What this covers

This lecture, one installment in Michael Sugrue's Great Minds series, follows Ludwig Wittgenstein through two phases of his career. It begins with the young author of the Tractatus, which opens with "The world is all that is the case," rules out metaphysics, and numbers its sentences to work out every entailment. The lecturer presents it as a manifesto of logical positivism. Logical truths reduce to tautologies, ethics, aesthetics and theology are consigned to silence, and Wittgenstein believed he had dissolved every philosophical problem, past or future, as either expressible or gibberish. The lecture then turns to his unease in the 1930s, his self-criticism, and his refusal to publish again, since print seemed too final for a philosophy that was a process.

The second half takes up the Investigations. The lecturer sets Wittgenstein against the tradition running back to Plato, where a definition names the one quality that all instances share (Socratic Essentialism). Examples such as "game" (the Olympics, tic-tac-toe, poker, tag) and "chair" illustrate Family Resemblance, with the Smith family's overlapping features as the model. Borderline cases like a doll's house chair are settled by the Language Games in play and the purposes involved. Precision matters only as far as it is useful (Pragmatic Sufficiency), and fuzzy talk about ethics or religion becomes legitimate if it communicates.

The more contentious turn is the argument that understanding must show itself in observable behavior, illustrated by a child doing sums in first grade. The lecturer frames this as the only alternative to mind-reading, and the claim is marked as contested. The lecture ends on philosophy as therapy, the fly released from the fly bottle, and a book Wittgenstein called an unfinished album of therapies.

Sharpest takeaway

Wittgenstein's philosophical evolution from the Tractatus's demand for logical certainty to the Investigations' pragmatic acceptance of linguistic ambiguity and family resemblance demonstrates that philosophy's task is therapeutic clarification of everyday language use, not the pursuit of impossible absolute definitions.

  • The Tractatus's picture theory of language and demand for mathematical precision in definition is logically coherent but makes impossible demands on ordinary language
  • Language games operate through family resemblance and practical use rather than essential definitions, as shown by examples like 'game' and 'chair'
  • Philosophy's role shifts from solving all problems through logic to curing conceptual confusions caused by misunderstanding how language actually works in practice

The claims · ranked43 claims · weighted by value

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0.80

Family resemblance is the principle holding together sets of things referred to by a single term: just as members of the Smith family share overlapping physical features without one universal feature belonging to all, things like chairs share overlapping features (built for sitting, made by people, etc.) without needing one essential defining characteristic.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“Vidkun sign says let's extrapolate from that idea let's take the idea that all the chairs have a rough family resemblance they're things built by people so that you can sit on them... the reason why we might be tempted to call these various things chairs is because they share a certain family resemblance that allows us to clump these common nouns together”

0.80

In the Investigations, Wittgenstein permits us to discuss ethics, aesthetics, and theology using fuzzy, ambiguous language without requiring logical precision, because if such discourse succeeds in communicating and is used appropriately, its fuzziness is not an impediment to understanding.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“we can talk about ethics we can talk about aesthetics we can talk about theology the difficulty is is that they're very ambiguous very fuzzy words the question is is the fuzziness of our discourse an impediment to understanding each other or not if we get an understanding of what someone is talking about when they talk about beauty or about God or about religion if it communicates with you and you could tell by whether they use it in the proper way well then it's working just fine”

0.80

Despite achieving renown and admiration, Wittgenstein became profoundly uneasy during the 1930s, questioning whether his work was completely right and asking himself whether there might be a way out of the logical corner he had painted himself into, demonstrating intellectual honesty by criticizing his own work more trenchantly than any external critic could.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“as his work was absorbed as he got a band of admiring or perhaps not even admiring adoring students and colleagues 15 Stine became rather uneasy... Vicky and Stein said well are you sure that I'm completely right are you certain that everything I've said here is absolutely true is there really no way out of this logical corner I've painted myself into”

0.80

Whether a borderline case (like a doll's house chair) counts as a game or chair depends on what language game you're playing and what purposes you're pursuing; there is no absolute answer, only contextual answers relative to human purposes.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“when Johnny comes back and wants to know if some questionable case the dolls house chair is a chair we say well it depends on what you want to do it that Johnny if you want to build doll houses maybe we'll call it a chair if you want to talk only about things that people can really sit on well then it's not a chair it depends on what language game you're playing”

0.80

After the Tractatus, Wittgenstein refused to publish anything further, circulating only manuscripts among students and colleagues, because he came to believe that publication seemed too final and that philosophy is more a process than a series of absolute certainties, reflecting his move away from logical hubris.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“he refused to publish after the Tractatus he did publish one paper under protest decided that he didn't like it after he had done it and would put nothing else in print he circulated a few manuscripts among his students and among his friends among his colleagues but he didn't like to put anything in print because it seems so final and it seems that philosophy is more a process than a series of absolute certainties”

0.80

Philosophy's aim is to allow the fly to get out of the fly bottle: we are trapped by the language we've been brought up on and confused by odd quirks in language itself, which can only be unraveled by examining how words get used in practice.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Lichtenstein says that you're in the investigations what is the aim of your philosophy to allow the fly to get out of the fly bottle in other words we're taken in by the language that we've been brought up on and we tend to get confused because language itself is full of odd quirks and odd facts which only can be determined and conely can be unraveled in the way words get used”

0.80

The Investigations is inherently incomplete because there is an infinite number of overlapping language games, which means philosophy itself is also infinite and endless—a total reversal from the Tractatus's claim to have solved all philosophical problems.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“the problem with the investigations is that it's incomplete one of the difficulties is and here's the real point is that there's an infinite number of overlapping language games and not only is it incomplete but philosophy itself is incomplete the incompleteness of this book gestures at the fact that there is no ultimate finale to the philosophical enterprise which is a total reversal of what he thought he had done in this for error in the early part of his career”

0.80

In the Investigations, Wittgenstein's philosophy becomes a form of therapy treating conceptual confusions and diseases caused by our use of language, making philosophy like intellectual medicine where the philosopher is a trainer or intellectual doctor helping improve thinking.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“philosophy in the investigations turns out to be a kind of therapy we have conceptual charley horses so we have conceptual diseases and he's going to be a trainer or intellectual doctor who's going to help us improve our thinking and he's going to offer us therapy for the misapprehensions and the confusions introduced into our thinking by our use of language”

0.79

Using the example of 'game,' there is no single universal characteristic that all games share and only games have: ask what the Olympics have in common with tic-tac-toe, what poker has in common with chess, what tag has in common with peekaboo—each shares some features with others but no property unites all of them.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“ask yourself what the Olympics have in common with tic-tac-toe ask yourself what poker has in common with chess ask yourself what tag has in common with peekaboo ask yourself if any of these things have one universal characteristics one universal characteristic that allows us to say that all these things are games if they don't have one universal characteristic how is it that we can use the word in a sensible way”

0.74

First-grade teachers test whether children understand addition by having them solve problems, not because teachers enjoy making children nervous, but because testing behavior is the only way to verify understanding.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“as a matter of practical fact every first-grade teacher when they want to find out if the kids in the class understand addition they give them a test not because they like making the kids nervous but because the only way to find out whether they understand addition or not is to have them do some addition problems”

0.74

Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus is a manifesto of logical positivism asserting that anything that can be said can either be said clearly or not at all, making him a logically decisive individual with a razor-blade mind who cuts through complexity to identify one basic core.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“essentially anything that can be said can either be said clearly or not at all so he's a real yes or no kind of a man a very logically clear decisive individual who has a professional competence in mathematics”

0.74

Young Wittgenstein believed he had solved all possible philosophical problems—not only the 2,500 years of previous philosophical problems but every philosophical problem that could ever be raised—because any philosophical question must be formulated in language, and if it cannot fit into his theory of the declarative statement, it is gibberish.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Ludwig Wittgenstein the young man who wrote the Tractatus believed that he had solved all possible philosophical problems not only all philosophical problems that have been developed in the previous twenty five hundred years of philosophy but all philosophical problems that could ever be raised because if you're going to ask a question it's going to be in language”

0.74

Imagine someone who claimed to understand addition but had never done any addition problem on paper and had never given anyone any evidence of understanding addition—just said 'I've done a great many sums but in my head'—we would have no grounds for believing them and would have to conclude understanding requires observable behavioral manifestation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“he says imagine the case of someone that claimed to understand addition but never ever had done an addition problem on paper and had never given anyone any evidence of understanding addition just says I've done a great many sums but I've done them all in my head imagine the strange condition you were in now how can we tell if this person understands addition assuming that they're not willing to do anything out here in the world that we can say take it on faith”

0.74

Understanding a word like 'chair' means being able to use it correctly in the way the community uses it; whether you can articulate the form or essence of the word matters not at all if you can demonstrate proper use, and the focus on essence may be a wasteful pursuit since there may be no essence to find.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“if Johnny can use the word chair then Johnny understands chair whether you can tell you what the form of the chair is are not as a matter of fact it may be a waste of time because in probability there is no form of the chair there is no one quality which every chair has and only chairs have”

0.74

Precision in language should be increased only as far as it is useful for specific purposes; beyond that, demanding further precision is mere pedantry with no practical benefit, following the principle 'if it isn't broke, don't fix it'.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“we can increase it to the point where we find it useful again and then there's no point in taking our precision any further except for the points of pedantry because if it isn't fixed if it isn't broke don't fix it”

0.74

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that ethics, theology, and aesthetics are inexpressible because they are too ambiguous and gooey to fit his logical framework, relegating them to silence.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“he says or in a way it's a way of going back to the first line of the Tractatus the world is all that is the case and what we must what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence in the Tractatus being a logical scientific kind of a guy he said that there were no way that we could express propositions in ethics or in theology or in aesthetics it's too gooey and ambiguous form”

0.73

In the Investigations, Wittgenstein treats language not as a picture of the world but as a set of social practices and games that overlap without having one universal characteristic, rejecting the idea that there is a single skeleton key that unlocks all linguistic doors.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“in his later work when he gets to the investigations Lichtenstein has decided that instead of language being a picture he wants to treat language as a game as a set of social practices which overlap and which don't have one universal skeleton key which allows us to open all linguistic doors instead there are a plurality of overlapping games which have a certain degree of consistency within them but there's no one unifying characteristic that covers all possible linguistic expressions”

0.72

The only alternative to behaviorism as a criterion for understanding would be to read minds directly or have a seance to access mental content, which is impossible; therefore, external behavioral activity must be the touchstone for verifying understanding.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“imagine people claiming that they understood Swedish with the exception that they had never spoken any Swedish and they had never read anything in Swedish but they want you to believe that they know it do you see the problem that is to say what possible criterion could we have for ascribing to a person an understanding of an idea or a concept or process unless it was somewhere in their behavior the only other alternative is to read their mind to hold hands have a seance to see if we can directly get access to it and since that's impossible back to behaviorism back to the standard of external activity as the touchstone for whether Johny understands this”

0.69

Wittgenstein explicitly stated that the Investigations was incomplete and that he could not have written a good book, saying 'I would have written a good book if I could but I was just outside my capacity so this will have to do', viewing it as an album of therapies rather than a finished system.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“fit Kim Stein says the book is incomplete I would have written you in the introduction he says I would have written a good book if I could but I was just outside my capacity so this will have to do he says at best it says it's an album a series of therapies to uncloudy understanding of the world”

0.69

In the Tractatus, all true analytic statements (logical truths) reduce to tautologies—statements of the form 'X is X' that tell us nothing about the world but only about the logical entailments in our definitions and language.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“it turns out that all true deductive statements or analytic facts are in fact tautologies in other words they only tell you that X is X now it may be a very abstract set of equations on both sides but really what it all reduces to is everything is itself every mathematical equation says that this is this and nothing more it tells us nothing about the world”

0.68

Wittgenstein structures the Tractatus by numbering sentences (1, 2, 2.1, 2.01, etc.) to work out all logical entailments and implications exhaustively, intending to tell us what can and cannot be put into language and what we can and cannot sensibly talk about.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“he numbers his sentences like a scientific fellow that he is and the first sentence is followed by sentence number two but sentence number two is followed by sentence number two point 12.01 2.0 - in other words he works out all the logical entailment all the logical implications of the views that he holds and then moves on so he intends to be logically exhaustive”

0.68

In the Western philosophical tradition stemming from Plato, a definition must specify one universal quality that every instance of a thing has and only instances of that thing have, following a mathematical model where concepts have essential properties like odd numbers or triangles.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“in each of the Socratic dialogues there is an attempt to define some important abstract concept and in fact in the process of defining it Socrates has very clear criteria for what counts as a definition... Socrates wants to define justice... when Socrates in the Meno asks me know what is virtue Meno gives him a bunch of examples is the virtue of generals the virtue of soldiers the virtue of men the virtue of women as Socrates says no no no stop stop I don't want examples of virtue I want to know what virtue itself is I want to know some quality that every virtue has an only virtue has in other words Socrates demands that virtue be defined in the way that we define odd numbers or triangles”

0.66

The Tractatus opens with the sentence 'The world is all that is the case,' which means there will be no metaphysics in the book and it commits to a strictly one-world interpretation of what can be thought and said, with no appeal to transcendent or abstract realms.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“the first sentence is the world is all that is the case which is perhaps the most mysterious lines in philosophy it certainly means that the set of the states ever affairs that we find around us the simple facts are what the world is for us it's a word it's a way of saying that there will be no metaphysics in this book that it will be a strictly one world interpretation”

0.63

Logical positivism in the Tractatus represented an extreme position ('physics über alles' or 'physics over everything') where only logic and physics counted as serious philosophy, and anything else (poetry, religion, emotion) was dismissed as not worthy of serious intellectual attention.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“you could call a logical positivism a physics uber alles physics over everything we have logic we have physics that's what real serious scientific philosophers do anything else is essentially poetry or religion or neurosis or something like that it's not to be taken seriously by real tough philosophers”

0.60

We can add resolution to a fuzzy satellite photo as needed for our purposes—if we need backyard detail, we can clarify; if a satellite photo of the US suffices, we don't need a priori ultimate essential definitions of all words before we can meaningfully talk. Talk comes first, action comes first; logical systematization comes second.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“insofar as we just want to satellites photo of the United States this does just fine if you want your backyard I suppose we could clarify it somewhat and insofar as our language games demand that we bring it down to the level of the backyard that we increase the specificity we can always add that as we need it but we don't need a priori an ultimate essential definition of all the words in our language prior to being able to talk talk comes first action comes first these logical systemization zuv it comes second”

0.60

Wittgenstein identifies a fundamental problem: many things cannot be defined in the Socratic way (by specifying a single essential quality), yet Socrates demands this impossible standard, making people look stupid by asking them to accomplish the impossible and then showing they failed.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“the difficulty that Vicki Stein has stumbled on and it's a fascinating problem is that many things can are not and cannot be defined that way in other words he thinks Socrates is unintentionally playing intellectual sleight of hand by demanding of people something that couldn't possibly be there and then it turns out that when the people try and give him what he wants they end up looking stupid because they piranha there on an expedition to do the impossible”

0.60

If a six-year-old child can understand what 'game' means without philosophers being able to specify its essential form, this suggests that the demand for such specification is the problem, not the fuzziness of language or the world.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“think about the paradigm of six-year-olds if they understand what game means don't tell me that us philosophers don't and if we can't specify some quality that every instantiation of the we use of the word game has and only such as Stan she Asians have then why should we believe that there is such a thing”

0.56

Unlike Plato and Spinoza who confuse us with abstract intellectual constructs, Wittgenstein baffles us with the contents of our closets and objects on our table, making it amazing that we understand words like 'sugar' or 'salt'—he restores common sense grounded in practical empirical reality rather than demanding mathematical formality.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“it's remarkable about Vidkun Stein that unlike Plato and Spinoza who can confuse us and baffle us with the most profound intellectual constructs Vidkun Stein can baffle us with the contents of our closets Vicky Stein can baffle us with the objects on the table Vicky Stein can make it amazing that you should know how to use the word sugar or salt remarkable but not remarkable what Vidkun Stein has done is gone back to the way words actually work in the practical empirical world”

0.56

We must find some principle that holds our world together to avoid the problem of arbitrary reference: suppose a term X referred to ladies shoes, all numbers over 200, and lobsters—these share no connection, so we need the principle of family resemblance to prevent language from becoming completely arbitrary.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“what this means is that we're going to have to find some principle that holds our world together because there's a danger here suppose we were to say that some term X in some language referred to ladies shoes all the numbers over 200 and lobsters well the problem is that there's no connection between these things in other words we don't want to be so completely disparate that we get an totally arbitrary set of utterances referring to the world”

0.56

Wittgenstein's behaviorism reduces the internal psyche or ego of the subject to a dimensionless point that takes up no space and contains nothing within it—a black box entirely impenetrable to other people. He doesn't deny that people have a self, but says it's inaccessible to us, making the theory come close to the impossibility of knowing other minds.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“what fit constrain does is drive the world of the psyche of the ego of the subject back not to the point where you abolish as it as many of the more radical logical positives do otto neurath does that a jair I believe does it as well but what he does is drive the ego or the psyche of the subject back to not non-existence but to the point where it's to the level where it is a dimensionless point that takes up no space and that contains nothing within it it is a black box entirely impenetrable to all other people”

0.56

One of Wittgenstein's key later questions is 'How is a word learned?' If you want to know the meaning of a word, ask yourself how you would teach it to a six-year-old, because all children must be taught words one by one through practical empirical fact.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“one of his favorite questions is how is a word learned that it's say if you want to define if you want to know about the meaning of a word X then ask yourself how do you find out about X how would you teach X to a six-year-old because as a matter of practical empirical fact all the six-year-olds all the children are in our culture are going to have to be taught the words of English and they get taught them one by one”

0.56

The therapeutic goal rescues us not only from extreme skepticism but from the futility of chasing our tails like puppies, representing Wittgenstein's retreat from philosophical hubris.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“we are rescued not only from an extreme skepticism we are rescued from chasing our own tails around like puppies in that respect Vick and Stein represents a retreat from philosophical hubris”

0.56

The Investigations shows that understanding a term means being able to use it the way the community uses it; we test whether Johnny understands 'game' by observing his behavior—his use—not his internal mental states, making this a behaviorist theory of understanding.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“our standard for knowing where the Johnny understands the word game is his behavior and what this does it comes very very close to abolishing the mind or the psyche or the internal element in understanding in other words this theory of whether you understand the term game or not refers not at all to your mental experiences to your subjective understanding of it it refers to the way you behave”

0.56

A scholar who spent 20-30 years trying to find one quality common to all beautiful things (Beethoven's Ninth, Rembrandt's portraits, the Sistine Chapel) might discover that the difficulty is in the question itself: these things may not have anything intrinsically in common but rather share overlapping commonalities allowing rough reference.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“imagine someone that had spent a scholar spent his entire life trying to figure out what it is that makes beautiful things beautiful and he looked at Beethoven's Ninth Symphony he looked at Rembrandt's portraits he looked at the Sistine Chapel he looked at a number of things and racked his brain for a whole career twenty thirty forty years trying to figure out some quality that all these things have in common and the difficulty may be in the kind of question that we're asking they may not have anything intrinsically in common that unites all of them there may be a series of overlapping commonalities”

0.56

We teach the word 'game' to a child not by specifying an essential definition, but by giving examples: we teach the child peekaboo, card games, checkers, various games, and then we check understanding by observing whether the child uses the word appropriately for new cases or misapplies it to non-games like pencils.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“we teach Johnny peek we teach Johnny maybe a card game we teach Johnny how to play checkers we teach Johnny a number of games how do we know when Johnny understands the term game what we do is we look for some behavior some use on the part of Johnny that shows that he knows where it fits in in our language so for example if he starts writing his homework and he says this thing that I'm writing my homework with that's a game we say no Johnny you don't understand that's not a game that's a pencil”

0.56

Once Johnny learns how to use the word 'chair' and refers to things like that appropriately, Johnny understands what a chair is; this applies to all of language. Wittgenstein undeceives us and makes unambiguous things we thought were problems but are not—the problem lies not with the world or language but with unreasonable expectations.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“and once Johnny learns how to use the word chair and refers to things like that with it well then Johnny understands what a chair is and that is true not just for chairs but it's true for all of language and what he's done is undeceive us and make unambiguous things which we thought were problems but in fact are not problems the problem lies not with the world the problem lies not with language the problem lies with the unreasonable set of demands and expectations that we bring to it”

0.56

Retracting one's first and most widely known work is unprecedented in the history of philosophy and represents a great achievement in human self-criticism and rigorous intellectual honesty.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“The idea of a great philosopher a philosophy received enormous international notoriety retracting his first and most widely known work is unprecedented in the history of philosophy and one of the great achievements in human self criticism the capacity to be critical towards oneself as well as others the rigorous intellectual honesty is what comes out of the investigations and it is enormous ly impressive in that respect”

0.52

As an example of intellectual honesty, Ludwig Wittgenstein is without peer in the last 500 years of philosophy; he is one of the greatest thinkers and one of the greatest souls of all, and as an empirical personal fact, he was one of the loneliest and most distant of men.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“as an example of intellectual honesty Ludwig Vicki Stein is without peer in the last 500 years of philosophy one of the greatest thinkers and in that respect one of the greatest souls of all and as a matter of just empirical personal fact for him he was one of the loneliest and most I kind of put a distant of men”

0.52

Plato would object that family resemblance leaves inherent ambiguity: at the periphery, there will always be uncertainty about whether something falls under a term (is a doll's house chair a chair? is a boulder you sit on a chair?), and Plato demands absolute logical certainty or nothing.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“there's a problem here and Plato would be the first one to come back when that let's be fair to him he'd say look how do we know when we really understand something maybe Johnny is going to go out and misuse the word later on and there's an intrinsic ambiguity to defining things by example that is to say there's always going to be an uncertainty when you get to the peripheral examples of a game or a chair or anything else as to whether this falls under the rubric chair or game or not is a doll's house chair a chair well maybe is a throne a chair well I guess if you sit on a boulder is that a chair well kind of”

0.51

Scott Loeb Frager demanded complete logical rigor, saying a term that isn't defined perfectly is like an area in geometry without a perfect definition—if it isn't bounded completely, it's not an area, hence not a definition. Wittgenstein replies that this is unnecessary: 'stand roughly there' is perfectly comprehensible without Cartesian coordinates.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Vikki Stein says in a very memorable passage that some mathematician had tried to demand complete logical rigor his name was Scott Loeb Frager and he said that a term that isn't defined perfectly is like an area in geometry that has an imperfect definition if it's not bounded completely it's not an area which means is not a definition but Vicki's fences no that's not really true he asks is it nonsensical to say stand roughly there do I have to specify with Cartesian coordinates exactly what I want you to stand no stand roughly there I mean anybody that understands English was going to understand this”

0.48

Wittgenstein had both an extremely practical orientation toward his subject matter (from his engineering background) and a desire for mathematical rigor and formality, creating an unusual philosophical character combining engineering pragmatism with mathematical abstraction.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“he has both an extremely practical orientation towards his subject matter but also he has the desire from mathematical rigor and mathematical formality which lends to it a character which is not unlike anything else in the Western philosophical tradition”

0.34

The Tractatus caused a sensation among philosophers and secured Wittgenstein a professorship at Cambridge, with students and colleagues calling it an unprecedented breakthrough with definitive solutions to philosophical problems.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“Vidkun Stein's book when published created a tremendous sensation he got a professorship at Cambridge and he was lionized everywhere students and professors of philosophy said finally we've had a real breakthrough finally we've had someone who on his own could create new approaches to philosophical problems that were unprecedented”

0.29

The Tractatus is an exceedingly difficult book that requires taking a course in formal logic first and then dedicating six months to a year of study before understanding it—a serious commitment that most readers are unwilling or unable to make.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“it is surely one of the most difficult works in modern philosophy should any of you be brave enough to undertake a reading of it first take a course in formal logic and then prepare to give up six months or a year of your life that's not a joke perfectly serious”