
Entering A Seismic Shift In Private Markets | Bob Elliott
What this covers
This episode of Forward Guidance's "On the Margin" is a conversation between host Mike Ippolito and Bob Elliott, CIO of Unlimited (Organization)) and a former Bridgewater investment executive. It opens with an unusual detour, a paper on the economic organization of a P.O.W. camp, which Elliott uses to show how rationing leads to trade, prices, money supply effects and credit. From there he places the current inflation inside a Macroeconomic Cycle pattern. He calls it the second or third inning, with the Federal Reserve (The Fed)) only eight months into a tightening effort that typically runs two to three years. He also explains why the Fed tends to overshoot, since it steers on backward-looking inflation and unemployment data.
The middle of the conversation moves to portfolios and policy. Elliott argues the 60/40 portfolio was built for low, falling inflation, and that it is more than 90 percent correlated with equities over short horizons. He frames equities as uncertain bonds, so rising real rates hit long-duration stocks hardest. One contested claim is that the economy has restructured away from short-rate sensitivity, leaving the Fed with weaker tools just as inflation pressure peaks. The Arthur Burns episode comes up as a lesson about political pressure on central bankers.
The last stretch covers private markets. Elliott describes institutions moving into private equity and Venture capital after 2008 to avoid recognizing daily losses. He says GP discretion over marks, with no Price discovery, lets losses stay hidden until exits or failures force repricing. He calls this moment Peak Hope and says cheap money is gone, not just cyclically absent. He also criticizes SoftBank and Tiger Global for deploying capital irresponsibly. The FTX fallout then becomes a case study in unregulated innovation, weak due diligence on financial firms, and the centuries-old basics of segregating customer assets. He ends with expectations for 2023.
Bob Elliot argues that we are experiencing a textbook macroeconomic inflationary cycle where the Fed must slow the economy through multi-stage transmission mechanisms, and that private markets are fundamentally mispriced because they obscure losses that public markets immediately recognize through price discovery.
- The current cycle mirrors 1950s-70s dynamics: stimulus → tight labor markets → supply shocks → wage-price spiral → Fed tightening, which takes 2-3 years to fully play out
- Private asset valuations lack price discovery and rely on GP discretion, allowing losses to be hidden while public comps have already declined 80%, creating inevitable repricing
- The era of cheap money is genuinely over, not cyclically absent, so loss-making long-duration assets cannot be valued as they were under zero rates and QE
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The Federal Reserve looks at inflation and unemployment on a backward-looking basis and tunes monetary policy in response to those two indicators to meet its dual mandate; they will almost certainly overshoot because of this backward-looking dynamic, which is both a feature (if you understand it you can trade on it) and a bug (it is not forward-looking).
“the most important thing to recognize is what are the things that the FED looks at and how do they respond that's the only thing those are the only two things that matter I think it actually matters a lot more than for instance whatever Brainerd is saying versus somebody else versus somebody else that's all that's all noise relative to the thing that matters which is the Fed looks at on a backward looking basis inflation and unemployment”
The economic organization of a POW camp demonstrates fundamental macroeconomic dynamics: rationing creates trade, trade creates markets with price discovery, prices reflect money supply, inflation/deflation emerge as money supply cycles, and credit markets develop with borrowing based on temporal value of goods; the same dynamics recur time and again across different contexts.
“it's a it's an observational study about a person who is in A POW Camp who looked at how um what we sort of think of as macroeconomic Dynamics emerge and market dynamics emerged in the Pow Camp over the course of of uh you know the months and years that that people were there the key thing to to recognize is basically the income of the camp was that everyone got uh a set of rations from the red costs and I included some things that you might like and some things that you might not like and different people had different preferences um and that naturally created the dynamic where people started to trade with each other”
Crypto regulatory failures reflected both SEC failure to regulate and crypto community failure to accept baseline regulatory requirements that already exist across the broader financial system, and these regulatory protections exist not for systemic reasons but specifically to protect small-scale individual investors.
“you had a situation that was obviously radically uh under under regulated uh and not under regulated because I have some wish that everyone be regulated by the government but under regulated from the perspective of there were not the sort of basic consumer protections that exists when you invest in Banks or you invest in public market Securities or with a investment uh investment broker like there weren't there's reasons for the public good and for the good of the small scale investor this is not about the system this is the good of the small scale investor there are reasons why those regulatory constraints exist and why that regulation is in place and it's to protect the small-scale investor”
The basic mechanics of financial institutions (segregation of customer assets from firm assets, clear accounting of claims versus holdings, robust exchanges with proper clearing) are not modern or complex—they trace back centuries and are fundamental to preventing insolvency-style fraud.
“there are other exchanges that exist out there in the world you know Financial Market exchanges have existed for hundreds of years thousands of years um and there's a set of Dynamics a set of criteria various ways in which you know that an exchange is strong versus ways that you know that an exchange might have risks and I I think part of the conceptualization that was missed was not seeing that that's the form of thing that you had which was you had an exchange exchanges have certain forms and not coming over here and saying oh yes I it's not a technology play it's a financial market exchange and so things like um you know our you know can you very clearly tie a person's account to an asset that exists in that account in a first-class way you know those are the sorts of things that if you're uh a broker or an exchange or things like that you can't like that that's that's fundamental stuff that you have to have in place”
The reason people naturally move toward public markets with transparent pricing is not regulatory requirement but functional—there is 'real value for all involved to see and evaluate' the dynamics, reducing information asymmetry and improving outcomes.
“there's a reason why people move typically towards public markets with public marks in you know in a that is widely just the price of which is widely distributed it's because there's real value for all involved to see and evaluate that sort of dynamic not to mention the fact to be perfectly Frank with you that the regulatory considerations in public markets the regulatory infrastructure that exists in the US when it comes to public markets is radically better than what it is in private markets”
People love unregulated financial innovation until they want their money back, at which point they realize the lack of regulation was a mistake; this pattern holds across history (wildcat banks in the 19th century), and crypto is the latest version of this cycle.
“people love unregulated Financial Innovation until they want their money back like that's that's the way it works right yeah yeah people love wildcat banks in the in the 19th century until they wanted their money back and the Wildcat fans were like now sorry you don't have your money don't have that anymore right”
Institutional investors moved heavily into private assets (private equity and venture capital) following the 2008 financial crisis because the experience of stocks falling by two-thirds was unpleasant and private assets offered smoother volatility and a way to avoid recognizing daily losses.
“many institutional investors have uh see private assets as a way to not have to put up with the sort of volatility that they saw that they see and experience in uh in the public markets and you know I think private investment private equity and Venture Capital has been around for a long time I think in particular started to Boom following the financial crisis for a couple of different reasons one the financial crisis was not a pleasant experience for people holding Public Market Securities and seeing you know stock stocks Fall by two-thirds right that was a pretty unpleasant uh outcome for them”
Private assets eventually get repriced downward through two mechanisms: exits (whenever they occur, priced at whatever the market dictates) and business failure (when companies are no longer ongoing concerns and must be marked to zero).
“eventually what's going to happen is that um is that there's either going to be exits and that'll be priced however it's priced but you know if you invested in something in in 2020 or something like that like you know your exit could be 12 years later right you know yeah right yeah I think the other way typically and this is what you saw in the in the 2000 cycle is when the businesses are no longer an ongoing concern that then they do get marked to zero because you can't you know like like that's it it's over”
The easy money from the period of ultra-low rates has a long duration because households refinanced into 2 percent mortgages, businesses locked in low long-term debt, and those obligations persist for years, meaning the experience of easy money is still present in the economy today despite Fed tightening beginning in February 2022.
“part of the reason why this cycle is going to go slow is because the easy money wasn't that long ago right like all the household every household basically refined into a two percent mortgage or close to it every business basically refinance their their debt obligations pushed out maturities locked in low rates for a long time like the easy the experience of easy money is still with us today every time someone pays a two percent yield on their mortgage that's the easy money that is still there and it has a long you know it lives for a long time”
A 60/40 portfolio of stocks and bonds does not actually provide meaningful diversification because bonds are much lower volatility than equities, so even a 70/30 or 60/40 allocation is 90+ percent correlated with equity markets over 1-3-6 month timeframes, meaning most investors hold concentrated equity risk.
“by and large most investors basically only have Equity risk and the reason why that is is because bonds have much lower volatility than equities do and so even if the capital allocation is 70 30 or 60 40 you basically have a portfolio that's 90 plus percent correlated with Equity markets over the course of you know a one three six month time frame”
The 60/40 portfolio was built for an environment of low and falling inflation; in 2022 we experienced the biggest upside inflation outcome relative to expectations in 30-40 years, which is why both stocks and bonds fell significantly, hitting bonds particularly hard and demonstrating that 60/40 is poorly positioned for inflationary dynamics.
“the biggest upside inflation outcome upside relative to expectations inflation outcome than we've seen in 30 or 40 years and so it's not surprising that the 60 40 portfolio hasn't done very well because basically the 60 40 portfolio is up that on low and falling inflation um and that's you know at its core that's basically what happened this year”
Equities are like uncertain bonds in that earnings function as a coupon discounted by the prevailing discount rate; in inflationary cycles real rates rise, which discounts future earnings more heavily, causing equity prices to fall particularly for long-duration stocks with earnings far in the future.
“when you think about stocks you know the all stocks are are an uncertain Bond think about it that way in the sense of you're getting an earnings which is like your coupon and it that those earnings are being discounted by uh the prevailing discount rate and so when you have an inflationary Dynamic what you see is you see the prevailing discount rate rise real rates rise in particular which causes future cash flows to be discounted more heavily uh and as a result cause a depression in price”
Unprecedented monetary stimulation and very low interest rates created an environment where low-cost-of-capital liquidity could be channeled into long-dated cash flow assets, allowing GPs to fund negative cash flow companies and launcher volatility through the J-curve without marking losses, making venture capital the perfect asset given institutional investor preferences and macro conditions.
“we also entered an environment of unprecedented monetary stimulation and very low interest rates and what that did is it created a lot of liquidity that could uh it both create a lot of liquidity so there's a lot of ability to borrow uh and borrow meaning like issue stock issue bonds borrow in all sorts of different ways to fund uh companies that were not positive cash flow earning in order to basically fill that Gap and then on top of it what it did is it lowered interest rates which created a circumstance where your your cost of capital or your needed return on Capital was very low relative to the amount of liquidity that was out in the system and what you could do is you could basically take a lot of that liquidity Channel it into something that had very long dated cash flows that could you know live through the J curve much longer because there's a lot of liquidity to help Finance the J curve buy a lot of lottery tickets and be able to launder the volatility where you didn't actually have to recognize you know the zeros that you necessarily put up on the board”
Private asset valuations are completely at the discretion of GPs and not independently triangulated like public market assets; GPs can choose when to mark them, what comparables to use, and can justify holding capital raised at a higher price even if it was distressed, creating ultimate ambiguity about the actual value of private assets.
“the short answer is that they get marked whenever the general partner wants to mark them uh and at whatever valuation the general partner wants to Value them at and I and I say that um in a way that could come across as being like tongue-in-cheek and kind of you know snarky but but that is the reality which is that anytime you see those valuations they're not a function of price just market price Discovery they're a function of what the GPS are telling you I think that's really important to recognize”
Private market investors benefit from the ability to not recognize losses because they don't want their constituents (in public funds) or clients calling to complain about value declines; this smoothing through cycles allows investors to avoid scrutiny that public market investors face daily, creating a perverse incentive to hide problems.
“if what you are is an Institutional Investor or run a family office or or or Ria and what you don't want to have is people calling you up and complaining you know calling you up either like your constituents if you're on a public fund or or the family or your clients you really don't want them to call you up and start complaining about why did you invest in this thing that went up or you know it's fine if it goes up this thing that went down right and part of the benefit of the private Market world is that you can smooth through those things and not really recognize when there is a problem”
Financial institutions require a different type of due diligence, expertise, and investigation than technology or healthcare companies; most venture investors and institutional allocators lack significant experience investing in or operating financial firms, causing them to miss key due diligence questions when framing financial investments as technology plays.
“there is a lot of expertise in areas like technology or Healthcare or my previous work in consumer in consumer um as a combination of you know as investors and operators of those sorts of companies and that um that expertise is not the same as expertise in a financial institution that's a very different it's a very different type of medicine and that if you look at the typical investors the the whether it's the allocators at the big institutional you know funds um or or the Venture Capital allocators very few have significant experience wanting or or operating or investing in financial firms and financial firms are very different uh in terms of the types of uh the types of due diligence you would need to run the types of questions you would need to ask”
Investors at SoftBank and Tiger Global recognized that moving large capital into venture markets generated fees that justified deploying more capital (moving $20 billion to deploy another $20 billion), creating perverse incentives where the thing that earned them capital was irresponsible capital deployment rather than prudent returns management.
“they were very uh I mean I think look I I think that at a at a a big picture level yes they were very smart and the way in which they were very smart is they recognized that the thing that was going to earn them Capital over time earn them like earn the fees over time was not carefully and prudently managing the portfolio to carefully you know allocate sums and hold back during uh during the boom environment like what they recognized is if they could move 20 billion dollars into the Venture Capital markets then they could call up their friends again and move another 20 billion dollars right and it's investing like that's what they recognized is that all the incentives were aligned for them to behave irresponsibly right”
Macroeconomic cycles are slow; many investors only know V-shaped crises (2008 or 2020) and then forget the grinding 2-3 year period of decline that follows; we are currently in the early-to-middle stages of a slow-moving slog that could take years to fully play out, requiring discipline to preserve capital through uncertainty rather than betting on a V-shaped recovery.
“the most important thing to recognize is that um it is that macroeconomic Cycles are really slow and like most of us who have uh have sort of cut our teeth in the investing world either you know many the vast you know a big chunk of folks only really know the 2020 recession which wasn't even really recession it's like kind of uh an extraordinary unusual circumstance or they know that experience plus the 08 Dynamic which you know banking crisis is uh is a sort of Once In A Hundred Year type uh experience until you sort of only know these sort of v-shaped uh Dynamics you know where you have a crisis and then the FED stimulates and you rebound”
We are in the second or third inning of a typical inflationary macroeconomic cycle that began with fiscal and monetary stimulus brushing up against capacity, combined with supply shocks (COVID and commodity-related to the war), which created significant input and goods price rises, followed by wage growth reinforcement as workers sought higher compensation in a tight labor market, and the Fed is only 8 months into a typical 2-3 year tightening cycle.
“we're sort of in the second or third inning of that which is we have the inflationary cycle we have the rising prices we have the reasonably elevated level of output we have the tightening and response but that's really only been going for about you know uh I mean less than nine months eight months right”
Many loss-producing venture-backed businesses accumulated capital during good times and were running large deficits; when capital became scarce, they cut jobs and tightened spending, delaying the inevitable: eventually they will need to raise capital again or go bankrupt, at which point they will become non-ongoing concerns.
“they had a lot of capital built up during the good times they were running big deficits you started to see a circumstance where um where things were started to to tighten up but recognition that there was no longer going to be easy capital in the future when that happened many of them you know cut jobs to some extent tightened up their their outlays and are basically in a circumstance where they're running much smaller you know financing needs than they had before that sort of delayed the inevitable which is at some point they're going to have to start raising Capital again or they're going to go bankrupt”
Public market exchanges, public market securities, and public market regulatory infrastructure (SEC filings, Big Four audits, K's and Q's, rigorous examination) are radically better than private market infrastructure, making it hard to believe the problems seen in crypto would have occurred in fully publicly traded, audited, SEC-regulated securities.
“the regulatory considerations in public markets the regulatory infrastructure that exists in the US when it comes to public markets is radically better than what it is in private markets like there you know if if it's hard for me to believe that you could have the sort of problems that you've seen in the crypto space if those were you know fully publicly traded Securities that were that required audits from a big you know Big Four auditing firm that had to file SEC you know uh K's and q's that were looked at and examined in the level of rigorousness that the public market Equity investors are you know examine things like that's one of the benefits like you you Public Market exchanges Public Market Securities Public Market regular regulation like if anything that's what we're seeing is a win a win for the investor from public markets relative to private markets”
The US economy has restructured away from short-end interest rate sensitivity over the last 15 years since the financial crisis, which means the Fed now has reduced ability to control inflation through interest rate rises, creating a situation where we have the highest inflationary pressures in a long time and the weakest ability to control them, likely resulting in one of the longest and hardest cycles the Fed has faced in 50 years.
“meaningfully restructured in the U.S context restructured the economy away from short-end sensitivity over the course of the last 15 years since the financial crisis and so yeah it you know it sounds crazy that that you know the easy money was just eight months ago and that really but it was it was just eight months ago like that's how far in we are into this process”
We are at peak hope in private markets; the typical smoothing strategy is to hold onto investments hoping for recovery over 3-4 years, but we are not in a cyclical environment for those assets—we went from the easiest monetary conditions in modern history to a period where cheap money is over, meaning loss-making long-duration assets will be fundamentally repriced and cannot achieve the valuations they had under zero rates and QE.
“we're right at the at it's called Peak hope like what's what's happening right now is typically what you're trying to do is smooth through a cycle right and hope that you're gonna get a positive outcome on the back end right either the companies themselves will recover or asset valuations will recover and you and you hope over the course of three or four years that eventually what happens is you bring your evaluations down a little bit and the reality starts to converge back and then you get back onto this long-term positive cycle well in an environment the the problem is the problem is we're not in a cyclical environment for those assets right now where we just happen to have a bit of weakness”
Arthur Burns initially raised interest rates to the highest they had been in a long time, earning a reputation as an inflation fighter, but then faced enormous political pressure and eventually reversed course, allowing inflation to persist; Powell was in the room for Burns' speech about his mistakes and learned the lesson that political pressure is a real constraint on Fed action.
“Arthur Burns initially was viewed as a fighter of inflation he hiked up interest rates right initially much higher than you know he had this perception he brought interest rates to the highest they had been you know since since a long time before right yeah exactly and and there's an enormous amount of political pressure right because his interest rates rise this macroeconomic cycle that you detailed before goes into effect and when you're raising rates it's not good for people it's painful people get let go from their jobs companies start to suffer and it's like hey why are we why are we doing all this stuff and I think you know he tried to see through he gave this he gave this speech that Powell was in the in the room for”
Loss-producing tech companies in public markets are down 80 percent while the Cambridge Associates Venture Capital index is down only 10 percent; in reality, venture-backed companies are probably down much closer to 80 percent, but investors see the smooth 10 percent mark because they don't have real price discovery.
“loss producing or loss producing tech companies and the public markets are down 80 percent the Cambridge Associates uh Venture Capital index is down 10 okay like one of those two things you know what what's the reality well you know if I had to if I had to bet I'd say probably a lot closer to down 80 than down 10 and even when you go talk to people who are actually operators in these businesses what they'll tell you is that it's down 80 not down 10 percent but that's not what investors are getting they see this very nice smooth thing where you know where they don't have to worry about”
The 2-and-20 fee structure (2% management fee + 20% of profits) is problematic for investors because while managers are skilled at generating returns, they are equally skilled at charging high fees that leave investors no better off than they would be with lower-fee alternatives.
“while the managers are pretty good at generating high quality returns they're also pretty good at charging pretty high fees which leave investors not much better off than what they would be otherwise”
Bob Elliot left Bridgewater Associates after nearly 15 years where he was on the investment committee, created many strategies across asset classes (especially in the flagship Pure Alpha fund), and ran Ray Dalio's personal investment research team for more than a decade, working on various publications.
“my my career is really 20 years is a systematic investor I was at Bridgewater Associates for uh for almost 15 years where uh I was uh part of uh the investment Committee created many of the uh strategies creative strategies across all the wide range of asset classes many of which were in uh the flagships your Alpha fund and then also uh ran Ray dalio's personal investment research team for more than a decade as well”
After leaving Bridgewater, Elliot moved to the private side of the 2 and 20 space, ran a $125 million venture book systematically identifying high-potential early-stage consumer opportunities using big data, and realized that 2 and 20 asset managers charge high fees that leave investors not much better off than doing passive indexing.
“bran went over to the private side of the 2 and 20 space ran a 125 million dollar Venture book which systematically identified high potential early stage consumer opportunities you could think about systemization but in the private side of the two and twenty space uh using big data which is very relevant in the consumer space but increasingly in my sort of later years at Bridgewater as well as my time over on the private side of the 2 and 20 space it increasingly became obvious to me that 2 in 20 asset managers uh it's really good for the manager and not so good for the investor”
Institutional investors' experience with private markets will eventually lead to demand for more accurate real-time valuations and less capital lock-up; over 20 years, private markets will either look more like public markets with obvious valuations or people will increasingly recognize the value of public markets due to superior regulatory infrastructure.
“over time I think people will start to to ask and demand for more accurate assessments of the valuation I think they'll ask and demand for you know Capital not to be locked up the way that it is like all of these things are basically like they're they're hiding what is embedded meaningful losses and so in the same way you saw I think public private Market investing become you know a really attractive uh fad uh over the course of the last 20 years or so you know probably 20 by 20 years from now will uh either either you know probably in part the private markets will look a lot more like the public markets in the sense of the valuations will be more obvious to people more in real time and I think people will more increasingly recognize the value of the public markets”
The Fed has a suite of tools and can intervene if there is a violent sell-off in treasury markets; while the Fed has said this, the host believes them because the tools exist (even though others claim naively or delusionally).
“depending if there's some violent sell-off in the treasury market or something like that that causes the FED to step in sooner than they would than they would like to ultimately but they've kind of talked about that and the FED always they always will say something like this but they say they have this Suite of tools and I I get called I get called naive uh or a deep state plant when I say things like this but I kind of believe them I kind of believe that they can do that”
The unlimited funds hfnd ETF is designed to allow everyday investors access to hedge fund-style returns through a low-cost index structure (roughly one-quarter the fees and half the tax burden of traditional hedge fund LP positions).
“our first product is the hfnd ETF uh which is uh been out there for a couple of months now and available in all the main platforms and over time we'll build out a suite of different products uh tracking that 2 and 20 uh index uh outcomes including Venture Capital private equity and others”