What this covers

This Citi panel brings together five speakers: David Birch, Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, Andrew McCormack, [Harish Natarajan] and Julie Monaco. They test the case for CBDC from several angles: central bank motives, the commercial and geopolitical stakes, and the practical design choices. The framing is that fintechs, banks, big techs and central banks are all building toward always-on payments. The discussion keeps asking what problem a digital central bank currency would actually solve. It starts from the decline of cash, a trend that predates COVID-19, and from the argument that cash imposes diffuse social costs and hits the poorest hardest.

The sharpest disagreement concerns financial inclusion. Natarajan argues that CBDC offers no clear advantage over agent banking, tiered KYC) and e-money providers, which together have lifted account access by as much as 50 percentage points in some countries. He also says decentralized CBDC models depend on the same private sector they are meant to improve on. Mancini-Griffoli describes the hybrid model, in which the private sector faces customers while the central bank regulates, and lists the open design questions: interest, anonymity, technology and transaction limits. He also covers disintermediation and bank-run worries, and argues that being first does not secure currency dominance. McCormack stresses starting from users and use cases, treating privacy as a dial, and having a deliberate strategy for cashlessness, citing Sweden. Monaco's contribution is the multipronged agenda of digital identity, data sharing and cross-border payment integration.

The geopolitical thread is the most contested. Birch reads the People's Bank of China's DCEP as long-term strategy, not a reaction to Libra. He ties it to the Belt and Road Initiative, to less dependence on the dollar, and to a return to the offline peer-to-peer vision of Mondex. Natarajan adds that it also reclaims payments from Alipay and WeChat Pay. Birch further argues that wider use of alternative currencies would erode US sanctions power. The panel also considers why emerging markets face a harder risk-benefit calculation, since their capital markets are thinner and their policy tools weaker.

Sharpest takeaway

Central bank digital currencies are not a silver bullet solution to payment system problems, but rather one complementary tool among many—including digital identity, payment infrastructure reform, and financial inclusion strategies—that must be thoughtfully designed around societal needs rather than technological capabilities.

  • CBDC alone does not solve financial inclusion, identity, or open banking; multiple coordinated reforms are required
  • Technology should follow societal/political choices about privacy and control, not lead them
  • Different economies have different catalysts and needs; there is no one-size-fits-all CBDC design

The claims · ranked40 claims · weighted by value

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0.80

The international monetary and financial system was constructed after World War II to serve post-war conditions with the U.S. as approximately one-third of the global economy, but times have changed and circumstances now call for rethinking that system's design and governance.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· David Birch

“we're in an international money and financial system that was constructed after the Second World War to meet the... Which were incredibly successful at meeting the needs of the time and rebuilding global economies and facilitating global trade. But that was from a time when the U.S. was a third of the globe. You know, times have changed. It's time to rethink that.”

0.78

Decentralized CBDC models (both synthetic/e-money and banking/intermediary variants) create a fundamental contradiction: they rely on private sector interests for distribution, yet advocates dismiss private sector solutions as inadequate for inclusion—resulting in hypocrisy when the same private sector is then expected to solve inclusion through CBDC distribution.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Harish Natarajan

“The big advantage of CBDC is a solution to address financial inclusion, you are ruling out the whole private sector in solving financial inclusion, and now you are then relying on private sector to distribute CBDC... I think there's a dichotomy of saying... at the one side, you say, you cannot rely on the existing approaches which are based on the private sector, and then you'll say you want to move to CBDC, but then again you would rely on the private sector. So, I think there's a dichotomy there.”

0.75

In emerging markets with underdeveloped capital markets and interbank lending infrastructure, the tools to mitigate CBDC-related risks (such as extraordinary monetary policy tools) are weaker and less effective than in developed economies, making the risk-benefit calculation for CBDC adoption higher for developing nations.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Harish Natarajan

“those are based on central banks kind of being extraordinary monetary policy tools. And then also the banks, they're using other social funding, like capital markets or interbank lending and so on, which are not developed in the emerging markets to begin. So, you have a situation where neither is necessarily a boon approach, and then you also have the risks, which mitigating those risks in the emerging market might be more difficult”

0.75

The People's Bank of China CBDC (DCEP) was not a knee-jerk reaction to Libra but rather part of a long-term strategic plan to improve Chinese economic efficiency and extend Chinese soft power through the Belt and Road Initiative and reduce dependence on the dollar for international transactions.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“I certainly wouldn't want people to get the impression that was some sort of knee-jerk reaction to the launch of Libra. I mean, the People's Bank of China doesn't do knee-jerk reactions to anything. They're not like our banks. They have a plan. They have a strategy for things, so it's a little bit different. They've been working on this for a long time... They have a long-term plan to improve the efficiency of the Chinese economy. And to extend Chinese soft power, it's a perfectly reasonable goal out along the Belt and Road and into other countries and reduce dependence on the dollar for international transactions.”

0.75

To achieve the societal goals of cheap, fast, reliable, accountable, and transparent payments, the solutions involve improving digital identity infrastructure, data sharing standards, and cross-border payment infrastructure integration—many of which are necessary conditions but insufficient alone, requiring a multipronged approach.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Julie Monaco

“we want it to be transparent, what is stopping, from a policy standpoint or from an institutional standpoint, us aggressively improving digital identity, data sharing, cross-border retail payment infrastructure, integration, the things that enable us and enable the global economy? What's keeping us from doing that?”

0.75

An increasing number of central banks are considering public-private partnerships (synthetic or hybrid CBDC models) where the private sector handles customer interfacing, issuance of coins, and transaction settlement, while the central bank handles regulation, licensing, and ensuring trust—allowing safer, more liquid payment instruments without requiring central banks to absorb all operational costs and risks.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli

“an increasing number of central banks are considering a public-private partnership to offer these digital currencies... So, the idea is that the private sector has a comparative advantage in innovating and interfacing with the customer... And the central bank would be... What is it's comparative advantage? Well, it's comparative advantage is regulating and ensuring trust in the system... The firms issuing tokens would be supervised by the central bank. And, in a way, that would be a way to offer a very safe, very liquid payment instrument, digital payment instrument to the public that is fully backed with central bank reserves, but at the same time not exposing the central bank to the same cost risks”

0.75

People who are forced to remain in a cash economy bear the highest costs—paying more for everything, being vulnerable to theft and loss, unable to access online deals and advantages of digital commerce—making cash not merely inconvenient but economically harmful to the poor.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“the least well-off people pay the highest costs. Being trapped in a cash economy is not cheap. If you're trapped in a cash economy, you have to pay more for everything. You're more vulnerable. You're the person who gets mugged or the cash gets lost or stolen or whatever. You're the person that can't get the good online deals for things. I mean, it's not a neutral thing, people being stuck in a cash economy. It's a bad thing.”

0.75

First-mover advantage in CBDC adoption may not translate to long-term currency dominance because the factors determining which currencies are used widely and held as reserves (institutional stability, market depth) do not change from one day to the next with the introduction of digital forms of money.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli

“Some people think that there's a first-mover advantage to central banks introducing CBDC, and that that might induce other central banks to follow suit. And the argument is that, if you're a first-mover, your currency then gets adopted more widely. But I think it's important to remember that there are reasons for currencies to be used widely. There are reasons for currencies to be considered reserve currencies, and those have a lot to do with institutional stability, market depth. And these are not things that are gonna change from one day to the next with the mere introduction of a digital form of money.”

0.74

CBDC design must begin with users and use cases in mind—considering individual use cases, corporate use cases, and cross-border use cases—rather than with technical possibilities, and user experience must be thoughtfully designed for CBDC to succeed.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Andrew McCormack

“Any design, any product design, whether it be CBDC or anything else, should start with users in mind, right? Who are the users? Is it individuals? Are there corporate use cases that need to be contemplated? Is there cross-border use cases that need to be contemplated? Those are the kinds of issues that we're grappling with... The user experience, right? It's the users and use cases and the experience that have to be really thoughtfully designed”

0.73

CBDC does not offer a superior solution to the three root causes of financial exclusion (cost to sell, cost to access, utility perception) compared to existing proven approaches, and therefore cannot be justified as a financial inclusion strategy without demonstrating specific advantages over agent banking, tiered KYC, and e-money non-banks.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Harish Natarajan

“when you look at CBDC as a strategy to expand financial inclusion, one has to see whether it is really superior to these approaches. And what are these three problems we have mentioned-- cost to sell, cost to access, and utility-- which one of them does CBDC really address in a promising way? And the answer, actually, is no, specifically with respect of financial inclusion.”

0.71

There is no single market failure for which CBDC is the only solution; rather, CBDC can help address multiple distinct market failures (payment system concentration, barriers to financial inclusion, contestability concerns) that can also be solved through other targeted reforms like antitrust action, but CBDC offers some additional benefits that may tip the scales in its favor.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli

“The answer is no. There's no single market failure for which CBDC is the only solution. I think that there are a series of market failures... The concentration of the payment system in the hands of a few private companies... barriers to market contestability... financial inclusion... these can all be solved by separate reforms... But it just so happens that CBDC can also help. And it just so happens that some of these reforms are difficult to implement. And so, I think, the argument for CBDC is not that it is the one answer to one or several frictions or problems, but that it does help along these lines”

0.70

If individuals want to fully understand CBDC possibilities, they need to understand cryptographic techniques like zero-knowledge proofs, cryptographic lining, and homomorphic encryption—concepts that are highly counterintuitive to those accustomed to physical currency but enable capabilities not previously possible.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· David Birch

“the possibilities that are put in front of us, because of cryptography and advances in cryptography, are quite counterintuitive. If you don't understand that space, it's quite hard to explain to people what can be done using zero-knowledge proofs and cryptographic lining and homomorphic encryption. It's very counterintuitive if you live in a world of dollar bills and index cards”

0.69

There are multiple design questions that central banks must resolve for CBDCs with no current consensus, including: whether CBDC should carry interest rates, what level of anonymity it should have, what technology should underpin it, and what transaction limits (if any) should exist.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli

“There are lots of design questions that need to be solved. Should CBDC carry interest rates? Should it be anonymous or not? And to what extent should it be anonymous? What technology should it use? And for the most part, pilots have not used distributed ledger technology, although central banks are interested in this technology. Whether it should carry limits, et cetera. And there's certainly no consensus on this.”

0.69

Central banks are concerned that CBDCs could cause banking sector disintermediation—where deposit holders withdraw from banks to hold central bank digital currency instead—which would unfund banks and destabilize the banking system, particularly in crisis periods through bank runs.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli

“banking sector disintermediation, the fact that holders of deposits in the banking system might withdraw deposits to hold central bank digital currency. And that would unfund the banks. That's a big concern. That's a concern in normal times. The equivalent concern in crisis times is run risk, the risk that, of course, if there's concern about the stability of the banking system, you would see large shifts away from bank deposits to central bank digital currencies.”

0.69

The decline of cash as a payment instrument, a trend predating COVID-19, is a key driver of central bank interest in CBDCs, creating a need for digital payment alternatives to prevent financial exclusion as physical currency becomes less available.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Andrew McCormack

“The decline of cash, even pre-COVID, was a noted trend and certainly one of the key drivers. Financial inclusion. Disintermediation and bank runs are key concerns in the design of these systems and obviously public-private partnerships in terms of implementation.”

0.69

A global three-pronged approach has been shown to effectively address financial inclusion: agent-based banking models (expanding the distribution solution), tiered KYC (simplifying customer due diligence requirements), and basic bank accounts combined with direct provisioning of payment services by non-bank entities using e-money constructs, which have together produced rapid progress with some countries achieving 50-percentage-point increases in account access.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Harish Natarajan

“there's a three-pronged approach to address this, and all of them have to, of course, work together for it to be effective. The first one is of our Asian-based models for expanding the solution... The second one is on tiered KYC... And then the third one is about basic bank accounts and direct publishing of payment services by non-bank entities using e-money construct... All these three, when you put them together, have had significant policy impact... And in some sense, it has also been a very rapid progress. If you look at the (indistinct) for 2011, just 50% of adults had access to bank accounts globally. And in 2017, just 69%... countries which implemented this strategy, the increase has been all 50 percentage points.”

0.69

The high-level business case for domestic CBDC has two parts: reducing costs in the economy by eliminating friction from cash (e.g., physical handling, distribution), and reducing overall total social cost of payments since cash is very expensive and those costs are diffuse and often invisible to consumers.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“the high-level business case for domestic central bank digital currency, it breaks into two parts. To what extent does it reduce costs in the economy? To what extent does it reduce the overall total social cost of payments? Cash is very expensive, and because the costs are diffuse, people don't really see them, but it is a friction in the economy.”

0.69

Central banking institutions move slowly and deliberately on payment system upgrades because of the critical importance of these systems to economic stability and integrity; this caution is a feature not a bug, as hasty implementation of poorly-designed systems would create systemic risk.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Andrew McCormack

“I represent part of this ecosystem that is famous for not moving super quickly on anything. And usually there's a pretty good reason for that, which is around the stability and integrity of these systems, which are so fundamental and foundational to any economy, right? So, these movements into new methods of payment, especially ones with tectonic shifts associated with them, have to be measured and really well thought out... guilty as charged, but I think everyone would agree that the prudence and the stability aspects have to be well thought out so that it's not a half-baked solution”

0.69

Allowing cashlessness to develop through natural private sector drivers in developed markets (Sweden example) has led to suboptimal outcomes with marginalized and excluded populations, suggesting policymakers need a deliberate strategy around cashlessness rather than allowing it to happen organically.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Andrew McCormack

“where we've just allowed cashlessness to happen, it's not been the optimal outcome. By just allowing cashless, driven by natural private sector drivers, we end up with people who are marginalized and excluded. And that's not what we want.”

0.69

Privacy in digital payments must be calibrated as a dial, not binary; jurisdictions vary significantly in data privacy regulations and political tolerance for surveillance, requiring context-specific privacy design decisions.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Andrew McCormack

“the privacy dials need to be set, and that's kind of one of the key discussion points of CBDCs in our report and our work in general. Where to set them? Jurisdictions vary greatly in terms of the prevailing data privacy regulations, and obviously there's a political tolerance and a societal influence on where that might ultimately lead in any given particular country.”

0.69

Digital IDs are a complementary but essential reform: without digital ID infrastructure, the best payment systems and cross-border rails cannot function because you cannot onboard users onto systems if you cannot identify them.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli

“Yes, we should invest in developing digital IDs. And we know that without digital IDs, we're not gonna be able to solve the problems of cross-border payment or access to cross-border payments or access to payments. So, you could have the best payment system or the best cross-border rails in the world, but if there's no national ID, no digital ID, if you can't get people onto these rails, then they're not gonna be useful.”

0.68

If people worldwide use alternative digital currencies, it would reduce the ability of the United States to project soft power through the dollar clearing system and the New York money centers, and through control of that system (e.g., sanctions), described by The Economist as 'financial carpet bombing.'

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“the ability of the United States to project soft power through the dollar clearing system, and particularly the New York money centers... and through the secondary implications of control over that system, sanctions and so on... I mean, 'The Economist' called it financial carpet bombing, which I think is an interesting description. That's their words, not mine.”

0.68

China's CBDC development also represents domestically a reclamation of central bank and commercial bank roles in payments, since payments in China have been largely captured by two big tech companies (Alipay, WeChat Pay) over the past 15 years.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Harish Natarajan

“It's also true that the central bank in China was-- or payments in general in China were largely overtaken by two big tech companies over the past 15 years. And so, this move also represents, domestically, an opportunity to get central banks and commercial banks back in the game.”

0.68

The People's Bank of China's DCEP (digital currency/electronic payment) reconnects with the original Mondex vision from 25 years ago by enabling offline person-to-person value transfers, which is crucial for a true cash replacement since it allows direct payment without requiring bank accounts or intermediaries.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“The crucially important point about the People's Bank of China pilots, about the DCEP, is that it reconnects with that original Mondex vision from 25 years ago in that it allows offline person-to-person value transfers. And the importance of that cannot be overlooked. If you're going to implement a true cash replacement-- so I can send money to Julie, not my bank account sending money to Julie's bank account-- Julie could choose to put the money in a bank account if she wants to. She doesn't have to.”

0.68

CBDC implementation must move beyond the restriction to banks (as in Mondex era) to ubiquity across phones, cars, laptops—a "Facebook route" where digital cash is truly everywhere—otherwise it changes nothing about distribution.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“now, you'd never dream of having that restricted to banks. Because if you're gonna go down...I'll label it the 'Facebook route.' If you're gonna go down this route of issuing central bank digital cash to be an actual cash replacement, then you want it everywhere. I mean, it should be in my phone, in my car, in my laptop. I mean, it shouldn't be just in a bank account. That would get us nowhere. That wouldn't do anything.”

0.64

Central banks around the world have shifted from asking 'if' they will implement CBDCs to asking 'when,' with a majority now actively exploring, piloting, or investigating digital currency possibilities rather than dismissing the concept entirely.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli

“if you had asked that question about a year ago, I would've told you it's all about 'if.' The winds have turned, and there's a majority of central banks that are not necessarily saying that they will do this, but there's a majority of central banks that are dabbling, that are learning about central bank digital currencies”

0.64

The U.S. has a peculiarly inefficient financial infrastructure with total social costs of payments far too high, and ironically still printed and mailed stimulus checks in 2020 despite being an advanced economy, while Colombia successfully distributed stimulus electronically through mobile wallets.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· David Birch

“The U.S. has a peculiarly inefficient financial infrastructure. I mean, the total social costs of payments in the U.S. are far too high. And as an outsider, it does seem funny that they would... You know, it's 2020, and they were printing stimulus checks and mailing them out to people. Dead people at that, as well. Whereas I watched a fantastic video from Better Than Cash Org the other day about what was done in Colombia, where the government wanted to do stimulus. And basically they encouraged people to go out and get mobile wallets and they distributed the money largely electronically.”

0.64

Central governments around the world struggled to deliver fiscal stimulus to citizens quickly during COVID-19 because they lacked infrastructure to reach unbanked populations efficiently, creating both a practical and humanitarian motivation for CBDC as a direct-distribution mechanism.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Julie Monaco

“We've seen unprecedented actions by central governments around the world in terms of fiscal stimulus programs and trying to put money directly into the hands of individuals. And I think if you look at that government by government, you saw that certain governments struggled to get funding to citizens very quickly, especially if they did not have an infrastructure to reach unbanked citizens, which are often the most vulnerable citizens that they're trying to reach.”

0.63

Run risk and disintermediation concerns are increasingly downplayed by central banks due to deposit insurance effectiveness and empirical observation that large runs on banks have not occurred despite existing safe liquid assets like government bonds being available outside the banking sector.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli

“Interestingly, this is actually a concern that is starting to be downplayed by a lot of central banks because of deposit insurance, the ability of deposit insurance in many countries. And the fact that we've seen in a lot of countries that there hasn't been large runs on banks despite the already existing very safe and liquid assets to hold outside of the banking sector.”

0.63

Mondex was a failed early digital currency initiative from 25 years ago; M-Pesa in Kenya became a major success in financial inclusion and is the single most important initiative for genuine financial inclusion at scale.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“one of which which didn't work and one of which which did. And the one that didn't work was Mondex, which was based in the U.K. but also in the U.S. and Canada and Australia. And for one reason or another, which we're not gonna go into, it never got traction. And the other was M-Pesa down in Kenya, which became a success beyond anybody's wildest dreams, and as Harish has mentioned, is probably the single most important initiative in terms of bringing genuine financial inclusion that we've seen.”

0.63

Financial exclusion is a major development challenge in emerging markets and developing economies, with only 60% of adults having access to a bank account in lower and middle-income countries compared to 93.7% in advanced economies, and the gap is even wider when measuring actual usage of accounts for payments, savings, credit, insurance, and investments.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Harish Natarajan

“Very clearly financial exclusion is a very clear development and policy challenge for central banks and public authorities in emerging markets. Just to quote a piece of statistic, the kind of... with access to an account in lower and middle income countries, and it's 60% versus 93.7% in advanced economies. And the gap is even wider if you start looking at the usage of accounts for making payments. Savings, credit, insurance, and investments, all of them. The gap is like almost like a half of the advanced economies in the emerging markets.”

0.61

For developed economies with high banking penetration (Denmark example: everybody has a bank account and digital ID, no one uses cash), introducing CBDC would make no difference to average citizens since they already conduct all transactions digitally through mobile phones and cards.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“what would central bank digital currency do for a developed economy? I would've picked the U.K. I don't feel very developed at the moment, but let's say, I don't know, Denmark, right? So, everybody in Denmark has a bank account. Everybody in Denmark has a digital ID. The introduction of central bank digital currency to the average Dane won't make any difference, right? Because nobody uses cash anyway.”

0.60

Money laundering was significantly disrupted when businesses closed during COVID-19 lockdowns, which raised the question of whether legitimate business could continue during crises without physical currency, suggesting digital currency could help reduce money laundering by making all transactions visible.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Julie Monaco

“we've often talked about digital currency and dematerializing money as a way to stop money laundering. And there were reports that, when businesses closed down when we were at the end of March and early April in a complete shutdown almost globally in terms of businesses, that there was a huge disruption to money laundering and that it was impossible for money laundering to happen, which I think raised the idea of, if legitimate business continued during the COVID crisis, do we really need physical currency?”

0.56

Police raids in England recently broke a criminal encryption chat application, arrested ~350 people, and seized £57 million in physical cash, but found no Bitcoin USB sticks or prepaid debit cards—revealing that criminals still predominantly use physical cash despite having access to digital alternatives.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· David Birch

“There was big, big set of police raids. It was a big story in England yesterday. The police broke some encryption chat application that criminals were using, and they arrested - like 350 people yesterday. And they found £57 million in cash. I can tell you what they didn't find. They didn't find Bitcoin USB sticks or prepaid debit cards. What they found was massive piles of good, old fashioned cash that was handed to them by the Bank of England.”

0.56

The present moment is 'digital currency time' (analogous to 'steam engine time' in the industrial revolution) not because of any single catalyst but because multiple converging factors (technological advances, geopolitical shifts, cash decline, financial inclusion needs) have simultaneously aligned to make CBDCs timely.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· David Birch

“the reason why we're getting digital currency now is... Historians talk about steam engine time. They say, 'Why did we get steam engines in England at that part of the 18th century?' And you can point to all sorts of things-- the fuel and the advances in technology and the availability of capital. You can point to all of these things, but the truth is it was no one thing. We got steam engines because it was steam engine time. And this is digital currency time. There's no one reason. It's all of those things coming together”

0.56

While digital currencies may permeate local economies (people will use them alongside local currencies), this does not mean people will entirely stop using local currency; the word 'permeation' better describes the outcome than 'substitution,' and such permeation may have positive welfare effects in some countries where local currency management is weak.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· David Birch

“The word I prefer, the word I used in my book was 'permeation.' So, it isn't that people are gonna stop using the local currency and start using digital dollars or digital yuan, but those currencies will permeate the local economies, and that will cause all sorts of problems for the management of those economies...there is some good research evidence that the availability of strong stable currencies in some of those environments is actually to the net welfare.”

0.52

In Bank of England CBDC benefit calculations, the net benefit to the economy comes much more from enabling new products and services built on CBDC as a platform rather than from cost savings, making the platform/innovation benefit the primary economic driver.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“cash, you can't do anything with it. Digital cash can have an API. It can be a platform for new goods and services and new products and amazing new things which we can't think of, but people will invent, if that platform is there. So, certainly, in the Bank of England's calculations, the net benefit to the economy comes much more from the new products and services that are enabled, although there is a saving, much less from the saving side.”

0.52

Technologists have moved ahead of policy in digital currency discussion: once policymakers clarify what society wants, implementation is straightforward, but the constraint is determining societal preferences first rather than letting technology lead.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Birch

“Once Andrew and Tommaso and Harish have worked out what they want-- I mean, I'm using them as a proxy for society as a whole-- then you, Julie, would have no problem coming up with a working business model for that and I would have no problem coming up with the technological implementation that would do it. So, I think we've got ourselves into the situation where it's up to us to push that debate out to the wider audience. It shouldn't be people like us that are deciding how this works.”

0.52

Instead of creating fintech banking licenses as proposed, the US should adopt a national electronic money license equivalent to the EU's Electronic Money Institution or India's Payment Institution, which would establish a clearer regulatory pathway for financial innovation.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· David Birch

“instead of that sort of fintech banking license they were talking about, they really should've gone for a national electronic money license...The U.S. needs--...the equivalent of the EU's Electronic Money Institution or the Indian Payment Institution”

0.22

BIS Innovation Hub mission is to help shape the future of central banking through practical research into enabling technologies that make central banks more effective across CBDCs, cross-border payments, open banking, digital identity, and cyber resilience.

definitionspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Andrew McCormack

“Our mission is really to help shape the future of central banking through direct kind of practical research into enabling technologies that might make central banks more effective in their various roles, informing key policy areas in and around CBDCs but also just cross-border payments, open banking, digital identity, and cyber resilience”