What this covers

This is a 33-minute interview, recorded on 13 March 2026, in which host Anthony Fattouh talks with Rabobank strategist Michael Every. They read current US foreign policy as Mercantilism that fuses economics with geopolitics, replacing fifty years of "growth at all costs." Venezuela comes first, described as a warm-up: a left-aligned regime removed, its oil redirected north, and China, Russia and Iran denied a foothold in the US sphere. Iran is the harder case, because it chose to blockade the Strait of Hormuz rather than let itself be toppled. The conversation treats Iran as the control point for roughly a fifth of global oil flows, plus fertilizer, sulfur and helium.

The range then widens. On China, Every argues Beijing is ambivalent about backing Iran, since energy chaos would hurt its Asian customers and alienate Gulf partners such as Saudi Arabia. The Cold War serves as a model, with Cuban Missile Crisis tension followed by détente, and war is cast as a catalyst that puts everything on the table for a settlement. Fattouh offers a Japan-in-the-1980s template for nudging China from export manufacturing toward consumption. They also ask how Trump's peace positioning squares with escalation, and whether sunk-cost logic is keeping him committed.

The more contentious turns come later. Every argues that Europe lacks any grand strategy, with 27 states and a fossil-fuel dependence it cannot escape. He says markets cannot price strategic concepts, and that the Iran crisis produces a "multiverse" of binary outcomes rather than one. He also warns that losing would bring "disorder with no rules" rather than a return to the old rules-based order. The closing stretch asks what a negotiated successor system, Bretton Woods 3 (BW3)), might look like.

Sharpest takeaway

Trump's escalating confrontation with Iran represents a pivot point in grand macro strategy where control of Middle Eastern energy is the prerequisite for establishing a new global order (Bretton Woods 3) that favors the US, and failure to secure this control would signal irreversible American decline equivalent to the 1956 Suez Crisis.

  • Iran controls ~20% of global oil flows and 30% of fertilizer flows; whoever controls these resources controls the ability to divide the world into different economic blocs
  • If the US retreats from Iran despite commitment, it becomes like the UK and France post-Suez—unable to project power—making future coercion impossible and ending Western primacy
  • Winning in Iran enables Trump to establish a new negotiated world order (BW3) by entering great power negotiations with strong leverage; losing leaves the West in a multipolar world with diminished terms of trade

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0.76

In a worst-case scenario where Western power declines and prosperity contracts while inequality remains high, the result is a 'receding tide' where both rich and poor are harmed, which is 'messier' and more destabilizing than inequality in a growing economy.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“Imagine if we have a receding tide. Uh you know, going out and showing all the horrible detritus when the water recedes. That's the kind of prospect in a worst-case scenario you're looking at and most economies and societies, including some I've experienced firsthand in the past, deal very poorly with that kind of dramatic collapse both in power and in status and in aggregate well-being. You know, when the rich are doing badly and the poor are doing badly, it gets it gets really messy, even messier than when the rich rich are doing well and the poor aren't doing so well.”

0.73

Iran, together with the Middle East around it, controls approximately 20% of global oil flows and 30% of fertilizer flows, plus key sulfur and helium flows, making whoever controls that region capable of dividing the world into different economic blocks or systems.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“Iran, obviously, together with the Middle East around it, is around 20% of global oil flows, 30% of fertilizer flows, key sulfur and and helium flows, too. And whoever can control that really has the whip hand in terms of dividing the world into different blocks or different systems.”

0.71

Current global foreign policy has shifted from 50 years of prioritizing 'global economic growth at all costs' to mercantilism, where grand macro strategy (fusion of economic policy with grand geopolitical strategy) reigns supreme.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Anthony Fattouh

“while for the past 50 years, global foreign policy has prioritized global economic growth at all costs, this is now shifted back to the times of mercantilism, where grand macro strategy, a fusion of economic policy with grand geopolitical strategy, reigns supreme.”

0.69

War is 'often the catalyst' to achieve major geopolitical settlements because it forces all parties to put everything on the table in a 'big gamble,' making it possible to negotiate major prizes that would otherwise be impossible.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“War is often the catalyst to achieve these kind of things. But it can get worse because if Trump escalates to try and extricate himself from this unfavorable terms. And Russia escalates, which has now got more money in his pocket. And China opts to escalate. For example, starting to move forces around in Asia. Well, while Trump is tied down in the Middle East. Then we are moving towards at least market worries about WW3. Rather than BW3. But very often you have to go to the edge before you resolve something. And it's only when everything is on the table in a big gamble that you actually walk away with the biggest prize.”

0.69

The Cold War included periods of dramatic tension like the Cuban Missile Crisis (where the world nearly ended), followed by détente where Soviets and Americans 'got along pretty well because they scared each other silly,' which could be a model for the current Cold War II.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“within the Cold War we had periods of dramatic tension like the Cuban Missile Crisis and we're in that kind of territory now. And then after that we had detente. We had detente for quite a few years where the Soviets and the Americans got along pretty well because they scared each other silly during the Cuban Missile Crisis when the world nearly came to an end.”

0.63

Europe lacks a grand macro strategy because it has 27 member states (plus EU Commission), each with separate interests, leaving it unable to respond cohesively to the shifting great power competition around it.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“Europe's got a real problem, obviously, and the primary one is this. Um it doesn't have a grand macro strategy. Because there are 27 members of Europe, so it has 27 grand macro strategies, and 28 if you then count the European Commission, which doesn't speak for everybody on all things at all times. So, until that is addressed, and that's a huge conversation in and of itself, Europe is increasingly cognizant that this is all happening around them, but it's not capable yet of addressing this multiplicity of conflating threats.”

0.63

Even if Europe wants to achieve 'fortress Europe' by decoupling from the US, China, and Russia, it cannot eliminate fossil fuel dependency for military operations on any realistic timeframe, leaving it structurally unable to achieve energy independence.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“That will leave only one that can fill the gap. And were Europe to feel, okay, we need to decouple from the US, and we need to, you know, arm ourselves against Russia, and and we need to, you know, put up barriers against China, so it's only fortress Europe. Okay, great. Where do you get your energy from? Because they will, you know, they will be fossil fuel imports alongside green energy, for sure. That's that's a unrealistic timeframe to think Europe suddenly doesn't need fossil fuels. Military's run on them, for a start.”

0.63

Kolanovic focuses on 'the real economy' and 'the actual world around us' rather than abstract markets, arguing that understanding the concepts in people's heads is necessary to predict actions that affect real material conditions.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“we are focused on the real economy. We are focused on the actual world around us. It's just that you have to understand the concepts that are in people's heads in order to predict what the actions are going to be, which will end up with the consequences which you feel in your pocket and on the supermarket shelves around you.”

0.59

Many countries are caught between multiple hegemons ('between two stools'), facing very difficult circumstances because they cannot escape dependence on imports from whichever great power controls key commodities, making the geopolitical restructuring extremely dangerous for middle powers.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“So, that's just one example of many, but it leaves many countries, and and many of them are within Europe, but not only Europe, other other areas are are caught between two stools, too. Who are going to have a very, very difficult time in this environment.”

0.57

Marko Kolanovic has been warning about the shifting global economic system, trade wars, global fragmentation, and resurgence of economic statecraft for over a decade.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Anthony Fattouh

“Marko's been warning about the shifting global economic system, trade wars, global fragmentation, and resurgence of economic statecraft for over a decade.”

0.57

Markets 'like to trade binaries' (yes/no outcomes) but the Iran crisis creates 'multiple or multiverse scenarios' with different binary outcomes (very positive or very negative) depending on which path dominates, making it difficult for markets to price.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Marko Kolanovic

“Markets don't like it because they like to trade binaries. Yes, no. And this is multiple or multiverse scenarios. Uh and they are binary to an extent. One of them is incredibly positive and one of them is incredibly negative but there are lots of ways that that can transpire and what you buy and what you sell in those particular environments is very different.”

0.53

At the time of speaking, Iran has chosen to blockade the Strait of Hormuz rather than allowing itself to be toppled as a regime, which has placed the US in a much more difficult position than a successful Venezuela-style regime change.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Marko Kolanovic

“That obviously hasn't happened, to summarize at the time of speaking. Iran is instead blockading Hormuz.”

0.52

Markets cannot price the geopolitical and grand macro strategy concepts that determine actual state behavior, so they are unable to properly price assets during periods of strategic transition, and markets are focused on day-to-day transactional reality rather than the conceptual frameworks that drive long-term outcomes.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“But markets of course have some inkling of this, but that's not how they can price for these things, and day-to-day that's not how you can transact or or do business. It's just something to consider conceptually.”

0.52

Venezuela was a warm-up exercise in which the US successfully removed a left-aligned regime, preventing China from gaining easy access to Venezuelan oil and commodities that can now flow north to the US, while also denying Russia, Iran, and China a presence in a country within the US sphere of influence.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“Venezuela was the warm-up and a very successfully executed warm-up... it wasn't just about the Don Roe doctrine in Latin America, which it is. It was also about denying China easy access to the oil and commodities that were in Venezuela, which can now flow north to the US... The key point is it could then threaten to coerce China with that. As well as gaining greater national security because Russia, Iran, China were not going to be present in a country within its backyard.”

0.52

Bretton Woods 3 (BW3) is a potential new global order where major powers negotiate their spheres of influence, economic models (consumer vs. producer), and interdependencies explicitly, establishing symmetric vulnerability so no single power can dominate, replacing the post-WWII rules-based system.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“the biggest powers in the world will sit down and say, "Okay, what are my key interests? What areas of the world do I feel I really have to have influence over or de facto control over? What do I want my economic model to look like? Am I a consumer? Am I a producer? Am I an importer? Am I an exporter? How do we give everyone a sense of security so that they don't feel they're going to be toppled or attacked, which is very important. But how do we have that politically? So internally, geopolitically between each other, and geo-economically, so that for example, one country doesn't feel that it relies entirely on the other for something. But both of them rely on the other one for something that leaves them both vulnerable.”

0.52

If the US retreats from Iran now, even if oil prices decline, the US would position itself as equivalent to the UK and France in the 1956 Suez Crisis, which ended them as independent great powers—making it impossible for the US to project coercive power in the future because markets would sell off and the US would lack credibility.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“If it retreats from here now, even if oil prices go down, and everyone breathes a sigh of relief, the US would have shown itself to be effectively the same as the UK and France in 1956 in the Suez crisis, which ended them as great powers independently. You wouldn't be able to do this kind of thing again anywhere where it mattered, because markets would sell off, and that's it. The US wouldn't act.”

0.52

The traditional free market assumption that trade interdependence prevents conflict ('if we broke it, it would be bad') is insufficient; countries must explicitly understand and negotiate symbiotic relationships (e.g., 'I provide food, you provide energy'), otherwise they may attempt to secure both independently, breaking the relationship.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“How do we have that politically? So internally, geopolitically between each other, and geo-economically, so that for example, one country doesn't feel that it relies entirely on the other for something. But both of them rely on the other one for something that leaves them both vulnerable. Which is traditionally how free market thinking assumes the world works, that we all just trust each other because if we broke it, it would be bad. Well, sometimes you actually need to explain that. Like, I will provide you with food, you will provide me with energy. So if that breaks down for example, you don't have energy. And I don't have food. And both of us are in deep, deep trouble. So we know we have that symbiotic relationship, but it only comes from a kind of paranoia rather than coming from this natural belief that uh hey, that's just free trade. That's just how it works. Because that isn't how it works always. And very often you can find countries which start with that relationship and then shift it around to try and make sure that they have both energy and food for example, or that they don't import either from the other country.”

0.49

China is currently ambivalent about backing Iran because escalation would create global energy/commodity chaos that would harm Asian economies China exports to, alienate Gulf allies (Saudi Arabia, UAE), and push regional instability that would reduce demand for Chinese goods.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Marko Kolanovic

“I think they were taken aback by Venezuela, the audacity of it. And then even though it was much easier to see that Iran was coming cuz again, the fleet was moved there, etc. I think again, they don't know quite what to do because their traditional instinct would be, okay, we vociferously back Iran. Okay, well, where will that lead? If you understand the way that I see it, that the US cannot afford to back off. You're escalating on every front. And you're creating global chaos, or at least you're not helping resolve global chaos, even if the US instigated it, which will drag down most of the Asian economy with it. And if you're China, even if you're well insulated with energy supplies, which you are, you don't have all the chemicals which flow out of the Gulf, so you still have issues with fertilizer, you still have issues with uh helium, which you need to semiconductors, you still have issues with sulfur, which will push up the cost of metals globally, particularly copper. And also, all the Asian economies you want to export to, uh as well as others, it won't only be Asia by any means, they suffer badly, so they can't afford to buy your products anymore. So, indirectly, you still get hit by it.”

0.48

The theoretical framework of 'statecraft vs. policy' that Kolanovic has discussed for years—previously sounding 'dry, technical, and wonkish'—now has direct real-economy consequences: 'no petrol in the pump, no diesel in the Bowser, no food on the shelves.'

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“recognize that what was talked about in previous conversations as a theoretical framework of what Trump may or may not try and do and state craft versus policy, which all sounded very dry and very technical, very wonkish, it can suddenly mean there's no petrol in the pump, no diesel in the Bowser, no food on the shelves in a in a worst-case scenario. And that's what it actually actually means.”

0.48

The cards (leverage) a country brings to great power negotiations determine 'how much of the pot you take walking out,' which is why Iran is critical: if the US enters negotiations without Middle East control, its hand is much weaker; with it, the hand is very strong.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“And the cards you have in your hand going into that discussion will determine how much of the pot you take walking out. Which is why Iran is so critical. The US, if they have to go into that conversation absent Iran, absent the Middle East, they have much, much weaker hand. If they go in there with Iran and the Middle East oil in their pocket, uh then well, that's a very, very strong hand. And so that's what this is all about at the end of the day.”

0.48

If Trump loses the Iran confrontation, people hoping the rules-based order would return are mistaken; instead they would face 'disorder with no rules,' which would be worse than what Magonomics (MAGA-oriented economic statecraft) would produce.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“if you think it's good that Trump might lose here because you don't like Magonomics, which I can understand. Actually, there's nothing good waiting for you on the other side if Magonomics loses, because it won't be replaced by the rules-based order. It will be replaced by disorder with no rules.”

0.48

The US approach to China should involve encouraging China to transition from export-led manufacturing to a consumer economy, similar to what happened to Japan in the 1980s, which would involve currency strengthening and limitations on manufacturing expansion to create a more balanced economic model.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Anthony Fattouh (host)

“the US would want China to do something like what happened in to Japan in the '80s, where it's like, 'Okay, you you know, maybe let your currency strengthen, you sort of try and have these not limitations, but it's not a expand manufacturing or costs.'”

0.45

Trump may be willing to absorb market uncertainty and pain in the short term because he is already committed and cannot back down without showing weakness, similar to a sunk-cost dynamic where continued investment in a losing strategy seems better than retreat.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Anthony Fattouh

“It is the markets. It is how how much pain is he willing to take and as you said maybe he's already gone uh you know sunk cost he's committed too much. He can't back down.”

0.45

Trump's first presidency promoted peace (no wars started), but his current strategy requires military escalation, which contradicts his peace positioning—though Kolanovic argues this is compatible with Trump's underlying imperative to find a 'new modus vivendi' with China and Russia.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Marko Kolanovic

“if we look at the Trump's first presidency, he was, you know, he labeled himself the peace president. There were no wars. He sort of like went ran on that as a during the during the most recent sort of president's president's election. So, where was the shift? Was it just the evolution of the strategy...Well, look, people will have their own interpretation, and we all have to be cognizant that this will damage Trump politically in terms of being able to say I never started any wars, because he he absolutely did with this one. But, it isn't necessarily completely incompatible with what I genuinely believe is his underlying uh imperative, which is to try and find a new modus vivendi which suits the US better with China, with Russia, with others”

0.42

Trump Accountability Coverage Over (TACO) narratives claiming withdrawal represents success are less likely than genuine retreat, and if retreat occurs, it will be presented as 'the best we could do but we're going home because energy prices are too high'—a far-down outcome on Kolanovic's list of probabilities.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Marko Kolanovic

“I think TACO is less likely than people think even if some people may try and dress some outcomes up as TACO having because they've said that will happen. They don't want to, you know, back away from that. But I think on on the on the on the underlying basis a genuine US retreat and saying, 'Well, that's the best we could do, but we're going home because energy prices are too high.' That's that's pretty far down my list of outcomes. It definitely is.”

0.41

If Trump wins in Iran, BRICS narratives and 'anything but the US dollar' positioning become 'much less likely on the actual map' because losing members and regional influence reduces the coalition's viability.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Marko Kolanovic

“how do you feel about BRICS narratives as one by one you start striking off members? Uh and if Trump also flips Cuba, which they're talking about, by the way, in the background, they say that happens in other few weeks, at least you know, mega circles do. Okay, so let's say all that happens. Are you still going to continue to say BRICS is the future and anything but the US dollar is the future? Well, you can, but it looks much less likely on the actual map.”

0.37

Kolanovic is 'very happy to be discussing these things because the more different views and inputs you get into your thinking, the better your thinking is,' emphasizing intellectual humility and epistemic pluralism.

normativeestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Marko Kolanovic

“I'm very, very happy to be discussing these things because the more different views and inputs you get into your thinking, the better your thinking is.”

0.32

The grand macro argument about Iran flows through to macro market outcomes, which further flows to micro outcomes (which individual companies do well), requiring analysis at multiple levels.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Marko Kolanovic

“this is a much larger meta argument that I'm making, but it does flow through the macro. And of course, there's a micro component in terms of which individual companies are going to do well, which I can't address here, but is clearly part of it.”

0.32

Saudi Arabia was already scaling back its mega projects, suggesting regional economic uncertainty is already affecting capital allocation and investment decisions independent of the Iran crisis outcome.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Marko Kolanovic

“Though Saudi Arabia was already scaling back its mega projects. So, okay, that's one another question.”

0.17

Kolanovic has argued publicly that Iran is the pivot point for Trump's strategy, and this argument is developed systematically throughout multiple conversations, not something new in this discussion.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Marko Kolanovic

“I've argued this point in public before, it is the pivot point for everything that Trump is trying to achieve as part of his grand macro strategy.”