappealable authority.
“China is counting that the combination of AI as well as quantum computing will eliminate the need for even inventiveness”
America's high productivity and competitiveness come bundled with brutal social outcomes—citizens living 5-7 years less than peer developed countries, infant mortality 2-3x higher, maternal mortality 6-8x higher, and incarceration rates ~50x higher (comparable to Turkmenistan, Cuba, Nicaragua)—raising the question of whether such 'deaths and blood' are the necessary price of that productivity.
“citizens live 5 to seven years less than an average developed country... infant mortality is two or three times... female uh mortality during child birth about 6 to eight times higher... incarcerate people at a rate that 50 times more”
The next decade or two could be the most transformative period the human race has experienced since the agricultural revolution, because unlike prior industrial or mercantile revolutions we are changing nearly all relationships—industries, sectors, personal and social relationships—simultaneously rather than just one or two sets.
“the next decade, possibly two decades, probably could be the most transformative that the human race have experienced since arguably agricultural revolution”
Humans must reconcile themselves to the reality that they are 'no longer useful' in the way they once were—the industrial revolution needed human brains as managers and strategists, but the information revolution (and AI) no longer needs human brains. This is the fundamental prerequisite for achieving sustained productivity gains: accepting that humans are obsolete.
“when are we going to get to a stage that we do get to sustainably higher multiffactor productivity, not just putting more capital in, but a productivity starts to rise. Well, uh to me, in order to get to that stage, we have to reconcile ourselves with our reality. Uh that is we're no longer useful. Certainly not in the way we thought we were. [snorts] Uh and we'll never be useful again. Uh because industrial revolution really needed us as their brains. Information revolution doesn't need our brains anymore.”
Volcker's true legacy is creating the modern financial world: the ratio of financial instruments to GDP rose from roughly 1-1.5x in Volcker's era (when velocity of money was stable, as Friedman assumed) to ~2:1 by the Greenspan put, 3:1 under Bernanke, 5:1 under Yellen, and ~6:1 today—an understated figure ignoring unfunded liabilities and ~$30 trillion of private capital.
“if you go to Paul Walker days, the amount of financial instruments per dollar GDP was around 1 1.5 and was relatively flat... by the time we get to Yelen that was 5:1 today... their number is about 6 to1.”
Markets assign the US (and India) a low equity risk premium because investors reward structural strengths—sound economy and corporate sector—while discounting dysfunctional politics, whereas Europe gets a high risk premium because investors penalize its structural weaknesses without crediting its offsetting strengths.
“what you have in the US is structurally sound economy... but dysfunctional society and politics... You assign a very low-risk premier to us because you reward structural strengths against the weaknesses”
Central banks must keep generating liquidity because asset prices have become a far more significant signal for consumer and business behavior than wages, so any meaningful compression of liquidity immediately flows into economic fundamentals; reported QT is largely a signal, not a true contraction, since other forms of liquidity kept rising throughout.
“asset prices are far more significant signal for consumers and businesses than um than wages”
Because there is no mean reversion, returns become permanently highly concentrated—winners take everything and losers get nothing—but the winners are not a fixed set (not just the Magnificent 7 or 'tech'), since the absence of cycles to widen and revert means concentration is a structural feature.
“the returns are highly concentrated. So in other words, all the winners winnings go to the winners. Losers get nothing. But the winners are not the same people.”
An implosion of Russia would be the worst possible geopolitical outcome, which likely explains why Biden and allies were so controlled about the degree of help they were willing to give Ukraine.
“Implosion of Russia will be the worst possible outcome. And that's probably why uh Joe Biden and the rest of them were so um controlled as to the degree of help that they willing to provide uh to Ukraine.”
The polarization difference between high-tax California and low-tax states like Alabama or Florida is not about competent vs incompetent politicians but about which trade-off each makes; California's failed $20bn homeless spending coexists with it remaining the richest/second-richest state per capita due to network effects, while low-tax states have higher death, incarceration and lower medical-coverage rates.
“it's not um it's not incompetent or competent because if you think of places like Alabama, uh attracting a lot of investments, growing... do you want to live in Alabama? Uh and if you think of average lifespan, they live much less.”
Without a knowable risk-free rate and with risk premia equally unstable (could be 1% in the morning and 5% in the afternoon), there is no reliable weighted average cost of capital, hence no meaningful P/E and no mean reversion—so the analyst's traditional framework of cyclical positioning and standard-deviation-from-mean valuation collapses entirely.
“if you don't have risk free rate and risk premier you have no weighted average cost of capital. That means you don't have a PE. It doesn't exist anymore. And you don't have mean reversion.”
The McKinsey Global Report estimated that the information age has a waterfront impact about 300 times greater than the industrial revolution, and the speed is about 10 times faster, making the overall impact approximately 3,000 times larger.
“the McKenzie global report uh that was published several years ago. uh they tried to estimate the impact of the information age relative to industrial revolutions. Uh their view was that the information age has a waterfront. In other words, areas that are impacted about 300 times of the industrial revolution and the speed with which we're progressing is about 10 times faster. So the overall impact therefore is about 3,000 times.”
Only government, with its strength and monopoly power, can act as the guardrail to rebalance the capital-labor relationship that technology and finance are reshaping; the system will never self-rebalance as Bessent and Trump expect, so greater state involvement is necessary and not inherently bad.
“Only the government has the strengths and a monopoly power to be the guardrail. Nobody else system by itself is never going to rebalance as much as as much as Scott Basson and Donald Trump think it would.”
Cold war and hot war are economically distinct regimes: a cold war has ~1-2 casualties per 100,000 and defense spending rarely above 5-6% of GDP, while a hot war has ~20+ casualties per 100,000 and military spending of 20-50% of GDP—so we should accept cold war as a reality while focusing on avoiding the leap to hot war.
“In a cold war, the casualties are usually one or two per 100,000... Defense spending very seldom goes above five or 6% of GDP. In a hot war, the casualties are usually 20 or more per 100,000. Uh military spending usually 20 40 sometimes 50% of GDP.”
The only durable solution to inequality-driven youth radicalization is rising productivity combined with the right economic policies (redistribution, corporate and wealth taxes, socialized healthcare)—but in the US these ideas are viewed with deep suspicion even by those they would help, because the US is fundamentally a right-leaning nation with no room for a genuine European-style left party.
“Productivity with the right economic policies can solve the problem. The problem is that it might take quite a while”
Schvitz's most optimistic scenario for the next 3-5 years is 5% productivity growth and zero inflation, which would solve most problems: gold price would fall to $1,000, governments would have no debt problems, all productivity gains would be shared, and polarization pressures would disappear. However, he estimates the probability of this occurring at zero.
“I said 5% productivity and zero inflation. If you actually reach that level, everything changes. Uh gold price will be $1,000. Governments have no problem with debt whatsoever. We all happy. The productivity is shared around everything. polarization pressures disappear. Everybody will be thinking what the hell are they doing electing these people? So everything return back to normal 5. What are the chances of 50 in the next 3 to 5 years? Uh zero to me I don't think that's likely.”
Over the next ~10 years AI will be overwhelmingly about replacement and efficiency rather than augmentation, because while academics like Acemoglu describe systems that augment rather than replace humans, ~90% of people lack the capacity to be 'augmented' so augmentation won't work in practice.
“at least initial stages over the next 10 years it's all going to be about replacement and efficiency... 90% of people can't fly. They don't have the wings anyway.”
This coming decade is simultaneously the easiest time in history to become a billionaire and the easiest time to sink into poverty, with extreme return concentration meaning that if you are not in the top 0.1% you are effectively a 'peasant'—a guilded-age dynamic in which ~135,000 US households control most wealth.
“this coming decade is the easiest time to become a billionaire and it's the easiest time to sink into poverty. So make your choices wisely.”
In the 2024 New York mayoral election, younger voters (under 45) overwhelmingly voted for Mum Dani, a 34-year-old socialist candidate advocating price controls, rent controls, free buses, and government-supported grocery stores, while older voters voted for traditional Andrew Como. Dani, affiliated with the Socialist Democratic Party, will be NYC's first socialist mayor.
“You can see it in uh I live in New York. You can see it in Mam Dani. Uh I mean we had um we had a choice of either very traditional Andrew Como or uh Mum Dani who is a very young very charismatic 34 [51:40] year old who is talking about things like price controls and Terry and rent controls. He's talking about free buses. He's talking about stateup supported grocery stores. Now [clears throat] younger generation uh completely bought all of this. You find anybody above the age of 45 voted for Andrew Ka. Everybody below that pretty much voted for mom daddy. And [clears throat] he's going to be our first socialist mayor because he does it does belong to socialist democratic party”
The US economy is now so divided that stripping out AI investment (~$600-700bn) and the wealth effect (the top 0.1% hold ~52% of assets in equities vs ~5% for the bottom 50%) would leave the top 1% of households as the only thing preventing the economy from stagnating, with AI investment and the wealth effect mutually reinforcing.
“if you take out II investment which is currently running at about 600700 billion uh and if you take out the wealth impact... if you take out top 1% of the households uh US economy today will be stagnating”
The information age began in 1971 with the first consumer-usable computers and Intel chips, did not propagate until early 1990s, and did not become truly disruptive until late 1990s to early 2000s.
“if you think of the information age, we can actually quantify it pretty accurately that information age started in 1971. This is when you had first uh first computers uh that you could use, not just a mainframe computer. This is the first chips uh that come out out of Intel. So we can sort of measure it relatively accurately. The information age started in 1971 but it really did not propagate until early 1990s and it has did not become really disruptive in any meaningful way until late 1990s earlier 2000s.”
Because excess capital is now so vast that destroying even a little creates major havoc, any meaningful asset bust (e.g., a dot-com-scale ~$15-20tn US wipeout) would feed directly into investment and consumption, guaranteeing a strong policy response of 'privatizing profits and socializing losses'—and accelerating, technology-shortened business cycles now let us create new bubbles within days rather than years, limiting the depth of any correction.
“we've reached such a level of excess capital uh that by destroying a little bit you're creating major havoc. So you can't afford it.”
Computers and modern finance were both 'born' in the 1970s (finance freed by the end of capital controls) but did not meet until the late 1990s, when their marriage produced new instruments like ETFs.
“both of them were born in 1970s because remember prior to 1970s capital there were capital controls... when information revolution and finance met each other they got married and now there are beautiful children ETFs”
The US is the single most polarized society in the Western world (followed by the UK, then several European countries, then Canada/Japan, with Australia least), and the more polarized a country is the more incompetent its policymaking becomes, which can lead to incompetent policy or even civil war.
“the US is a single most polarized society in the western world. The next one is the UK... the more polarized you are the more incompetent you become”
Excess capital combined with rising geopolitical tension makes increased global military spending nearly inevitable (from ~$2.6-2.7tn today to $3.5-4tn by the early 2030s, already exceeding global R&D), which is investable via defense names—but whether it culminates in actual war depends on the degree of pressure.
“today we're already spending more on military than on R&D on a global basis... 2.6 2.7 trillion today will be at least three and a half 4 trillion by the time we get to early 2000s”
The choice of New York's young, charismatic socialist mayor (Mamdani) over the traditional Cuomo, with everyone under ~45 voting for him and over-45s for Cuomo, exemplifies the generational shift toward acceptance of price/rent controls, free buses and state-supported grocery stores.
“You find anybody above the age of 45 voted for Andrew Ka. Everybody below that pretty much voted for mom daddy.”
Macro analysis becomes self-defeating: the more important macro becomes, the less useful and harder to assess it is, so the right approach is to build a baseline macro 'roof' (assume volatility, stagnation, rising geopolitical pressure) and then invest, with fixed-income/currency managers losing all their moorings while equity managers retain more to work with.
“macro permeates everything but the more important it becomes the less useful it is and the more difficult it will be to assess”
If the economy reached ~5% multifactor productivity growth with zero inflation, everything would normalize—gold would fall to $1,000, government debt would cease to be a problem, and polarization pressures would disappear—but the probability of achieving that in the next 3-5 years is effectively zero.
“5% productivity and zero inflation. If you actually reach that level, everything changes. Uh gold price will be $1,000. Governments have no problem with debt whatsoever.”
Per a McKinsey estimate, the information age affects roughly 300 times the 'waterfront' of areas the industrial revolution did, and proceeds about 10 times faster, yielding an overall impact roughly 3,000 times that of the industrial revolution.
“areas that are impacted about 300 times of the industrial revolution and the speed with which we're progressing is about 10 times faster. So the overall impact therefore is about 3,000 times”
The information age can be dated precisely to 1971 with the first usable computers and the first Intel chips, but it did not propagate until the early 1990s and only became truly disruptive in the late 1990s/early 2000s.
“the information age started in 1971... it really did not propagate until early 1990s and it has did not become really disruptive in any meaningful way until late 1990s earlier 2000s”
Good evening and thanks for coming to the event.
“Hi folks. Uh good evening. Thank you so much for for coming uh this evening.”